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Dist. 1, Art. 1, Q. 3

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 1

Textus Latinus
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Quaestio III. Utrum persona una possit simul uniri cum alia, assumendo unam et eandem numero naturam.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum persona una possit simul uniri cum alia, assumendo unam et eandem naturam numero. Et quod non, videtur.

1. Anselmus in libro: Cur Deus homo, capitulo nono1: « Plures personae nequeunt unum et eundem hominem assumere; quare tantum in una persona fieri necesse est ».

2. Item, si personae plures unirentur uni et eidem naturae, aut ergo in unitate essentiae, aut in unitate suppositi. In unitate essentiae non, quia impossibile est, Creatorem et creaturam convenire in una essentia. In unitate personae non, quia tres personae in persona non conveniunt, sed personaliter distinguuntur: ergo videtur, quod nullo modo plures personae possint unum hominem accipere2.

3. Item, unio divinae naturae ad humanam facit sibi mutuo communicare propria idiomata3: ergo si tres personae assumerent unum hominem, ille homo esset Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus; et ex hoc sequeretur propter communicationem idiomatum, quod Pater esset Filius et Spiritus sanctus, et e converso; et si hoc, tunc periret personalis distinctio.

4. Item, si tres personae assumerent unum et eundem hominem, aut ergo unica unione, aut pluribus. Si unica: ergo cum Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus non communicant nisi in essentia, unio illa esset in aliquo essentiali, quod est impossibile. Si pluribus: ergo plures essent incarnationes4. Sed contra: impossibile est, esse plures incarnationes respectu unius carnis, quia incarnatio non habet inceptionem nisi ratione carnis, ergo pari ratione nec numerari habet nisi ratione carnis: ergo nec pluribus incarnationibus nec unica plures personae possent assumere unam et eandem naturam5.

Sed contra: 1. Humana natura idoneitatem habet ad hoc, ut assumatur a persona, in quantum est imago6; sed una et eadem anima est imago trium personarum simul et semel: ergo videtur, quod a tribus personis possit simul et semel assumi.

2. Item, una persona potest assumere plures naturas, et nihil impedit, quod Dei Filius non possit assumere unum7 alium hominem, cum arctatus non sit ad illam singularem naturam, quam assumsit: ergo pari ratione videtur, quod plures personae possint assumere unam et eandem naturam, cum ita possint plures personae super unam naturam, sicut persona una in plures naturas.

3. Item, gratia habet conformari naturae; sed plures personae divinae communicant per naturam in una substantia et essentia simpliciter una: ergo pari ratione communicare possunt in una natura per unionem gratuitam: ergo plures personae possunt unam et eandem naturam assumere.

4. Item, aut una natura, quae assumitur ab una persona, potest assumi ab alia, aut non. Si sic, habeo propositum. Si non, quaero, quid impedit? Cum non sit ibi nisi natura creata et persona divina, aut ergo erit impedimentum ex parte naturae creatae, aut ex parte personae divinae. Sed ex parte naturae creatae non potest, cum illa subiaceat omnino potentiae divinae personae. Ex parte divinae personae non, quia inter divinas personas nulla est resistentia, nulla est repugnantia, cum una aliam circumincedat, et una sit cum alia8: ergo si nullum est impedimentum, videtur simpliciter, quod plures personae possint hominem unum assumere.

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Conclusio

Plures personae non possunt unam et eandem numero naturam assumere.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sicut dicit Anselmus, « plures personae non possunt unum et eundem hominem assumere », non propter defectum potentiae, sed propter repugnantiam contradictionis implicitae. — Si enim plures personae assumerent unum hominem ad unitatem talem9, quae faceret communicationem idiomatum: ergo aut assumerent in unitatem, quae quidem esset unitas, quae se teneret ex parte assumentis, aut assumti. Si in unitatem, quae quidem se teneret ex parte assumentis, cum ex parte assumentis non sit reperire nisi unitatem personalem et unitatem essentialem; tunc plures personae assumerent unam naturam in unitatem essentiae, vel unitatem personae; sed utrumque horum simpliciter est impossibile. Nam plures personae divinae non possunt convenire in una persona, nec natura creata et increata possunt transire in unam naturam. — Si autem assumerent in unitatem, quae quidem se tenet ex parte assumti, cum illa sit unitas individualis, assumerent ergo in unitatem individui; sed illud adhuc est impossibile, quia assumens non trahitur ad unitatem assumti, sed potius trahit assumtum ad unitatem propriam. Nam assumere est ad se sumere.

