Dist. 5, Art. 1, Q. 5
Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 5
Articulus I. De assumtione ex parte assumentis.
Quaestio V. Utrum haec sit concedenda: divina natura est caro facta.
Quinto et ultimo quaeritur, utrum haec sit concedenda: divina natura est caro facta. Et quod sic, videtur.
(Ad oppositum.) 1. Ioannes Damascenus, et habetur in littera2: «Aimus, omnem et perfectam naturam deitatis in unam hypostasim incarnatam esse»; sed incarnari non est aliud quam carnem fieri: ergo si haec est vera: divina natura est incarnata, et haec, scilicet, divina natura est caro facta.
2. Item, nihil aliud est dicere: Verbum est caro factum, quam humana natura est assumta a Verbo; sed humana natura est assumta non solum a Verbo, sed etiam a divina natura, sicut ostensum fuit supra3: ergo videtur, quod divina natura sit caro facta.
3. Item, nihil aliud est Verbum carnem fieri, quam Dei Filium esse factum hominem; sed Dei Filius est divina natura vel essentia, et propter unionem est communicatio idiomatum4: ergo videtur, quod sicut ista conceditur: Verbum caro factum est; ita ista concedi debet: divina natura est facta caro.
Sed contra: (Fundamenta.) 1. Magister in littera5: «Melius hoc puto negare quam asserere»: ergo secundum sententiam Magistri videtur praedicta locutio esse neganda.
2. Item, quia Filius Dei est caro factus, conceditur, quod Filius Dei fuit passus et mortuus; sed non conceditur: divina natura est passa, vel mortua6: ergo nec ista debet concedi: divina natura est caro facta.
3. Item, quandocumque aliqua duo sic se habent, quod formaliter sunt distincta; si dicatur, unum fieri alterum, significatur, unum converti in alterum, utpote si dicatur aqua facta vinum; sed sic se habet caro et divina natura: cum ergo divina natura non sit in carnem conversa, videtur, quod haec non sit concedenda: divina natura est caro facta.
(Quaestio incidens.) Est igitur quaestio, quare magis conceditur: divina natura est incarnata, quam ista: divina natura est caro facta7.
Conclusio.
Locutio: divina natura est caro facta, non est admittenda.
Respondeo: (Conclusio.) Dicendum, quod ista debet et potest concedi: divina natura est incarnata, quia scripta legitur8 nec est simpliciter impropria.
(Duplex sensus.) Duplicem enim facit intellectum, quorum unus est verus et catholicus, licet alius sit ambiguus: unus, cum dicitur: divina natura est incarnata, id est carni unita; et hoc absque dubio verum est. Cum enim unio dicat relationem, simul cum hoc notat naturarum distinctionem et excludit confusionem; et ideo ratione istius intellectus potest concedi: divina natura est incarnata.
(Conclusio 2.) Potest etiam alius esse sensus: divina natura est incarnata, id est caro facta. Et ratione istius non admittitur communiter a doctoribus. Haec enim non recipitur: divina natura est caro facta; habet enim duplicem intellectum, et in uno intellectu est falsa et in alio intellectu est adeo expressiva, quod potest deducere in errorem; et ideo nullo modo recipitur.
(Ratio huius duplicis sensus.) — Duplicem autem habet intellectum praedicta locutio ex eo, quod hoc quod est facta, potest cadere inter subiectum et praedicatum, et1b referri ad totum. Si cadit inter subiectum et praedicatum, tunc notat factionem circa divinam naturam respectu formae carnis; et ideo sensus est: divina natura est caro facta, id est conversa in carnem; et haec quidem simpliciter2b est falsa. — Si autem respiciat totum, sic sensus est: divina natura est caro facta, id est factum est, ut divina natura sit caro; (Conclusio 3.) et haec quidem, proprie loquendo, est falsa, quia caro non praedicatur de divina natura. Si autem intelligatur synecdochice3b, ut sit sensus: divina natura est caro, id est homo; etsi illud aliquo modo (Conclusio 4.) posset concedi propter convenientiam in hypostasi, quae facit idiomatum communicationem — propter hoc quod haec est vera: homo est divina natura, id est, ille qui est homo — propter nimiam tamen expressionem tacenda est, ne videatur natura praedicari de natura, vel naturarum fieri identitatem aut confusionem; quae omnia releganda sunt ab illa excellentissima unione et assumtione. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes locutionem praedictam non esse admittendam, licet non multum cogant.
