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Dist. 21, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 21

Textus Latinus
p. 438

Quaestio II. Utrum in morte Christi Divinitas sit separata a carne.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum in mortep438-2 Divinitas sit separata a carne. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Soluto medio, solvuntur extrema; sed «Verbum unitur carni mediante intellectu», sicut dicit Damascenus, et habitum est supra distinctione secundap438-3: si ergo in morte separata fuit anima a carne, restat, quod Divinitas separata fuit ab eadem.

2. Item, destructo priori, destruitur posteriusp438-4; sed unio carnis ad animam prior est naturaliter, quam sit unio carnis ad Divinitatem, quia prima est naturalis, secunda gratuita, et natura prior est quam gratia: ergo soluta unione animae ad carnem, necesse est, solvi unitatem carnis ad Deitatem.

3. Item, Divinitas non est unibilis naturae insensibili et irrationalip438-5; sed caro post separationem animae facta est insensibilis: ergo non videtur fuisse idonea tunc, ut uniretur Divinitati: videtur igitur, quod in morte unio illa fuerit soluta, quae erat Divinitatis ad carnem assumtam.

4. Item, omnis unio terminatur ad aliquod unum: si ergo caro unita erat Deitati, aut ergo ista unio faciebat unum in natura, aut unum in persona. In natura non, hoc constatp438-6; in persona non, ut videtur, quia non est dicere, quod Filius esset persona carnis: ergo non videtur, quod aliquo genere unionis in morte Divinitas unita fuerit carni.

Sed contra: 1. Leo Papap438-7: «Tanta est unio Dei et hominis, ut nec supplicio posset dirimi nec morte disiungi»; sed de integritate humanae naturae est non tantum anima, verum etiam caro: ergo in morte non fuit separata caro a Verbo. Hoc ipsum dicit Augustinus contra Felicianum, cuius auctoritas habetur in litterap438-8.

2. Item, ratione videtur. Christus in triduo dip. 439citur iacuisse in sepulcro; sed hoc non dicitur nisi ratione carnis coniunctaep439-1: ergo in triduo caro fuit coniuncta Divinitati.

3. Item, quandocumquep439-2 aliqua duo unita separantur, aut elongantur secundum dissimilitudinem, aut secundum positionem; sed caro Christi non fuit elongata a Verbo secundum dissimilitudinem — talis enim elongatio est peccati — nec fuit elongata secundum positionem, quia Verbum Dei est ubique: ergo in morte non fuit soluta unio Divinitatis ad carnem.

4. Item, nihil unitum carni per passionem separabatur a carne, quod non pateretur, carne patiente; sed Deitas, patiente carne, non patiebatur: ergo per passionem et mortem ab ea non separabaturp439-3.

Conclusio.

In morte Christi Deitas a carne non fuit separata.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod in mortep439-4 non fuit Deitas separata a carne. Et ratio huius triplex est, videlicet liberalitas ex parte assumentis, dignitas ex parte assumtibilis, utilitas ex parte assumtionis. — Liberalitas, inquam, ex parte assumentis, quia, cum Deus dat aliquod donum, non subtrahit illud sine culpa; si ergo nulla culpa intervenit, non decuit divinam liberalitatem carnem, quam sibi liberaliter unierat, separare a se. — Dignitas etiam ex parte assumtibilis fuit in causa, quare ista unio non debuit separari. Caro enim illa non debuit videre corruptionem, secundum illud quod dicitur in Psalmop439-5: Non dabis Sanctum tuum videre corruptionem; sicut ergo nunquam decuit, ipsam incinerari, sic nunquam decuit, ipsam a Verbo separari. — Utilitas autem ex parte assumtionis ad hoc ipsum faciebat. Ad hoc enim fiebat illa unio Divinitatis ad humanam naturam et carnis ad animam, ut procuraretur nostra salus. Et quoniam separatio carnis a Divinitate in nullo faceret ad nostram salutem, pro eo quod non potest per eam fieri satisfactiop439-6, cum Divinitas non possit sentire dolorem et poenam in separatione ipsius a carne; hinc est, quod non erat conveniens, carnem separari a Divinitate. Unde nec passio habebat ad hoc aliquem ordinem. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes inductae ad istam partem.