Et sic patet, quod si dicatur, tres personas assumere unum et eundem hominem, omnibus modis implicatur10 contradictio, sive intelligatur, quod assumtio fiat in unitatem naturae, sive in unitatem personae. Nam si fit talis assumtio in unitatem naturae, ergo ex divina natura et humana constituitur una natura: ergo non est distinctio assumentis ad assumtum: ergo nec assumtio vera. Si autem fit assumtio in unitatem personae, ergo plures personae communicant in unam personam: ergo plures personae non sunt plures personae. Si autem fit assumtio in unitatem individui; cum illa unitas non se teneat ex parte assumentis, sed assumti, assumens non assumit naturam aliam ad propriam unitatem: ergo non assumit ad se, sed ad aliud; et si non assumit ad se, non assumit: assumtio igitur in unitatem individui non est assumere vere et proprie, sicut nunc loquimur de assumtione. — Propter igitur contradictionem implicitam, plures personas assumere unam et eandem naturam, nec est possibile nec est intelligibile. — Rationes igitur hoc ostendentes sunt concedendae.

Ad argumenta in oppositum:

Ad 1. Ad primum quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod una anima est imago trium; dicendum, quod imago de ratione sui dicit expressam repraesentationem, non secundum totum illud, in quo imago est, sed secundum aliquid sui. Unio autem, quae quidem est in incarnatione, totam humanam naturam in atomo et secundum totum facit uniri divinae personae, ita quod tota substantificatur in una tanquam in una propria hypostasi11. Non est autem inconveniens, quod aliquid repraesentet plures personas secundum differentes proprietates et potentias; inconveniens autem est, quod unum et idem uniatur pluribus personis in personae unitatem; et ideo non sequitur, quodsi una anima potest esse imago trium, quod simul et semel possit uniri tribus personis.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod una persona potest assumere plures naturas, ergo similiter plures personae unam naturam; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia, cum unio illa incarnationis fiat in unitatem personae, non in unitatem naturae, pluralitas naturarum non sic repugnat unioni incarnationis, sicut pluralitas personarum.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod plures personae possunt communicare in eadem essentia per naturam etc.; dicendum, quod non est simile, quoniam unitas personarum in una substantia dicit convenientiam in natura; convenientia autem in natura non repugnat distinctioni in persona, sicut nec econtra diversitas in natura repugnat unitati in persona. Sed unio gratuita non dicit convenientiam in natura, sed in persona; et ideo pluralitas personarum repugnat unitati unionis. Et propterea ratio praedicta non tenet, quia non est simile hinc inde12.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod quaeritur, quid impediat: dicendum, quod nec persona impedit per se, nec natura humana per se, sed modus unionis. Quia enim divina natura unitur humanae in unione13 personae, incompossibile est, quod in illa unione sit unitas ex parte extremorum et pluralitas ex parte medii, in quo attenditur illa unio. Unde sicut est incompossibile, p. 16 quod plures personae sint una persona, non propter repugnantiam personarum, sed propter inclusionem duorum oppositorum; sic in proposito est intelligendum.

Haec autem dicta sunt de incarnatione ipsa14 secundum eum modum, secundum quem facit idiomatum communicationem, per quem modum Filius Dei factus est homo. Et isto modo impossibile est intelligere, plures personas assumere unum et eundem hominem, sicut ostendit Anselmus, et ostendunt rationes praemissae. In hoc tamen non excluditur omnis alius modus assumtionis, quia, cum multa possit Deus facere, quae intellectus noster non potest15 capere, quis audebit asserere, quod tres personae non possint unum et eundem hominem assumere? Nihil enim videtur impedire, quin tres personae possint per gratiam illud efficere, ut sint personae unius singularis naturae in tempore, cum illa natura sit possibilis, et omnino obediens respectu cuiuslibet personae in Trinitate. — Et pro tanto voluerunt aliqui16 dicere non irrationabiliter, quod poterant tres personae assumere unum hominem in unitate individui; quod si rationabiliter intelligatur, satis rationabiliter potest sustineri. Nec repugnat verbum Anselmi, nec ea17 quae praedeterminata sunt. Non enim volunt dicere, quod illa assumtio terminaretur ad unitatem individualem ex parte assumentis, sed quod tres personae, si unum hominem assumerent, essent unus homo, ita quod in illis tribus personis esset communis unitas singularis naturae assumtae, non unitas personae. — Quidquid autem sit de hoc, illud pro indubitanti habendum est, quod modo assumendi praedeterminato impossibile est, plures personas18 unum et eundem hominem assumere propter implicationem contradictionis implicitae; quia sequeretur, quod Filius esset Pater.

