Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 2, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 2

Textus Latinus

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Articulus I. De natura assumta quantum ad unionis congruitatem.

Quaestio I. Utrum maior sit congruitas ad unionem in rationali creatura quam in toto universo.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum maior sit congruitas in rationali natura quam in toto universo, an e contrario. Et quod maior sit congruitas in rationali natura, videtur:

1. Primo, quia Deus assumsit solam rationalem naturam: si ergo Deus semper facit quod melius est et magis congruum, videtur, quod maior sit congruitas in rationali natura quam in tota machina mundana.

2. Item, natura creata assumta est in unitatem personae; et quod magis idoneum est ad unitatem personalem, magis idoneum est ad assumtionem: si ergo dignitas personalis non est nisi in creatura rationali¹, videtur, quod illam solam maxime congruum sit uniri.

3. Item, unionis gratia maior est, quam sit gratia fruitionis vel beatificationis²; sed sola natura rationalis est disposita ad fruitionem: ergo sola videtur quod habeat congruentiam ad unionem.

4. Item, totum universum factum est propter creaturam rationalem³: ergo rationalis creatura excellentior est omnibus aliis, quae sunt de constitutione universi: ergo ad Deum magis accedit; et quod magis ad Deum accedit magis est congruum Deo uniri: ergo etc.

5. Item, universum totum non dicitur factum ad Dei imaginem et similitudinem, sed sola rationalis creatura; sed imago dicit similitudinem expressam: ergo inter omnes creaturas sola rationalis creatura expressius assimilatur Deo⁴. Sed illud solum est congruum ad unionem cum Deo, quod habet expressam similitudinem cum eo: ergo idem quod prius.

Sed contra:

1. Augustinus ad Volusianum⁵: « In rebus mirabilibus tota ratio facti est potentia facientis »: ergo cum incarnatio sit assumtio creaturae et sit opus mirabile, videtur, quod tota ratio assumtionis sit ex parte facientis: ergo non est maior congruitas in rationali natura quam in alia natura creata.

2. Item, infinite distantium non magis approximat unum quam alterum; sed omnis creatura distat a divina natura in infinitum: ergo non est congruitas in rationali creatura magis quam in aliis⁶.

3. Item, incarnatio facit aliquo modo ad complementum totius universi⁷; sed magis perficeretur universum, si Deus uniretur ipsi toti quam ipsi parti: ergo videtur, quod magis sit habilis ad unionem universitas tota quam rationalis creatura.

4. Item, effectus universalis magis assimilatur causae universali quam effectus particularis⁸; sed universum claudit in se universaliter omnem effectum Dei: ergo magis assimilatur Deo quam rationalis natura. Sed quod magis assimilatur Deo maiorem habet congruentiam ad unionem: ergo etc.

5. Item, illud est magis unibile, in cuius assumtione magis manifestatur divina potentia, sapientia et bonitas; sed universum est huiusmodi. Probatio minoris: magis enim manifestatur divina potentia, sapientia et bonitas in conditione totius universitatis quam alicuius eius partis, quia, cum quaelibet pars eius sit bona, eius universum est non solum bonum, sed etiam valde bonum⁹: ergo si magis manifestatur in universitatis conditione, multo magis videtur, quod manifestetur in universitatis assumtione.

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Conclusio.

Non est tanta congruitas ad unionem in tota universitate, sicut est in eius parte aliqua, scilicet rationali creatura.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod non est tanta nobilitas¹⁰ ad unionem in tota universitate, sicut est in eius parte aliqua, utpote in rationali natura.

