Dist. 5, Art. 2, Q. 1
Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 5
Articulus II. De assumtione ex parte assumti.
Consequenter quaeritur de secundo principali, videlicet de assumtione ex parte assumti. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quinque.
Primo quaeritur, utrum persona Dei assumserit humanam naturam.
Secundo, utrum assumserit humanam personam.
Tertio, utrum sit ponere perfectam intentionem personalitatis circa animam separatam.
Quarto, utrum concedendum sit, quod Deus assumserit hominem.
Quinto et ultimo, utrum concedendum sit, quod assumserit humanitatem.
Quaestio I. Utrum concedendum sit, naturam humanam assumtam esse a Deo.
Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum sit concedendum, quod humana natura sit assumta a Deo. Et quod sic, videtur.
1. Ad Philippenses secundo1: Semetipsum exinanivit, formam servi accipiens; sed veritas naturae attenditur quantum ad propriam formam: ergo si assumsit formam hominis, assumsit hominis naturam. (Fundamenta.)
2. Item, Augustinus de Fide ad Petrum2: «Deus humanam naturam in unitatem personae accepit».
3. Item, nullus est verus homo, nisi vere habeat humanam naturam; sed Dei Filius verus homo est: ergo habet humanam naturam in se. Sed non habet eam per aeternam generationem: ergo habet per assumtionem: igitur assumsit humanam naturam.
4. Item, quicumque est alicuius filius naturalis, communicat cum eo in natura3; sed Dei Filius est Virginis filius naturalis: ergo communicat cum ea in natura. Aut igitur illam naturam habuit ab aeterno, vel ex tempore; constat, quod non ab aeterno, sed ex tempore. Si ex tempore, aut ex propria virtute, aut ex aliena; constat, quod ex virtute propria; sed quod accipit quis virtute propria dicitur assumere: restat igitur, quod humana natura sit a Deo assumta.
Sed contra: 1. Omne quod assumitur, est, antequam sit assumtum; sed humana natura Christi non fuit ante unionem ipsius cum Verbo4: ergo non videtur, quod fuerit assumta a Verbo. (Ad oppositum.)
2. Item, omne quod assumitur ab aliquo, fit aliquo modo unum cum eo, a quo assumitur, quia assumtio ordinatur ad unionem5: ergo si humana natura assumitur a Deo, fit unum cum Deo. Sed quae sunt eadem, unum potest praedicari de altero: ergo humana natura est Deus, et e converso; sed hoc est falsum: ergo et illud, ex quo sequitur, scilicet quod humana natura sit a Deo assumta.
3. Item, omne quod assumitur ab aliquo ad unionem, acquirit proprietatem aliquam eius, a quo assumitur et cui unitur; sed humana natura non acquirit aliquam proprietatem ipsius Verbi — nulla enim proprietas Verbi dicitur de humana natura — ergo non videtur, quod ipsa a Verbo Dei fuerit assumta.
4. Item, Boethius in libro de Duabus Naturis et una persona Christi6 ponit quatuor definitiones naturae, quarum nulla videtur competere assumtioni divinae: ergo si recte et sufficienter definit naturam, non videtur esse concedendum, quod humana natura sit assumta a Deo. Quod patet discurrendo per singulas notificationes, quarum prima est: «Natura est earum rerum, quae, cum sint, quoquo modo intellectu capi possunt». Hoc modo non potest accipi, cum dicitur: humana natura est assumta; quia, si unam proprietatem hominis vel partem assumsisset, videtur assumsisse humanam naturam. — Secunda definitio naturae est: «Natura est vel quod agere, vel quod pati potest7». Et adhuc ista notificatio non competit sibi, quia secundum istum modum sibi sufficeret assumsisse solum animam, ad hoc quod diceretur assumsisse humanam naturam. — Tertia notificatio est: «Natura est principium motus et quietis per se, et non secundum accidens8». Adhuc nec ista competit, quia sufficeret, si solum corpus assumsisset. — Quarta notificatio est haec: «Natura est unamquamque rem informans specifica differentia». Sed nec etiam isto modo videtur assumtioni competere, quia, sicut dicit Damascenus tertio libro capitulo undecimo9: «Verbum incarnatum non eam quae nuda contemplatione consideratur assumsit naturam — non enim incarnatio hoc esset, sed fictio et deceptio incarnationis — neque eam quae specie consideratur, sed eam quae est in atomo»: ergo nullo modo videtur esse concedendum, quod Deus humanam naturam assumsit. (Definitiones naturae.)
