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Dist. 3, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 3

Textus Latinus
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Quaestio II. Utrum Deus sit cognoscibilis per creaturas.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum Deus sit cognoscibilis per creaturas. Et quod non, videtur.

1. Quia via ad errorem non est via ad cognitionem; sed cognitio per creaturam est via erroris: ergo etc. Probatio minoris: Sapientiae decimo quarto1: Creaturae Dei sunt in deceptionem et in odium et in muscipulam pedibus insipientium. Praeterea, Augustinus de Libero Arbitrio2 loquitur de his, qui occupantur in creaturis: « Dorsum ad Te vertentes, in corporali opere tanquam in umbra sua defiguntur ».

2. Item, tenebra vel tenebrosum non est via ad cognoscendum luminosum sive lucem3; sed creatura est tenebra, Deus autem est lux: ergo Deus non est cognoscibilis per creaturam.

3. Item, medium, per quod cognoscitur aliquid vel probatur de extremo, debet communicare in aliquo cum eo ad quod cognoscendum est4; sed Creator et creatura nihil habent commune: ergo Deus non cognoscitur per creaturas.

4. Item, omne medium, per quod ascenditur ad extremum, distat ab illo gradibus finitis5; sed omnis creatura quantumcumque nobilis distat a Deo gradibus infinitis, quia quantumcumque duplicatur, nunquam perveniet ad eius nobilitatem: ergo per creaturam non ascenditur in cognitionem Dei.

Contra:

1. Sapientiae decimo tertio6: A magnitudine speciei et creaturae cognoscibiliter poterit Creator horum videri. Unde Isidorus de Summo bono7: « Ex pulcritudine circumscriptae creaturae pulcritudinem suam, quae circumscribi non potest, facit Deus intelligi ».

2. Item, ratione ostenditur sic: contingit non solum effectum cognosci per causam, sed etiam cau-

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sam per effectum8: ergo si Deus est causa operans secundum suam nobilitatem, et creatura effectus, poterit Deus cognosci per creaturam.

3. Item, sensibile est via cognoscendi intelligibile9; sed creatura sensibilis, Deus intelligibilis: ergo per creaturam est devenire in cognitionem Creatoris.

4. Item, contingit simile cognosci per simile10; sed omnis creatura est similis Deo vel sicut vestigium, vel sicut imago: ergo per omnem creaturam contingit cognosci Deum.

Quaeritur ergo, quae differentia sit inter vestigium et imaginem; et cum in omni creatura sit vestigium, quaeritur, quare non similiter imago, et secundum quid attendatur11 vestigium.

Conclusio.

Deus per creaturas naturali rationis lumine cognosci potest.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, quia relucet causa in effectu, et sapientia artificis manifestatur in opere, ideo Deus, qui est artifex et causa creaturae, per ipsam cognoscitur.

Et ad hoc duplex est ratio, una est propter convenientiam, alia propter indigentiam: propter convenientiam, quia omnis creatura magis ducit in Deum quam in aliquod aliud; propter indigentiam, quia, cum Deus tanquam lux summe spiritualis non possit cognosci in sua spiritualitate ab intellectu quasi materiali, indiget anima cognoscere ipsum per creaturam12.

Ad argumenta:

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod cognitio creaturae est via in errorem; dicendum, quod dupliciter est cognoscere creaturam: vel quantum ad proprietates speciales et13 quae sunt imperfectionis, vel quantum ad conditiones generales, quae sunt completionis; si autem quantum ad speciales conditiones et imperfectionis: aut attribuendo Deo, aut removendo. Primo modo est via erroris, secundo modo via cognitionis; et sic cognoscitur Deus per ablationem.