Et ratio huius est defectus unitatis, et personalis dignitatis, et similitudinis sive conformitatis, qui quidem reperitur¹¹ in tota universitate; et propterea non est idonea ad unionem cum persona divina, sicut rationalis creatura. — Universum enim habet partium multitudinem differentium numero, genere et specie; et ideo non competit ad unionem cum Deo in hypostasis unitate¹². — Habet etiam partes carentes vita et ratione et sensu, et ideo deficientes ab excellentia proprietatis personalis, et propter hoc non habet idoneitatem ad unionem in unitate personae. — Habet etiam partes, in quibus reperitur solum ratio vestigii, et ideo deficientes a conformitate expressae similitudinis, et propterea ineptas ad tantam excellentiam unionis. — In rationali autem creatura reperiri potest unitas, et personalis dignitas, et expressa conformitas; et ideo maior est in ea ad assumtionem idoneitas sive congruitas. — Et propterea rationes, quae hoc ostendunt, concedendae sunt.

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur de verbo Augustini, quod tota ratio facti est potentia facientis; dicendum, quod est ratio causalitatis et ratio congruitatis: causalitatis in efficiendo, congruitatis in suscipiendo. Cum ergo dicit Augustinus, quod ratio facti tota est potentia facientis, intelligit de ratione causalitatis, non de ratione congruitatis.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de infinitate distantium, dicendum, quod sicut habitum est in primo et secundo¹³, cum dicitur, quod omnis creatura distat a Deo in infinitum, intelligitur de distantia per recessum ab aequalitate et participatione tertiae naturae, quia nihil univocum est creaturae ad Creatorem, in nullo etiam creatura Creatori potest aequari; sed non habet veritatem de distantia, quae attenditur per oppositionem¹⁴ ad convenientiam secundum rationem ordinis et imitationis. Nam rationalis creatura immediate in Deum ordinatur et expressissime inter creaturas Deum imitatur; et ratione huius assimilationis et convenientiae habet rationem imaginis et congruitatem respectu divinae unionis.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod incarnatio¹⁵ facit ad completionem universi; dicendum, quod hoc accidit; nihilominus tamen congruentius facit ad complementum universi in assumtione nobilissimae creaturae quam omnium; quoniam multitudo habet reduci ad aliquod unum sicut ad complementum, quia status est in unitate magis quam in multitudine¹⁶. — Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod magis assimilatur universum totum¹⁷ quam rationalis creatura; dicendum, quod assimilari dicitur dupliciter: intensive vel extensive. Et extensive verum est, quod magis assimilatur mundo archetypo sive Deo maior mundus quam minor, sive universitas tota quam rationalis creatura. Qualitative sive intensive est e converso propter magnam distantiam aliquarum partium eius, in quibus relucet divina bonitas de longinquo sicut in vestigio.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod magis manifestatur divina potentia, sapientia et bonitas, si assumeret universum; dicendum, quod falsum est; quia facere per unionem, quod asinus fieret Deus vel aliquod aliud¹⁸ brutum, potius dedeceret divinam potentiam et sapientiam, quam commendaret. Facere autem, quod homo sit Deus, in nullo praeiudicat nec potentiae nec sapientiae, cum homo natus sit effici deiformis. — Nec valet illud quod obiicit, quod magis manifestatur divina potentia et sapientia in conditione universitatis quam in conditione alicuius suae partis; pro eo quod decet divinam potentiam et sapientiam non solum producere ad esse creaturas magis nobiles, sed etiam minus nobiles; et ideo tam in his quam in illis commen-

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datur, et magis manifestatur in omnibus simul quam in aliqua earum per se; non sic autem est de assumtione, sicut visum est.