Scholion

I. Quod tres personae divinae possint numero unam et eandem naturam assumere in unitatem unius personae, manifestam implicat contradictionem. Sed restat quaestio, an tres personae possint assumere unam naturam humanam tantum unitate singularis naturae, ita ut tres personae conveniant in una natura assumta, sicut conveniunt in ipsa divina natura; et de quaestione sic intellecta duplex est sententia theologorum. Affirmative respondent Alex. Hal., S. Thom., Petr. a Tar., Henr. Gand., Durand., Dionys. Carth., multique recentiores; sed S. Thom. in Comment. (hic q. 2. a. 1.) hoc affirmat, « loquendo de potentia absoluta, quamvis non sit congruum secundum ordinem divinae sapientiae »; quae restrictio etiam ad mentem aliorum huius sententiae patronorum dicta est. At Scotus defendit responsum negativum, cui favent B. Albert. nec non Richard. a Med., quamvis hic, distinctione utens, hoc tunc tantum esse possibile doceat, si supponatur, quod natura humana sustentetur immediate non per tres personas, sed per substantiam (aliqui substituunt subsistentiam) communem. Haec autem suppositio, intellecta de natura, non approbatur a S. Bonav. (hic et d. 5. a. 1. q. 4.) nec ab Alexandro Hal. (loc. cit. m. 3.). — S. Bonav. autem media quadam via incedit, ut in fine quaestionis explicatur. Consentit quippe omnino Scoto, si unio haec intelligitur secundum eum modum, quo facit idiomatum communionem; si autem sumitur secundum alium quendam modum Deo possibilem, tunc ipse non contradicit primae opinioni, ac sententiam sui magistri Alexandri, quod tres personae assumere possint unum hominem in unitate individui, censet esse non improbabilem.

II. Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 2. m. 4. — Scot., hic q. 2; Report. hic q. 3. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 4; S. III. q. 3. a. 6. — B. Albert., hic d. 10. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 4. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 8. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. 6. q. 7. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 6. — Biel, hic q. 1.

III. Sequens (4.) quaestio intelligenda est de potentia Dei absoluta. Quid sibi velit potentia absoluta et ordinata, bene explicatur a S. Thoma (hic q. 2. a. 3.), cum quadrupliciter distinguit ea quae ordini divinae potentiae attribui possunt. — In responsione ad quaestionem doctores communiter conveniunt. Alex. Hal., loc. cit. m. 5. a. 2. — Scot., hic q. 3. n. 7; Quodl. q. 19. n. 3. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 3; S. III. q. 3. a. 8. — B. Albert., hic a. 10. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 3. — Aegid. R., loc. cit. a. 4. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 5.

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English Translation

Question III. Whether one person could be united together with another simultaneously, by assuming one and the same nature in number.

Thirdly it is asked whether one person could be united together with another simultaneously, by assuming one and the same nature in number. And it seems that it could not.

1. Anselm in the book Cur Deus homo, chapter nine1: « Several persons cannot assume one and the same man; wherefore it is necessary that it come to be in one person only ».

2. Likewise, if several persons were united to one and the same nature, then either in unity of essence, or in unity of supposit. Not in unity of essence, since it is impossible that the Creator and the creature come together in one essence. Not in unity of person, since the three persons do not come together in a person, but are distinguished personally: therefore it seems that in no way could several persons take up one man2.

3. Likewise, the union of the divine nature to the human brings it about that they communicate to one another their proper idioms3: therefore if three persons were to assume one man, that man would be Father and Son and Holy Spirit; and from this it would follow, on account of the communication of idioms, that the Father would be the Son and the Holy Spirit, and conversely; and if this is so, then the personal distinction would perish.