Si autem cognoscatur quoad conditiones perfectionis, sic potest esse dupliciter, sicut pictura dupliciter cognoscitur: aut sicut pictura, aut sicut imago; unde aut sistitur in pulcritudine creaturae, aut per illam tenditur in aliud. Si primo modo, tunc est via deviationis; unde Augustinus in libro de Libero Arbitrio14: « Vae his qui nutus tuos pro Te amant et oberrant in vestigiis tuis et derelinquunt Te ducem ». Si secundo modo, prout est via in aliud, sic est ratio cognoscendi per superexcellentiam, quia omnis proprietas nobilis in creatura Deo est attribuenda in summo; et sic patet illud15.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tenebrosum medium non est via cognoscendi lucem; dicendum, quod est oculus bene dispositus et oculus lippus. De oculo bene disposito verum est, sed non de lippo, cui nubes obtegens vel terra suscipiens luminis claritatem est medium videndi solem; sic intellectui nostro, qui se habet sicut oculus noctuae ad manifestissima naturae16.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de defectu communitatis, dicendum, quod17 non est commune per univocationem, tamen est commune per analogiam, quae dicit habitudinem duorum ad duo, ut in nauta et doctore, vel unius ad unum, ut exemplaris ad exemplatum.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod semper sunt infiniti gradus; dicendum, quod ascensus in Deum potest esse dupliciter: aut quantum ad aspectum praesentiae; et sic quaelibet creatura nata est ducere in Deum, nec sic sunt infiniti gradus; aut quantum ad aequalitatem aequiparantiae; et sic verum est, quod sunt infiniti, quia bonum creatum, quantum-

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cumque duplicatum, nunquam aequiparatur increato.

Primus autem gradus quantum ad ascensum ad aspectum praesentiae est in consideratione visibilium, secundus in consideratione invisibilium, ut animae vel alterius substantiae spiritualis; tertius est ab anima in Deum, quia « imago ab ipsa veritate formatur et Deo immediate coniungitur »18.

Ad illud quod ultimo quaeritur de differentia vestigii et imaginis, quidam assignant19, quod vestigium est in sensibilibus, imago in spiritualibus. Sed ista distinctio et positio non valet, quia vestigium est etiam in spiritualibus. Nam unitas, veritas, bonitas, in quibus consistit vestigium, sunt conditiones maxime universales et intelligibiles.

Alii20 dicunt, quod vestigium dicitur, quia repraesentat secundum partem, sed imago secundum totum. Sed haec iterum differentia non valet, quia, cum Deus sit simplex, non habet repraesentans secundum partem; cum iterum sit infinitus, a nulla omnino creatura, etiam a toto mundo non potest repraesentari secundum totum.

Et ideo intelligendum, quod cum creatura ducat in cognitionem Dei per modum umbrae21, per modum vestigii et per modum imaginis, differentia eorum notior, a qua etiam denominatur, accipitur penes modum repraesentandi. Nam umbra dicitur, in quantum repraesentat in quadam elongatione et confusione; vestigium, in quantum in22 elongatione, sed distinctione; imago vero, in quantum in propinquitate et distinctione.

Ex hac differentia colligitur secunda, quae est penes conditiones, in quibus attenduntur haec. Nam creaturae dicuntur umbra quantum ad proprietates, quae respiciunt Deum in aliquo genere causae23 secundum rationem indeterminatam; vestigium quantum ad proprietatem, quae respicit Deum sub ratione triplicis causae, efficientis, formalis24 et finalis, sicut sunt unum, verum et bonum; imago quantum ad conditiones, quae respiciunt Deum non tantum in ratione causae, sed et obiecti, quae sunt memoria, intelligentia et voluntas.

Ex his concluduntur aliae duae differentiae: quantum ad ea ad quae ducunt; nam creatura ut umbra ducit ad cognitionem communium, ut communia; vestigium in cognitionem communium, ut appropriata; imago ad cognitionem propriorum, ut propria25.

Alia differentia est penes ea in quibus reperiuntur. Quoniam enim omnis creatura comparatur ad Deum et26 in ratione causae et in ratione triplicis causae, ideo omnis creatura est umbra vel vestigium. Sed quoniam sola rationalis creatura comparatur ad Deum ut obiectum, quia sola est capax Dei per cognitionem et amorem: ideo sola est imago.

