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Dist. 1, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 1

Textus Latinus
p. 12

Quaestio II. Utrum una persona possit uniri humanae naturae sine altera.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum una persona possit uniri sine altera. Et quod non, videtur:

1. Primo per Damascenum1, qui dicit, quod in divinis «omnia sunt unum praeter generationem, ingenerationem et processionem»; sed incarnatio non est aliquid horum: ergo si incarnari convenit uni personae, necesse est, quod conveniat alteri.

2. Item, opera Trinitatis sunt indivisa2: ergo opus, quod convenit uni personae, necesse est, quod conveniat alteri: ergo si incarnatio est opus Dei, impossibile est, quod conveniat uni personae sine alia.

3. Item, incarnatio est opus recreationis, sicut hominis formatio fuit opus creationis; sed impossibile est, hominem formari ab una persona, quod non ab alia: ergo impossibile est, hominem reformari ab una persona, quod non ab alia3: ergo una persona non potest incarnari sine alia.

4. Item, perfectiori modo est Deus in aliquo, quando est per unionem, quam cum est per gratiam inhabitantem; sed impossibile est, unam personam inhabitare in aliquo sine alia4: ergo impossibile est, unam personam uniri carni, quod non uniatur et alia.

5. Item, impossibile est, Filium venire in mentem, quin simul cum eo veniat et Pater et Spiritus sanctus, sicut dicitur Ioannis decimo quarto5: Ad eum veniemus etc.: ergo impossibile est, Filium venire in carnem, quin simul veniat Pater et Spiritus sanctus. Si ergo mitti in carnem est incarnari, videtur etc.

6. Item, impossibile est, aliquid absolutum convenire uni, quod non conveniat alteri, pro eo quod6 solum relationibus distinguuntur: ergo si esse incarnatum, vel esse hominem est praedicatum absolutum; ergo impossibile est, quod conveniat uni, quod non conveniat alteri: ergo una persona non potest sine altera incarnari.

Sed contra: 1. Ioannis primo7: Verbum caro factum est; sed Verbum, sicut in primo habitum est, nominat proprietatem personae: ergo si attribuitur ipsi Verbo incarnatio, videtur, quod alicui personae poterit convenire per se.

2. Item, incarnari non est aliud quam in carnem mitti8; sed mitti potest convenire uni personae sine alia, quia Filius mittitur, et «nunquam Pater legitur esse missus»: ergo et incarnari.

3. Item, incarnatio est unio in persona: ergo si «alia est persona Patris, alia Filii9»; videtur, quod si unio sit in persona una, non sit necesse fieri in alia; et si unio potest fieri, similiter et incarnatio.

4. Item, quamvis una sit veritas Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti, tamen persona Patris significari potest per aliud signum quam persona Filii vel Spiritus sancti, sive loquamur de signo vocali, sive reali; sed qua ratione signum potest copulari uni personae sine aliis secundum significationem, eodem modo potest aliquod creatum copulari secundum unionem personalem: ergo si una persona potest sine altera significari, similiter potest una sine altera incarnari10.

Conclusio

Una divina persona incarnari potest, ita quod non alia incarnetur.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sine dubio una persona11 incarnari potest, ita quod non alia incarnetur, sicut operis evidentia manifestat.

Et ratio huius est ista, quia, cum contingat dupliciter comparari creaturam ad Creatorem, videlicet secundum susceptionem alicuius completionis et p. 13 secundum habitudinem relationis, una12 comparatio necessario respicit tres personas indistincte et indivisim, pro eo quod in eis est una perfectio essentialis. Comparatio vero secundum habitudinem relationis potest esse respectu alicuius personae determinate et distincte, pro eo quod istae personae relationibus distinguuntur. — Similiter Deus dupliciter habet13 comparari ad creaturam, videlicet in ratione principii causantis et in ratione suppositi substantificantis. In prima comparatione necessario communicant tres personae, pro eo quod in Deo unica est natura et unica est virtus operativa, per quam Deus creaturarum est causa. Secunda vero comparatio potest respicere aliquam personam distincte, pro eo quod, etsi una persona conveniat cum altera in natura et eius virtute, distinguitur tamen ab alia in supposito et personali proprietate14.