Scholion

I. Conveniunt auctores in hoc, quod nulla creatura dicitur assumtibilis secundum unionem hypostaticam nec a potentia aliqua activa, nec a potentia passiva, sed a potentia obedientiali et susceptiva solummodo respectu Creatoris; item in hoc, quod haec susceptibilitas potest considerari secundum potentiam Dei vel absolutam vel ordinatam. Communius etiam cum S. Thoma (hic q. 1. a. 1.) affirmatur, quod « loquendo de potentia Dei absoluta, Deus potest assumere quamcumque creaturam vult... Loquendo autem de potentia ordinata, illam creaturam assumere potest, quam congruit eum assumere ex ordine suae sapientiae ». Scot., contra Henr. Gand. disputans, insuper putat, non repugnare, creaturam rationalem hypostatice assumi, quin habeat fruitionem Dei. — Non desunt tamen auctores antiqui et recentiores, qui cum Henrico Gand. et Dionys. Carth. sustinent, omnino implicare, creaturam irrationalem, quae non sit capax personalitatis propriae nec unionis per gratiam et gloriam, per se uniri Deo in personalitate divina, cum haec unio maior sit, quam ea quae fit per gratiam et gloriam. Huius sententiae patroni pro se afferunt etiam S. Bonaventuram hic in corp. et ad 1. 5; d. 21. a. 1. q. 2. ad 3, qui in hoc ultimo loco illud vulgare argumentum pro prima opinione, quod divinitas in triduo post mortem Christi remansit unita corpori eius, ita solvit, ut non tantum paritatem quoad utrumque casum neget, sed etiam, ut videtur, ipsam possibilitatem unionis hypostaticae respectu irrationabilium entium. Item provocant ad Alexandrum Hal. (S. p. III. q. 2. m. 7, q. 12. m. 1. a. 1, cfr. q. 7. m. 2. a. 1.). Insuper Richard. a Med. utramque opinionem reputat probabilem. — Attamen S. Bonav. in istis locis loquitur tantum de congruitate, non explicite de potentia Dei absoluta; tamen insistit, quod ex parte irrationalium non sit congruitas in suscipiendo, nec idoneitas ad unionem in unitate personae. Nam animalia secundum naturam suam non habent capacitatem formaliter suscipiendi personalitatem, quae implicat rationalem naturam; unde etiam supposita illa unione cum Deo solummodo in ratione subsistentiae, talis unio deficeret in multis effectibus, quos perfecta unio hypostatica in Christo habet; v. g. manifeste deesset ille « effectus, secundum quem comparatur creatura ad Deum ut perveniens; et hic est effectus unionis, in qua uniuntur in unitate personae creatura et Creator, ut homo-Deus » (ita I. Sent. d. 37. p. I. a. 3. q. 2.). — Quidquid autem sit de potentia absoluta abstracte considerata, quam coarctare non debemus; certe ex parte creaturae irrationalis manifeste et summopere deficit ratio congruitatis ad unionem hypostaticam, ita ut, si quis animalia per se ad hanc dignitatem esse incapacia dixerit, de vocabulo eo minus litigandum videatur, quia piae fidelium aures perhorrescunt verba parum religiosa, quibus a nonnullis Nominalibus opposita sententia proponitur et defenditur.

II. Praeter auctores citatos: Scot., hic q. 1: Report. hic q. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. III. q. 4. a. 1; S. c. Gent. IV. c. 54. — B. Albert., hic a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 4. — Aegid. R., hic p. II. q. 1. a. 1. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. 13. q. 5, et (de creatura rationali assumta, utrum possit esse sine fruitione Dei) Quodl. 6. q. 6. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. et 4. — Biel, hic q. 1.

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English Translation

Article I. On the assumed nature with respect to the fittingness of the union.

Question I. Whether the fittingness for union is greater in a rational creature than in the whole universe.

Concerning the first, one proceeds thus and it is asked whether the fittingness is greater in a rational nature than in the whole universe, or the contrary. And that the fittingness is greater in a rational nature seems [to be the case]:

1. First, because God assumed only a rational nature: if therefore God always does what is better and more fitting, it seems that the fittingness is greater in a rational nature than in the whole world-machine.

2. Likewise, the created nature [that was] assumed is [assumed] into the unity of a person; and what is more suited to personal unity is more suited to being assumed: if therefore personal dignity exists only in a rational creature¹, it seems that it is most fitting that it alone be united.

3. Likewise, the grace of union is greater than the grace of fruition or beatification²; but only the rational nature is disposed to fruition: therefore it alone seems to have a fittingness for union.

4. Likewise, the whole universe was made for the sake of the rational creature³: therefore the rational creature is more excellent than all the other things which belong to the constitution of the universe: therefore it draws nearer to God; and what draws nearer to God is more fitting to be united to God: therefore, etc.