Scholion

I. Deum non immediate in se nec a priori a viatoribus cognosci, sed per ea quae ab ipso facta sunt, post Concilium Vaticanum (de Fide can. 1. de Revelatione) in dubium vocari nequit. Hic canon: Si quis dixerit, Deum unum et verum, Creatorem et Dominum nostrum, per ea quae facta sunt, naturali rationis humanae lumine certo cognosci non posse, a. s., omnino convenit cum doctrina Seraphici Doctoris. — In fine conclusionis iuxta textum a nobis reformatum intellectus humanus vocatur quasi materialis, quod intelligendum est in comparatione ad puram spiritualitatem divinam. In hoc sensu S. Bonav. (I. Sent. d. 37. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. ad 4.) dicit: Nam nihil est omnino spirituale, nisi solus Deus, sicut dicit Augustinus de Moribus Ecclesiae (vel potius Gennadius de Dogm. Eccles. c. 2.): Solus Deus est incorporeus, quia omnia replet.

II. Quod vestigium Trinitatis in omni creatura inveniatur, est sententia communis. Omnis enim creatura, quatenus habet in se unum esse, distinctum a quolibet alio, respicit Deum ut causam efficientem; quatenus habet verum esse, respicit ipsum ut causam exemplarem; quatenus habet bonum esse, respicit eundem ut causam finalem. — Differentiam inter imaginem et vestigium non omnes eodem modo assignant. S. Doctor, ut ex textu apparet, quadruplicem dat differentiam, cui S. Thomas aliam adiungit (S. I. q. 45. a. 7.). Scotus autem contra verba S. Thomae aliquas difficultates affert (hic q. 3.). De hac doctrina cfr. ipse S. Doctor, hic dub. 3; II. Sent. d. 38. a. 2. q. 1; Breviloq. p. II. c. 1. 12; Hexaem. Serm. 12. — Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 8. per totam et q. 7. m. 7; p. I. q. 18. m. 1. 8. — Scot., hic q. 5. 9. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1. 2. 3; S. I. q. 45. a. 7. — B. Albert., hic a. 14. 18. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 2. — Durand., hic p. I. q. 4. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 4. 8. — Biel, hic q. 9.

III. Plura de hac quaestione: S. Bonav., II. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 2. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 2. m. 3. a. 1. 2. — Scot., hic q. 1. 2. 3. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3; S. c. Gent. c. 13. — B. Albert., hic a. 2. et 3; S. p. I. tr. 3. q. 15. n. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 1. q. 1. et a. 2. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., a. 24. q. 6. — Durand., hic a. 2. et 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Biel sicut in praec. quaest.

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English Translation

Question II. Whether God is knowable through creatures.

Secondly it is asked, whether God is knowable through creatures. And it seems that he is not.

1. Because a way to error is not a way to knowledge; but knowledge through a creature is a way of error: therefore etc. Proof of the minor: Wisdom 141: The creatures of God are made for deception and for hatred and for a snare to the feet of the foolish. Likewise, Augustine On Free Choice2 speaks of those who are occupied with creatures: "Turning their backs to Thee, they are fixed in bodily work as in their own shadow."

2. Likewise, darkness or what is dark is not a way to knowing the luminous or light3; but a creature is darkness, while God is light: therefore God is not knowable through a creature.

3. Likewise, the middle term, through which something is known or proved concerning an extreme, must share in something with that which is to be known4; but Creator and creature have nothing in common: therefore God is not known through creatures.

4. Likewise, every middle by which one ascends to an extreme is distant from it by finite degrees5; but every creature, however noble, is distant from God by infinite degrees, because however much it be doubled, it will never arrive at his nobility: therefore through a creature one does not ascend to the knowledge of God.