Quoniam igitur in unione naturarum sive incarnatione persona divina fit suppositum sive hypostasis humanae naturae, ita quod unio sive incarnatio non tantum dicit habitudinem Dei ad creaturam per modum causae, immo etiam per modum suppositi; similiter ex parte creaturae non dicit comparationem solum quantum ad susceptionem completionis, sed etiam quantum ad habitudinem relationis: hinc est, quod incarnatio potest convenire uni personae, ita quod non conveniat alteri15. — Unde rationes hoc ostendentes concedendae sunt.

Ad argumenta in oppositum:

Ad 1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur, quod in divinis omnia sunt unum praeter ingenerationem etc.; dicendum, quod verum est. Sed cum dicitur, quod incarnatio non est aliquid horum; dicendum, quod etsi non sit aliquid horum, tamen aliquid horum includit. Includit enim intellectum personalis distinctionis; incarnatio enim est unio carnis ad naturam divinam in personam distinctam16. — Cum vero dicitur, quod indivisa sunt Trinitatis opera; dicendum, quod verum est. Sed cum dicitur, quod incarnatio est operatio17 Trinitatis; dicendum, quod incarnatio, secundum quod dicit operationem, est communis tribus personis; sed quia praeter hoc importat relationem, ideo uni personae sine alia potest attribui. Et est exemplum: si tres puellae vestiant unam, vestis induitio est a tribus, non tamen tres induuntur, sed una sola. Similiter tres personae operatae sunt incarnationem, et tamen una sola dicitur incarnari18.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de opere creationis, dicendum, quod non est simile; quia hominis formatio19 dicit actionem et operationem tantum, non relationem ad personam, et ideo communis est tribus; non sic est de incarnatione.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Filius non potest esse in aliquo per inhabitantem gratiam, quod non sit tota Trinitas; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia Deum inhabitare20 in aliquo dicit effectum in creatura, quem necesse est esse a tota Trinitate; sed uniri dicit respectum ad personam, et hoc potest esse ad unam personam sine alia, sicut prius ostensum est.

Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de missione in carnem et mentem, dicendum, quod non est simile; quia missio Filii in mentem solum est secundum operationem essentialem, non secundum unionem personalem; non sic est de missione Filii in carnem.

Ad 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod esse incarnatum est praedicatum absolutum; dicendum, quod quamvis sit praedicatum absolutum21 exterius, est tamen relatio interius, et ratione relationis implicitae potest alicui personae convenire distincte. Et hoc patet, quia nihil aliud est Filium incarnari quam Filium sibi carnem unire; nihil aliud est Deum esse hominem quam unam et eandem personam esse hypostasim divinae et humanae naturae22.

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English Translation

Question II. Whether one person can be united to human nature without another.

Secondly it is asked whether one person can be united without another. And that it cannot, it seems thus:

1. First, by Damascene1, who says that in the divine things "all things are one except generation, ingeneration, and procession"; but the incarnation is not any of these: therefore if to be incarnate belongs to one person, it is necessary that it belong to another.

2. Likewise, the works of the Trinity are undivided2: therefore a work that belongs to one person necessarily belongs to another: therefore if the incarnation is a work of God, it is impossible that it belong to one person without another.

3. Likewise, the incarnation is a work of re-creation, just as the formation of man was a work of creation; but it is impossible for man to be formed by one person and not by another: therefore it is impossible for man to be re-formed by one person and not by another3: therefore one person cannot be incarnate without another.

4. Likewise, God is in something in a more perfect way when he is so through union than when he is so through indwelling grace; but it is impossible for one person to indwell in something without another4: therefore it is impossible for one person to be united to flesh and not the other be united as well.

5. Likewise, it is impossible for the Son to come into the mind without the Father and the Holy Spirit coming together with him, as is said in John, chapter fourteen5: We will come to him etc.: therefore it is impossible for the Son to come into the flesh without the Father and the Holy Spirit coming together. If therefore to be sent into the flesh is to be incarnate, it seems etc.

6. Likewise, it is impossible for something absolute to belong to one which does not belong to another, for the reason that6 they are distinguished only by relations: therefore if to be incarnate, or to be man, is an absolute predicate; therefore it is impossible that it belong to one which does not belong to another: therefore one person cannot be incarnate without another.

On the contrary: 1. John, chapter one7: The Word was made flesh; but the Word, as was established in the first [book], names a property of a person: therefore if the incarnation is attributed to the Word itself, it seems that it can belong to some person of itself.

