Dist. 21, Art. 1, Q. 3
Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 21
Articulus I. De separatione, facta in morte, per comparationem ad unionis vinculum.
Quaestio III. Utrum Verbum unitum fuerit carni et animae duplici unione.
Tertio quaeritur, utrum Verbum unitum fuerit carni et animae duplici unione. Et quod sic, videtur.
1. Unio numeratur per extrema unibiliap440-4; sed caro et anima sunt diversa unibilia, hoc enim est corporale, et illud spirituale: ergo si uniuntur Verbo, pluribus unionibus uniuntur.
2. Item, si aliquod unum unitur aliquibus alterutrum divisis, unitur eis diversis unionibus; sed hypostasis Verbi unita fuit in morte carni et animae alterutrum divisis: ergo uniebatur eis unionibus diversis. Sed eodem modo unita fuit Divinitas carni et animae in incarnatione et in morte et post mortem, quia illa unio non fuit variata: ergo si post mortem uniebatur diversis unionibus, necessario sequebatur, quod et in ipsa incarnatione.
3. Item, ubicumque est ordo prioris ad posterius, ibi est numeratio et distinctio; sed per prius unitur anima ipsi Verbo quam caro, caro enim unitur mediante animap440-5: ergo si in huiusmodi unionibus est ordo, ibi est distinctio: ergo pluribus unionibus uniuntur.
4. Item, anima unitur Divinitati et unitur carni; nec unitur unione unica, sed duplicip440-6: ergo pari ratione videtur, quod hypostasis Verbi, cum unitur carni et animae, duplici unione unitur. Si tu dicas, quod non est simile, quia ex Deitate et carne non fit unum, sicut fit ex carne et anima; tunc obiicitur: esto quod ex carne et anima non fiat unum, sicut fuit in morte; videtur tunc, quod illa iam non sit una unio, sed duae.
Sed contra: 1. Unio terminatur ad unum; sed caro et anima uniuntur ipsi Verbo in unam personamp440-7: ergo videtur, quod uniantur ei unione unica.
2. Item, unio facta est per assumtionemp440-8, ergo ubi est una assumtio, ibi est una unio; sed Verbum assumsit totam naturam humanam unica assumtione: ergo univit sibi carnem et animam unica unione.
3. Item, sicut totus homo componitur ex carne et anima, ita totum corpus componiturp440-9 ex partibus organicis: ergo si essent diversae uniones carnis et animae ad naturam divinam, pari ratione essent diversae uniones manus et pedis ad eandem, et aliorum membrorum. Quodsi hoc est inconveniens, restat, quod carnis et animae una est unio ad Deitatem.
4. Item, cum caro et anima uniuntur unione naturali, una unione uniuntur: ergo pari ratione, quando uniunturp440-10 unione personali, cum ita bene sit unum illud quod est unum in persona, sicut illud quod est unum in natura; sed caro et anima uniuntur Verbo unione personali: ergo uniuntur unione unica, non unione multiplici.
### Conclusio. Loquendo de unione in sensu activo et passivo, unica unione caro et anima fuerunt unitae Verbo; loquendo de unione ut relatione, ante mortem fuerunt unitae unica unione in actu et pluribus in potentia, post mortem autem pluribus in actu.
Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod unio dicitur tribus modis: uno modo dicitur unio actio unientis, alio modo dicitur passio unibilis, tertio modo dicitur relatio unitorum. Cum ergo quaeritur, utrum anima et corpus uniantur ipsi hypostasi Verbi unione duplici; respondendum est, quod si loquamur de unione-actione, non est ibi nisi unica unio. Unica enim unione univit sibi Verbum carnem et animam, sicut unica assumtione assumsit corpus et animam. Similiter, si loquamur de unione passivep441-1, non fuit ibi nisi unica unio. Caro enim et anima non fuerunt unita ipsi Verbo in unionis primordio ut divisa, sed ut coniuncta in unam substantiam et naturam; ideo assumta et unita fuerunt assumtione et unione unica. — Si autem loquamur de unione, secundum quod est relatio unibilium; sic dicendum est, quod cum relatio numeretur per extremap441-2, eo modo habet multiplicari, quo habet plurificari ipsum unibile. Quoniam igitur unibile ex parte humanae naturae fuit unum in actu et plura in potentia — quia extremum illud erat humana natura, constans ex corpore et anima, quae concurrebant in unum secundum actum et poterant esse divisap441-3 et distincta — hinc est, quod quamdiu corpus et anima fuerunt coniuncta, unica unione uniebantur Verbo, unica, inquam, in actu, sed pluribus in potentia; quando vero ab invicem in morte fuerunt separata, uniebantur unionibus pluribus. Caro enim dicebatur unita Verbo et unita anima; et haec relatio ex parte carnis et animae erat alia et alia. Intellecto enim, quod caro non esset unita, adhuc posset intelligi esse unita anima.