Conclusio
Vere et proprie loquendo, concedi potest et debet, quod humana natura est a Deo assumta.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod vere et proprie loquendo, concedi potest et debet, humanam naturam a Deo assumtam esse, pro eo quod, sicut dicit Philosophus1b: «Natura accipitur et pro vera materia et pro vera forma», et de his dicitur secundum quandam analogiam. (Conclusio.) Quoniam igitur Deus assumsit carnem et animam humanam, et caro est principium hominis materiale, anima vero formale2b; hinc est, quod vere non solum humanam naturam, sed etiam totam humanam naturam dicitur assumsisse. — Et concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc inductae. p. 131
1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nihil assumitur nisi ens; dicendum, quod hoc dupliciter potest intelligi: uno modo sic: nihil assumitur nisi ens in ipsa assumtione; et hoc quidem verum est nec habet instantiam in proposito, quia humana natura simul habuit esse et esse assumtum. Alio modo potest intelligi, ut nihil assumatur, nisi prius sit, quam assumatur; et si hoc intelligitur de esse in potentia, veritatem habet, quia assumta natura prius est in potentia materiae, vel efficientis, quam uniatur ipsi assumenti. Si autem intelligatur quantum ad esse in actu, sic non habet veritatem, in ea potentia maxime, quae simul potest rem fabricare et sibi unire. Unde si quis posset vestimentum in dorso suo facere, simul esset vestimenti compositio et vestimenti assumtio. Per hunc modum intelligendum est in proposito. (Solutio oppositorum. Duplex sensus. Notandum.)
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod assumtio unum facit etc.; dicendum, quod verum est; non tamen omnimode facit unum, sed secundum quod competit comparatione3b assumentis ad assumtum. Si autem in aliqua assumtione reperitur unio, potissime reperitur in assumtione humanae naturae a Verbo; quia non tantum est ibi unitas per adiacentiam, sed etiam est ibi unitas, quae est ipsius naturae ad hypostasim suam4b. Haec autem unitas aliquo modo admittit differentiam in omni creata natura; unde de nulla hypostasi, cuius sit natura creata, conceditur, quod sit sua essentia vel natura in abstractione, sed solum per modum concretionis; unde non dicitur, quod Petrus sit humanitas, sed quod Petrus sit homo. Per hunc modum intelligendum est in proposito, quia, quamvis Deus non sit humana natura, est tamen homo. Et propterea non cogit illa ratio: unum non praedicatur de altero in abstractione, ergo non habent identitatem sive unitatem assumtioni competentem. (Notandum.)
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omne quod assumitur ab aliquo, acquirit aliquam proprietatem; dicendum, quod verum est, quod aliquam proprietatem acquirit; sed hoc potest esse in recto, vel in obliquo; vel ratione suppositi, vel ratione formae. Et quamvis non videatur humanae naturae acquiri proprietas ex ratione formae, acquiritur ratione suppositi; quamvis etiam5b non conveniat ei proprietas in recto, convenit in obliquo, secundum quod natura abstractive sumitur. (Notandum.)
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur: secundum quam illarum notificationum accipitur ibi natura? dico, quod secundum omnem potest accipi, maxime tamen secundum ultimam, quia completivam et specificam habuit hominis differentiam. Nec valent illae instantiae, quia Christus dicitur non solum assumsisse humanam naturam, sed totam humanam naturam; nec dicitur assumsisse specificam differentiam, secundum quod specifica differentia sumitur per abstractionem a singularibus, sed assumsit specificam differentiam in particulari veraciter existentem6b; et hoc modo datur intelligi nomine naturae. — In hoc enim differt essentia a natura; quia essentia nominat rei formam in quadam abstractione, natura eam nominat entem in motu et materia ut naturalium operationum principium. (Differt essentia a natura.) Et ideo doctores catholici magis isto verbo uti voluerunt: Deus assumsit humanam naturam, quam hoc: Deus assumsit humanam essentiam, quamvis utraque sit vera; ista enim7b est magis propria.