2. Likewise, to be incarnate is nothing other than to be sent into the flesh8; but to be sent can belong to one person without another, since the Son is sent, and "the Father is never read to have been sent": therefore so also is to be incarnate.

3. Likewise, the incarnation is a union in a person: therefore if "the person of the Father is one, that of the Son another9"; it seems that, if the union is in one person, it is not necessary that it occur in another; and if the union can occur, likewise also the incarnation.

4. Likewise, although the truth of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit is one, nevertheless the person of the Father can be signified by a sign other than the person of the Son or of the Holy Spirit, whether we speak of a vocal sign or a real one; but by the same reasoning by which a sign can be coupled to one person without the others according to signification, in the same way something created can be coupled according to a personal union: therefore if one person can be signified without another, likewise one can be incarnate without another10.

Conclusio

One divine person can be incarnate, in such a way that another is not incarnate.

I respond: It must be said that without doubt one person11 can be incarnate, in such a way that another is not incarnate, as the evidence of the work makes manifest.

And the reason for this is this: that, since it happens that the creature is compared to the Creator in two ways, namely according to the reception of some completion and according to the relationship of relation, one12 comparison necessarily regards the three persons indistinctly and indivisibly, for the reason that in them there is one essential perfection. But the comparison according to the relationship of relation can be in respect of some person determinately and distinctly, for the reason that these persons are distinguished by relations. — Likewise God has13 to be compared to the creature in two ways, namely in the character of the causing principle and in the character of the substantifying supposit. In the first comparison the three persons necessarily share in common, for the reason that in God the nature is one and the operative power is one, by which God is the cause of creatures. But the second comparison can regard some person distinctly, for the reason that, although one person agrees with another in nature and its power, it is nevertheless distinguished from the other in supposit and personal property14.

Since therefore in the union of natures, or the incarnation, the divine person becomes the supposit or hypostasis of the human nature, in such a way that the union or incarnation states not only the relationship of God to the creature in the manner of a cause, but indeed also in the manner of a supposit; likewise on the part of the creature it states a comparison not only as to the reception of completion, but also as to the relationship of relation: hence it is that the incarnation can belong to one person, in such a way that it does not belong to another15. — Whence the reasons showing this are to be conceded.

To the arguments to the contrary:

To 1. To that which is first objected, that in the divine things all things are one except ingeneration etc.; it must be said that it is true. But when it is said that the incarnation is not any of these; it must be said that, even if it is not any of these, nevertheless it includes something of these. For it includes the notion of personal distinction; for the incarnation is a union of flesh to the divine nature into a distinct person16. — But when it is said that the works of the Trinity are undivided; it must be said that it is true. But when it is said that the incarnation is an operation17 of the Trinity; it must be said that the incarnation, according to that it states an operation, is common to the three persons; but because beyond this it imports a relation, therefore it can be attributed to one person without another. And there is an example: if three maidens clothe one [maiden], the putting-on of the garment is by the three, yet the three are not clothed, but only one. Likewise the three persons have wrought the incarnation, and yet only one is said to be incarnate18.

To 3. To that which is objected concerning the work of creation, it must be said that it is not similar; because the formation of man19 states an action and operation only, not a relation to a person, and therefore is common to the three; it is not so with the incarnation.

To 4. To that which is objected, that the Son cannot be in something through indwelling grace without it being the whole Trinity; it must be said that it is not similar, because for God to indwell20 in something states an effect in the creature, which must be from the whole Trinity; but to be united states a respect to a person, and this can be to one person without another, as was shown before.

To 5. To that which is objected concerning the mission into the flesh and into the mind, it must be said that it is not similar; because the mission of the Son into the mind is only according to essential operation, not according to personal union; it is not so with the mission of the Son into the flesh.