4. Likewise, if three persons were to assume one and the same man, then either by a single union, or by several. If by a single one: then, since the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit communicate only in essence, that union would be in something essential, which is impossible. If by several: then there would be several incarnations4. But on the contrary: it is impossible that there be several incarnations with respect to one flesh, since the incarnation has its inception only by reason of the flesh, therefore by like reasoning it can be numbered only by reason of the flesh: therefore neither by several incarnations nor by a single one could several persons assume one and the same nature5.

On the contrary: 1. Human nature has the aptitude to be assumed by a person, insofar as it is an image6; but one and the same soul is the image of the three persons simultaneously and at once: therefore it seems that it could be assumed by three persons simultaneously and at once.

2. Likewise, one person can assume several natures, and nothing prevents the Son of God from being able to assume one7 other man, since he was not constrained to that singular nature which he assumed: therefore by like reasoning it seems that several persons could assume one and the same nature, since several persons can stand over one nature, just as one person can stand over several natures.

3. Likewise, grace has to be conformed to nature; but the several divine persons communicate through nature in one substance and essence simply one: therefore by like reasoning they can communicate in one nature through a gratuitous union: therefore several persons can assume one and the same nature.

4. Likewise, either one nature, which is assumed by one person, can be assumed by another, or not. If so, I have my point. If not, I ask, what prevents it? Since there is nothing there but a created nature and a divine person, then either there will be an impediment on the part of the created nature, or on the part of the divine person. But on the part of the created nature it cannot be, since that lies wholly subject to the power of the divine person. On the part of the divine person it cannot be, since among the divine persons there is no resistance, no repugnance, since the one mutually indwells the other, and the one is with the other8: therefore if there is no impediment, it seems simply that several persons could assume one man.

Conclusio

Several persons cannot assume one and the same nature in number.

Respondeo: It must be said that, as Anselm says, « several persons cannot assume one and the same man », not on account of a defect of power, but on account of the repugnance of an implicit contradiction. — For if several persons were to assume one man unto such a unity9 as would bring about the communication of idioms: then either they would assume unto a unity, which indeed would be a unity holding on the side of the assuming, or of the assumed. If unto a unity which indeed would hold on the side of the assuming, since on the side of the assuming there is nothing to be found but personal unity and essential unity; then several persons would assume one nature unto unity of essence, or unity of person; but each of these is simply impossible. For several divine persons cannot come together in one person, nor can a created and an uncreated nature pass over into one nature. — But if they were to assume unto a unity which indeed holds on the side of the assumed, since that is an individual unity, they would then assume unto unity of an individual; but that too is impossible, since the one assuming is not drawn to the unity of the assumed, but rather draws the assumed to its own unity. For to assume is to take to oneself.

And thus it is plain that, if it be said that three persons assume one and the same man, in every way a contradiction is implied10, whether it be understood that the assumption comes to be unto unity of nature, or unto unity of person. For if such an assumption comes to be unto unity of nature, then out of the divine nature and the human one nature is constituted: therefore there is no distinction of the assuming from the assumed: therefore neither is the assumption true. But if the assumption comes to be unto unity of person, then several persons communicate in one person: therefore several persons are not several persons. But if the assumption comes to be unto unity of an individual; since that unity does not hold on the side of the assuming, but of the assumed, the one assuming does not assume the other nature unto its own unity: therefore it does not assume to itself, but to another; and if it does not assume to itself, it does not assume: the assumption therefore unto unity of an individual is not to assume truly and properly, as we now speak of assumption. — On account therefore of the implicit contradiction, for several persons to assume one and the same nature is neither possible nor intelligible. — Therefore the reasons showing this are to be conceded.

To the arguments to the contrary:

To 1. To the first which is objected to the contrary, that one soul is the image of the three; it must be said that an image, by its very account, bespeaks an express representation, not according to the whole of that in which the image is, but according to something of it. But the union which indeed is in the incarnation makes the whole human nature in its individual atom and according to its whole be united to the divine person, so that the whole is given subsistence in the one as in one proper hypostasis11. But it is not unfitting that something represent several persons according to differing properties and powers; it is, however, unfitting that one and the same thing be united to several persons unto unity of person; and therefore it does not follow that, if one soul can be the image of the three, it could be united to the three persons simultaneously and at once.

To 2. To that which is objected, that one person can assume several natures, therefore likewise several persons one nature; it must be said that it is not alike, since, because that union of the incarnation comes to be unto unity of person, not unto unity of nature, a plurality of natures is not repugnant to the union of the incarnation in the way that a plurality of persons is.