On the contrary:

1. Wisdom 136: From the greatness of the beauty and of the creature, the Creator of these can knowably be seen. Whence Isidore On the Highest Good7: "From the beauty of the circumscribed creature, God makes his own beauty, which cannot be circumscribed, to be understood."

2. Likewise, by reason it is shown thus: it happens that not only is the effect known through the cause, but also the cause through the effect8: therefore if God is the cause operating according to his nobility, and the creature the effect, God can be known through the creature.

3. Likewise, the sensible is the way of knowing the intelligible9; but the creature is sensible, God intelligible: therefore through the creature one arrives at the knowledge of the Creator.

4. Likewise, it happens that like is known through like10; but every creature is like God either as a vestige, or as an image: therefore through every creature it happens that God is known.

It is asked therefore what difference there is between vestige and image; and since in every creature there is a vestige, it is asked why not likewise an image, and according to what the vestige is to be attended to11.

Conclusion.

God can be known through creatures by the natural light of reason.

I respond: It must be said that, because the cause shines forth in the effect, and the wisdom of the artisan is manifested in the work, therefore God, who is the artisan and the cause of the creature, is known through it.

And for this there is a twofold reason, one is on account of fittingness, the other on account of need: on account of fittingness, because every creature leads more to God than to anything else; on account of need, because, since God as supremely spiritual light cannot be known in his spirituality by an intellect that is, as it were, material, the soul needs to know him through a creature12.

Replies:

1. To that which is objected, that the knowledge of a creature is a way to error; it must be said that it is twofold to know a creature: either as to its special properties and13 those which are of imperfection, or as to its general conditions, which are of completion; if, however, as to its special and imperfect conditions: either by attributing them to God, or by removing them. In the first way it is a way of error, in the second way a way of knowledge; and so God is known by way of removal.

If, however, it be known as to the conditions of perfection, this can be in two ways, just as a picture is known in two ways: either as a picture, or as an image; whence either one halts in the beauty of the creature, or through it one is borne to another. If in the first way, then it is a way of deviation; whence Augustine in the book On Free Choice14: "Woe to those who love thy signs in place of Thee, and wander among thy traces and forsake Thee as leader." If in the second way, insofar as it is a way to another, then this is the manner of knowing by way of supereminence, because every noble property in a creature is to be attributed to God in the highest degree; and so that is clear15.

2. To that which is objected, that a dark middle is not a way of knowing light; it must be said that there is the well-disposed eye and the bleared eye. Of the well-disposed eye it is true, but not of the bleared, for which the cloud covering or the earth receiving the brightness of light is a means of seeing the sun; so it is for our intellect, which is related as the eye of the owl to the most manifest things of nature16.

3. To that which is objected concerning the defect of community, it must be said that17 it is not common by univocation, yet it is common by analogy, which expresses the relation of two to two, as in the sailor and the teacher, or of one to one, as of exemplar to exemplate.

4. To that which is objected, that there are always infinite degrees; it must be said that the ascent to God can be in two ways: either as to the aspect of presence; and thus every creature is fit to lead to God, nor are there in this way infinite degrees; or as to the equality of correspondence; and thus it is true that there are infinite, because the created good, however much doubled, is never made equal to the uncreated.

The first degree, however, of ascent to the aspect of presence is in the consideration of visible things, the second in the consideration of invisible things, such as the soul or another spiritual substance; the third is from the soul to God, because "the image is formed by Truth itself and is immediately joined to God"18.

To that which is finally asked concerning the difference of vestige and image, some assign19 that vestige is in sensible things, image in spiritual. But this distinction and position is not valid, because vestige is also in spiritual things. For unity, truth, goodness, in which vestige consists, are conditions most universal and intelligible.

Others20 say that vestige is so called because it represents according to a part, but image according to the whole. But again this difference is not valid, because, since God is simple, he does not have one representing him according to a part; since again he is infinite, by no creature at all, not even by the whole world, can he be represented according to the whole.

