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Dist. 5, Art. 1, Q. 4

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 5

Textus Latinus
p. 126

Quaestio IV. Utrum assumere possit convenire divinae naturae, abstracta omni persona.

Quarto quaeritur, utrum assumere convenire possit divinae naturae, abstracta omni persona. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. (Ad oppositum.) Abstractis omnibus personis, est intelligere Omnipotentem; sed Omnipotenti nullum verbum est impossibile9: ergo videtur, quod omni personalitate abstracta, possibile sit, Deum carnem assumere.

2. Item, omni personalitate abstracta, adhuc est intelligere Deum summe bonum; sed quia summe bonus est, diligit creaturam, et per nimiam caritatem suam assumsit humanam naturam10: ergo omni personalitate abstracta, adhuc est intelligere, Deum carnem humanam posse assumere.

3. Item, omni personalitate abstracta, adhuc est intelligere Deum potentem creare et potentem genus humanum reparare11; sed reparat assumendo carnem: ergo videtur redire idem quod prius.

4. Item, omni personalitate abstracta, adhuc intelligitur Deus ut sapiens, ergo sciens et potens tyrannum superare et vincere; sed assumtionis my- p. 127 sterium est ad1b tyrannum vincere et superare: ergo intelligitur ut potens carnem assumere.

Sed contra: 1. (Fundamenta.) Assumere est sibi unire, aut ergo in supposito, aut in forma; sed divina natura non potest sibi humanam unire in forma: ergo si unit aliquo modo, necesse est unire in supposito et persona2b: ergo abstractis suppositis et personis, impossibile est amplius assumtionem intelligere.

2. Item, assumtio dicit aliquam actionem; sed nulla actio esse intelligitur alicuius nisi ut entis in actu — nihil enim3b est in actu ens, nisi prout est in supposito — ergo supposito abstracto, non est intelligere assumtionem aliquam.

3. Item, impossibile est intelligere, ut humana natura assumatur, nisi assumatur in atomo vel in singulari, quia, sicut vult Damascenus4b, «natura praeter singularia solum est in nuda consideratione»: ergo pari ratione impossibile est intelligere, quod assumtio fiat in natura abstracta ab omni persona.

4. Item, impossibile est, assumtionem alicuius competere alicui nisi post completum suum esse — nemo enim assumit sibi aliquid, nisi postquam est completum5b — sed perfecta completio naturae rationalis non est nisi persona: ergo omni personalitate circumscripta, impossibile est, quod natura humana assumatur a divina.

### Conclusio. Circumscripta omni personalitate, non potest intelligi, a divina natura assumi humanam; circumscripta vero personalitate a fide determinata, assumtio haec potest intelligi, sed non ita congrue.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod dupliciter contingit in divinis circumscribere personalitatem per intellectum: aut simpliciter, aut prout fides determinat. (Distinctio.) — (Membrum 1.) Simpliciter circumscribitur intellectus personalitatis, quando consideratur divina natura ut in se, non in aliquo supposito determinate, et in quantum communicabilis est a multis, non in quantum est in hoc vel in illo. Et hoc modo divina natura consideratur per modum cuiusdam ordinabilis ad alium. Et hoc modo non intelligitur secundum ra- p. 128 tionem agendi nec patiendi, quia actio non attribuitur formae nisi in supposito. Et sic assumtio non potest ei convenire (Conclusio 1.), tum quia natura talis non intelligitur ut agens, quia actio est formae in supposito; tum etiam, quia natura talis, sic considerata, non habet in quo possit uniri cum humana natura; non enim potest uniri in forma. Et ista duo cadunt in intellectu huius vocabuli, quod est assumere; et ideo ratione utriusque impedimentum est, ut nequaquam naturae consideratae in abstractione ab omni personalitate possit assumtio intelligi convenire.

(Membrum 2.) Alio modo potest circumscribi a divinis6b personalitas non simpliciter, sed per eum modum, per quem fides determinat, scilicet Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti, ita tamen quod intelligatur ibi suppositum rationalis naturae, sicut intelligunt Iudaei et pagani. Et hoc modo potest intelligi assumtio convenire Deo (Conclusio 2.); licet non ita congrue, sicut intelligitur, praesupposita personali distinctione. — (Explicatur.) Intellecto enim, quod sola illa persona, quae est innascibilis, esset in divinis, posset utique humanitatem assumere, et intelligi potest7b, quod Deus fieret homo; sed tamen non ita congrueret, sicut nunc, quia tunc non esset ibi ratio mediationis nec satisfactionis nec missionis, sicut nunc est, cum Filius a Patre mittitur et Patri pro homine satisfacit et mediator est inter Deum Patrem8b et genus humanum. Unde nullus intellexit unquam incarnationem, nisi praeintellexerit personarum distinctionem.