I. Ipsa conclusio satis manifesta est. — In arg. 4. ad oppos. hic referuntur quatuor definitiones naturae, quas Boethius sumsit ex Aristotele, qui V. Metaph. text. 5. septem habet huiusmodi definitiones, alibi a nostro Doctore tactas. Quod omnes istae quatuor definitiones aliquo modo adaptari possint ad ea quae de natura humana assumsit Christus, confirmat etiam S. Thom. (hic q. 3. a. 1.), qui eodem modo ibi etiam solvit instantiam hanc, quod differentia specifica significet naturam nudam. Dicit enim: «Sicut genus est quaedam intentio, quam intellectus ponit circa formam intellectam, ita etiam differentia et omnia quae significant secundas intentiones. Tamen huic intentioni intellectae respondet natura quaedam, quae est in particularibus, quamvis, secundum quod est in particularibus, non habeat rationem generis, vel speciei» etc. — Locutionem hanc: Deus assumsit humanam essentiam, quam Ss. Thom. (loc. cit. ad 3.) et Bonav. (hic ad 4.) admitti posse dicunt, non approbat Alex. Hal. (S. p. III. q. 4. m. 3.), hac ductus ratione: «Quamvis sint idem re natura et essentia, tamen differunt ratione. Natura enim respicit rem in fieri, essentia vero respicit rem secundum esse. Quia ergo non fuit in esse res assumta, ideo non debet concedi: assumsit humanam essentiam». Concedentes autem istam locutionem dicunt, quod «quamvis secundum grammaticam essentia dicatur ab essendo, tamen essentia est causa essendi, [quatenus «essentia se habet ad esse sicut id, per quod est esse», S. Thom., loc. cit. ad 3.]; unde naturaliter prior est esse actuali ipsius personae seu suppositi» (ita Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. ad 5.). — Nota etiam, quod ibi auctor naturae humanae attribuit esse distinctum.
II. Plures Scholastici hanc quaestionem tantum tangunt in aliis huius dist. quaestionibus. Praeter laudatos de ea agunt: B. Albert., hic a. 5. — Petr. a Tar., art. cit. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 1.
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Article II. On the assumption on the part of the thing assumed.
Next there is inquiry concerning the second principal matter, namely the assumption on the part of the thing assumed. And concerning this five questions are asked.
First it is asked whether the Person of God assumed a human nature.
Second, whether He assumed a human person.
Third, whether one must posit a complete intention of personality with respect to the separated soul.
Fourth, whether it is to be conceded that God assumed a man.
Fifth and last, whether it is to be conceded that He assumed humanity.
Question I. Whether it is to be conceded that the human nature was assumed by God.
Concerning the first, one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether it is to be conceded that the human nature was assumed by God. And that it is so, it seems.
1. To the Philippians 21: He emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant; but the truth of a nature is attended to with respect to its proper form: therefore if He assumed the form of a man, He assumed the nature of a man. (Fundamenta.)
2. Likewise, Augustine On Faith, to Peter2: «God took the human nature into the unity of the Person».
3. Likewise, no one is a true man unless he truly has a human nature; but the Son of God is a true man: therefore He has a human nature in Himself. But He does not have it through the eternal generation: therefore He has it through assumption: therefore He assumed a human nature.
4. Likewise, whoever is someone's natural son shares with him in nature3; but the Son of God is the natural son of the Virgin: therefore He shares with her in nature. Therefore He had that nature either from eternity or in time; it is established that not from eternity, but in time. If in time, then either by His own power or by another's; it is established that by His own power; but what one receives by his own power he is said to assume: it remains, therefore, that the human nature was assumed by God.