And therefore it must be understood that, since the creature leads into the knowledge of God by way of shadow21, by way of vestige, and by way of image, the better-known difference among them, from which they are also named, is taken according to the mode of representing. For shadow is so called inasmuch as it represents at a certain distance and in a certain confusion; vestige, inasmuch as in22 distance, but with distinction; image, however, inasmuch as in nearness and distinction.

From this difference a second is gathered, which is according to the conditions in which these are considered. For creatures are called shadow as to those properties which regard God in some genus of cause23 according to an indeterminate notion; vestige as to a property which regards God under the notion of a threefold cause — efficient, formal24, and final — as are one, true, and good; image as to those conditions which regard God not only under the notion of cause, but also of object, which are memory, understanding, and will.

From these are concluded two further differences: as to those things to which they lead; for the creature as shadow leads to the knowledge of common things as common; vestige to the knowledge of common things as appropriated; image to the knowledge of proper things as proper25.

Another difference is according to the things in which they are found. For since every creature is compared to God both26 under the notion of cause and under the notion of a threefold cause, therefore every creature is a shadow or a vestige. But since only the rational creature is compared to God as to an object, because it alone is capable of God through knowledge and love, therefore it alone is image.

Scholion

I. That God is not known immediately in himself nor a priori by wayfarers, but through the things which have been made by him, cannot, since the Vatican Council (On Faith, can. 1, On Revelation), be called into doubt. This canon: If anyone shall say that the one and true God, our Creator and Lord, cannot be known with certainty through the things which have been made, by the natural light of human reason, let him be anathema — entirely agrees with the doctrine of the Seraphic Doctor. — At the end of the conclusion, according to the text as we have restored it, the human intellect is called quasi materialis ("as it were material"), which is to be understood by comparison with the pure divine spirituality. In this sense S. Bonav. (I. Sent. d. 37, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, ad 4) says: For nothing is wholly spiritual save God alone, as Augustine says in On the Morals of the Church (or rather Gennadius, On Ecclesiastical Doctrines, c. 2): God alone is incorporeal, because he fills all things.

II. That the vestige of the Trinity is found in every creature is the common opinion. For every creature, insofar as it has in itself one being, distinct from any other, regards God as efficient cause; insofar as it has true being, regards him as exemplary cause; insofar as it has good being, regards the same as final cause. — Not all assign the difference between image and vestige in the same way. The Seraphic Doctor, as is evident from the text, gives a fourfold difference, to which St. Thomas adds another (S. I, q. 45, a. 7). Scotus, however, raises certain difficulties against the words of St. Thomas (here, q. 3). On this doctrine see the Seraphic Doctor himself, here dub. 3; II. Sent. d. 38, a. 2, q. 1; Breviloquium p. II, c. 1, 12; Hexaemeron Serm. 12. — Alex. of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 8 throughout, and q. 7, m. 7; p. I, q. 18, m. 1, 8. — Scotus, here q. 5, 9. — St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 1, 2, 3; S. I, q. 45, a. 7. — B. Albert, here a. 14, 18. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3, q. 2. — Durandus, here p. I, q. 4. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 4, 8. — Biel, here q. 9.