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod soluto medio, solvuntur extrema; dicendum, quod illud habet veritatem de medio necessitatisp439-7, non autem de medio congruitatis; anima autem non erat medium necessitatis, sed congruitatis; praeterea, non solum erat medium ratione coniunctionis secundum actum, sed etiam secundum habitum. Et licet anima non esset unita carni in morte, erat tamen ei unibilis, et per hoc caro etiam unibilis Divinitati.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod destructo priori, destruitur posterius; dicendum, quod illud verum est, ubi posterius dependet essentialiter a priori; ubi vero aliquid praecedit alterum sicut dispositio congrua, non oportet, quod habeat veritatem; et sic est in proposito. Nam unio Divinitatis ad carnem sive carnis ad Divinitatemp439-8 non dependet essentialiter sive dependentia necessitatis ab unione illorum duorum ad invicem, sed si illam praesupponit, hoc est quaedam congruitatis convenientia.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Divinitas non est unibilis naturae irrationali et insensibili; dicendum, quod sip439-9 caro Christi tunc careret et ratione et sensu, habebat tamen ordinem ad animam, quae rationem et sensum in se habet. Et si tu obiicias, quod illud non sufficiat, quod aliquid sit possibile ad unionem animae rationalis, ad hoc quod congruum sit uniri cum Divinitate; dicendum, quod absque dubio hoc non suffecisset in primordio incarnationis, immo simul decuit Divinitatem uniri carni et animae ut coniunctisp439-10; secus autem est in mysterio nostrae redemptionis, quod quidem debuit consummari per mortem; et ratione cuius congruum fuit, ut illa quae prius valde coniuncta erant, non minus congrue essent ad tempus divisa, caro videlicet et anima; et pro isto tempore bene sufficiebat ipsi carni unibilitas ad animam loco congruitatis reddentis eam idoneam ad unionem cum Divinitatis natura.

p. 440 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod unio terminatur ad aliquod unum; dicendum, quod verum est. Talis enim unio terminatur ad unum in persona; nam caro unitur divinae naturae in unitate hypostasis et personae Filii Dei. Sed attendendum, quod aliter dicitur illa hypostasis carnis etp440-1 hypostasis hominis. Hypostasis enim hominis dicitur non solum in obliquo, sed etiam in recto; est enim hypostasis, quae est homo. Sed hypostasis carnis intelligitur in obliquo, non quia esset caro, sed quia habebat carnem; unde illa poterat dici caro Verbi. Et hoc est quod dicit Damascenusp440-2: «Si mortuus est ut homo, et sancta illa anima ab eius corpore divisa est; Divinitas tamen inseparabilis ab utroque permansit, neque ita una hypostasis in duas divisa est; etenim corpus et anima a principio in Verbi hypostasi habuerunt sustinentiam, et in morte a se invicem divisa manserunt, singulum autem eorum unam hypostasim Verbi habens. Neque enim corpus neque anima propriam habuit hypostasim praeter hypostasim Verbi». Et sic patet illudp440-3.

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English Translation

Question II. Whether in the death of Christ the Divinity was separated from the flesh.

Secondly it is asked, whether in deathp438-2 the Divinity was separated from the flesh. And that it was, seems [to be the case].

1. When the middle is dissolved, the extremes are dissolved; but «the Word is united to the flesh by the mediation of the intellect», as Damascene says, and as was held above in the second distinctionp438-3: if therefore in death the soul was separated from the flesh, it remains that the Divinity was separated from the same.

2. Likewise, when the prior is destroyed, the posterior is destroyedp438-4; but the union of the flesh to the soul is by nature prior to the union of the flesh to the Divinity, because the first is natural, the second gratuitous, and nature is prior to grace: therefore, the union of the soul to the flesh being dissolved, the unity of the flesh to the Deity must necessarily be dissolved.

3. Likewise, the Divinity cannot be united to a nature insensible and irrationalp438-5; but the flesh, after the separation of the soul, became insensible: therefore it does not seem to have been fit at that time to be united to the Divinity: it seems therefore that in death that union was dissolved which was of the Divinity to the assumed flesh.

4. Likewise, every union terminates at some one [thing]: if therefore the flesh was united to the Deity, then either this union made one in nature, or one in person. It did not [make one] in nature—this is establishedp438-6; nor in person, as it seems, because one cannot say that the Son was the person of the flesh: therefore it does not seem that by any kind of union the Divinity was united to the flesh in death.