On the contrary: 1. Everything that is assumed exists before it is assumed; but the human nature of Christ did not exist before its union with the Word4: therefore it does not seem that it was assumed by the Word. (Ad oppositum.)
2. Likewise, everything that is assumed by something becomes in some way one with that by which it is assumed, because assumption is ordered to union5: therefore if the human nature is assumed by God, it becomes one with God. But things that are the same — the one can be predicated of the other: therefore the human nature is God, and conversely; but this is false: therefore that also from which it follows is false, namely that the human nature was assumed by God.
3. Likewise, everything that is assumed by something unto union acquires some property of that by which it is assumed and to which it is united; but the human nature does not acquire any property of the Word — for no property of the Word is said of the human nature — therefore it does not seem that it was assumed by the Word of God.
4. Likewise, Boethius in his book On the Two Natures and the One Person of Christ6 sets down four definitions of nature, none of which seems to befit the divine assumption: therefore if he defines nature rightly and sufficiently, it does not seem to be conceded that the human nature was assumed by God. This is evident by running through the individual notifications, of which the first is: «Nature is of those things which, since they are, can in some way be grasped by the intellect». In this way it cannot be taken when it is said: the human nature is assumed; because, if He had assumed one property or part of a man, He would seem to have assumed the human nature. — The second definition of nature is: «Nature is that which can either act or be acted upon7». And again this notification does not befit it, because in this way it would suffice Him to have assumed the soul alone, in order that He be said to have assumed the human nature. — The third notification is: «Nature is the principle of motion and rest of itself, and not according to accident8». Again neither does this befit, because it would suffice if He had assumed the body alone. — The fourth notification is this: «Nature is the specific difference informing each thing». But not even in this way does it seem to befit the assumption, because, as Damascene says in his third book, chapter eleven9: «The incarnate Word did not assume the nature considered in bare contemplation — for this would not be incarnation, but a feigning and a deception of incarnation — nor the one considered in its species, but the one which is in the individual»: therefore in no way does it seem to be conceded that God assumed the human nature. (Definitiones naturae.)
Conclusion
Speaking truly and properly, it can and ought to be conceded that the human nature was assumed by God.
I respond: It must be said that, speaking truly and properly, it can and ought to be conceded that the human nature was assumed by God, for this reason: that, as the Philosopher says1b, «Nature is taken both for true matter and for true form», and these are spoken of according to a certain analogy. (Conclusio.) Since, therefore, God assumed flesh and a human soul, and the flesh is the material principle of a man, while the soul is the formal2b; hence it is that He is said truly to have assumed not only the human nature, but even the whole human nature. — And the reasons adduced for this are to be conceded.
1. To that which is objected, that nothing is assumed unless it is a being; it must be said that this can be understood in two ways: in one way thus: nothing is assumed unless it is a being in the assumption itself; and this indeed is true and has no counter-instance in the matter at hand, because the human nature had being and being-assumed at the same time. In another way it can be understood that nothing is assumed unless it first exists before it is assumed; and if this is understood of being in potency, it holds true, because the assumed nature first exists in the potency of matter, or of the efficient cause, before it is united to the one assuming it. But if it is understood with respect to being in act, then it does not hold true, especially in that potency which can at once fashion a thing and unite it to itself. Hence if someone could make a garment on his own back, the fashioning of the garment and the assumption of the garment would be simultaneous. In this way it must be understood in the matter at hand. (Solutio oppositorum. Duplex sensus. Notandum.)
2. To that which is objected, that assumption makes a unity, etc.; it must be said that it is true; yet it does not make a unity in every way, but according as it befits in the comparison3b of the one assuming to the thing assumed. But if in any assumption a union is found, it is most fully found in the assumption of the human nature by the Word; because there is there not only a unity by adjacency, but there is also there the unity which is that of the nature itself to its hypostasis4b. But this unity in some way admits a difference in every created nature; whence concerning no hypostasis whose nature is created is it conceded that it is its own essence or nature in abstraction, but only by the mode of concretion; whence it is not said that Peter is humanity, but that Peter is a man. In this way it must be understood in the matter at hand, because, although God is not a human nature, He is nevertheless a man. And therefore that argument does not compel: the one is not predicated of the other in abstraction, therefore they do not have the identity or unity befitting the assumption. (Notandum.)