Et secundum hoc patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam. Uno enim modo concedi potest, quod caro et anima uniantur Divinitati multiplici unione, secundum illud quod consuevit dicip441-4, quod triplex fuit ibi unio: una Divinitatis ad carnem, alia Divinitatis ad animam, alia animae ad carnem. Et secundum istam viam procedunt rationes, quae ostendunt, ibi fuisse uniones plures. — Aliis autem modis dicendum est, quod ibi fuit una tantum unio; et secundum hanc viam procedunt rationes ad oppositum. Et sic patet totum. Sed quoniam aliquae de rationibus ad primam partem inductis sophisticae sunt et concludunt etiam, unionem plurificari simpliciter; ideo ad eas oportet respondere.
1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur, quod caro et anima sunt diversa unibilia, quia unum spirituale, alterum corporale; dicendum, quod licet caro et anima diversitatem habeant inter se, sunt tamen partes constituentes unum in essentia et natura; et quia in unam naturam concurrunt, hinc est, quod in illa unione, qua Dei Filius humanam naturam assumsit, rationem tenent unius extremi.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in morte Verbum unitum erat duobus diversis et divisis; dicendum, quod etsi illa essent localiter divisa, erant tamen secundum naturalem inclinationem ad invicemp441-5 ordinata, et ratione illius ordinis caro erat idonea, ut esset unita Deitati. Praeterea, esto quod plures essent uniones post mortem, secundum quod unio nominat relationem, non tamen sequitur, quod similiter essent in vita, quia, quamvis unio manserit uniformiter et immutabiliter quantum ad vinculum, facta est tamen quaedam immutatio in altero extremorum, scilicet in humana natura, cuius principia constituentia fuerunt in morte seiuncta, cum tamen essent unita in vita.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est ibi ordo, ergo distinctio; dicendum, quod quidam est ordo, qui ponit simpliciter distinctionem, quando est ordo, qui attenditur secundum positionem et gradum inter res consimilis generis; sed quando aliqua sic ordinantur, quod ibi est unum propter alterump441-6; non oportet, ibi esse numerationem; sicut si teneam equum per frenum, per prius teneo frenum quam equum, quia equum teneo mediante freno; non tamen duplici tentione teneo utrumque, sed unica. Et sic patet, quod non cogit illa ratio. Non tamen est omnino simile de huiusmodi tentione et de unione; sed hoc inductum est ad illius rationis dissolutionem.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima unitur Divinitati et carni duplici unione etc.; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia Divinitas et caro non cedunt in unam naturam, immo naturaliter et essentialiter sunt distincta; non sic autem est de carne et anima, quiap441-7 unam naturam constituunt; et ideo non oportet, quod Deitas eis diversis unionibus uniatur.
I. Triplex hic distinguitur sensus vocabuli unionis, sicut supra d. 2. a. 3. q. 2. ad 6. distincta est triplex gratia unionis. De aliis modis et speciebus unionis cfr. loci supra d. 1. a. 1. q. 1. in scholio citati. — Responsio ad hanc quaestionem supponit principia supra d. 2. a. 3. q. 1. explicata. Conclusiones approbat et ultimas explicat S. Thom. (hic q. 1. a. 1. quaestiunc. 2. ad 5.) his verbis: Relationes secundum rem [i. e. reales] multiplicantur secundum multiplicationem eorum, supra quae fundantur relationes; unde contingit, quod relatio ex parte unius extremi est una, quae ex parte alterius multiplicatur, sicut de illo qui una paternitate ad multos filios refertur, qui ad ipsum multis filiationibus referuntur. Ita etiam est hoc, quia ex parte ipsius Filii Dei est una tantum, quamvis non sit ex parte ipsius relatio realis, sed rationis tantum. Ex parte autem assumtorum, quae divisa sunt, sunt duae uniones in actu post mortem; ante autem erat una in actu et multae in potentia. Unde non oportet, quod aliqua unio fiat ibi de novo, sicut nec in divisione continui etc. (cfr. S. Bonav., hic solut. ad 2.). — Notanda est doctrina in solut. ad 1. 2. 4. tradita, qua solvitur etiam difficultas, a Richardo a Med. (hic a. 1. q. 2. ad 2.) sic expressa: «Verbum non remansit unitum carni post separationem animae ut cuidam toti, sed ut parti humanae naturae. Et ideo, sicut de hypostasi Ioannis non praedicatur pars humanae naturae… ita a simili aliqualiter dico, quod post separationem animae a carne Christi, caro non potuit vere praedicari de Verbo». Idem docet S. Bonav. supra q. 1. ad 2, q. 2. ad 4. et infra a. 2. q. 3. ad 2. Consentit S. Thom., in Comment. loc. cit. ad 3. 4. 6, et S. III. q. 50. a. 2. ad 2, a. 3. ad 3.