On the contrary: 1. Leo the Popep438-7: «So great is the union of God and man, that it could be sundered neither by punishment nor disjoined by death»; but to the integrity of human nature belongs not only the soul, but also the flesh: therefore in death the flesh was not separated from the Word. This same thing Augustine says against Felician, whose authority is had in the text [of the Master]p438-8.

2. Likewise, it seems [so] by reason. Christ is said to have lain in the sepulchre during the three days; but this is not said except by reason of the flesh conjoined [to him]p439-1: therefore during the three days the flesh was conjoined to the Divinity.

3. Likewise, wheneverp439-2 any two united things are separated, they are removed apart either according to dissimilarity, or according to position; but the flesh of Christ was not removed apart from the Word according to dissimilarity—for such a removal is [the removal] of sin—nor was it removed apart according to position, because the Word of God is everywhere: therefore in death the union of the Divinity to the flesh was not dissolved.

4. Likewise, nothing united to the flesh through the passion was separated from the flesh which would not suffer, the flesh suffering; but the Deity, the flesh suffering, did not suffer: therefore through the passion and death it was not separated from itp439-3.

Conclusion.

In the death of Christ the Deity was not separated from the flesh.

I respond: It must be said that in deathp439-4 the Deity was not separated from the flesh. And the reason for this is threefold, namely liberality on the part of the one assuming, dignity on the part of what is assumable, utility on the part of the assumption. — Liberality, I say, on the part of the one assuming, because, since God gives some gift, he does not withdraw it without fault; if therefore no fault intervened, it did not befit the divine liberality to separate from itself the flesh which it had liberally united to itself. — Dignity also on the part of what is assumable was a cause why this union ought not to be separated. For that flesh ought not to see corruption, according to that which is said in the Psalmp439-5: Thou shalt not give thy Holy One to see corruption; as therefore it never befitted that it be reduced to ashes, so it never befitted that it be separated from the Word. — Utility moreover on the part of the assumption made for this same [end]. For unto this was that union of the Divinity to human nature and of the flesh to the soul made, that our salvation might be procured. And since the separation of the flesh from the Divinity would in no way make for our salvation, for the reason that satisfactionp439-6 cannot be made through it, since the Divinity cannot feel pain and punishment in its separation from the flesh; hence it is that it was not fitting for the flesh to be separated from the Divinity. Whence neither did the passion have any ordering to this. — Therefore the reasons brought forward to this side are to be granted.

1. To that which is objected, that when the middle is dissolved, the extremes are dissolved; it must be said that this holds true of a middle of necessityp439-7, but not of a middle of congruity; now the soul was not a middle of necessity, but of congruity; moreover, it was a middle not only by reason of conjunction according to act, but also according to habit. And although the soul was not united to the flesh in death, yet it was unitable to it, and through this the flesh too was unitable to the Divinity.

2. To that which is objected, that when the prior is destroyed, the posterior is destroyed; it must be said that this is true where the posterior depends essentially on the prior; but where something precedes another as a congruous disposition, it need not hold true; and so it is in the case at hand. For the union of the Divinity to the flesh, or of the flesh to the Divinityp439-8, does not depend essentially or with a dependence of necessity upon the union of those two to one another, but if it presupposes it, this is a certain fittingness of congruity.

3. To that which is objected, that the Divinity cannot be united to an irrational and insensible nature; it must be said that, althoughp439-9 the flesh of Christ then lacked both reason and sense, it nevertheless had an ordering to the soul, which has reason and sense in itself. And if you object that it does not suffice that something be possible for the union of a rational soul, in order that it be congruous to be united with the Divinity; it must be said that, without doubt, this would not have sufficed at the first beginning of the incarnation—indeed it befitted that the Divinity be united at once to the flesh and the soul as conjoinedp439-10; but it is otherwise in the mystery of our redemption, which indeed had to be consummated through death; and by reason of this it was congruous that those things which before were very much conjoined should be no less congruously divided for a time, namely the flesh and the soul; and for that time the unitability to the soul well sufficed for the flesh itself, in place of a congruity rendering it fit for union with the nature of the Divinity.