Ad obiecta: (Solutio oppositorum.) 1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod divina natura est incarnata et conceditur4b; dicendum, quod non est simile, sicut iam visum est.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod propter humanae naturae assumtionem ista conceditur: Verbum est factum caro; dicendum, quod non est simile, (Notandum.) quia Verbum dicit ipsam hypostasim, cui innititur5b ipsa humana natura et quam habet denominare. Et ideo non significatur ex hoc aliqua naturarum mutatio vel confusio, sed solum Verbi ad humanam naturam denominatio, ut dicatur Verbum esse homo. Non sic autem est, cum dicitur: divina natura est facta caro, quia, cum istae naturae sint distinctae, nec una habeat ab altera denominari, quamvis habeat alteri uniri, magis a proprietate et veritate praedicta locutio recedit.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Verbum fieri carnem non est aliud, quam Verbum fieri hominem; dicendum, quod verum6b est. Et quoniam ista est vera et propria: Verbum est factum homo; figurativa locutio, quae in eam immediate resolvitur, non est via ducendi in errorem, immo concedi potest satis catholice. Haec autem: divina essentia facta est homo, quamvis non sit omnino falsa, quia hypostasis praedicatur de divina natura per identitatem; non tamen est adeo propria, sicut ista: Filius Dei factus est homo, immo nimium est expressiva. Et propterea locutio figurativa, in qua significatur per synecdochen caro sumi pro toto homine, simpliciter respuitur, pro eo quod magis recedit a sermonis proprietate et ab expressione veritatis, et approximat intellectui erroris. — (Notandum.) Qua de causa multae negantur locutiones a doctoribus theologiae, ne paralogizentur et decipiantur simplices, qui nesciunt vocabulorum virtutes7b.
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Article I. On the assumption on the part of the one assuming.
Question V. Whether this is to be conceded: the divine nature is made flesh.
Fifth and last it is asked whether this is to be conceded: the divine nature is made flesh. And that it is so, it seems.
(To the opposite.) 1. John Damascene, and it is found in the text [of the Master]2: «We say that the whole and perfect nature of the deity was made incarnate into one hypostasis»; but to be made incarnate is nothing other than to be made flesh: therefore if this is true: the divine nature is made incarnate, then this also, namely: the divine nature is made flesh.
2. Likewise, to say the Word is made flesh is nothing other than that human nature has been assumed by the Word; but human nature has been assumed not only by the Word, but also by the divine nature, as was shown above3: therefore it seems that the divine nature is made flesh.
3. Likewise, for the Word to be made flesh is nothing other than for the Son of God to be made man; but the Son of God is the divine nature or essence, and on account of the union there is a communication of idioms4: therefore it seems that, just as this is conceded: the Word is made flesh; so this ought to be conceded: the divine nature is made flesh.
On the contrary: (Fundamental arguments.) 1. The Master, in the text5: «I think it better to deny this than to assert it»: therefore, according to the opinion of the Master, the aforesaid locution seems to be denied.
2. Likewise, because the Son of God is made flesh, it is conceded that the Son of God suffered and died; but it is not conceded: the divine nature suffered or died6: therefore neither ought this to be conceded: the divine nature is made flesh.
3. Likewise, whenever any two things are so related that they are formally distinct; if one is said to become the other, it is signified that the one is converted into the other, as for instance if water is said to be made wine; but flesh and the divine nature are so related: since therefore the divine nature is not converted into flesh, it seems that this is not to be conceded: the divine nature is made flesh.
(An incidental question.) There is therefore a question, why it is conceded rather: the divine nature is made incarnate, than this: the divine nature is made flesh7.
Conclusion.
The locution: the divine nature is made flesh, is not to be admitted.
I respond: (Conclusion.) It must be said that this ought to and can be conceded: the divine nature is made incarnate, because it is read as written8 and is not simply improper.
(A twofold sense.) For it yields a twofold understanding, of which one is true and catholic, although the other is ambiguous: one, when it is said: the divine nature is made incarnate, that is, united to flesh; and this without doubt is true. For since union bespeaks a relation, together with this it notes the distinction of the natures and excludes confusion; and therefore by reason of this understanding it can be conceded: the divine nature is made incarnate.
(Conclusion 2.) There can also be another sense: the divine nature is made incarnate, that is, made flesh. And by reason of this it is not commonly admitted by the doctors. For this is not received: the divine nature is made flesh; for it has a twofold understanding, and in one understanding it is false and in the other understanding it is so expressive that it can lead into error; and therefore it is in no way received.
(The reason for this twofold sense.) — The aforesaid locution has a twofold understanding from this, that this which is made can fall between subject and predicate, and1b be referred to the whole. If it falls between subject and predicate, then it notes a making with regard to the divine nature in respect of the form of flesh; and therefore the sense is: the divine nature is made flesh, that is, converted into flesh; and this indeed is simply2b false. — But if it regards the whole, then the sense is: the divine nature is made flesh, that is, it is brought about that the divine nature be flesh; (Conclusion 3.) and this indeed, properly speaking, is false, because flesh is not predicated of the divine nature. But if it be understood synecdochically3b, so that the sense be: the divine nature is flesh, that is, man; even though that might in some way (Conclusion 4.) be conceded on account of the convergence in the hypostasis, which makes the communication of idioms — on account of this, that this is true: man is the divine nature, that is, he who is man — yet on account of its excessive expressiveness it must be passed over in silence, lest nature seem to be predicated of nature, or an identity or confusion of the natures be made; all of which must be banished from that most excellent union and assumption. — There are therefore to be conceded the arguments showing that the aforesaid locution is not to be admitted, although they do not greatly compel.
