Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 1, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 1

Textus Latinus

p. 8

Articulus I. De incarnatione quantum ad unionis possibilitatem.

Quaestio I. Utrum divina natura potuerit uniri cum humana natura.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum divina natura potuerit uniri cum humana natura. Et quod non, videtur.

1. Uniri est pati, sicut unire est agere³, ergo quod impossibile est pati impossibile est uniri; sed divinam naturam impossibile est pati: ergo impossibile est cum alia natura uniri.

2. Item, quaecumque ad invicem uniuntur, aliquo modo componuntur, ergo quod impossibile est alteri componi impossibile est alteri uniri; sed divinam naturam impossibile est alteri componi, cum sit simplicissima et perfectissima⁴: ergo etc.

3. Item, omne unibile et non unitum est ad actum et complementum unionis possibile, omne autem possibile ad actum et complementum est mutabile et imperfectum; sed in Deo nulla potest esse mutatio, nulla imperfectio⁵: ergo nulla temporalis unio.

p. 9

4. Item, quaecumque sunt unibilia, sunt ad invicem proportionabilia, quoniam inter illa nulla est unio, inter quae nulla cadit proportio; sed Dei, qui infinitus est, ad creaturam, quae finita est, nulla cadit proportio⁶: ergo nulla potest esse illarum naturarum coniunctio.

5. Item, plus distat Creator a creatura, quam distent duo opposita, pro eo quod omnia opposita communicant in aliquo genere proximo, vel remoto⁷, Deus autem et creatura nullum genus commune participant: ergo facilius est unire aliqua opposita, quam sit unire divinam naturam cum humana. Sed Deus non potest facere, quod idem sit homo et asinus, vel quod idem sit album et nigrum, aut certe, quod idem sit et non sit: ergo non potest facere, quod idem sit homo et Deus.

Sed contra: 1. Plus potest Deus facere, quam homo potest dicere, iuxta illud Lucae primo⁸: Non erit impossibile apud Deum omne verbum: si igitur homo potest illud credere et dicere, quod Deus sit humanitati nostrae unitus; videtur, quod hoc non sit apud Deum impossibile.

2. Item, plus potest Deus facere, quam nos petere, iuxta illud ad Ephesios tertio⁹: Deus, qui potest facere superabundanter, quam petimus, aut intelligimus; sed homo potuit petere, Filium Dei incarnari: ergo Verbum Dei fieri carnem vel incarnari non fuit Deo impossibile.

3. Item, quando duo sic se habent, quod unum est materiale respectu alterius et illi conforme, possibile est, uniri unum alteri; sed anima plus habet de possibilitate¹⁰ respectu Dei, quam habeat corpus respectu animae; plus etiam habet de ratione conformitatis, cum anima sit substantia spiritualis et imago Dei: ergo si Deus animam potuit unire corpori, videtur, quod similiter possit substantiam humanam unire sibi.

4. Item, omne quod est alteri maxime intimum et amabile, est ei unibile unione maxima; sed Deus est animae intimus et amabilissimus¹¹: ergo videtur, quod substantiae rationali perfecte uniri possit Spiritus increatus.

5. Item, si divina natura non potest sibi unire humanam, aut hoc est propter impedimentum ex parte naturae suae, aut propter impedimentum ex parte creaturae. Si propter impedimentum ex parte naturae suae: ergo cum illud sit opus perfectissimum et nobilissimum, videtur, quod divina natura non sit consona omnimodae perfectioni et nobilitati. Si propter impedimentum¹² creaturae: ergo videtur, quod creatura non sit in perfecta obedientia respectu Creatoris; hoc autem derogat divinae omnipotentiae: ergo impossibile est, quod respectu talis unionis interveniat impedimentum ex parte aliqua. Et si hoc, restat quod Deus potuit creaturam rationalem sibi unire.

Conclusio

Possibile fuit, humanam naturam uniri divinae in persona Filii.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod absque dubio possibile fuit, naturam humanam uniri divinae in persona Filii.

Ratio autem huius est ista: quia omnia illa attribuenda sunt divinae potentiae, quae sibi non derogant; et talia sunt, quae posse est potentiae¹³. Divinam autem naturam uniri humanae in unitatem personae non est aliud, quam divinam personam, quae ab aeterno fuit hypostasis respectu divinae naturae, esse hypostasim respectu humanae naturae in tempore; hoc autem non dicit aliquam imperfectionem, sed potius dignitatem et nobilitatem. — Sicut enim, cum Deus sit bonus ab aeterno, in nullo fit derogatio bonitati suae, dum est causa bonitatis creatae¹⁴ in tempore, quamvis bonitas creata longe sit inferior bonitate increata; sic, cum persona Filii Dei sit hypostasis intellectualis et spiritualis et increata ab aeterno, in nullo derogat ei, si sit hypostasis rationalis naturae creatae in tempore. — Et quemadmodum Deus de non creante fit creans in actu absque aliqua sui mutatione vel innovatione, sed solum facta immutatione ex parte naturae creatae¹⁵; sic persona Filii Dei, quae non erat hypostasis humanae naturae in actu, habet esse eius hypostasis absque aliqua sui mutatione vel innovatione, sola facta mutatione ex parte naturae assumtae. —

p. 10

Et quemadmodum Deus, cum est in creatura per essentiam, praesentiam et potentiam, in nullo dependet ab ipsa, sed potius dependet creatura ab ipso, tanquam a causa conservante et sustentante¹⁶; sic et Deus, cum est in creatura rationali per unionem, non dependet ex ipsa, sed potius e converso rationalis natura dependet ex hypostasi divina et habet substantificari¹⁷ in illa, sicut natura substantificatur in persona.