II. Specialem quaestionem de eadem re habent Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. 2.) et Richard. a Med. (hic a. 1. q. 4.). Alii ipsam tangunt in praecedentibus duabus quaestionibus, vel III. Sent. d. 2, praesertim in quaestione, utrum totum assumserit mediantibus partibus (S. Thom., ibi q. 2. a. 1. quaestiunc. 3; Scot., ibi q. 2.).
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Article I. On the separation, made in death, by comparison to the bond of union.
Question III. Whether the Word was united to the flesh and the soul by a twofold union.
Thirdly it is asked, whether the Word was united to the flesh and the soul by a twofold union. And that it was so, it seems.
1. A union is numbered according to the unitable extremesp440-4; but the flesh and the soul are diverse unitables, for the one is corporeal and the other spiritual: therefore if they are united to the Word, they are united by several unions.
2. Likewise, if some one thing is united to certain things mutually divided, it is united to them by diverse unions; but the hypostasis of the Word was united in death to the flesh and the soul, which were mutually divided: therefore it was united to them by diverse unions. But the Divinity was united to the flesh and the soul in the same manner in the incarnation and in death and after death, since that union was not varied: therefore if after death it was united by diverse unions, it necessarily followed that this was so even in the incarnation itself.
3. Likewise, wherever there is an order of prior to posterior, there is numeration and distinction; but the soul is united to the Word prior to the flesh, for the flesh is united by the mediation of the soulp440-5: therefore if in unions of this kind there is order, there is distinction therein: therefore they are united by several unions.
4. Likewise, the soul is united to the Divinity and is united to the flesh; nor is it united by a single union, but by a twofold onep440-6: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems that the hypostasis of the Word, when it is united to the flesh and the soul, is united by a twofold union. If you say that the case is not alike, because from the Deity and the flesh there is not made one thing, as there is from the flesh and the soul; then it is objected: granted that from the flesh and the soul one thing is not made, as was the case in death; it then seems that this is no longer one union, but two.
On the contrary: 1. A union is terminated at one thing; but the flesh and the soul are united to the Word himself into one personp440-7: therefore it seems that they are united to him by a single union.
2. Likewise, the union was made through assumptionp440-8, therefore where there is one assumption, there is one union; but the Word assumed the whole human nature by a single assumption: therefore he united the flesh and the soul to himself by a single union.
3. Likewise, just as the whole man is composed of flesh and soul, so the whole body is composedp440-9 of organic parts: therefore if there were diverse unions of the flesh and the soul to the divine nature, by parity of reasoning there would be diverse unions of the hand and the foot to the same, and of the other members. But if this is unfitting, it remains that there is one union of the flesh and the soul to the Deity.
4. Likewise, since the flesh and the soul are united by a natural union, they are united by one union: therefore by parity of reasoning, when they are unitedp440-10 by a personal union — since that which is one in person is just as truly one as that which is one in nature; but the flesh and the soul are united to the Word by a personal union — therefore they are united by a single union, not by a manifold one.
### Conclusion. Speaking of union in the active and passive sense, the flesh and the soul were united to the Word by a single union; speaking of union as a relation, before death they were united by a single union in act and several in potency, but after death by several in act.
I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that "union" is said in three ways: in one way union is called the action of the one uniting, in another way it is called the passion of the unitable, in a third way it is called the relation of the things united. When therefore it is asked whether the soul and the body are united to the hypostasis of the Word itself by a twofold union, it must be answered that, if we speak of union-as-action, there is there but a single union. For the Word united the flesh and the soul to himself by a single union, just as by a single assumption he assumed the body and the soul. Likewise, if we speak of union passivelyp441-1, there was there but a single union. For the flesh and the soul were not united to the Word as divided in the first beginning of the union, but as conjoined into one substance and nature; therefore they were assumed and united by a single assumption and union. — But if we speak of union according as it is a relation of unitables, then it must be said that, since a relation is numbered according to the extremesp441-2, it has to be multiplied in the same way as the unitable itself has to be made several. Since therefore the unitable on the side of the human nature was one in act and several in potency — because that extreme was the human nature, consisting of body and soul, which concurred into one according to act and could be dividedp441-3 and distinct — hence it is that, so long as the body and the soul were conjoined, they were united to the Word by a single union, single, I say, in act, but several in potency; but when they were separated from one another in death, they were united by several unions. For the flesh was said to be united to the Word and united to the soul; and this relation on the side of the flesh and the soul was one thing and another. For granted that the flesh were not united, the soul could still be understood to be united.