4. To that which is objected, that the union terminates at some one [thing]; it must be said that this is true. For such a union terminates at one [thing] in person; for the flesh is united to the divine nature in the unity of the hypostasis and person of the Son of God. But it must be attended to, that the hypostasis is called of the flesh andp440-1 the hypostasis of the man in different ways. For the hypostasis of the man is said not only in the oblique, but also in the direct; for there is a hypostasis which is the man. But the hypostasis of the flesh is understood in the oblique, not because it was flesh, but because it had flesh; whence it could be called the flesh of the Word. And this is what Damascene saysp440-2: «If he died as a man, and that holy soul was divided from his body; the Divinity nevertheless remained inseparable from both, nor was the one hypostasis thus divided into two; for the body and the soul from the beginning had their subsistence in the hypostasis of the Word, and in death remained divided from one another, each of them however having the one hypostasis of the Word. For neither the body nor the soul had its own hypostasis apart from the hypostasis of the Word». And thus that [matter] is clearp440-3.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Edd. addunt Christi.
    The editions add Christi [of Christ].
  2. Art. 3. q. 1. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. — In fine arg. pro ab eadem codd. D bb a carne.
    Article 3, question 1. See here the text of the Master, c. 1. — At the end of the argument, for ab eadem [from the same], codices D bb read a carne [from the flesh].
  3. Cfr. Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 54. et XI. c. 1. (VI. c. 15. et X. c. 1.), nec non Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Communitatibus et differentiis generis et speciei, ex quo cap. nonnulla transcripsimus tom. II. pag. 95, nota 2. In fine arg. pro solvi unitatem mallemus solvi unionem; sed nihil mutavimus, refragantibus et codd. et edd.
    Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, text 54, and XI, c. 1 (VI, c. 15 and X, c. 1), as well as Porphyry, On the Predicables, the chapter on the commonalities and differences of genus and species, from which chapter we transcribed a few things in vol. II, p. 95, note 2. At the end of the argument, for solvi unitatem [the unity to be dissolved] we should prefer solvi unionem [the union to be dissolved]; but we have changed nothing, both the codices and the editions opposing it.
  4. Vide supra d. 2. a. 1. q. 1. — In fine arg. pro assumtam Vat. assumtio.
    See above, distinction 2, article 1, question 1. — At the end of the argument, for assumtam [assumed], the Vatican [edition reads] assumtio [assumption].
  5. Cfr. supra d. 6. a. 2. q. 1.
    Cf. above, distinction 6, article 2, question 1.
  6. Serm. 68. (alias 66.) sive 17. de Passione, c. 1. Cfr. supra pag. 162, nota 2. — Pro disiungi multi codd. et edd. distingui.
    Sermon 68 (otherwise 66), or 17 On the Passion, c. 1. Cf. above, p. 162, note 2. — For disiungi [disjoined] many codices and editions [read] distingui [distinguished].
  7. Hic c. 1. in fine.
    Here [in the text of the Master], c. 1, at the end.
  8. Cfr. infra d. 22. q. 1.
    Cf. below, distinction 22, question 1.
  9. Multi codd. perperam quantumcumque. Subinde pro unita codd. A aa iuncta, cod. K coniuncta. Mox et paulo inferius pro dissimilitudinem cod. A disiunctionem et similiter bis potentiam pro positionem.
    Many codices wrongly [read] quantumcumque [however much]. Thereupon, for unita [united], codices A aa [read] iuncta [joined], codex K coniuncta [conjoined]. Soon, and a little below, for dissimilitudinem [dissimilarity], codex A [reads] disiunctionem [disjunction], and likewise twice potentiam [power] for positionem [position].
  10. Gregor. Nyss., Epist. 3. ad Eustathiam et Ambrosiam: In morte ut corpus ab anima separaretur, per dispensationem fecit; at Deitas, quae divisionem nullam admittit, ubi semel ei subiecto cohaesit, neque a corpore neque ab anima unquam fuit divulsa.
    Gregory of Nyssa, Letter 3, to Eustathia and Ambrosia: In death he brought it about by dispensation that the body should be separated from the soul; but the Deity, which admits no division, once it had adhered to that subject, was never torn away either from the body or from the soul.
