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Dist. 8, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 8

Textus Latinus
p. 188

Quaestio II. Utrum nasci de Virgine vere dicatur de natura assumta.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum nasci de Virgine vere dicatur de natura assumta. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. (Fundamenta) Eius est generari cuius est generare, licet non eiusdem numero; sed generare est actus ipsius naturae1: ergo et generari. Sed cuius est generari, eius est nasci: ergo si generari competit naturae assumtae, convenit ei nasci de Virgine.

2. Item, bene sequitur: iste generat hunc hominem, ergo hominem; sed hunc hominem dicere est dicere personam, hominem vero naturam: ergo bene sequitur, si persona est nata, quod natura est nata.

3. Item, omne quod incipit esse, aliquo genere mutationis incipit esse; sed humana natura in Christo incipit esse; nec est dare aliud genus mutationis quam generationis2: ergo fuit concepta et nata.

4. Item, Christus natus est de Virgine aut ratione suppositi, aut ratione naturae; sed non ratione suppositi, quia illud est aeternum: ergo ratione naturae: ergo natura humana proprie dicitur nata de Virgine.

Sed contra: 1. (Ad oppositum) Sicut se habet divina natura ad nativitatem aeternam, sic natura humana ad nativitatem temporalem; sed divina natura non est nata nativitate aeterna3: ergo nec humana natura in Christo nativitate temporali.

2. Item, nativitas ad nihil terminatur nisi ad ens completum; sed ens completum dicit personam4: ergo generatio non terminatur ad naturam, sed ad personam.

3. Item, actus et operatio non terminatur nisi ad hoc aliquid5: ergo si hoc aliquid non dicit naturam, sed potius hypostasim; videtur, quod humana natura in Christo non debeat dici nata nec concepta.

4. Item, humana natura dicit simul carnem et animam; sed sicut caro est per propagationem, ita et anima per creationem: ergo sicut haec non recipitur, quod humana natura in Christo exeat in esse per creationem, ita non debet concedi, quod exeat per generationem: ergo non videtur haec admittenda: humana natura est nata.

(Conclusio)

Concedendum est, humanam naturam in Christo esse natam de Virgine.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod humana natura dupliciter potest accipi (Distinctio): uno modo ratione partium constituentium, alio modo ratione formae communis, consequentis totum compositum. Et utroque modo est verum dicere (Conclusio praevia). Verum est enim, quod humana natura assumta a Verbo assumsit carnem et animam; verum est etiam, quod assumsit formam consequentem compositionem, videlicet humanitatem6.

Utroque etiam praedictorum modorum contingit dicere humanam naturam natam de Virgine (Conclusio generalis). Nam si humana natura dicatur compositum, hoc modo potest concedi, quod sit nata de Virgine, non ratione totius, sed partis, scilicet carnis, quae in utero Virginis concepta fuit et ex utero Virginis prodiit7 (Membrum 1). — Si vero natura humana dicatur forma communis, consequens totum compositum, sic concedi potest, quod adhuc fuit nata in Christo, non ratione sui, sed ratione suppositi, in quo habet existere, et etiam in quo habet multiplicari (Membrum 2). Propter quod etiam dicit Philosophus8, quod « natura in productione talis formae occulte habet operari »; generando enim p. 189 hunc hominem, generat hominem. — Sic igitur concedendum est, humanam naturam in Christo natam esse de Virgine utrolibet praedictorum modorum. Sed uno modo dicitur esse nata ratione partis constitutivae per synecdochen9 (Corollarium); alio modo ratione partis subiectivae; et sic quodam modo per accidens. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ad hanc partem inductae, licet aliquae earum procedant sophistice (Nota).

1. (Solutio oppositorum) Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod divina natura in Christo non est nata, ergo nec humana; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia divina natura non multiplicatur in suppositis, sed est una in generante et genito; et ideo non recipit vocabulum distinctivum. Natura vero humana multiplicari habet et plurificari in parente et in prole. Hinc est, quod generatio in divinis terminatur ad personam; in creaturis non solum ad personam, verum etiam ad naturam10 (Notandum).

2. 3. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod generatio terminatur ad ens completum; dicendum11, quod verum est per se et primum; ex hoc tamen non sequitur, quod ad naturam non possit terminari, sed quod non terminatur ad naturam, circumscripta hypostasi; et hoc quidem verum est. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad sequens (Notandum).

4. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod anima exit in esse per creationem; dicendum, quod etsi sola pars hominis traducatur, videlicet caro, nihilominus tamen totus homo dicitur nasci et generari, pro eo quod intentio naturae non terminatur ad alteram partem per se, sed prout habet coniungi et perfici ex altera. Et ideo totus homo dicitur natus, quamvis tantum ex altera parte traducatur; non enim intendit homo generare carnem, sed hominem4b. — Si vero quaeritur, quare non dicitur exire in esse per creationem, sicut per generationem (Quaestio incidens solvitur); dicendum, quod generatio non excludit creationem praeambulam; creatio vero, cum sit ex nihilo, aliam excludit productionem, secundum quod dicit proximam creaturae et immediatam eductionem5b.

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English Translation

Question II. Whether to be born of the Virgin is truly said of the assumed nature.

Secondly it is asked whether to be born of the Virgin is truly said of the assumed [human] nature. And that it is so, seems [to follow].

1. (Foundations) That which it belongs to to beget, it belongs to to be begotten, though not as the same in number; but to beget is an act of the nature itself1: therefore also to be begotten. But that which it belongs to to be begotten, it belongs to to be born: therefore if to be begotten befits the assumed nature, it befits it to be born of the Virgin.

2. Likewise, it follows well: this one begets this man, therefore [begets] a man; but to say "this man" is to say a person, whereas "man" [says] a nature: therefore it follows well that, if the person is born, the nature is born.

3. Likewise, everything that begins to be begins to be by some kind of change; but the human nature in Christ begins to be; nor is there any kind of change to be assigned other than that of generation2: therefore it was conceived and born.

4. Likewise, Christ was born of the Virgin either by reason of the supposit or by reason of the nature; but not by reason of the supposit, because that is eternal: therefore by reason of the nature: therefore the human nature is properly said to be born of the Virgin.

On the contrary: 1. (To the opposite) As the divine nature is related to the eternal nativity, so the human nature [is related] to the temporal nativity; but the divine nature is not born by an eternal nativity3: therefore neither is the human nature in Christ [born] by a temporal nativity.

2. Likewise, a nativity is terminated at nothing except a complete being; but a complete being says a person4: therefore generation is not terminated at a nature, but at a person.

3. Likewise, an act and operation is terminated only at a "this something"5: therefore if a "this something" does not say a nature, but rather a hypostasis, it seems that the human nature in Christ ought not to be said to be born or conceived.

4. Likewise, the human nature says at once flesh and soul; but just as the flesh is by propagation, so also the soul is by creation: therefore just as this is not admitted, that the human nature in Christ comes into being by creation, so it ought not to be conceded that it comes into being by generation: therefore this does not seem to be admissible: the human nature is born.

(Conclusion)

It must be conceded that the human nature in Christ was born of the Virgin.

I respond: For an understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that the human nature can be taken in two ways (Distinction): in one way by reason of its constituent parts, in another way by reason of the common form following upon the whole composite. And in both ways it is true to say [it] (Prior conclusion). For it is true that the human nature assumed by the Word assumed flesh and soul; it is also true that it assumed the form following upon the composition, namely humanity6.

In each of the aforesaid ways also it occurs to say that the human nature is born of the Virgin (General conclusion). For if the human nature be called the composite, in this way it can be conceded that it is born of the Virgin, not by reason of the whole, but of a part, namely of the flesh, which was conceived in the womb of the Virgin and came forth from the womb of the Virgin7 (Member 1). — But if the human nature be called the common form, following upon the whole composite, in this way it can be conceded that it was furthermore born in Christ, not by reason of itself, but by reason of the supposit, in which it has to exist, and also in which it has to be multiplied (Member 2). On account of which the Philosopher also says8 that "in the production of such a form nature has to work hiddenly"; for in begetting this man, it begets a man. — Thus, therefore, it must be conceded that the human nature in Christ was born of the Virgin in either of the aforesaid ways. But in one way it is said to be born by reason of the constitutive part, by synecdoche9 (Corollary); in another way by reason of the subjective part; and thus in a certain manner per accidens. — Therefore the reasons adduced for this side are to be conceded, although some of them proceed sophistically (Note).

1. (Solution of the opposing arguments) To that which is objected, that the divine nature in Christ is not born, therefore neither is the human; it must be said that it is not alike, because the divine nature is not multiplied in supposits, but is one in the one begetting and the one begotten; and therefore it does not receive a distinguishing term. But the human nature has to be multiplied and pluralized in parent and in offspring. Hence it is that generation in divine things is terminated at a person; in creatures not only at a person, but also at a nature10 (Note).