To 6. To that which is objected, that to be incarnate is an absolute predicate; it must be said that, although it is an absolute predicate21 exteriorly, it is nevertheless a relation interiorly, and by reason of the implied relation it can belong to some person distinctly. And this is plain, because for the Son to be incarnate is nothing other than for the Son to unite flesh to himself; for God to be man is nothing other than for one and the same person to be the hypostasis of the divine and the human nature22.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Libr. 1. de Fide orthod. c. 8. Cfr. tom. 1. pag. 460, nota 3, ubi integer textus (secundum ed. Migne) habetur.
    Bk. 1, On the Orthodox Faith, c. 8. Cf. tom. 1, p. 460, note 3, where the entire text (according to the Migne edition) is given.
  2. Cfr. Ambros., Apologia prophetae David altera, c. 12. n. 62; V. de Fide, c. II. n. 134; III. de Spiritu sancto, c. 4. n. 19. seqq.; nec non Hieronym., Comment. in Epist. ad Ephes. c. 5, 1; atque August., Epist. II. (alias 218.) n. 2; in Ioan. Evang. tr. 20. n. 3. seqq.; Enchirid. c. 38. n. 12; I. de Trin. c. 4. n. 7, c. 6. n. 12; II. c. 10. n. 18.
    Cf. Ambrose, Second Apology of the Prophet David, c. 12, n. 62; On the Faith, Bk. V, c. II, n. 134; On the Holy Spirit, Bk. III, c. 4, n. 19 ff.; likewise Jerome, Commentary on the Epistle to the Ephesians, c. 5, 1; and Augustine, Epistle II (otherwise 218), n. 2; On the Gospel of John, tract. 20, n. 3 ff.; Enchiridion c. 38, n. 12; On the Trinity, Bk. I, c. 4, n. 7, c. 6, n. 12; Bk. II, c. 10, n. 18.
  3. August., II. de Trin. c. 5. n. 9: Ille Mariae conceptus et partus operatio Trinitatis est, qua creante omnia creantur. — In edd. deest prima conclusio.
    Augustine, On the Trinity, Bk. II, c. 5, n. 9: That conception and birth of Mary is an operation of the Trinity, by whose creating all things are created. — In the editions the first conclusion is wanting.
  4. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 15. p. I. q. 3, ubi simile arg. contra missionem Filii et Spiritus S. proponitur. Ibid. missio Spiritus S. explicatur his verbis ex August.; IV. de Trin. c. 20. n. 28. allatis: «Mittitur Filius, cum ex tempore cuiusquam mente percipitur», quae verba in arg. seq. respicienda sunt. — In cod. F minor sic sonat: sed una persona non potest esse in aliquo sine alia per gratiam. In conclusione codd. G H bb pro quod non substituunt quin.
    Cf. I Sent., d. 15, p. I, q. 3, where a similar argument is proposed against the mission of the Son and the Holy Spirit. There the mission of the Holy Spirit is explained by these words adduced from Augustine, On the Trinity, Bk. IV, c. 20, n. 28: "The Son is sent, when in time he is perceived by someone's mind," which words are to be regarded in the following argument. — In cod. F the minor [premise] reads thus: but one person cannot be in something without another through grace. In the conclusion codd. G H bb substitute but that not for that not.
  5. Vers. 23.
    Verse 23.
  6. Vat. hic addit tres personae, et paulo inferius cum edd. 1, 2 post uni bene subiungit ita. — De maiori cfr. I. Sent. d. 34. q. 1.
    The Vatican edition here adds the three persons, and a little below, with edd. 1, 2, after to one well subjoins thus. — On the major [premise] cf. I Sent., d. 34, q. 1.
  7. Vers. 14. — De Verbo cfr. I. Sent. d. 27. p. II. q. I.
    Verse 14. — On the Word cf. I Sent., d. 27, p. II, q. I.
  8. Gal. 4, 4: At ubi venit plenitudo temporis, misit Deus Filium suum, factum ex muliere. — De minori cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1, et I. Sent. d. 15. p. I. q. 3. Verba: nunquam Pater legitur esse missus, sumta sunt ex August., II. de Trin. c. 5. n. 8, ubi proprie sic legitur: Pater enim solus nusquam legitur missus.
    Gal. 4:4: But when the fullness of time came, God sent his Son, made of a woman. — On the minor [premise] cf. here the text of the Master, c. 1, and I Sent., d. 15, p. I, q. 3. The words: the Father is never read to have been sent, are taken from Augustine, On the Trinity, Bk. II, c. 5, n. 8, where it properly reads thus: For the Father alone is nowhere read to have been sent.
  9. Symbol. Athanas. — De maiori vide infra lit. Magistri, d. V. c. 1, et Comment. a. I. q. I. seqq. — Mox pro si unio sit cod. Z si unio fit.
    Athanasian Creed. — On the major [premise] see below the text of the Master, d. V, c. 1, and the Commentary, a. I, q. I ff. — Presently for if the union be cod. Z [reads] if the union occur.