Et sic patet, quod unio divinae naturae cum humana in nullo derogat nobilitati divinae¹⁸; et ideo, cum omnia attribuenda sint Deo, quae non derogant omnipotentiae eius, indubitanter ponendum est, eius incarnationis mysterium esse Deo possibile. Propter quod dixit Angelus ad Mariam, in eius primordio aperiens incarnationis mysterium: Non erit impossibile apud Deum omne verbum. — Unde et concedendae sunt rationes, quae hoc ostendunt.

Ad argumenta:

Ad 1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod uniri est pati; dicendum, quod sicut dicit Priscianus¹⁹, quaedam sunt verba, quae in voce activa significant passionem; et quaedam sunt verba, quae in voce passiva significant actionem; et hoc modo intelligendum est, cum dicitur, divinam naturam humanae uniri, non quia divina natura aliquid patiatur, sed quia ipsa divina natura humanam naturam unit²⁰ sibi in propriam personam sive hypostasim. Posset etiam aliter dici, quod sicut generare et generari non significant in divinis actionem vel passionem, sed relationem²¹; sic etiam uniri, dictum de divina natura vel persona, non dicit actionem aliquam, sed relationem potius, quae quidem relatio dicit dependentiam solum in natura creata; sicut haberi potest ex his, quae in primo Libro determinata sunt, cum agebatur de divinis nominibus, quae dicunt respectum ad creaturam, distinctione trigesima²².

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quae uniuntur componuntur; dicendum, quod si proprie accipiatur verbum componendi, in plus est unio quam compositio. Unio enim dicit coniunctionem duorum in tertio, sive uniantur ad constitutionem tertii, sive non²³. Compositio vero dicit coniunctionem aliquorum, ita quod veniunt ad constitutionem tertii; et omne tale aliquo modo est materiale respectu alterius. Et ideo compositio semper importat imperfectionem in componentibus, unio vero non. Et propterea non sequitur, quod si divina natura non potest alteri componi, quod non possit alteri uniri.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omne unibile non²⁴ unitum est ad complementum unionis possibile; dicendum, quod illud verum est de illo unibili, quod habet perduci ad actum unionis per aliquid acquisitum in ipso; de illo autem, quod est unibile solum per aliquid acquisitum in altero, non habet veritatem; et hoc modo est unibilis divina natura humanae naturae per mutationem factam in creatura. Et ideo ex hoc non sequitur, quod aliqua sit possibilitas imperfectionis vel mutationis²⁵ ex parte divinae naturae, sed solum ex parte naturae creatae. Et ratio huius est, quia unio dicit relationem, relatio introduci habet in esse per mutationem factam in uno extremo, altero omnino immobili remanente; sicut patet: si ego sim albus, et generetur

p. 11

alius, qui sit albus, statim incipit mihi esse similis, nulla in me facta mutatione, sed solum in ipso. Similiter exemplum ponit Boethius²⁶ de dextro et sinistro. Sic intelligendum est in proposito. Et potest etiam huius simile inveniri in unione radii et crystalli. Si enim crystallus superinducatur radio iam domum illuminanti, crystallus illuminari dicitur et a radio pertransiri et ei copulari absque mutatione facta ex parte radii, sed solum ex parte crystalli²⁷. Sic suo modo, sed longe spiritualius, intelligendum est in natura assumta et persona Verbi.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omne unibile est proportionabile; dicendum, quod verum est, si intelligatur de proportione, quae attenditur in convenientia ordinis. Si autem intelligatur de proportione, quae est in commensuratione quantitatis, veritatem non habet, pro eo quod, si aqua maris infinita esset, adhuc posset spongia immergi, sicut nunc immergeretur, et uniri; et ideo sufficit ad unionem proportio, quae surgit ex convenientia ordinis. Et talis est convenientia, quae est inter creaturam rationalem et Deum, pro eo quod natura rationalis, eo ipso quod est imago Dei, nata est ordinari ad ipsum immediate, sicut in primo²⁸ et secundo libro fuit ostensum.

Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod maior est convenientia oppositorum, quam sit Dei ad creaturam, et ita quod magis sunt unibilia; dicendum, quod etsi maior sit convenientia propter alicuius communis²⁹ participationem, nunquam tamen ita est convenientia secundum possibilitatem et ordinem unius ad alterum, quia unum oppositum non habet ordinari ad suum oppositum sicut ad causam et complementum, sicut creatura rationalis habet ordinari ad Deum. Convenientia autem in participatione alicuius communis non facit, aliqua esse unibilia, nisi sit aliqua convenientia secundum rationem inclinationis et ordinis, sicut patet. Magis enim est anima unibilis corpori, quam sit una anima unibilis alteri; et sicut non tenet illud argumentum: anima non potest alteri animae uniri: ergo non potest corpori uniri: sic nec illud argumentum concludit: oppositum non potest uniri opposito: ergo creatura non potest uniri Deo.