III. Further on this question: S. Bonav., II. Sent. d. 3, p. II, a. 2, q. 2. — Alex. of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 2, m. 3, a. 1, 2. — Scotus, here q. 1, 2, 3. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 3; Summa contra Gentiles c. 13. — B. Albert, here a. 2 and 3; Summa p. I, tr. 3, q. 15, n. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 1, q. 1, and a. 2, q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, a. 24, q. 6. — Durandus, here a. 2 and 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1. — Biel as in the preceding question.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 11, ubi contra mss. et ed. 1 legit Vulgata: Quoniam creaturae Dei in odium factae sunt et in tentationem animabus hominum et in muscipulam etc. Cum hac lectione convenit Vat. eo excepto, quod habet deceptionem loco tentationem.
    Verse 11, where, against the manuscripts and ed. 1, the Vulgate reads: Since the creatures of God have been made for hatred and for a temptation to the souls of men and for a snare etc. With this reading the Vatican edition agrees, with the exception that it has deceptionem in place of tentationem.
  2. Libr. II. c. 16, n. 43: Tanquam enim dorsum ad Te ponentes in carnali opere velut in umbra sua defiguntur.
    Book II, c. 16, n. 43: For, as it were putting their back to Thee, they are fixed in carnal work as in their own shadow.
  3. Aristot., I. Poster. c. 21. (23.): In privativa autem negativa propositio universalis, affirmativa autem negativa prior et notior (per affirmativam enim negativa nota) et prior affirmativa est, sicut esse prius est non esse. Et III. de Anima, text. 25. (c. 6.) docet, privationes non cognosci nisi per contraria, scil. per cognitionem habitus. Cfr. etiam II. de Caelo, text. 18. (c. 3.).
    Aristotle, I. Posterior Analytics c. 21 (23): In a privative [proposition], moreover, the negative universal proposition, but the affirmative — the negative is prior and better known (for through the affirmative the negative is known) and the affirmative is prior, just as being is prior to non-being. And III. On the Soul, text 25 (c. 6) he teaches that privations are not known except through their contraries, namely through knowledge of the habit. Compare also II. On the Heavens, text 18 (c. 3).
  4. Aristot., I. Poster. c. 7: Nam ex eodem genere oportet esse extrema et media. Idem ait X. Metaph. text. 22. (IX. c. 7.). Et III. de Part. Animal. c. 1: Nam et medium particeps utriusque extremi est. — Extremum est nomen logicale significans subiectum vel praedicatum conclusionis, pro quorum nexu cognoscendo medium adhibitum vocatur terminus medius. — Vat. contra codd. et ed. 1 post cum eo minus bene omittit ad.
    Aristotle, I. Posterior Analytics c. 7: For the extremes and the middles must be of the same genus. He says the same in X. Metaphysics text 22 (IX, c. 7). And III. On the Parts of Animals c. 1: For the middle also is a participant in both extremes. — Extremum is a logical term signifying the subject or predicate of a conclusion, for the knowing of whose connection a medium is employed, called the middle term. — The Vatican edition, against the codices and ed. 1, after cum eo less aptly omits ad.
  5. Cfr. Aristot., I. Poster. c. 18. seqq. (c. 19. seqq.), ubi simile ostendit respectu ipsius demonstrationis. — Paulo infra ope mss. loco duplicetur, nunquam pervenitur substituimus duplicatur, nunquam perveniet; supple creatura. Cod. I propositionem maiorem formaliter melius exhibet Item nullum medium... gradibus infinitis. In conclusione plures codd. ut K T etc. ad loco in.
    Cf. Aristotle, I. Posterior Analytics c. 18 ff. (c. 19 ff.), where he shows the like with respect to demonstration itself. — A little below, on the authority of manuscripts, in place of duplicetur, nunquam pervenitur we have substituted duplicatur, nunquam perveniet; supply creatura. Codex I better exhibits the major proposition formally: Likewise, no middle... by infinite degrees. In the conclusion several codices, such as K, T, etc., have ad in place of in.
  6. Vers. 5.
    Verse 5.
  7. Sive Sentent. I. c. 4.
    Or Sentences I, c. 4.
  8. Vide Aristot., I. Poster. c. 10. (c. 13.) et II. Poster. c. 17. (c. 11.). — In hac propositione auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 addidimus etiam.