(Epilogus.) Concedendum est igitur, quod circumscripta personalitate a fide determinata, etsi possit intelligi assumtio, non tamen ita congrue. Omni vero personalitate circumscripta, non contingit, a divina natura assumi humanam. Unde concedendae sunt rationes ad istam partem, quia procedunt secundum istam viam.

Ad argumenta: 1. 2. 3. 4. (Solutio oppositorum.) Ad illud vero quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod divina natura, abstractis personis, intelligitur ut summe potens, ut summe sapiens, et ut summe bona, et ut creaturarum causa effectiva; ad omnes illas rationes responderi potest interimendo9b, si intelligatur, quod fiat abstractio ab omni supposito. Necessario enim qui cogitat Deum cogitat ut aliquem habentem deitatem sive naturam intellectualem; alioquin non cogitat eum ut perfecte in se entem, et nec ut perfecte potentem, nec ut summe sapientem. Alter etiam10b intellectus est ibi, quia ad assumtionem non tantum requiritur causa efficiens, sed etiam illud, in quo fiat unio. Et ideo esto1c, quod omni personalitate circumscripta, consideraretur divina natura in ratione perfecte potentis et sapientis, non tamen cogitari posset in ratione assumentis, quia non posset ibi esse intellectus unibilitatis.

Scholion

I. Alex. Hal. in uno loco (S. p. III. q. 2. m. 3.) ad quaestionem respondet simpliciter negando, his verbis: «Dico ergo, quod abstractis personis non intelligo divinam naturam posse uniri; et si quis forte posset hoc intelligere, ego non intelligo». Duplicem pro hac assertione affert rationem: primo, quia «natura divina et humana non possunt invicem mutari nec misceri, ut quaedam tertia fiat ex duabus» etc.; secundo, «quia nunquam intellectus intelligit, naturam esse in actu nisi in re naturae [supposito], sicut humanitatem esse in actu non intelligo nisi in habente ipsam... habens autem illam est persona vel hypostasis» etc. Attamen idem in alia simili quaestione (ibid. q. 7. m. 1. a. 2.) iam innuit eandem distinctionem, qua utuntur S. Bonav. et posteriores Scholastici, qui subsistentiam absolutam in Deo vel reapse admittunt, vel saltem a gentilibus eandem suppositam esse concedere debent. Hinc abstractis per intellectum proprietatibus personalibus, adhuc «remanebit in consideratione nostra natura divina ut subsistens et ut persona» (scilicet ut suppositum absolutum); ita S. Thom. (S. III. q. 3. a. 3. ad 1; cfr. idem, hic q. 2. a. 3.). Sed hoc modo, circumscriptis personis, intelligi potest natura divina assumens.

II. Praeter citatos: Scot., III. Sent. d. 1. q. 2. n. 6, et in utroque Scripto hic q. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.

III. Seq. (5.) quaestio a Magistro (hic c. 2.) posita est; ad quam respondet, istam locutionem melius silendam, vel negandam esse. Posteriores Scholastici explicite de eadem non tractant, excepto B. Alberto, hic a. 13. S. Thom. rem tangit S. III. q. 3. a. 2, ubi cum S. Bonav. admittit alteram propositionem in corp. relatam. Approbat enim dictum Damasceni (III. de Fide orthod. c. 6.): «Dicimus, naturam Dei incarnatam esse, secundum beatos Athanasium et Cyrillum».

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English Translation

Question IV. Whether assuming can befit the divine nature, with every person abstracted.

Fourthly it is asked, whether assuming can befit the divine nature, with every person abstracted. And that it can, it seems.

1. (Toward the opposite.) When all persons are abstracted, the Omnipotent is still understood; but to the Omnipotent no word is impossible9: therefore it seems that, with every personality abstracted, it is possible for God to assume flesh.

2. Likewise, with every personality abstracted, God is still understood as supremely good; but because he is supremely good, he loves the creature, and through his exceeding charity he assumed human nature10: therefore, with every personality abstracted, it is still possible to understand that God can assume human flesh.

3. Likewise, with every personality abstracted, God is still understood as able to create and able to restore the human race11; but he restores by assuming flesh: therefore the same as before seems to return.

4. Likewise, with every personality abstracted, God is still understood as wise, and therefore as knowing and able to overcome and conquer the tyrant; but the mystery of the assumption is for1b conquering and overcoming the tyrant: therefore he is understood as able to assume flesh.