Scholion

I. Cum, fide testante, Verbum caro factum sit, etiam fide constat, possibile fuisse Deo carnem assumere, non solum secundum potentiam ipsius absolutam, sed etiam ordinatam, quae attenditur in congruitate ad omnia divina attributa. Sola autem naturali ratione non potest evidenter probari, sive a priori sive a posteriori, possibile esse hoc mysterium; nec ipse modus hypostaticae unionis potest indagari, cum sit prorsus singularis et valde diversus ab omnibus unionis speciebus, quae in creaturis inveniuntur. Solvi autem possunt omnia argumenta ab infidelibus contra possibilitatem ac congruentiam incarnationis obiecta. — Praedicta communiter a theologis docentur; secundum quam doctrinam etiam argumenta proposita a seraphico Doctore intelligenda sunt. Obiectiones autem infidelium fere omnes iam satis solvuntur determinando veram ineffabilis huius unionis intelligentiam, quod fit in seqq. distinctionibus. De variis unionis speciebus vide infra d. 6. a. 2. q. 1, d. 2. a. 3. q. 2. in corp. et ad 4, d. 5. a. 1. q. 1, d. 21. a. 1. q. 3, d. 22. a. 1. q. 1; I. Sent. d. 10. a. 2. q. 2, d. 16. q. 3. ad 3, d. 37. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. ad 1. Cfr. etiam doctrina Damasceni relata supra pag. 8, nota 3, et praecipue S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1, ubi multos naturalis unionis modos ad tria capita reducit, scilicet vel quando aliqua non uniuntur nisi per coniunctionem eorum in aliquo uno (ita uniuntur duo rami in uno trunco, duo homines in una specie, homo et equus in uno genere, et analoga in quodam uno); vel quando uniuntur tum per coniunctionem ad invicem, tum aliquo uno, quod ex eorum coniunctione constituitur (sicut materia et forma); vel quando ita coniunguntur ad invicem, ut non in aliquo uno, quia ex eorum unione nihil resultat, sicut ex accidente et subiecto non efficitur unum per se, cuius subiectum et accidens partes dici possint.

II. Observandum est, quod in solut. ad 1. duae responsiones afferuntur, quia prima sola non sufficeret. Manifestum quidem est, quod unibilitas ex parte Dei, qui est actus purus, nullo modo dicit potentiam passivam, sed potentiam activam assumendi naturam humanam; sed haec potentia activa (sicut et ipse actus sive operatio uniendi) est tribus personis communis. In Filio autem haec unio insuper importat relationem, quae quidem ex parte naturae assumtae est realis, non autem ex parte personae assumentis. Hoc egregie explicatur in solut. ad 3, et simul per distinctionem duplicis unibilis solvitur difficultas satis intricata et a theologis non eodem modo enodata, scilicet quod substantialis unio Verbi cum humana natura eidem quandam mutationem vel novitatem attribuere videatur.

III. Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 2. m. 1. 2. — Scot., in utroque Scripto, hic q. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. c. Gent. IV. c. 39. 40. — B. Albert., hic a. 1. (simul agit de congruitate). — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Biel, hic q. 1.

IV. De sequenti (2.) quaestione inter catholicos nulla potest esse controversia, nec etiam differentia opinionum in assignanda ratione principali, licet in explicatione eiusdem diversae de constitutione personae divinae sententiae se prodant. Alex. Hal., loc. cit. m. 4. — Scot., loc. cit. n. 4; Report. q. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1; S. III. q. 3. a. 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 11. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., a. 1. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 3. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

---

English Translation

Article I. On the incarnation as regards the possibility of union.

Question I. Whether the divine nature could be united with human nature.

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and asks whether the divine nature could be united with human nature. And it seems that it could not.

1. To be united is to undergo, just as to unite is to act³; therefore that which is impossible to undergo is impossible to be united; but it is impossible for the divine nature to undergo: therefore it is impossible for it to be united with another nature.

2. Likewise, whatever things are united to one another are in some manner composed; therefore that which is impossible to be composed with another is impossible to be united to another; but it is impossible for the divine nature to be composed with another, since it is most simple and most perfect⁴: therefore, and so on.

3. Likewise, everything unitable and not united is in potency to the act and completion of union, and everything in potency to the act and completion is mutable and imperfect; but in God there can be no change, no imperfection⁵: therefore there can be no temporal union.

4. Likewise, whatever things are unitable are proportionable to one another, since there is no union between those between which no proportion falls; but between God, who is infinite, and the creature, which is finite, no proportion falls⁶: therefore there can be no conjunction of those natures.

5. Likewise, the Creator is more distant from the creature than two opposites are distant, on account of the fact that all opposites share in some genus, whether proximate or remote⁷, whereas God and the creature participate in no common genus: therefore it is easier to unite some opposites than it is to unite the divine nature with the human. But God cannot bring it about that the same thing be a man and an ass, or that the same thing be white and black, or indeed that the same thing both be and not be: therefore he cannot bring it about that the same thing be a man and God.

On the contrary: 1. God can do more than a man can say, according to that text of Luke, chapter one⁸: No word shall be impossible with God: if therefore a man can believe and say that God is united to our humanity, it seems that this is not impossible with God.

2. Likewise, God can do more than we can ask, according to that text in Ephesians, chapter three⁹: God, who is able to do superabundantly more than we ask or understand; but a man could ask that the Son of God be incarnate: therefore for the Word of God to be made flesh or to be incarnate was not impossible for God.

3. Likewise, when two things are so disposed that one is material in relation to the other and conformed to it, it is possible for the one to be united to the other; but the soul has more of possibility¹⁰ in relation to God than the body has in relation to the soul; it has also more of the character of conformity, since the soul is a spiritual substance and the image of God: therefore if God could unite the soul to the body, it seems that he could likewise unite human substance to himself.