5. Likewise, the whole universe is not said to be made to the image and likeness of God, but only the rational creature; but the image bespeaks an express likeness: therefore among all creatures only the rational creature is more expressly assimilated to God⁴. But that alone is fitting for union with God which has an express likeness with him: therefore the same as before.

Sed contra:

1. Augustine to Volusianus⁵: « In marvelous things the whole account of the deed is the power of the doer »: therefore, since the incarnation is the assumption of a creature and is a marvelous work, it seems that the whole account of the assumption is on the part of the doer: therefore the fittingness is not greater in a rational nature than in another created nature.

2. Likewise, of things infinitely distant, the one does not approach [the other] more than the other does; but every creature is distant from the divine nature to infinity: therefore there is no greater fittingness in a rational creature than in others⁶.

3. Likewise, the incarnation contributes in some way to the completion of the whole universe⁷; but the universe would be more perfected if God were united to the whole itself than to the part itself: therefore it seems that the whole universe is more apt for union than the rational creature.

4. Likewise, a universal effect is more assimilated to a universal cause than a particular effect is⁸; but the universe encloses within itself universally every effect of God: therefore it is more assimilated to God than the rational nature. But what is more assimilated to God has a greater fittingness for union: therefore, etc.

5. Likewise, that is more unitable in whose assumption the divine power, wisdom, and goodness are more manifested; but the universe is of this kind. Proof of the minor: for the divine power, wisdom, and goodness are more manifested in the making of the whole universe than of any part of it, because, since each of its parts is good, its universe is not only good, but even very good⁹: therefore if [it] is more manifested in the making of the universe, much more does it seem that it would be manifested in the assumption of the universe.

Conclusio.

The fittingness for union in the whole universe is not so great as it is in some part of it, namely in the rational creature.

Respondeo: It must be said that the nobility¹⁰ for union is not so great in the whole universe as it is in some part of it, namely in the rational nature.

And the reason for this is the defect of unity, and of personal dignity, and of likeness or conformity, which indeed is found¹¹ in the whole universe; and therefore it is not suited for union with a divine person, as the rational creature is. — For the universe has a multitude of parts differing in number, genus, and species; and therefore it is not fit for union with God in the unity of a hypostasis¹². — It also has parts lacking life and reason and sense, and therefore falling short of the excellence of personal property, and on this account it does not have aptitude for union in the unity of a person. — It also has parts in which only the account of a vestige is found, and therefore falling short of conformity to an express likeness, and consequently unfit for so great an excellence of union. — But in the rational creature there can be found unity, and personal dignity, and express conformity; and therefore in it the aptitude or fittingness for being assumed is greater. — And consequently the arguments which show this must be granted.

To 1. To that which is objected concerning the word of Augustine, that the whole account of the deed is the power of the doer; it must be said that there is an account of causality and an account of fittingness: of causality in the effecting, of fittingness in the receiving. When therefore Augustine says that the account of the deed is wholly the power of the doer, he understands it of the account of causality, not of the account of fittingness.

To 2. To that which is objected concerning the infinity of distance, it must be said that, as was held in the first and second [book]¹³, when it is said that every creature is distant from God to infinity, it is understood of the distance by recession from the equality and participation of a third nature, because nothing is univocal of the creature and the Creator, nor in anything can the creature be made equal to the Creator; but it does not hold true of the distance which is regarded by opposition¹⁴ to agreement according to the account of order and imitation. For the rational creature is ordered immediately to God and most expressly among creatures imitates God; and by reason of this assimilation and agreement it has the account of an image and a fittingness with respect to the divine union.

To 3. To that which is objected, that the incarnation¹⁵ contributes to the completion of the universe; it must be said that this is accidental; nevertheless it more fittingly contributes to the complement of the universe in the assumption of the noblest creature than of all of them; since a multitude must be reduced to some one as to a complement, because stability lies in unity rather than in multitude¹⁶. — To that which is objected, that the whole universe is more assimilated¹⁷ than the rational creature; it must be said that to be assimilated is said in two ways: intensively or extensively. And extensively it is true that a greater world is more assimilated to the archetypal world or to God than a lesser one, or the whole universe more than the rational creature. Qualitatively or intensively it is the converse, on account of the great distance of some of its parts, in which the divine goodness shines back from afar as in a vestige.