  10. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. in fine. — Paulo superius edd. verbo copulari adiiciunt increato, et post pauca codd. A E N T U V omittunt una ante sine altera.
    Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 3, at the end. — A little above the editions add uncreated to the word to be coupled, and after a few [words] codd. A E N T U V omit one before without another.
  11. Cod. Z subiungit sine altera. Cod. P: sicut est operis evidentia manifestum.
    Cod. Z subjoins without another. Cod. P: as is manifest by the evidence of the work.
  12. Edd. prima.
    The editions [read] first.
  13. Cod. T potest.
    Cod. T [reads] can.
  14. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 26. q. I. seqq. et d. 33. q. I. seqq. — Paulo superius pro conveniat codd. K Z communicat.
    Cf. I Sent., d. 26, q. I ff. and d. 33, q. I ff. — A little above, for agree codd. K Z [read] share in common.
  15. Vide Anselm., de Fide Trinitatis et de incarnatione Verbi (ad Urbanum Papam, contra blasphemias Ruzelini sive Roscelini), c. 1.
    See Anselm, On the Faith of the Trinity and on the Incarnation of the Word (to Pope Urban, against the blasphemies of Ruzelinus or Roscelinus), c. 1.
  16. Cfr. infra d. V. et VI. lit. Magistri, et Comment., ubi plura de hac re. — Paulo superius post Includit enim cod. F verbo intellectum praemittit habitudinem sive.
    Cf. below d. V and VI, the text of the Master, and the Commentary, where there is more on this matter. — A little above, after for it includes, cod. F prefixes a relationship or to the word the notion.
  17. Edd. opus. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3.
    The editions [read] work. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 3.
  18. Petr. Pictaviensis (✝ 1205), IV. Sent. c. 8, eandem obiectionem solvens ait: In praedicta argumentatione fallacia est secundum accidens, vel potius secundum quid et simpliciter, quia prius proponitur quid, postea assumitur quid et cui. Fallacia. Quidquid facit unus istorum trium, facit uterque reliquorum; unus induit se: ergo et reliqui duo, scil. posito, quod imus in medio se induat, et alii duo eundem adiuvent; et est hic eadem fallacia et similitudo. — Paulo superius post vestiant unam plurimi codd. cum edd. perperam supplent vestem (fortasse in originali legebatur veste?), nec pauci codd., ut F G H L T U V aa cum edd. 1, 2 deinde omittunt vestis. Melius codd. P Z bb post vestiant unam supplent ex se; nos nihil supplevimus, secuti codd. M O.
    Peter of Poitiers (✝ 1205), IV Sent., c. 8, solving the same objection, says: In the aforesaid argumentation there is a fallacy of accident, or rather of the qualified and the absolute, because first the "what" is proposed, afterwards the "what" and "for whom" is assumed. Fallacy. Whatever one of these three does, each of the rest does; one clothes himself: therefore so also the other two, namely supposing that the one in the middle clothe himself, and the other two help him; and here there is the same fallacy and likeness. — A little above, after clothe one, very many codd. with the editions wrongly supply garment (perhaps in the original it read with a garment?), and not a few codd., as F G H L T U V aa with edd. 1, 2 then omit garment. Better, codd. P Z bb after clothe one supply of themselves; we have supplied nothing, following codd. M O.
  19. Cod. U ante dicit interserit formationis, et deinde codd. L aa voculae non praefigunt sed.
    Cod. U before states inserts of formation, and then codd. L aa prefix but to the particle not.
  20. Edd. et nonnulli codd. habitare, et mox edd. eaedem quam pro quem.
    The editions and some codd. [read] to dwell, and presently the editions [read] the same which for which.
  21. Codd. A T V falso relatum pro absolutum; edd. quamvis non sit praedicatum relatum. Subinde pro est tamen relatio interius, quae lectio habetur etiam in codd. C N P U bb, Vat. est tamen relatum interius, alii codd. cum edd. 1, 2 est tamen interius.
    Codd. A T V wrongly [read] related for absolute; the editions [read] although it is not a related predicate. Then for it is nevertheless a relation interiorly, which reading is found also in codd. C N P U bb, the Vatican edition [reads] it is nevertheless something related interiorly, other codd. with edd. 1, 2 it is nevertheless interiorly.
  22. Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    See the scholion to the preceding question.
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