4. Likewise, everything which is most intimate and lovable to another is unitable to it by the greatest union; but God is most intimate and most lovable to the soul¹¹: therefore it seems that the uncreated Spirit could be united perfectly to a rational substance.

5. Likewise, if the divine nature cannot unite the human to itself, this is either on account of an impediment on the part of its own nature, or on account of an impediment on the part of the creature. If on account of an impediment on the part of its own nature: then, since that work is most perfect and most noble, it seems that the divine nature is not consonant with perfection and nobility in every mode. If on account of an impediment¹² on the part of the creature: then it seems that the creature is not in perfect obedience in respect of the Creator; but this derogates from the divine omnipotence: therefore it is impossible that, in respect of such a union, an impediment should intervene from any part. And if this is so, it remains that God could unite a rational creature to himself.

Conclusio

It was possible for human nature to be united to the divine in the person of the Son.

Respondeo: It must be said that without doubt it was possible for human nature to be united to the divine in the person of the Son.

Now the ground of this is the following: that all those things are to be attributed to the divine power which do not derogate from it; and such are the things which are within the power to do¹³. But for the divine nature to be united to the human in the unity of person is nothing other than for the divine person, which from eternity was the hypostasis in respect of the divine nature, to be the hypostasis in respect of the human nature in time; and this says no imperfection, but rather dignity and nobility. — For just as, since God is good from eternity, no derogation is made to his goodness when he is the cause of created goodness¹⁴ in time, although created goodness is far inferior to uncreated goodness; so, since the person of the Son of God is an intellectual and spiritual and uncreated hypostasis from eternity, it in no way derogates from him if he be the hypostasis of a rational created nature in time. — And just as God becomes a creator in act from being a non-creator without any change or innovation of himself, but only by a change being made on the part of the created nature¹⁵; so the person of the Son of God, who was not in act the hypostasis of human nature, has the being of its hypostasis without any change or innovation of himself, by a change being made on the part of the assumed nature alone. —

And just as God, when he is in a creature by essence, presence, and power, in no way depends on it, but rather the creature depends on him, as on a conserving and sustaining cause¹⁶; so also God, when he is in a rational creature by union, does not depend on it, but rather conversely the rational nature depends on the divine hypostasis and has its being-substantified¹⁷ in it, just as the nature is substantified in the person.

And thus it is clear that the union of the divine nature with the human in no way derogates from the divine nobility¹⁸; and therefore, since all things are to be attributed to God which do not derogate from his omnipotence, it must without hesitation be laid down that the mystery of his incarnation is possible for God. On account of which the Angel said to Mary, at its beginning disclosing the mystery of the incarnation: No word shall be impossible with God. — Hence also the reasons which show this are to be granted.

Ad argumenta:

To 1. To that, then, which is objected to the contrary, that to be united is to undergo; it must be said that, as Priscian says¹⁹, there are certain verbs which in the active voice signify passion; and there are certain verbs which in the passive voice signify action; and in this manner it must be understood, when it is said that the divine nature is united to the human, not that the divine nature undergoes anything, but that the divine nature itself unites²⁰ the human nature to itself into its own person or hypostasis. It could also be said otherwise, that just as to generate and to be generated do not signify in divine matters action or passion, but a relation²¹; so too to be united, said of the divine nature or person, does not state any action, but rather a relation, which relation indeed states a dependence only in the created nature; as can be gathered from those things which were determined in the first Book, when divine names which state a respect to the creature were treated, in distinction thirtieth²².

To 2. To that which is objected, that things which are united are composed; it must be said that, if the word to compose be taken properly, union is wider than composition. For union states the conjunction of two in a third, whether they be united for the constitution of a third or not²³. But composition states the conjunction of some things in such a way that they come to the constitution of a third; and every such thing is in some manner material in relation to the other. And therefore composition always imports imperfection in the things composed, whereas union does not. And on that account it does not follow that, if the divine nature cannot be composed with another, that it cannot be united to another.

To 3. To that which is objected, that everything unitable and not²⁴ united is in potency to the completion of union; it must be said that this is true of that unitable thing which has to be brought to the act of union through something acquired in itself; but of that which is unitable only through something acquired in the other, it does not hold; and in this manner the divine nature is unitable to the human nature through a change made in the creature. And therefore from this it does not follow that there is any possibility of imperfection or change²⁵ on the part of the divine nature, but only on the part of the created nature. And the ground of this is that union states a relation, and a relation has to be introduced into being through a change made in one extreme, the other remaining wholly unmoved; as is clear: if I am white, and another be generated

who is white, he straightway begins to be like me, with no change made in me, but only in him. Boethius likewise²⁶ gives the example of right and left. Thus it must be understood in the case at hand. And a likeness of this can also be found in the union of a ray and a crystal. For if a crystal be set beneath a ray already illuminating a house, the crystal is said to be illuminated and to be penetrated by the ray and joined to it without any change made on the part of the ray, but only on the part of the crystal²⁷. So in its own manner, but far more spiritually, must it be understood in the assumed nature and the person of the Word.

To 4. To that which is objected, that everything unitable is proportionable; it must be said that it is true, if it be understood of the proportion which is regarded in the agreement of order. But if it be understood of the proportion which is in the commensuration of quantity, it does not hold, on account of the fact that, if the water of the sea were infinite, a sponge could still be immersed, as it now would be immersed, and united; and therefore for union there suffices the proportion which arises from the agreement of order. And such is the agreement which is between the rational creature and God, on account of the fact that the rational nature, by the very fact that it is the image of God, is born to be ordered to him immediately, as was shown in the first²⁸ and second books.