To the objections: (Solution of the opposing arguments.) 1. As to that indeed which is objected, that the divine nature is made incarnate and is conceded4b; it must be said that it is not similar, as has already been seen.
2. As to that which is objected, that on account of the assumption of human nature this is conceded: the Word is made flesh; it must be said that it is not similar, (Note.) because the Word names the very hypostasis upon which the human nature itself rests5b and which it has to denominate. And therefore there is not signified by this any mutation or confusion of the natures, but only the denomination of the Word to human nature, so that the Word is said to be man. But it is not so when it is said: the divine nature is made flesh, because, since these natures are distinct, and one cannot be denominated from the other, although it can be united to the other, the aforesaid locution recedes the more from propriety and truth.
3. As to that which is objected, that for the Word to be made flesh is nothing other than for the Word to be made man; it must be said that it is true6b. And since this is true and proper: the Word is made man; the figurative locution, which is immediately resolved into it, is not a way of leading into error, but rather can be conceded quite catholically. But this: the divine essence is made man, although it is not wholly false, because the hypostasis is predicated of the divine nature by identity; nevertheless is not so proper as this: the Son of God is made man, but rather is excessively expressive. And therefore the figurative locution, in which it is signified by synecdoche that flesh is taken for the whole man, is simply rejected, for the reason that it recedes the more from the propriety of speech and from the expression of truth, and approaches the understanding of error. — (Note.) For which cause many locutions are denied by the doctors of theology, lest the simple, who do not know the force of words, be led into fallacy and deceived7b.
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- Hic c. 1 in fine. De minori vide ibid. c. 2.Here [in the Master's text], c. 1, at the end. On the minor [premise] see ibid., c. 2.
- Quaest. I.Question I.
- Cfr. supra pag. 14, nota 3. — Pro et propter multi codd. et edd. 1, 2 vel propter.Cf. above, p. 14, note 3. — For et propter ("and on account of") many codices and editions 1, 2 read vel propter ("or on account of").
- Hic c. 2. — Edd. cum textu origin. quam temere asserere.Here, c. 2. — The editions, with the original text, read quam temere asserere ("than rashly to assert").
- Vide verba Hieronymi hic in lit. Magistri, c. 1, circa medium, insuper locum Damasceni, supra pag. 14, nota 3, allatum.See the words of Jerome here in the text of the Master, c. 1, near the middle, and besides the passage of Damascene cited above, p. 14, note 3.
- Hanc rationem Magister insinuat hic c. 2.The Master intimates this reasoning here, c. 2.
- Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. — Cod. K in Scriptura legitur. Mox pro ambiguus cod. M abusivus, et subinde pro unus, quod habet Vat., edd. 1, 2 et codd. unde, sed non congrue.Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 1. — Codex K reads in Scriptura legitur ("is read in Scripture"). Presently, for ambiguus ("ambiguous"), codex M reads abusivus ("abusive"); and thereafter, for unus ("one"), which the Vatican edition, editions 1, 2, and the codices have, [some read] unde ("whence"), but not fittingly.
- Codd. H (K primitus) bb rectius vel pro et; Vat. post et subiicit potest etiam.Codices H (K originally) bb more correctly read vel ("or") for et ("and"); the Vatican edition, after et, subjoins potest etiam ("can also").
- Cod. H et hoc sensu simpliciter.Codex H reads et hoc sensu simpliciter ("and in this sense, simply").
- Cfr. tom. II, pag. 519, nota o.Cf. tome II, p. 519, note o.
- In edd. deest et conceditur.In the editions et conceditur ("and is conceded") is lacking.
- Pro innititur codd. K M O Z bb unitur. Mox pro significatur cod. Z sequitur. In fine solut. pro recedit cod. K recedet, cod. Y excedit.For innititur ("rests upon") codices K M O Z bb read unitur ("is united"). Presently, for significatur ("is signified") codex Z reads sequitur ("follows"). At the end of the solution, for recedit ("recedes") codex K reads recedet ("will recede"), codex Y excedit ("exceeds").
- Codd. G H I K L Y Z aa bb vera.Codices G H I K L Y Z aa bb read vera ("true," fem.).
- Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.See the scholion to the preceding question [q. IV]. ---