And according to this the reply to the question proposed is clear. For in one way it can be conceded that the flesh and the soul are united to the Divinity by a manifold union, according to what is customarily saidp441-4, namely that there was there a threefold union: one of the Divinity to the flesh, another of the Divinity to the soul, another of the soul to the flesh. And along this way the arguments proceed which show that there were several unions there. — But in other ways it must be said that there was there but one union; and along this way the arguments to the opposite proceed. And so the whole matter is clear. But since some of the arguments brought forward for the first part are sophistical and conclude also that the union is multiplied simply, they must therefore be answered.
1. To that, then, which is objected first, that the flesh and the soul are diverse unitables, because the one is spiritual, the other corporeal; it must be said that, although the flesh and the soul have a diversity between themselves, they are nevertheless parts constituting one thing in essence and nature; and because they concur into one nature, hence it is that in that union, by which the Son of God assumed the human nature, they hold the account of one extreme.
2. To that which is objected, that in death the Word was united to two diverse and divided things; it must be said that, even though those were locally divided, they were nevertheless ordered toward one anotherp441-5 according to a natural inclination, and by reason of that order the flesh was fit to be united to the Deity. Moreover, granted that there were several unions after death, according as union names a relation, it does not nevertheless follow that they would be so in life; for although the union remained uniformly and immutably as to the bond, there was nevertheless made a certain change in the other of the extremes, namely in the human nature, whose constituting principles were sundered in death, although they were united in life.
3. To that which is objected, that there is order there, therefore distinction; it must be said that there is a certain order which posits distinction simply, when it is an order that is regarded according to position and grade among things of a like genus; but when some things are so ordered that there is one thing on account of anotherp441-6, it is not necessary that there be numeration there; just as if I hold a horse by the bridle, I hold the bridle prior to the horse, because I hold the horse by the mediation of the bridle; nevertheless I do not hold both by a twofold holding, but by a single one. And so it is clear that that argument does not compel. Yet the case of such holding and of union is not altogether alike; but this has been adduced for the dissolution of that argument.
4. To that which is objected, that the soul is united to the Divinity and to the flesh by a twofold union, etc.; it must be said that the case is not alike, because the Divinity and the flesh do not yield into one nature, but rather are naturally and essentially distinct; whereas it is not so with the flesh and the soul, sincep441-7 they constitute one nature; and therefore it is not necessary that the Deity be united to them by diverse unions.
I. Here a threefold sense of the word union is distinguished, just as above, d. 2, a. 3, q. 2, ad 6, a threefold grace of union was distinguished. On the other modes and species of union, cf. the passages cited above, d. 1, a. 1, q. 1, in the scholion. — The reply to this question presupposes the principles explained above, d. 2, a. 3, q. 1. St. Thomas approves the conclusions and explains the last ones (here q. 1, a. 1, quaestiuncula 2, ad 5) in these words: Relations according to the thing [i.e., real relations] are multiplied according to the multiplication of the things upon which the relations are founded; whence it happens that the relation on the side of one extreme is one, which on the side of the other is multiplied, as in the case of one who by one paternity is referred to many sons, who are referred to him by many filiations. So too is this, because on the side of the Son of God himself it is one only, although on his side it is not a real relation but only one of reason. But on the side of the things assumed, which are divided, there are two unions in act after death; before, however, there was one in act and many in potency. Whence it is not necessary that any union come to be there anew, just as neither in the division of a continuum, etc. (cf. St. Bonaventure, here, in the solution to argument 2). — Note the doctrine handed down in the solutions to arguments 1, 2, 4, by which is also resolved the difficulty expressed thus by Richard of Mediavilla (here a. 1, q. 2, ad 2): «The Word did not remain united to the flesh after the separation of the soul as to a certain whole, but as to a part of the human nature. And therefore, just as a part of the human nature is not predicated of the hypostasis of John… so by a similar reasoning I say in a certain way that, after the separation of the soul from the flesh of Christ, the flesh could not truly be predicated of the Word». St. Bonaventure teaches the same above, q. 1, ad 2; q. 2, ad 4; and below, a. 2, q. 3, ad 2. St. Thomas agrees, in his Commentary at the place cited, ad 3, 4, 6, and Summa III, q. 50, a. 2, ad 2; a. 3, ad 3.