To 5. To that which is objected, that the agreement of opposites is greater than that of God to the creature, and thus that they are more unitable; it must be said that, although the agreement be greater on account of the participation of something common²⁹, yet never is the agreement such according to the possibility and order of the one to the other, because one opposite is not born to be ordered to its opposite as to a cause and completion, as the rational creature is born to be ordered to God. But agreement in the participation of something common does not make things to be unitable, unless there be some agreement according to the character of inclination and order, as is clear. For the soul is more unitable to the body than one soul is unitable to another; and just as that argument does not hold: the soul cannot be united to another soul: therefore it cannot be united to the body: so neither does that argument conclude: an opposite cannot be united to its opposite: therefore the creature cannot be united to God.

Scholion

I. Since, faith bearing witness, the Word was made flesh, it is also established by faith that it was possible for God to assume flesh, not only according to his absolute power, but also according to his ordained power, which is regarded in congruity with all the divine attributes. But by natural reason alone it cannot be evidently proved, either a priori or a posteriori, that this mystery is possible; nor can the mode itself of the hypostatic union be searched out, since it is altogether singular and very diverse from all the species of union which are found in creatures. But all the arguments objected by unbelievers against the possibility and congruity of the incarnation can be resolved. — The foregoing are commonly taught by the theologians; and according to this doctrine the arguments proposed by the Seraphic Doctor are also to be understood. Now nearly all the objections of unbelievers are already sufficiently resolved by determining the true understanding of this ineffable union, which is done in the following distinctions. On the various species of union see below d. 6 a. 2 q. 1, d. 2 a. 3 q. 2 in the body and ad 4, d. 5 a. 1 q. 1, d. 21 a. 1 q. 3, d. 22 a. 1 q. 1; I Sent. d. 10 a. 2 q. 2, d. 16 q. 3 ad 3, d. 37 p. I a. 1 q. 1 ad 1. Compare also the doctrine of Damascene related above on page 8, note 3, and especially St. Thomas, here q. 1 a. 1, where he reduces the many modes of natural union to three heads, namely: either when some things are not united except through their conjunction in some one thing (thus two branches are united in one trunk, two men in one species, man and horse in one genus, and analogous things in some one thing); or when they are united both through conjunction with one another and in some one thing which is constituted from their conjunction (as matter and form); or when they are so conjoined with one another that they are not in some one thing, since from their union nothing results, as from an accident and a subject there is not effected one thing per se, whose subject and accident could be called parts.

II. It must be observed that in the solution to objection 1 two responses are brought forward, because the first alone would not suffice. It is indeed manifest that unitability on the part of God, who is pure act, in no way states passive potency, but active potency of assuming human nature; but this active potency (as also the act itself or operation of uniting) is common to the three persons. In the Son, however, this union further imports a relation, which indeed on the part of the assumed nature is real, but not on the part of the assuming person. This is excellently explained in the solution to objection 3, and at the same time, through the distinction of the twofold unitable, there is resolved a difficulty rather intricate and not unraveled by the theologians in the same manner, namely that the substantial union of the Word with the human nature seems to attribute to it a certain change or novelty.

III. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. III q. 2 m. 1, 2. — Scotus, in both Writings, here q. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 1 a. 1; Summa contra Gentiles IV c. 39, 40. — Blessed Albert, here a. 1 (he treats at the same time of congruity). — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1 a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 1 q. 1. — Giles of Rome, here q. 1 a. 1. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Denis the Carthusian, here q. 1. — Biel, here q. 1.

IV. Concerning the following (second) question there can be no controversy among Catholics, nor even any difference of opinions in assigning the principal ground, although in the explanation of the same diverse opinions concerning the constitution of the divine person show themselves. Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. m. 4. — Scotus, loc. cit. n. 4; Reportata q. 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 2 a. 1; Summa III q. 3 a. 4. — Blessed Albert, here a. 11. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3 a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, a. 1 q. 2. — Giles of Rome, here q. 1 a. 3. — Durandus, here q. 2. — Denis the Carthusian, here q. 2.