To 3. To that which is objected, that several persons can communicate in the same essence through nature, etc.; it must be said that it is not alike, since the unity of the persons in one substance bespeaks a coming-together in nature; but a coming-together in nature is not repugnant to a distinction in person, just as conversely a diversity in nature is not repugnant to a unity in person. But a gratuitous union does not bespeak a coming-together in nature, but in person; and therefore a plurality of persons is repugnant to the unity of the union. And on this account the aforesaid reasoning does not hold, since it is not alike on the one side and the other12.

To 4. To that which is asked, what prevents it: it must be said that neither does the person prevent it of itself, nor the human nature of itself, but the mode of union. For because the divine nature is united to the human in a union13 of person, it is incompossible that in that union there be unity on the part of the extremes and plurality on the part of the middle, in which that union is regarded. Hence just as it is incompossible that several persons be one person, not on account of the repugnance of the persons, but on account of the inclusion of two opposites; so it is to be understood in the case proposed.

Now these things have been said concerning the incarnation itself14 according to that mode according to which it brings about the communication of idioms, by which mode the Son of God was made man. And in this mode it is impossible to understand that several persons assume one and the same man, as Anselm shows, and as the foregoing reasons show. In this, however, every other mode of assumption is not excluded, since, because God can do many things which our intellect cannot15 grasp, who will dare to assert that three persons could not assume one and the same man? For nothing seems to prevent the three persons from being able through grace to effect this, that they be persons of one singular nature in time, since that nature is possible, and wholly obedient with respect to any person whatever in the Trinity. — And to this extent some wished16 to say, not unreasonably, that the three persons could assume one man in unity of an individual; and if this be understood reasonably, it can be sustained reasonably enough. Nor does the word of Anselm stand against it, nor do those things17 which have been predetermined. For they do not wish to say that that assumption would be terminated at individual unity on the part of the assuming, but that the three persons, if they were to assume one man, would be one man, so that in those three persons there would be a common unity of the assumed singular nature, not a unity of person. — But whatever there be of this, this is to be held as beyond doubt, that by the predetermined mode of assuming it is impossible that several persons18 assume one and the same man, on account of the implication of an implicit contradiction; since it would follow that the Son would be the Father.

Scholion

I. That the three divine persons could assume numerically one and the same nature unto unity of one person manifestly implies a contradiction. But there remains the question whether the three persons could assume one human nature only by the unity of a singular nature, so that the three persons come together in one assumed nature, just as they come together in the divine nature itself; and concerning the question thus understood there is a twofold opinion of the theologians. Affirmatively respond Alex. Hal., S. Thom., Petr. a Tar., Henr. Gand., Durand., Dionys. Carth., and many more recent writers; but S. Thom. in the Commentary (here q. 2. a. 1.) affirms this « speaking of absolute power, although it is not congruous according to the order of divine wisdom »; which restriction is said also to be according to the mind of the others who patronize this opinion. But Scotus defends the negative answer, which is favored by B. Albert. and also Richard. a Med., although the latter, using a distinction, teaches that this is then only possible, if it be supposed that human nature is sustained immediately not by the three persons, but by a common substance (some substitute subsistence). But this supposition, understood of nature, is not approved by S. Bonav. (here and d. 5. a. 1. q. 4.) nor by Alexander Hal. (loc. cit. m. 3.). — But S. Bonav. proceeds by a certain middle way, as is explained at the end of the question. For he agrees entirely with Scotus, if this union be understood according to that mode by which it brings about the communion of idioms; but if it be taken according to some other mode possible to God, then he does not contradict the first opinion, and he reckons that the opinion of his master Alexander — that the three persons could assume one man in unity of an individual — is not improbable.

II. Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 2. m. 4. — Scot., here q. 2; Report. here q. 3. — S. Thom., here q. 2. a. 4; S. III. q. 3. a. 6. — B. Albert., here d. 10. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 4. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., here a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., here q. 1. a. 8. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. 6. q. 7. — Durand., here q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., here q. 6. — Biel, here q. 1.