3. To that which is objected, that everything which is assumed by something acquires some property; it must be said that it is true that it acquires some property; but this can be in the direct [case], or in the oblique; or by reason of the supposit, or by reason of the form. And although it does not seem that a property is acquired by the human nature from the account of form, it is acquired by reason of the supposit; and although5b a property does not befit it in the direct, it befits it in the oblique, according as the nature is taken abstractively. (Notandum.)
4. To that which is objected: according to which of those notifications is nature taken there? I say that it can be taken according to every one, yet most of all according to the last, because He had the completive and specific difference of a man. Nor do those counter-instances avail, because Christ is said to have assumed not only the human nature, but the whole human nature; nor is He said to have assumed the specific difference, according as the specific difference is taken by abstraction from singulars, but He assumed the specific difference in the particular, truly existing6b; and in this way it is given to be understood by the name of nature. — For in this essence differs from nature; because essence names the form of a thing in a certain abstraction, while nature names it as a being in motion and matter, as the principle of natural operations. (Differt essentia a natura.) And therefore the catholic doctors preferred to use this word: God assumed a human nature, rather than this: God assumed a human essence, although both are true; for the former7b is more proper.
I. The conclusion itself is sufficiently manifest. — In the 4th argument to the contrary there are reported here four definitions of nature, which Boethius took from Aristotle, who in Metaphysics V, text 5, has seven definitions of this kind, treated by our Doctor elsewhere. That all these four definitions can in some way be adapted to those things which Christ assumed of the human nature is confirmed also by St. Thomas (here q. 3, a. 1), who in the same way there also resolves this counter-instance, that the specific difference signifies a bare nature. For he says: «Just as genus is a certain intention which the intellect places about the form understood, so also is difference and all things that signify second intentions. Yet to this understood intention there corresponds a certain nature, which is in particulars, although, according as it is in particulars, it does not have the account of genus or species» etc. — This expression: God assumed a human essence, which Ss. Thomas (loc. cit. ad 3) and Bonaventure (here ad 4) say can be admitted, Alexander of Hales (S. p. III, q. 4, m. 3) does not approve, led by this reasoning: «Although nature and essence are the same in reality, yet they differ in account. For nature regards a thing in becoming, while essence regards a thing according to being. Since, therefore, the assumed thing was not in being, it ought not to be conceded: He assumed a human essence». But those conceding this expression say that «although according to grammar essence is named from being (essendo), nevertheless essence is the cause of being, [inasmuch as «essence is related to being as that by which there is being», St. Thomas, loc. cit. ad 3]; whence it is naturally prior to the actual being of the person or supposit itself» (so Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 2, a. 1, ad 5). — Note also that there the author attributes a distinct being to the human nature.
II. Many of the Scholastics touch this question only in the other questions of this distinction. Besides those praised, the following treat of it: Bl. Albert, here a. 5. — Petrus a Tarantasia, art. cit. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 1, a. 1.
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- Vers. 7.Verse 7.
- Cap. 2. n. 18. Cfr. c. 16. n. 60. In testimonio allato pro accepit textus origin. exhibet suscepit, et pro in unitatem codd. K aa in unitate.Chapter 2, n. 18. Cf. c. 16, n. 60. In the testimony adduced, for accepit the original text exhibits suscepit, and for in unitatem codices K, aa read in unitate.
- Cfr. supra d. 4. dub. 2.Cf. above, d. 4, dub. 2.
- De quo vide supra lit. Magistri, d. 11. c. 3, et Comment. d. 3. p. II. a. 3. q. 2.On which see above, the Master's text, d. 11, c. 3, and the Commentary, d. 3, p. II, a. 3, q. 2.
- Ut ostensum est supra a. I. q. I. in corp.As was shown above, a. I, q. I, in the body.