To 4. To that which is objected, that the divine power, wisdom, and goodness would be more manifested if it were to assume the universe; it must be said that this is false; because to bring it about by union that an ass should become God or any other¹⁸ brute would rather disgrace the divine power and wisdom than commend it. But to bring it about that man should be God in no way prejudices either the power or the wisdom, since man is born to be made deiform. — Nor is that valid which it objects, that the divine power and wisdom are more manifested in the making of the universe than in the making of some part of it; for the reason that it befits the divine power and wisdom to produce into being not only the more noble creatures but also the less noble; and therefore both in these and in those [it is] commended,

and is more manifested in all together than in any of them by itself; but it is not so concerning the assumption, as has been seen.

Scholion

I. Authors agree in this, that no creature is said to be assumable according to a hypostatic union either by any active power or by a passive power, but only by an obediential and receptive power with respect to the Creator; likewise in this, that this receptivity can be considered according to the power of God, whether absolute or ordained. It is also more commonly affirmed, with St. Thomas (here q. 1, a. 1), that « speaking of the absolute power of God, God can assume whatever creature he wills... But speaking of the ordained power, he can assume that creature which it is fitting for him to assume from the order of his wisdom ». Scotus, disputing against Henry of Ghent, holds in addition that it is not repugnant for a rational creature to be hypostatically assumed without its having the fruition of God. — Yet there are authors both ancient and more recent who, with Henry of Ghent and Dionysius the Carthusian, maintain that it is altogether contradictory for an irrational creature, which is not capable of its own personality nor of union through grace and glory, to be united in itself to God in the divine personality, since this union is greater than that which comes about through grace and glory. The patrons of this opinion adduce in their favor even St. Bonaventure here in the body and in [the reply] to 1 and 5; [and] d. 21, a. 1, q. 2, ad 3, who in this last place solves that common argument for the first opinion — that the divinity remained united to his body during the three days after Christ's death — in such a way that he not only denies the parity as regards each case, but even, as it seems, the very possibility of a hypostatic union with respect to irrational beings. They likewise appeal to Alexander of Hales (S. p. III, q. 2, m. 7, q. 12, m. 1, a. 1, cf. q. 7, m. 2, a. 1). Moreover Richard of Mediavilla reckons each opinion probable. — Nevertheless St. Bonaventure in these places speaks only of fittingness, not explicitly of the absolute power of God; yet he insists that on the part of the irrational there is no fittingness in receiving, nor aptitude for union in the unity of a person. For animals according to their nature do not have the capacity formally to receive a personality which implies a rational nature; whence even on the supposition of that union with God solely in the account of subsistence, such a union would fall short in many of the effects which the perfect hypostatic union in Christ has; e.g., there would manifestly be lacking that « effect according to which the creature is compared to God as one arriving; and this is the effect of the union, in which the creature and the Creator are united in the unity of a person, as God-man » (so I Sent., d. 37, p. I, a. 3, q. 2). — But whatever may be the case concerning the absolute power considered in the abstract, which we ought not to restrict; certainly on the part of the irrational creature the account of fittingness for a hypostatic union is manifestly and in the highest degree lacking, so that, if anyone should say that animals are of themselves incapable of this dignity, the less ought there to be dispute about the word, because the pious ears of the faithful shudder at the irreligious words by which the opposite opinion is proposed and defended by certain Nominalists.

II. Besides the authors cited: Scotus, here q. 1; Report. here q. 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1; S. III, q. 4, a. 1; S. c. Gent. IV, c. 54. — B. Albert, here a. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 4. — Giles of Rome, here p. II, q. 1, a. 1. — Henry of Ghent, Quodl. 13, q. 5, and (on a rational creature [that has been] assumed, whether it can be without the fruition of God) Quodl. 6, q. 6. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2 and 4. — Biel, here q. 1.