2. 3. But to that which is objected, that generation is terminated at a complete being; it must be said11 that it is true per se and primarily; yet from this it does not follow that it cannot be terminated at a nature, but that it is not terminated at a nature with the hypostasis set aside; and this indeed is true. — And by this the reply to the next [objection] is clear (Note).

4. To that which is objected last, that the soul comes into being by creation; it must be said that, although only a part of the man is propagated, namely the flesh, nevertheless the whole man is said to be born and begotten, for the reason that the intention of nature is not terminated at the one part per se, but inasmuch as it has to be joined and perfected from the other. And therefore the whole man is said to be born, although he is propagated only from the one part; for a man does not intend to beget flesh, but a man4b. — But if it be asked why it is not said to come into being by creation, as [it does] by generation (An incidental question is solved); it must be said that generation does not exclude a preceding creation; but creation, since it is from nothing, excludes another production, inasmuch as it says the proximate and immediate eduction of the creature5b.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 5. (IV. c. 4.) ait: Natura vero dicitur uno quidem modo nascentium generatio... alio vero, ex quo primo inexistente generatur quod gignitur. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 134, nota 10, ubi plura retulimus de illa quae etiam apud Hugonem a S. Vict. (Qq. in Epist. ad Rom. q. 119.) habetur naturae definitione: natura est vis insita rebus, similia ex similibus procreans. — Quoad maiorem animadverte illud Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 28. (VI. c. 8.): Generans tale est, quale quod generatur, non tamen idem nec unum numero, sed unum specie, ut in naturalibus; homo namque hominem generat. Cfr. ibid. text. 22. (VI. c. 7.). — In fine arg. pro convenit codd. F H I bb et edd. 1, 2 competit, Vat. videtur, quod competit.
    Aristotle, Metaphysics V, text 5 (IV c. 4), says: "Nature is said in one way [to be] the generation of growing things... in another, that out of which, as first present in [a thing], is generated what is engendered." Cf. vol. I, p. 134, note 10, where we reported more on the definition of nature found also in Hugh of St. Victor (Questions on the Epistle to the Romans, q. 119): "nature is a force implanted in things, procreating like from like." — As to the major premise, note that of Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, text 28 (VI c. 8): "The begetter is such as that which is begotten, yet not the same nor one in number, but one in species, as in natural things; for man begets man." Cf. ibid., text 22 (VI c. 7). — At the end of the argument, for convenit codices F H I bb and editions 1, 2 [read] competit, the Vatican [edition] videtur, quod competit.
  2. Cfr. supra pag. 111, nota 11. — In minori, de qua infra d. 11. a. 2. q. 1, pro incipit cod. K incepit.
    Cf. above, p. 111, note 11. — In the minor [premise], on which see below, d. 11, a. 2, q. 1, for incipit codex K [reads] incepit.
  3. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 5. a. 2. q. 1.
    Cf. Sentences I, d. 5, a. 2, q. 1.
  4. Vide supra d. 5. a. 2. q. 3. — De maiori cfr. Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 26. seqq. (VI. c. 8.), ubi neque formam neque materiam proprie generari docetur, sed compositum: « totum autem hoc Kallias aut Socrates est ». — In cod. K post verba sed ens completum a secunda manu non incongrue additum est in rationalibus.
    See above, d. 5, a. 2, q. 3. — On the major [premise] cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, text 26 ff. (VI c. 8), where it is taught that neither form nor matter properly is generated, but the composite: "but this whole is Callias or Socrates." — In codex K, after the words sed ens completum, by a second hand there is not incongruously added in rationalibus ["in rational things"].
  5. Id est primam vel singularem substantiam. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 109, nota 7; pag. 197, nota 3; pag. 373, nota 6. — Aristot., VII. Methaph. text. 26. (VI. c. 8.) dicit: Hoc aliquid enim facere ex omnino subiecto, hoc facere est (vide notam praeced.). Et 1. Metaph. c. 1. Philosophus docet: Actiones autem ac generationes omnes circa singulare sunt; non enim hominem nisi per accidens sanat qui medetur, sed Kalliam aut Socratem aut alium quempiam eorum qui sic dicuntur, cui accidit hominem esse. Cfr. XII. Metaph. text. 18. (XI. c. 3.). — Pro terminatur cod. K terminantur.