On the contrary: 1. (Foundations.) To assume is to unite to oneself, therefore either in a supposit or in a form; but the divine nature cannot unite the human to itself in a form: therefore if it unites in any way, it is necessary to unite in a supposit and a person2b: therefore, with supposits and persons abstracted, it is altogether impossible to understand an assumption.

2. Likewise, assumption asserts some action; but no action is understood to belong to anything except as a being in act — for nothing is a being in act3b except insofar as it is in a supposit — therefore, with the supposit abstracted, there is no understanding of any assumption.

3. Likewise, it is impossible to understand that a human nature is assumed, unless it be assumed in an individual or in a singular, because, as Damascene holds4b, «a nature apart from singulars exists only in bare consideration»: therefore by parity of reasoning it is impossible to understand that an assumption takes place in a nature abstracted from every person.

4. Likewise, it is impossible that the assumption of anything befit anyone except after its completed being — for no one assumes anything to himself except after he is complete5b — but the perfect completion of a rational nature is nothing but a person: therefore, with every personality circumscribed, it is impossible that the human nature be assumed by the divine.

### Conclusion. With every personality circumscribed, it cannot be understood that the human is assumed by the divine nature; but with the personality circumscribed [only] as faith determines, this assumption can be understood, though not so fittingly.

I respond: It must be said that there are two ways of circumscribing personality in the divine by the intellect: either simply, or as faith determines. (Distinction.) — (First member.) The intellect of personality is circumscribed simply, when the divine nature is considered as in itself, not in any determinate supposit, and insofar as it is communicable to many, not insofar as it is in this one or in that one. And in this way the divine nature is considered after the manner of something orderable toward another. And in this way it is not understood according to the account of acting nor of being acted upon, because action is not attributed to a form except in a supposit. And so the assumption cannot befit it (First conclusion.), both because such a nature is not understood as an agent, since action belongs to a form in a supposit; and also because such a nature, considered thus, has nothing in which it could be united with a human nature; for it cannot be united in a form. And these two things fall within the meaning of this word, which is "to assume"; and therefore on account of both there is an impediment, such that the assumption can in no way be understood to befit a nature considered in abstraction from all personality.

(Second member.) In another way personality can be circumscribed in the divine6b not simply, but in the manner in which faith determines, namely [the personality] of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, yet in such a way that there be understood there a supposit of rational nature, as the Jews and the pagans understand. And in this way the assumption can be understood to befit God (Second conclusion.); though not so fittingly as it is understood when the personal distinction is presupposed. — (It is explained.) For granted that only that person which is unbegettable were in the divine, he could indeed assume humanity, and it can be understood7b that God should become man; but yet it would not be so fitting as it is now, because then there would not be there the account of mediation nor of satisfaction nor of mission, as there is now, when the Son is sent by the Father and makes satisfaction to the Father on behalf of man and is mediator between God the Father8b and the human race. Hence no one has ever understood the incarnation, unless he has first understood the distinction of persons.

(Epilogue.) It must therefore be conceded that, with the personality circumscribed [only] as faith determines, even though the assumption can be understood, yet not so fittingly. But with every personality circumscribed, it does not come about that the human is assumed by the divine nature. Hence the reasons toward that side are to be conceded, because they proceed according to that way.

To the arguments: 1, 2, 3, 4. (Solution of the opposing [arguments].) But to that which is objected on the contrary — that the divine nature, with the persons abstracted, is understood as supremely powerful, as supremely wise, and as supremely good, and as the effective cause of creatures — to all those reasons one can reply by way of destroying [them]9b, if it be understood that an abstraction is made from every supposit. For necessarily whoever thinks of God thinks of him as someone having deity or an intellectual nature; otherwise he does not think of him as perfectly being in himself, nor as perfectly powerful, nor as supremely wise. There is also another10b understanding there, because for the assumption there is required not only an efficient cause, but also that in which the union takes place. And therefore, granted1c that, with every personality circumscribed, the divine nature were considered under the account of being perfectly powerful and wise, yet it could not be thought of under the account of an assumer, because there could not be there an understanding of unitability.