  11. Edd. supplent Christi.
    The editions supply Christi [of Christ].
  12. Psalm. 15, 10, quem versum August. (Enarrat. in hunc Ps. n. 10.) sic interpretatur: Neque sanctificatum corpus, per quod et alii sanctificandi sunt, corrumpi patieris. — Post pauca pro incinerari cod. V corrumpi. Subinde pro Utilitas autem codd. A V Utilitas etiam.
    Psalm 15, 10, which verse Augustine (Commentary on this Psalm, n. 10) thus interprets: Neither wilt thou suffer the sanctified body, through which others too are to be sanctified, to be corrupted. — A little after, for incinerari [to be reduced to ashes], codex V [reads] corrumpi [to be corrupted]. Thereupon, for Utilitas autem [Utility moreover], codices A V [read] Utilitas etiam [Utility also].
  13. Cfr. supra d. 20. q. 3. — Paulo inferius pro aliquem ordinem codd. R U aliquam ordinationem.
    Cf. above, distinction 20, question 3. — A little below, for aliquem ordinem [any ordering], codices R U [read] aliquam ordinationem [any ordination].
  14. Id est illud, sine quo coniunctio extremorum esse nequit; quod medium supra d. 2. a. 3. q. 1. vocatur medium colligantiae. — Paulo inferius pro non solum... sed etiam Vat. exhibet tantummodo non... sed et; deinde inter verba Et licet interiicit ideo.
    That is, that without which the conjoining of the extremes cannot be; which middle, above at distinction 2, article 3, question 1, is called the middle of binding-together. — A little below, for non solum... sed etiam [not only... but also] the Vatican [edition] exhibits tantummodo non... sed et [only not... but also]; then between the words Et licet [And although] it interjects ideo [therefore].
  15. Pro Divinitatem codd. et edd. 1, 2 animam. Fortasse prima codd. scriptura fuit sive Divinitatis ad animam pro sive carnis ad Divinitatem. Etiam in fine huius solut. edd. habent lectionem variantem, hanc scilicet: sed si illa supponit, hoc est quaedam congruitatis convenientia. Codd. A N T X haec est pro hoc est.
    For Divinitatem [the Divinity] codices and editions 1, 2 [read] animam [the soul]. Perhaps the first reading of the codices was sive Divinitatis ad animam [or of the Divinity to the soul] for sive carnis ad Divinitatem [or of the flesh to the Divinity]. Also at the end of this solution the editions have a variant reading, namely this: sed si illa supponit, hoc est quaedam congruitatis convenientia. Codices A N T X [read] haec est for hoc est.
  16. Edd., pro si substituto etsi, subinde omittunt tunc.
    The editions, etsi [even if] being substituted for si [if], thereupon omit tunc [then].
  17. Vide supra d. 3. p. II. a. 3. q. 2. — Mox pro mysterio edd. cum aliquot codd. ministerio. Inferius pro sufficiebat cod. B satisfaciebat.
    See above, distinction 3, part II, article 3, question 2. — Soon, for mysterio [mystery], the editions, with some codices, [read] ministerio [ministry]. Below, for sufficiebat [sufficed], codex B [reads] satisfaciebat [satisfied].
  18. Codd. R Z et aliter.
    Codices R Z [read] et aliter [and otherwise].
  19. Libr. III. de Fide orthod. c. 27: Si mortuus... et in morte a se invicem divisa, singulum eorum mansit, unam hypostasim Verbi habens. Quam ob rem una Verbi hypostasis, et Verbi et animae et corporis erat hypostasis. Neque enim corpus etc. — In testimonio allato pro sustinentiam cod. A subsistentiam (ὕπαρξιν). Paulo inferius pro habens, quod fide codd. A Q restituimus, alii codd. partim habent, partim habet; etiam edd. exhibent habet. Demum pro habuit codd. G H L aa cc habuerunt, codd. A Q U habent.
    On the Orthodox Faith, Book III, c. 27: If he died... and in death, divided from one another, each of them remained, having the one hypostasis of the Word. For which reason there was one hypostasis of the Word, and a hypostasis both of the Word and of the soul and of the body. For neither the body, etc. — In the testimony cited, for sustinentiam [subsistence] codex A [reads] subsistentiam (hyparxin). A little below, for habens [having], which on the authority of codices A Q we have restored, other codices read partly habent [they have], partly habet [it has]; the editions too exhibit habet. Finally, for habuit [had], codices G H L aa cc [read] habuerunt [they had], codices A Q U habent [they have].
  20. Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    See the scholion to the preceding question. ---
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