    That is, a primary or singular substance. Cf. vol. II, p. 109, note 7; p. 197, note 3; p. 373, note 6. — Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, text 26 (VI c. 8), says: "For to make a 'this something' out of a wholly [particular] subject, this is to make [it]" (see the preceding note). And [in] Metaphysics I, c. 1, the Philosopher teaches: "But all actions and generations are concerned with the singular; for the one who heals does not heal man except per accidens, but Callias or Socrates or some other of those who are so named, to whom it happens to be a man." Cf. Metaphysics XII, text 18 (XI c. 3). — For terminatur codex K [reads] terminantur.
  6. Cfr. supra d. 2. a. 2. q. 1. seqq. nec non d. 5. a. 2. q. 1. et 5.
    Cf. above, d. 2, a. 2, q. 1 ff., and also d. 5, a. 2, q. 1 and 5.
  7. Vide supra d. 4. a. 3. q. 1. seqq. — Pro prodiit edd. producta.
    See above, d. 4, a. 3, q. 1 ff. — For prodiit the editions [read] producta.
  8. Scil. Gilbertus Porret., qui in libro de Sex Principiis, c. 1. tractans quaestionem illam: utrum universalia i. e. quae sunt in pluribus, ideoque potentiam agentium singularium excedere videntur, sint a natura, an ab arte, ait: « Natura igitur in his occulte operatur ». Quae verba B. Albert., Comment. super praedictum librum, tr. 1. c. 5, sic explicat: « Natura, inquit, particularis in agente quidem et patiente intendit hunc et producit; universalis autem, quae hunc ordinat ad esse divinum, intendit simplex et universale. Et quia natura universalis operatur in particulari, ideo, quoniam natura particularis producit hunc, et quia hic est homo, natura universalis producit hunc in homine; et sic de aliis. Et hoc modo per consequens producitur id quod est universale, quamvis non sit universale, secundum quod est in isto » etc. Deinde ostendit, duplici de causa naturam in his dici operari occulte, quia scil. tum ex parte operantis, tum ex parte operati, quamvis universalis tamen sumta non nisi intellectu considerari possit.
    Namely Gilbert of Poitiers, who in the book On the Six Principles, c. 1, treating that question — whether universals, i.e. those which are in many and therefore seem to exceed the power of singular agents, are from nature or from art — says: "Nature, therefore, works hiddenly in these." Which words Blessed Albert, Commentary on the aforesaid book, tr. 1 c. 5, explains thus: "Particular nature, he says, intends this in the agent and patient and produces [it]; but universal nature, which orders this to divine being, intends the simple and the universal. And because universal nature works in the particular, therefore, since particular nature produces this, and because this is man, universal nature produces this in man; and so of the rest. And in this way, consequently, that which is universal is produced, although it is not universal, insofar as it is in this [thing]," etc. Then he shows that for a twofold cause nature is said in these [things] to work hiddenly, namely both on the side of the worker and on the side of the work, although the universal, taken as such, can be considered only by the intellect.
  9. Cfr. supra pag. 47, nota 4. — Pars subiectiva intelligitur quodlibet inferius sub toto universali contentum, v. gr. individuum sive singulare. Cfr. tom. II. p. 598, nota 9. — Paulo superius pro utrolibet codd. G K bb utroque.
    Cf. above, p. 47, note 4. — A subjective part is understood as any inferior contained under the universal whole, e.g. an individual or singular. Cf. vol. II, p. 598, note 9. — A little above, for utrolibet codices G K bb [read] utroque.
  10. Quod accuratius explicatum est I. Sent. d. 9. q. 1. — Aliquanto superius pro et genito codd. F G X bb et generato, et subinde pro distinctivum (plures codd. distinctum) cod. aa distinctionis.
    Which is more accurately explained [in] Sentences I, d. 9, q. 1. — Somewhat above, for et genito codices F G X bb [read] et generato, and thereupon for distinctivum (several codices distinctum) codex aa [reads] distinctionis.
  11. In plurimis codd. et edd. 1, 2 desideratur dicendum, quod.
    In very many codices and in editions 1, 2 the words dicendum, quod are wanting.
  12. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 18. a. 2. q. 3. et d. 32. a. 3. q. 2. ad 4. — Seqq. vide ibid. d. 7. p. II. a. 2. q. 2. in corp., ubi de ordinatione operationum Dei, naturae et artis agitur. — Paulo superius ante et alterum edd. repetunt praedicatur. Pro et alterum codd. K X habent et reliquum.
    Cf. Sentences II, d. 18, a. 2, q. 3 and d. 32, a. 3, q. 2 ad 4. — For what follows see ibid., d. 7, p. II, a. 2, q. 2 in the body, where the ordering of the operations of God, nature, and art is treated. — A little above, before et alterum the editions repeat praedicatur. For et alterum codices K X have et reliquum.
  13. Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    See the scholion to the preceding question. ---
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