III. The following (4th) question is to be understood of the absolute power of God. What absolute and ordained power mean is well explained by S. Thomas (here q. 2. a. 3.), where he distinguishes in four ways the things that can be attributed to the order of divine power. — In the response to the question the doctors commonly agree. Alex. Hal., loc. cit. m. 5. a. 2. — Scot., here q. 3. n. 7; Quodl. q. 19. n. 3. — S. Thom., here q. 2. a. 3; S. III. q. 3. a. 8. — B. Albert., here a. 10. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., here a. 1. q. 3. — Aegid. R., loc. cit. a. 4. — Dionys. Carth., here q. 5.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Libr. II. In Anselmi sententia textus originalis verbo assumere addit in unitatem personae et verbo fieri praemittit hoc.
    Book II. In Anselm's text the original wording, at the verb assumere ("to assume"), adds in unitatem personae ("unto unity of person"), and prefixes hoc ("this") to the verb fieri ("to come to be").
  2. Anselm., de Fide Trinit. et de incarn. Verbi, c. 4: Deus non sic assumsit hominem, ut natura Dei et hominis sit una et eadem; sed ut persona Dei et hominis una eademque sit, quod non nisi in una persona Dei esse potest. Diversas enim personas unam et eandem personam esse cum uno eodemque homine nequit intelligi. Nam si unus homo cum singulis pluribus personis una persona est, necesse est, plures personas, quae aliae sunt a se invicem, esse unam eandemque personam, quod non est possibile. Quapropter impossibile est, Deo incarnato secundum unamquamlibet personam, illum secundum aliam quoque personam incarnari. — Paulo superius pro in unitate suppositi cod. F in unitate personae.
    Anselm, On the Faith of the Trinity and on the Incarnation of the Word, c. 4: God did not so assume man that the nature of God and of man should be one and the same; but that the person of God and of man should be one and the same, which can only be in the one person of God. For it cannot be understood that diverse persons are one and the same person with one and the same man. For if one man is one person with each of several persons, it is necessary that the several persons, which are other than one another, be one and the same person, which is not possible. Wherefore it is impossible, when God is incarnate according to any one person, that he be incarnate according to another person also. — A little above, for in unity of supposit codex F reads in unity of person.
  3. Communicatio idiomatum (κοινωνία τῶν ἰδιωμάτων, i. e. communicatio proprietatum) a Damasc., III. de Fide orthod. c. 3, sic explicatur: Verbum porro, quia ipsius sunt quae sanctae eius carnis sunt, ea quae humanitati conveniunt sibi vindicat, et vicissim carni quae sua sunt impertit; illo nimirum alternae communicationis modo (κατὰ τὸν ἀντιδόσεως τρόπον), ob mutuam inter se partium commeationem (περιχώρησιν) unionemve hypostaticam... Eo porro nomine Dominus ipse gloriae crucifixus dicitur, quamvis alioqui divina ipsius natura minime passa sit etc. (ed. Migne). Cfr. infra a. 2. q. 1. ad 3; d. 2. dub. 2; d. 6. a. 1. q. 1. ad 6; d. 7. a. 1. q. 2. in fine. — Cod. P post humanam supplet naturam.
    The communication of idioms (κοινωνία τῶν ἰδιωμάτων, i.e. the communication of properties) is explained thus by Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith III, c. 3: The Word, moreover, since the things of his holy flesh are his own, claims for himself those things which belong to the humanity, and in turn imparts to the flesh the things which are his own; namely by that mode of mutual exchange (κατὰ τὸν ἀντιδόσεως τρόπον), on account of the mutual passing-over of the parts among themselves (περιχώρησις) or the hypostatic union... And by that name the Lord himself is said to be the crucified Lord of glory, although otherwise his divine nature suffered not at all, etc. (ed. Migne). Cf. below a. 2. q. 1. ad 3; d. 2. dub. 2; d. 6. a. 1. q. 1. ad 6; d. 7. a. 1. q. 2. at the end. — After human codex P supplies nature.
  4. Vat. addit respectu unius carnis. Paulo superius pro communicant, quod habent complures codd. et primae edd., Vat. communicent, cod. Z, et, ut videtur, pauci alii conveniant.
    The Vatican edition adds with respect to one flesh. A little above, for communicant ("communicate"), which several codices and the first editions have, the Vatican edition reads communicent, codex Z, and, as it seems, a few others, conveniant.