- Cap. 1, ubi etiam ab auctore ostenditur, tres priores definitiones inter se differre extensione, quippe cum prima verificetur de substantiis et accidentibus, secunda de omnibus substantiis (corporeis et incorporeis), tertia autem de substantiis corporeis tantum valeat. — Paulo inferius pro definit cod. N definivit.Chapter 1, where it is also shown by the author that the three earlier definitions differ among themselves in extension, since indeed the first is verified of substances and accidents, the second of all substances (corporeal and incorporeal), while the third holds only of corporeal substances. — A little below, for definit codex N reads definivit.
- Cfr. Aristot., 1. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 33. seq. (c. 7.). — Infra edd. solam animam pro solum animam.Cf. Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption, bk. 1, text 33 ff. (c. 7). — Below, the editions read solam animam for solum animam.
- Est Aristot., II. Phys. text. 3.It is from Aristotle, Physics II, text 3.
- De Fide orthod. — In auctoritate allegata post quae specie [textus originalis quae in specie, Vat. cum edd. 1, 2 perperam specie, quae] consideratur textus originalis adiungit non enim omnes personas assumsit. — Paulo superius pro Sed nec etiam codd. K P Q bb Sed nec adhuc, cod. F Sed nec in, et subinde pro assumtioni, quod habent codd. K (a secunda manu) P Q R S U, cod. Z assumere; in aliis assumtum.On the Orthodox Faith. — In the authority alleged, after quae specie [the original text quae in specie; the Vatican edition, with editions 1 and 2, wrongly specie, quae] consideratur, the original text adds for He did not assume all persons. — A little above, for Sed nec etiam codices K, P, Q, bb read Sed nec adhuc, codex F Sed nec in, and then for assumtioni, which codices K (by a second hand), P, Q, R, S, U have, codex Z reads assumere; in the others assumtum.
- Libr. II. Phys. text. 10. seqq. (c. 1.), ubi etiam habetur, quod forma magis sit natura quam materia (ideoque secundum analogiam, de quo cfr. I. Phys. text. 69. c. 7.). Cfr. ibid. text. 21. et 81. (c. 2. et 8.); V. Metaph. text. 5. (IV. c. 4.). — Cod. K omittit bis vera.Physics, bk. II, text 10 ff. (c. 1), where it is also found that form is more nature than matter (and therefore according to analogy, on which cf. Physics I, text 69, c. 7). Cf. ibid., text 21 and 81 (cc. 2 and 8); Metaphysics V, text 5 (IV, c. 4). — Codex K omits bis vera.
- Cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 4. (c. 1.). — Non pauci codd. homini pro hominis. Paulo inferius edd. verbo concedendae praefigunt ideo.Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 4 (c. 1). — Not a few codices read homini for hominis. A little below, the editions prefix ideo to the word concedendae.
- Codd. K Z in comparatione, edd. comparationi.Codices K, Z read in comparatione, the editions comparationi.
- Cfr. infra d. 6. a. 1. q. 3. et a. 2. q. 1. seqq. — De differentia, quae est inter hypostasim et naturam in creaturis, vide scholion ad sequentem quaest.Cf. below, d. 6, a. 1, q. 3, and a. 2, q. 1 ff. — On the difference which is between hypostasis and nature in creatures, see the scholion to the following question.
- Edd. habent enim, et tum post acquiritur tum post convenit subiciunt tamen. Aliquanto superius pro proprietati in acquiritur Edd. I. Z. illa, codd. aa bb proprietatem acquirat.The editions have enim, and both after acquiritur and after convenit they subjoin tamen. Somewhat above, for proprietati … acquiritur editions I, Z [read] illa, codices aa, bb proprietatem acquirat.
- Cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. 11. c. 1, et Comment. a. 3. q. 3. — Subinde Vat. omittit modo.Cf. above, the Master's text, d. 11, c. 1, and the Commentary, a. 3, q. 3. — Then the Vatican edition omits modo.
- Edd. tamen.The editions read tamen.