    See Aristotle, I. Posterior Analytics c. 10 (c. 13) and II. Posterior Analytics c. 17 (c. 11). — In this proposition, on the authority of the manuscripts and ed. 1, we have added etiam.
  9. Cfr. Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 39. (c. 8.): Formis sensibilibus innituntur intelligibilia... atque idcirco, qui nihil sentit, nihil discere vel comprehendere potest. — Mox post creatura et post Deus supple cum Vat. est.
    Cf. Aristotle, III. On the Soul, text 39 (c. 8): Intelligibles rest upon sensible forms... and therefore, he who senses nothing can learn or comprehend nothing. — Shortly after creatura and after Deus supply, with the Vatican edition, est.
  10. Aristot., VI. Topic. c. 1. (c. 2.) loquendo de metaphora ait: Nam metaphora quodammodo notum facit id quod significatur, propter (per) similitudinem. Ibidem et hanc definitionem imaginis, de qua S. Bonav. paulo infra agit, invenies: Nam imago id est, cuius generatio per imitationem est. Cfr. etiam II. Prior. c. 27. et 28. (29. et 30.), ubi Aristot. agit de icosibus (εἰκώς, i. e. simile, verisimile, consentaneum) et signis, quae si certissima sint, ab ipso indicia, (a Commentatoribus vestigia vel prodigia) nominantur; et Dionys., de Caelest. Hierarch. c. 1.
    Aristotle, VI. Topics c. 1 (c. 2), speaking of metaphor, says: For metaphor in a certain way makes known that which is signified, on account of (through) likeness. In the same place you will find this definition of image, of which S. Bonaventure treats a little below: For an image is that whose generation is by imitation. Compare also II. Prior Analytics c. 27 and 28 (29 and 30), where Aristotle treats of icosibus (εἰκώς, that is, like, likely, fitting) and signs, which, if they be most certain, he himself names indications, (and the Commentators, vestiges or prodigies); and Dionysius, On the Celestial Hierarchy c. 1.
  11. Vat. sibi non constans contra mss. et ed. 1 attenditur.
    The Vatican edition, inconsistent with itself, against the manuscripts and ed. 1 reads attenditur.
  12. Interpolatam et non aptam Vat. lectionem: quasi materiali luce indiget anima, ut cognoscat ipsum, scilicet per creaturam castigavimus ex mss. et ed. 1. Cod. O pro materiali habet naturaliter.
    We have corrected from the manuscripts and ed. 1 the interpolated and unapt Vatican reading: the soul needs, as it were, a material light, in order that it may know him, namely through a creature. Codex O has naturaliter in place of materiali.
  13. Ex fere omnibus mss. et ed. 1 hic et paulo infra post speciales conditiones addidimus et, pro quo cod. T primo loco habet id est, secundo loco quae sunt. Dein codd. O Z quantum ad proprietates generales et quae sunt. Mox mss. cum ed. 1 contra Vat. post si adiiciunt autem et post imperfectionis omittunt hoc est dupliciter.
    From nearly all the manuscripts and ed. 1, here and a little below after speciales conditiones we have added et, in place of which codex T has in the first instance id est, in the second quae sunt. Then codices O Z read quantum ad proprietates generales et quae sunt. Shortly after, the manuscripts with ed. 1, against the Vatican edition, add autem after si and after imperfectionis omit hoc est dupliciter.
  14. Lib. II. c. 16. n. 43.
    Book II, c. 16, n. 43.
  15. De triplici cognoscendi Deum via, scil. causalitatis, remotionis et superexcellentiae cfr. Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 6. et infra dub. 1.
    On the threefold way of knowing God, namely causality, remotion, and supereminence, cf. Dionysius, On the Divine Names c. 6, and below, dub. 1.
  16. Supple: tenebrosum (seu creatura) est medium cognoscendi lucem sive Deum. De comparatione intellectus cum oculo noctuae cfr. Aristot., II. Metaph. text. 1. (I. brevior, c. 1.): Sicut enim nocticoracum oculi ad lucem diei se habent, sic et animae nostrae intellectus ad ea quae sunt omnium naturae manifestissima (ed. Venet. 1489).
    Supply: The dark (or the creature) is the means of knowing light or God. On the comparison of the intellect with the eye of the owl cf. Aristotle, II. Metaphysics text 1 (the shorter I, c. 1): For just as the eyes of night-ravens are related to the light of day, so also the intellect of our soul is related to those things which are of all in nature the most manifest (Venice ed. 1489).