  5. Quod quomodo intelligendum sit, exponitur in fine huius quaest. — Paulo superius pro possent Vat. possunt.
    How this is to be understood is set out at the end of this question. — A little above, for possent ("could") the Vatican edition reads possunt ("can").
  6. Cfr. supra q. 1. fundam. 3. et infra d. 2. a. 1. q. 1. — Post a persona cod. K. subiicit divina.
    Cf. above q. 1, fundamentum 3, and below d. 2. a. 1. q. 1. — After by a person codex K adds divine.
  7. Post unum codd. X Z interserunt et. Circa finem arg. pro super (codd. Q Z bb in) unam naturam Vat. substituit assumere unam naturam, et dein omittit in ante plures naturas.
    After one codices X Z insert and. Near the end of the argument, for over (codices Q Z bb in) one nature the Vatican edition substitutes to assume one nature, and then omits over before several natures.
  8. Ut monstratum est I. Sent. d. 19. p. I. q. 1. — Proxime post pro ergo si plurimi codd. exhibent ergo sicut, codd. G H ergo cum. Paulo superius edd. 1, 2 verba omnino potentiae contraxerunt in omnipotentiae. In fine arg. codd. L Z bb voci unum adiungunt et eundem.
    As was shown in I Sent. d. 19. p. I. q. 1. — Immediately after, for therefore if very many codices read therefore just as, codices G H therefore since. A little above, editions 1 and 2 contracted the words wholly to the power into to the omnipotence. At the end of the argument codices L Z bb add to the word one the phrase and the same.
  9. Cod. aa unitate tali.
    Codex aa reads by such a unity.
  10. Cod. X implicabitur.
    Codex X reads implicabitur ("will be implied").
  11. Cod. E una et eadem. Mox cod. K verbo trium addit personarum. Paulo inferius pro secundum totum illud Vat. secundum totum id, vel illius. Subinde pro in quo codd. F G H M W X quod, codd. B U T V in quo quod. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 16. a. 1. q. 1. seq. et a. 2. q. 3.
    Codex E reads one and the same. Soon after, to the word of the three codex K adds persons. A little below, for according to the whole of that the Vatican edition reads according to the whole of it, or of which. Then for in which codices F G H M W X read which, codices B U T V in which that. Cf. II Sent. d. 16. a. 1. q. 1 following, and a. 2. q. 3.
  12. Codd. E H L aa hinc et inde.
    Codices E H L aa read on the one side and the other.
  13. Edd. cum nonnullis codd. unionem, cod. H unitate, cod. bb unitatem. Paulo ante pro modus unionis cod. F huius unionis modus. Mox post incompossibile est multi codd. adiiciunt illud, et post pauca pro sicut est incompossibile codd. F L aa substituunt sicut est impossibile.
    The editions, with some codices, read union (accusative), codex H unity (ablative), codex bb unity (accusative). A little before, for the mode of union codex F reads the mode of this union. Soon after it is incompossible many codices add this, and a little later, for just as it is incompossible codices F L aa substitute just as it is impossible.
  14. Cod. W de incarnatione Christi.
    Codex W reads concerning the incarnation of Christ.
  15. Edd. videtur posse. Mox pro non possint codd. F H L T U Z non possunt. Deinde pro ut sint personae codd. A E F G L N T U V ut sicut personae, perperam.
    The editions read seems to be able. Soon after, for could not codices F H L T U Z read cannot. Then for that they be persons codices A E F G L N T U V read that just as persons, wrongly.
  16. Plurimi codd. nec in his; sed codd. A K prius pro verbum Anselmi substituunt verbis Anselmi, quae lectio congrua esset, si pro nec ea vel nec in his poneretur nec his. Paulo superius pro voluerunt aliqui codd. K Z volunt aliqui, et mox pro quod si codd. A N T V X nec non edd. 1, 2, quia si.
    Very many codices read nor in these; but codices A K earlier substitute for the word of Anselm the reading the words of Anselm, which reading would be congruous, if for nor those things or nor in these one were to put nor these. A little above, for some wished codices K Z read some wish, and soon after for and if codices A N T V X, and also editions 1 and 2, read since if.
  17. Supplevimus ex cod. F plures personas. Mox Vat. vocem implicationem mutavit in multiplicationem.
    We have supplied from codex F several persons. Soon after, the Vatican edition changed the word implication into multiplication.
  18. Pro et (Vat. etiam) codd. A E G L N T V aa perperam in.
    For and (Vatican edition also) codices A E G L N T V aa wrongly read in.
← Dist. 1, Art. 1, Q. 2Dist. 1, Art. 1, Q. 4→