II. A special question on the same matter is treated by Peter of Tarentaise (here q. 1, a. 3, quaestiuncula 2) and Richard of Mediavilla (here a. 1, q. 4). Others touch upon it in the two preceding questions, or in III Sent., d. 2, especially in the question whether [the Word] assumed the whole by the mediation of the parts (St. Thomas, there q. 2, a. 1, quaestiuncula 3; Scotus, there q. 2).
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- Nam unio est relatio, quae respectum habet ad terminum. Cfr. supra pag. 193, nota 4.For a union is a relation, which has a respect to a term. Cf. above, p. 193, note 4.
- Cfr. supra d. 2. a. 3. q. 1. — De maiori cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Priori, et I. Sent. d. 20. a. 2. q. 1. — Cod. V post anima supplet ipsi, et post ordo codd. A K restat quod.Cf. above, d. 2, a. 3, q. 1. — On the major premise cf. Aristotle, Categories, the chapter "On the Prior," and I Sent., d. 20, a. 2, q. 1. — Codex V, after anima, adds ipsi, and after ordo codices A, K read restat quod.
- Vide supra lit. Magistri, d. V. c. 3.See above, the text of the Master, d. V, c. 3.
- Ut habetur supra d. 6. a. 2. q. 1.As is had above, d. 6, a. 2, q. 1.
- Cfr. supra d. 5. a. 1. q. 1. in corp.Cf. above, d. 5, a. 1, q. 1, in the body.
- Cod. A ita corpus hominis componitur.Codex A reads thus the body of man is composed.
- Cod. K supplet Verbo. Paulo inferius pro unum in natura plurimi codd. unum natura. — Duae hae uniones, licet sint bene distinguendae, non sunt accidentales, sed substantiales, quia substantia «dupliciter dicitur: uno modo pro essentia sive natura, alio modo pro supposito sive hypostasi» (S. Thom., S. III. q. 2. a. 6. ad 3.).Codex K adds Verbo ["to the Word"]. A little below, for unum in natura very many codices read unum natura. — These two unions, although they are well to be distinguished, are not accidental but substantial, since "substance is said in two ways: in one way for the essence or nature, in another way for the supposit or hypostasis" (St. Thomas, Summa III, q. 2, a. 6, ad 3).
- Edd. passione.The editions read passione ["by passion"].
- Vide supra d. 8. a. 2. q. 2. — Paulo ante pro relatio numeretur per, quam lectionem tuentur codd. A K (N a secunda manu) bb, Vat. relatio non numeretur nisi per, alii codd. relatio non uniretur per, edd. 1, 2 relatio non uniatur.See above, d. 8, a. 2, q. 2. — A little before, for relatio numeretur per ["a relation is numbered according to"], which reading codices A, K (N by a second hand), bb defend, the Vatican edition reads relatio non numeretur nisi per ["a relation is not numbered except according to"], other codices relatio non uniretur per, the editions 1, 2 relatio non uniatur.
- Pro divisa codd. B C D F M N O T diversa. Inferius pro ab invicem edd. et plures codd. ad invicem. Subinde post separata edd. repetunt in morte.For divisa ["divided"] codices B, C, D, F, M, N, O, T read diversa ["diverse"]. Below, for ab invicem the editions and several codices read ad invicem. Then after separata the editions repeat in morte ["in death"].
- Vide supra lit. Magistri, d. V. c. 3.See above, the text of the Master, d. V, c. 3.
- Pro ad invicem cod. bb in unionem, codd. A K in unione.For ad invicem codex bb reads in unionem, codices A, K in unione.
- Respicitur illud Aristot., III. Topic. c. 2: «Ubi unum propter alterum, ibi tantum unum». Cfr. supra pag. 222, nota 9. Cfr. etiam I. Sent. d. 20. a. 2. q. 1. — Vat. sed aliqua sic ordinantur, quod ubi est unum propter alterum. Paulo superius pro quando [cod. Q sicut] est ordo edd. quidam est ordo.There is regarded that saying of Aristotle, Topics III, c. 2: «Where one thing is for the sake of another, there is only one thing». Cf. above, p. 222, note 9. Cf. also I Sent., d. 20, a. 2, q. 1. — The Vatican edition reads sed aliqua sic ordinantur, quod ubi est unum propter alterum. A little above, for quando [codex Q: sicut] est ordo the editions read quidam est ordo.
- Pro quia codd. A K bb quae.For quia codices A, K, bb read quae.