---

Apparatus Criticus

A Damasceno (ed. Migne, Patrol. Graec. tom. 95. col. 231, inter Fragmenta) unio generaliter definitur διεστώτων πραγμάτων κοινωνικὴ συνδρομή, i. e. rerum distantium communicativus concursus (sive concursus, quo res distantes sese communicant) vel, ut in ed. Migne legitur, rerum distantium in sui invicem communionem venientium concursus. Ab eodem Damasc. deinde 12 modi unionis enumerantur (iam prius a Maximo Confess. recensiti, de quo vide Migne, Patrol. Graec. tom. 91. col. 214), quos, cum complures eorum a S. Bonav. adducantur, hic afferre iuvat. Est etenim: unio secundum mixtionem seu temperationem (κρᾶσιν), ut in fluidis; secundum coacervationem (σωρείαν), ut in siccis; secundum conspersionem (φύσιν), qualis est inter humidum et siccum; secundum admixtionem sive permixtionem (ἀνάμιξιν), ut in variis farinis; secundum confusionem (σύγχυσιν), ut in his quae liquantur, v. g. auro et argento; secundum compaginationem (ἁρμονίαν), ut in lapidibus; secundum appositionem (παράθεσιν), ut in asseribus et tabulis; secundum contractionem sive coalitionem (συναλοιφήν), ut in lampade ex igne prodeunte ac rursus cum igne unita; secundum essentiam (οὐσίαν), ut in individuis Petro et Paulo; secundum affectum (σχέσιν), ut in amicis ac sententiis; secundum compositionem (σύνθεσιν), ut in anima et corpore; secundum hypostasim (ὑπόστασιν), ut in Christo, ubi duae naturae unam personam habent; alio etiam modo unio secundum hypostasim et concursus rerum diversae essentiae in unam personam, servata unicuique post unionem sua naturali proprietate, ut in anima et corpore humano. Praeter hos 12 unionis modos etiam notatu digna est unio secundum consertionem (συναίρεσιν), ut in texturis; sicut et unio secundum insertionem (insitionem), de qua Rom. 11, 24: Insertus es in bonam olivam; nec non unio secundum commeationem sive circumincessionem (περιχώρησιν). — In Vat. desiderantur verba ergo quod impossibile est pati. Post maiori ergo cfr. I. Sent. d. 19. p. II. q. 3. Post secundum ergo cod. S repetit divinam naturam.
From Damascene (ed. Migne, Patrologia Graeca tom. 95, col. 231, among the Fragments) union is generally defined as διεστώτων πραγμάτων κοινωνικὴ συνδρομή, i.e. the communicative concurrence of distant things (or the concurrence by which distant things communicate themselves to one another), or, as it is read in the Migne edition, the concurrence of distant things coming into communion with one another. From the same Damascene there are then enumerated 12 modes of union (already earlier reviewed by Maximus the Confessor, on whom see Migne, Patrologia Graeca tom. 91, col. 214), which, since several of them are adduced by St. Bonaventure, it is helpful to set forth here. For there is: union according to mixture or tempering (κρᾶσιν), as in fluids; according to heaping together (σωρείαν), as in dry things; according to sprinkling together (φύσιν), such as is between the moist and the dry; according to admixture or commingling (ἀνάμιξιν), as in various flours; according to confusion (σύγχυσιν), as in those things which are liquefied, e.g. gold and silver; according to joining together (ἁρμονίαν), as in stones; according to apposition (παράθεσιν), as in planks and boards; according to contraction or coalition (συναλοιφήν), as in a lamp going forth from fire and again united with the fire; according to essence (οὐσίαν), as in the individuals Peter and Paul; according to affection (σχέσιν), as in friends and opinions; according to composition (σύνθεσιν), as in soul and body; according to hypostasis (ὑπόστασιν), as in Christ, where two natures have one person; in yet another mode, union according to hypostasis and the concurrence of things of diverse essence into one person, each retaining after the union its own natural property, as in the human soul and body. Besides these 12 modes of union, worthy of note also is union according to interweaving (συναίρεσιν), as in textures; just as also union according to engrafting (insertion), of which Romans 11:24: Thou wast grafted into the good olive tree; and also union according to commeation or circumincession (περιχώρησιν). — In the Vatican edition the words ergo quod impossibile est pati are wanting. After maiori ergo compare I Sent. d. 19 p. II q. 3. After secundum therefore codex S repeats divinam naturam.
Cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 1. seq. — In hoc arg. supponitur, quod componentia teneant rationem partis, quae per se includit imperfectionem. « Pars enim, ut ait Aristot., I. Polit. c. 3. (c. 2.), non solum alterius est pars, sed omnino alterius » (scil. totius). — Pro ergo quod codd. A F U sed quod.
Compare I Sent. d. 8 p. II q. 1 ff. — In this argument it is supposed that the components hold the character of a part, which of itself includes imperfection. "For a part, as Aristotle says, Politics I c. 3 (c. 2), is not only a part of another, but wholly of another" (namely, of the whole). — For ergo quod codices A F U read sed quod.
Cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. seq.
Compare I Sent. d. 8 p. I a. 2 q. 1 ff.
Aristot., I. de Caelo et mundo, text. 52. et 64. (c. 6. seq.), infiniti ad finitum proportionem esse negat.
Aristotle, On the Heavens I, text 52 and 64 (c. 6 ff.), denies that there is a proportion of the infinite to the finite.
Vide locc. ex Aristot. citt. tom. II. pag. 814, nota 8. — Quod Deus duo opposita coniungere nequeat, monstratum est I. Sent. d. 42. q. 3. — Paulo inferius post aliqua opposita cod. S addit quae communicant in aliquo genere proximo, vel remoto.
See the places from Aristotle cited in tom. II, p. 814, note 8. — That God cannot conjoin two opposites was shown in I Sent. d. 42 q. 3. — A little below, after aliqua opposita, codex S adds quae communicant in aliquo genere proximo, vel remoto.