Scholion

I. Alexander of Hales in one place (S. p. III. q. 2. m. 3.) answers the question by simply denying, in these words: «I say therefore that, with the persons abstracted, I do not understand that the divine nature can be united; and if anyone perhaps could understand this, I do not understand it». He brings forward a twofold reason for this assertion: first, because «the divine and human nature cannot be mutually changed nor mingled, so that some third thing be made out of the two» etc.; second, «because the intellect never understands that a nature is in act except in the reality of the nature [the supposit], just as I do not understand that humanity is in act except in that which has it... but that which has it is a person or hypostasis» etc. Yet the same author in another similar question (ibid. q. 7. m. 1. a. 2.) already hints at the same distinction which St. Bonaventure and the later Scholastics use, who either really admit an absolute subsistence in God, or at least must concede that the gentiles supposed the same. Hence, with the personal properties abstracted by the intellect, there will still «remain in our consideration the divine nature as subsisting and as a person» (namely as an absolute supposit); so St. Thomas (S. III. q. 3. a. 3. ad 1; cf. the same, here q. 2. a. 3.). But in this way, with the persons circumscribed, the divine nature can be understood as assuming.

II. Besides those cited: Scotus, III. Sent. d. 1. q. 2. n. 6, and in both Scripta here q. 1. — B. Albert, here a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1. a. 3. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 1. q. 2. — Giles of Rome, here q. 1. a. 3. — Denis the Carthusian, here q. 3.

III. The following (fifth) question was posed by the Master (here c. 2.); to which he replies that this way of speaking is better kept silent, or denied. The later Scholastics do not treat of it explicitly, except B. Albert, here a. 13. St. Thomas touches the matter at S. III. q. 3. a. 2, where with St. Bonaventure he admits the other proposition reported in the body. For he approves the saying of Damascene (III. On the Orthodox Faith c. 6.): «We say that the nature of God was incarnate, according to the blessed Athanasius and Cyril».

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Respicitur Luc. 1, 37.
    Reference is made to Luke 1:37.
  2. Cfr. Sap. 11, 25, et Eph. 2, 4.
    Cf. Wisdom 11:25, and Ephesians 2:4.
  3. Vide supra pag. 28, nota 2.
    See above, page 28, note 2.
  4. Vat. cum paucis codd. omittit ad. Paulo superius pro ergo sciens cod. V et sciens.
    The Vatican edition with a few codices omits ad. A little above, for ergo sciens codex V reads et sciens.
  5. Cfr. infra d. 6. a. 2. q. 1. in corp.
    Cf. below, d. 6, a. 2, q. 1, in the body.
  6. Pro enim mallemus substituere autem. — Quod hic profertur, illo axiomate exprimi solet: Actiones sunt suppositorum. Cfr. supra pag. 126, nota 1. — Aristot., IX. Metaph. text. 13. (VIII. c. 8.) ait: Semper etenim ex eo quod potentia est, fit actu ens ab actu existente, ut homo ex homine, musicus ex musico, semper aliquo primo movente, movens autem actu iam est.
    For enim we should prefer to substitute autem. — What is brought forward here is usually expressed by that axiom: Actions belong to supposits. Cf. above, page 126, note 1. — Aristotle, Metaphysics IX, text 13 (VIII, c. 8) says: For always from that which is in potency a being in act comes to be from a being existing in act, as man from man, musician from musician, always with some first mover, and the mover is already in act.
  7. Libr. III. de Fide orthod. c. 11. Cfr. supra pag. 15, nota 1.
    Book III, On the Orthodox Faith, c. 11. Cf. above, page 15, note 1.
  8. Scil. suum esse (ens); vel lege completus pro completum. — De propos. seq. cfr. infra n. 2. q. 3.
    Namely, its own being (a being); or read completus for completum. — On the following proposition cf. below, n. 2, q. 3.
  9. Post non cod. K repetit ut. Mox pro et in quantum edd. sed in quantum. Subinde Vat. omittit a multis, et paulo inferius pro ad alium rursum edd. 1, 2 exhibet ad aliam.
    After non codex K repeats ut. Presently, for et in quantum the editions read sed in quantum. Thereupon the Vatican edition omits a multis, and a little below, for ad alium again, editions 1, 2 give ad aliam.
  10. Cod. cc et edd. in divinis; in nostra lectione verbum circumscribi sumendum est pro abstrahi.
    Codex cc and the editions read in divinis; in our reading the verb circumscribi is to be taken for abstrahi.
  11. Edd. posset, et mox cum cod. T congrue pro congrueret.
    The editions read posset, and presently, with codex T, congrue for congrueret.
  12. Codd. A G H L T U V aa Deum et Patrem.
    Codices A G H L T U V aa read God and Father.
  13. Sive negando. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 87, nota 4. — Proxime post pro intelligatur ed. 2 intelligantur.
    That is, by denying. Cf. vol. I, page 87, note 4. — Immediately after, for intelligatur edition 2 reads intelligantur.
  14. Vat. Alter etenim.
    The Vatican edition reads Alter etenim [for Alter etiam]. ---
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