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Apparatus Criticus

Persona enim est, ut Boeth., de Una Persona et duabus naturis, c. 3. ait, naturae rationalis individua substantia. Cfr. infra d. 5. a. 2. q. 3; d. 10. a. 1. q. 2, et I. Sent. d. 23. a. 1. q. 1. — Cod. Q in natura rationali.
For a person is, as Boethius says (On the One Person and the Two Natures, c. 3), the individual substance of a rational nature. Cf. below d. 5, a. 2, q. 3; d. 10, a. 1, q. 2, and I Sent., d. 23, a. 1, q. 1. — Cod. Q [reads] in a rational nature.
Vide infra d. 6. a. 2. q. 2. seq. — De minori cfr. I. Sent. d. 1. a. 2. et 3.
See below d. 6, a. 2, q. 2 ff. — On the minor cf. I Sent., d. 1, a. 2 and 3.
Cfr. II. Sent. d. 15. a. 2. q. 1.
Cf. II Sent., d. 15, a. 2, q. 1.
Cfr. II. Sent. d. 16. a. 1. q. 1.
Cf. II Sent., d. 16, a. 1, q. 1.
Epist. 137. (alias 3.) c. 2. n. 8.
Letter 137 (otherwise 3), c. 2, n. 8.
Gregor. Nyssen., Orat. catechet. c. 27, contra eos qui turpitudini et dedecori ducunt, Deum carnem et corpus terrestre assumsisse, ait: Nihilo tolerabilior videtur esse turpitudo et dedecus, quod Deus coelestis corporis figuram susceperit quam terrestris. Ab eius enim, qui est altissimus et ad cuius altitudinem non patet aditus, natura ex aequo distat omnis creatura, et sunt omnia ei aequaliter subiecta... Neque ergo terra est remotior a suprema illa dignitate, neque caelum propinquius etc. Cfr. Tertull., de Carne Christi, c. 4.
Gregory of Nyssa, Catechetical Oration c. 27, against those who hold it shameful and disgraceful that God assumed flesh and an earthly body, says: The shame and disgrace seem in no way more tolerable that God took on the figure of a heavenly body than of an earthly one. For from him who is highest, and to whose height there is no access, every creature is equally distant by nature, and all things are equally subject to him... Therefore the earth is no more remote from that supreme dignity, nor the heaven nearer, etc. Cf. Tertullian, On the Flesh of Christ, c. 4.
De quo vide supra d. 1. a. 2. q. 1. seq. — In fine arg. pro universitas codd. A G H L N T U V perperam universitatis.
On which see above d. 1, a. 2, q. 1 ff. — At the end of the argument, for universitas codices A G H L N T U V wrongly [read] universitatis.
Cfr. Liber de Causis, prop. 1. et 4.
Cf. the Book of Causes, propositions 1 and 4.
Gen. 1, 31: Viditque Deus cuncta quae fecerat, et erant valde bona. — De hac re August., Enchirid. c. 10. n. 3. dicit, quod « a bona Trinitate creata sunt omnia, et nec summe nec aequaliter nec immutabiliter bona, sed tamen bona etiam singula, simul vero universa valde bona, quia ex omnibus consistit universitatis admirabilis pulcritudo ».
Gen. 1:31: And God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good. — On this matter Augustine, Enchiridion c. 10, n. 3, says that « all things were created by the good Trinity, and [are] neither supremely nor equally nor immutably good, yet good even singly, and together [are] all very good, because from all there results the admirable beauty of the universe ».
Cod. F habilitas, codd. M O nobilitas vel habilitas, cod. N a secunda manu congruitas, Vat. nobilitas vel congruitas. Subinde cod. T omittit ad unionem; pro in tota universitate Vat. substituit in totius universitatis assumtione.
Cod. F [reads] habilitas [aptitude], codd. M O nobilitas vel habilitas, cod. N in a second hand congruitas, the Vatican [edition] nobilitas vel congruitas. Then cod. T omits ad unionem; for in tota universitate the Vatican substitutes in totius universitatis assumtione.