Vers. 37. — Post pauca cod. T omittit illud.
Verse 37. — After a few words codex T omits illud.
Vers. 20. Pro qui potest facere Vulgata exhibet qui potens est omnia facere.
Verse 20. For qui potest facere the Vulgate gives qui potens est omnia facere (who is able to do all things).
De possibilitate hic dictum est per analogiam ad materiale principium sive materiam, quae respectu formae, quacum coniungitur, potentia (possibilitas) esse dicitur. — August., Epist. 137. (alias 3.) ad Volusian. c. 3. n. 11. ait: « Si autem utrumque [scil. unio animae nostrae cum corpore et unio Verbi cum anima] nobis pariter inexpertum credendum praeciperetur, quid horum citius crederemus? Quomodo non faleremur, duo incorporea quam unum corporeum alterumque incorporeum facilius potuisse misceri »? Cfr. etiam X. de Civ. Dei, c. 29. n. 2. — Leo M., Epist. 35. (alias 25.) ad Iulian. episc. Coensem c. 2. scribit: Cur autem inconveniens aut impossibile videatur, ut Verbum et caro atque anima unus Iesus Christus et unus Dei hominisque sit filius, si caro et anima, quae dissimilium naturarum sunt, unam faciunt etiam sine Verbi incarnatione personam; cum multo sit facilius, ut hanc unitatem sui atque hominis Deitatis praestet potestas, quam ut eam in substantiis suis obtineat solius humanitatis infirmitas?
Of possibility is here said by analogy to the material principle or matter, which in respect of the form with which it is conjoined is said to be potency (possibility). — Augustine, Letter 137 (elsewhere 3) to Volusianus c. 3 n. 11, says: "But if both [namely, the union of our soul with the body and the union of the Word with the soul] were enjoined upon us alike, as something never experienced, to be believed, which of these would we believe more readily? How should we not confess that two incorporeal things could more easily be mingled than one corporeal and the other incorporeal?" Compare also On the City of God X c. 29 n. 2. — Leo the Great, Letter 35 (elsewhere 25) to Julian, bishop of Cos, c. 2, writes: But why should it seem unfitting or impossible that the Word and flesh and soul be one Jesus Christ and one son of God and of man, if flesh and soul, which are of unlike natures, make one person even without the incarnation of the Word; since it is far easier that the power of the Godhead should furnish this unity of itself and of man, than that the weakness of mere humanity should obtain it in its own substances?
Cfr. I. Sent. d. 1. a. 3. q. 2, et II. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 2. in corp. — Paschasius diac., II. de Spiritu S. c. 1. ait: Anima vero animae, aut Angelus Angelo coniungi potest, infundi non potest, quia huiusmodi creaturarum genera tantum Spiritus S. i. e. solius Dei capacia sunt; quia figuli sui vasa sunt, ab illo solo impleri possunt, a quo de nihilo facta sunt, et sine quo vacua esse sentiuntur... Sola ergo se divina potentia, quae et in Spiritu sancto est, rationabilibus creaturis infusa et circumfusa permiscet, sicut peculiariter in illo dominici hominis corpore, ex Maria matre suscepto, gratia exuberante requievit, sicut de se ipso Filius dicit: Spiritus Domini super me (Luc. 4, 18.). — Ex hoc principio, quod Deus intimus sit animae, deduci potest, nullam creaturam rationalem cum alia tam intime posse coniungi, sicut Verbum incarnatum hypostatice coniunctum est cum natura humana.
Compare I Sent. d. 1 a. 3 q. 2, and II Sent. d. 8 p. II q. 2 in the body. — Paschasius the deacon, On the Holy Spirit II c. 1, says: A soul indeed can be conjoined to a soul, or an Angel to an Angel, but cannot be infused, because creatures of this kind are capable only of the Holy Spirit, i.e. of God alone; for they are vessels of their potter, and can be filled only by him by whom they were made from nothing, and without whom they perceive themselves to be empty... The divine power alone, therefore, which is also in the Holy Spirit, being infused into and poured around rational creatures, mingles itself with them, just as it peculiarly rested with overflowing grace in that body of the Lord's manhood, received from Mary his mother, as the Son says of himself: The Spirit of the Lord is upon me (Luke 4:18). — From this principle, that God is intimate to the soul, it can be deduced that no rational creature can be so intimately conjoined with another as the incarnate Word is hypostatically conjoined with the human nature.
Vat. addit ex parte. Paulo ante cod. S verbo nobilitati adiungit quod est inconveniens. — De potentia obedientiali cfr. II. Sent. d. 18. a. 1. q. 2. in corp.
The Vatican edition adds ex parte. A little before, codex S to the word nobilitati adds quod est inconveniens. — On obediential potency compare II Sent. d. 18 a. 1 q. 2 in the body.
Pro posse est potentiae, quam lectionem ex cod. V restauravimus, quaeque lectio prorsus convenit cum iis quae I. Sent. d. 42. q. 2. in corp. habentur, cod. M substituit posse est posse, Vat. cum ceteris edd. nec non cum aliis codd. possibile est posse.
For posse est potentiae — the reading which we have restored from codex V, and which agrees entirely with what is held in I Sent. d. 42 q. 2 in the body — codex M substitutes posse est posse, the Vatican edition with the other editions and also with other codices possibile est posse.
Codd. A E N creaturae.
Codices A E N read creaturae.
Cfr. I. Sent. d. 30. q. 1. seqq., et II. Sent. d. 1. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. — Paulo inferius pro sola facta mutatione codd. K S sed solum facta mutatione.
Compare I Sent. d. 30 q. 1 ff., and II Sent. d. 1 p. I a. 1 q. 2. — A little below, for sola facta mutatione codices K S read sed solum facta mutatione.