  17. Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 addit si. Paulo post pauci codd. ut X Y cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 non bene ductore pro doctore. Cfr. d. 23. a. 2. q. 1. in corp., ubi idem exemplum explicatur, et II. Sent. d. 16. a. 1. q. 1. in corp., ubi exemplum de nauta et auriga occurrit.
    The Vatican edition, against the trustworthiness of the manuscripts and ed. 1, adds si. A little after, a few codices such as X, Y with editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, not well, have ductore in place of doctore. Cf. d. 23, a. 2, q. 1 in the corpus, where the same example is explained, and II. Sent. d. 16, a. 1, q. 1 in the corpus, where the example of the sailor and the charioteer occurs.
  18. August., 83 QQ. q. 51. n. 2. dicit: Quare cum homo possit particeps esse secundum interiorem hominem, secundum ipsum ita est ad imaginem, ut nulla natura interposita formetur, et ideo nihil sit Deo coniunctius. Et auctor libri de Spiritu et anima, c. 11: Quae (mens) ita facta est ad imaginem Dei, ut nulla interposita natura ab ipsa veritate formetur.
    Augustine, 83 Questions, q. 51, n. 2, says: Wherefore, since man can be a participant according to the interior man, according to that same [interior man] he is so [made] to the image, that, no nature being interposed, he is formed [by it], and therefore nothing is more joined to God. And the author of the book On the Spirit and the Soul, c. 11: Which [mind] has been so made to the image of God that, no nature being interposed, it is formed by Truth itself.
  19. Addit Vat. claritatis gratia talem differentiam, quae tamen verba desunt in mss. et ed. 1.
    The Vatican edition adds, for the sake of clarity, talem differentiam, which words however are absent from the manuscripts and ed. 1.
  20. Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 addit autem. Paulo post plures codd. ut S V X bb omittunt differentia, pro quo ed. 1 habet distinctio.
    The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and ed. 1, adds autem. A little after, several codices such as S V X bb omit differentia, in place of which ed. 1 has distinctio.
  21. Vat. addit et, quod deest in mss.
    The Vatican edition adds et, which is absent in the manuscripts.
  22. Auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 hic et immediate post substituimus quantum in pro quadam. Mox cod. Q post sed addit cum.
    On the authority of the manuscripts and ed. 1, here and immediately after we have substituted quantum in in place of quadam. Shortly after, codex Q adds cum after sed.
  23. Ope mss. et ed. 1 expunximus hic a Vat. additum causae.
    With the help of the manuscripts and ed. 1 we have expunged here the causae added by the Vatican edition.
  24. Intellige de causa formali extrinseca sive de exemplari, non de causa formali intrinseca. Cfr. infra d. 8. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. ad 2.
    Understand of the extrinsic formal cause, or of the exemplar, not of the intrinsic formal cause. Cf. below, d. 8, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, ad 2.
  25. Iuxta sententiam communem attributa divina distinguuntur in communia ut communia sive communia simpliciter, quae sunt essentialia, ut esse, vivere, intelligere; communia ut appropriata, quae sunt illa essentialia, quae nos uni personae prae alia tribuimus, ut potentiam Patri, sapientiam Filio, bonitatem Spiritui sancto; propria sunt paternitas, filiatio et spiratio.
    According to the common opinion, the divine attributes are distinguished into common as common or common simply, which are essential, as being, living, understanding; common as appropriated, which are those essentials which we attribute to one person rather than to another, as power to the Father, wisdom to the Son, goodness to the Holy Spirit; the proper are paternity, filiation, and spiration.
  26. Supplevimus ex plurimis codd. et ed. 1 particulam et, qua distinctior redditur lectio. Paulo post cod. Z loco vel bene ponit et.
    We have supplied from very many codices and ed. 1 the particle et, by which the reading is rendered more distinct. A little after, codex Z well puts et in place of vel.
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