Edd. quae quidem non reperitur; plurimi codd., textum obscurantes, quae quidem reperitur, quam lectionem fide codd. P R U emendavimus substituentes qui (defectus) pro quae.
The editions [read] quae quidem non reperitur; very many codices, obscuring the text, [read] quae quidem reperitur, which reading we have emended on the authority of codices P R U, substituting qui (defect) for quae.
Cfr. infra d. 6. a. 1. q. 2. et a. 2. q. 3.
Cf. below d. 6, a. 1, q. 2, and a. 2, q. 3.
Libr. I. Sent. d. 1. a. 3. q. 1. ad 1, d. 3. p. I. q. 2. ad 3, d. 7. q. 4, d. 8. p. II. q. 1, d. 25. a. 2. q. 2, d. 35. q. 1; II. Sent. d. 16. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. — Codd. H Z addunt libro, Vat. libris. Mox post de distantia codd. L aa subiungunt quae attenditur; subinde pro tertiae edd. substituunt aeternae, et post pauca Vat. sola in nullo enim pro in nullo etiam.
Book I Sent., d. 1, a. 3, q. 1, ad 1, d. 3, p. I, q. 2, ad 3, d. 7, q. 4, d. 8, p. II, q. 1, d. 25, a. 2, q. 2, d. 35, q. 1; II Sent., d. 16, a. 1, q. 1, in the body. — Codd. H Z add libro, the Vatican libris. Soon after de distantia codd. L aa append quae attenditur; then for tertiae the editions substitute aeternae, and a little after, the Vatican alone [reads] in nullo enim for in nullo etiam.
Cod. E (K a secunda manu) comparationem. Circa finem solut. post convenientiae codd. M O inserunt magis, et subinde pro et congruitatem cod. K exhibet et per hoc congruitatem.
Cod. E (K in a second hand) [reads] comparationem. Near the end of the solution, after convenientiae codd. M O insert magis, and then for et congruitatem cod. K presents et per hoc congruitatem.
Vox incarnatio deest in multis codd.
The word incarnatio is lacking in many codices.
Aristot., II. de Caelo et mundo, text. 22. (c. 4.): Prius natura in unoquoque genere est unum multis. Cfr. Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 5. § 6. seq., et Boeth., de Unitate et uno, atque I. de Arithmet. c. 2. 3. et 7.
Aristotle, II On the Heaven and the World, text 22 (c. 4): By nature, in each genus, the one is prior to the many. Cf. Dionysius, On the Divine Names c. 5, § 6 ff., and Boethius, On Unity and the One, and I On Arithmetic c. 2, 3, and 7.
Codd. M O adiungunt suae causae. Mox pro dicitur codd. F K Z habent est. Subinde post Et extensive cod. F adicit sive quantitate, et paulo inferius post Qualitative idem cod. F inserit autem. — De mundo archetypo vide tom. II. pag. 16, nota 1, ubi et verba Platonis de eo. Non possumus non afferre ex Boeth., III. de Consol. metr. 9, pulcros hos versus: Tu cuncta superno / Ducis ab exemplo, pulcrum pulcherrimus ipse, / Mundum mente gerens, similique in imagine formans, / Perfectasque iubens perfectum absolvere partes.
Codd. M O add suae causae. Soon, for dicitur codd. F K Z have est. Then after Et extensive cod. F adds sive quantitate, and a little below, after Qualitative the same cod. F inserts autem. — On the archetypal world see tom. II, p. 16, note 1, where also are the words of Plato about it. We cannot but adduce from Boethius, III On Consolation, meter 9, these beautiful verses: Thou drawest all things from the supernal exemplar, most beautiful, [thyself] bearing the beautiful world in [thy] mind, and forming [it] after a like image, and bidding the perfect [whole] complete [its] parts as perfect.
Codd. G H K L N P V Z aliquod animal.
Codd. G H K L N P V Z [read] aliquod animal [some animal].

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