De quo vide I. Sent. d. 37. p. I. per totam, praecipue a. 3. q. 2, et II. Sent. d. 37. a. 1. q. 2. — Aliquanto superius pro cum est in edd. qui est in.
On which see I Sent. d. 37 p. I throughout, especially a. 3 q. 2, and II Sent. d. 37 a. 1 q. 2. — Somewhat above, for cum est the editions read qui est in.
De hoc verbo cfr. II. Sent. pag. 812, nota 6.
On this word compare II Sent. p. 812, note 6.
In cod. S legitur: Et sic patet, quod potest esse quaedam unio divinae naturae cum humana, quae in nullo derogat divinae naturae. Paulo inferius ante incarnationis in codd. H K Z bb deest eius.
In codex S it reads: And thus it is clear that there can be a certain union of the divine nature with the human, which in no way derogates from the divine nature. A little below, before incarnationis, in codices H K Z bb eius is wanting.
Libr. VIII. Grammat. c. 2: Haec enim [metuo, metuor; timeo, timeor] contrarias vocibus videntur habere significationes, quamvis etiam ad sensus pertinentia verba, si quis altius consideret, in activis vocibus passionem, et in passivis actionem fieri inveniret, ut audio te, video te, tango te. Ostendo enim, pati me aliquid in ipso actu etc. — Subinde cod. F omittit verba quaedam sunt... passionem, et non pauci alii codd. cum edd. 1, 2 omittunt illa alia verba et quaedam sunt verba... actionem, quorum loco cod. bb substituit e converso.
Grammar book VIII c. 2: For these [metuo, metuor; timeo, timeor] seem to have meanings contrary to their voices, although even verbs pertaining to the senses, if one consider more deeply, one would find that in active voices passion, and in passive voices action, comes about, as audio te (I hear thee), video te (I see thee), tango te (I touch thee). For I show that I undergo something in the very act, and so on. — Thereupon codex F omits the words quaedam sunt... passionem, and not a few other codices with editions 1, 2 omit those other words et quaedam sunt verba... actionem, in place of which codex bb substitutes e converso (conversely).
Codd. K Z univit.
Codices K Z read univit.
Cfr. I. Sent. d. 9. q. 2. — Paulo ante pro vel passionem codd. K Z bb exhibent et passionem; paulo inferius pro dicit actionem aliquam cod. Z dicit actionem et passionem.
Compare I Sent. d. 9 q. 2. — A little before, for vel passionem codices K Z bb give et passionem; a little below, for dicit actionem aliquam codex Z reads dicit actionem et passionem.
Praesertim q. 3.
Especially q. 3.
Ut duo rami in uno trunco, individua in specie, species in genere; econtra corpus et anima in sua unione constituunt tertium (vide hic in scholio locum S. Thomae). — Paulo superius pro quod si, quae lectio est codd. K Z, plurimi codd. cum edd. incongrue substituunt quod etsi, cod. A quod etiamsi. Post pauca pro in plus [i. e. latius] edd. exhibent etiam plus. Paulo inferius pro veniunt in codd. H K Q S U legitur conveniunt, et deinde in codd. K (K a secunda manu) Q componibilibus pro componentibus.
As two branches in one trunk, individuals in a species, species in a genus; on the contrary, body and soul in their union constitute a third (see here in the scholion the passage of St. Thomas). — A little above, for quod si, which is the reading of codices K Z, very many codices with the editions incongruously substitute quod etsi, codex A quod etiamsi. After a few words, for in plus [i.e. more broadly] the editions give etiam plus. A little below, for veniunt in codices H K Q S U is read conveniunt, and then in codices K (K by a second hand) Q componibilibus for componentibus.
Ante non unitum codd. F S (T a secunda manu) U inserunt et; codd. G L V cum edd. 1, 2 non unitum commutarunt in intimum. Subinde codd. aa bb inter ad et complementum interiiciunt actum et.
Before non unitum codices F S (T by a second hand) U insert et; codices G L V with editions 1, 2 changed non unitum into intimum. Thereupon codices aa bb between ad and complementum interpose actum et.
Edd. addunt in hac unione.
The editions add in hac unione (in this union).
Libr. de Trin. c. 5: Age enim, stet quisquam; et igitur si accedam dexter, erit ille sinister ad me comparatus, non quod ille ipse sinister sit, sed quod ego dexter accesserim etc. — Pro Similiter edd. cum aliquot codd. Simile.
On the Trinity book, c. 5: For come now, let someone stand; if then I approach on the right, he will be on the left in comparison to me, not because he himself is left, but because I have approached on the right, and so on. — For Similiter the editions with some codices read Simile.
Cod. F quantitatum. Paulo inferius pro immergeretur cod. H K immergitur, et immediate post pro uniri cod. Z uniretur.
Codex F reads quantitatum. A little below, for immergeretur codices H K read immergitur, and immediately after, for uniri codex Z reads uniretur.
Dist. I. a. 3. q. 1. seq.; d. 3. p. II. per totam; II. Sent. d. 16. a. 1. q. 1. seq., quo ultimo loco etiam exponitur, in quo consistat convenientia ordinis et convenientia in natura, ad quam spectat etiam convenientia in commensuratione quantitatis.
Distinction I a. 3 q. 1 ff.; d. 3 p. II throughout; II Sent. d. 16 a. 1 q. 1 ff., in which last place it is also explained in what the agreement of order and the agreement in nature consist, to which pertains also the agreement in the commensuration of quantity.
Ita Vat. et usus auctori familiaris; in aliis edd. et codd. communem. Paulo ante pro magis sunt codd. F L T U Z aa magis sint.
So the Vatican edition and the author's familiar usage; in the other editions and codices, communem. A little before, for magis sunt codices F L T U Z aa read magis sint.

← Dist. 1, Divisio Textus Dist. 1, Art. 1, Q. 2→