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Dist. 26, Art. 2, Q. 1

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 26

Textus Latinus
p. 568

Articulus II. De spe secundum considerationem relatam.

Consequenter quaeritur de spe secundum considerationem relatam. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quinque. Primo quaeritur de ipsa spe per comparationem ad timoris donum. Secundo per comparationem ad meriti usum. Tertio quaeritur de ipsa per comparationem ad caritatis habitum. Quarto quaeritur de eadem per comparationem ad proprium obiectum1. Quinto et ultimo quaeritur de ea per comparationem ad suum subiectum.

Quaestio I. Utrum timor et spes sint unus et idem habitus, an diversi.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur de spe per comparationem ad donum timoris, et est quaestio, utrum timor et spes sint unus et idem habitus, vel diversi. Et quod sint idem habitus, videtur posse ostendi:

1. Primo per simile in naturalibus: quoniam unum et idem pondus est, per quod corpus recedit ab una differentia positionis et accedit ad alteram; sed hoc est affectio in spiritibus, quod est pondus in corporibus, ut vult Augustinus2: ergo unus et idem habitus affectivus est, quo quis recedit a malo et quo tendit in bonum. Sed per timorem omnis recedit a malo, per spem tendit in bonum: ergo timor et spes sunt unus et idem habitus.

2. Item, hoc ipsum videtur per simile in disciplinabilibus; quia « oppositorum eadem est disciplina, ut recti et curvi, sani et aegri3 »: ergo si habitus virtutis est quaedam ars, videtur, quod unus et idem habitus possit ordinare habentem et dirigere ad opposita: ergo si spes dirigit animam in comparatione ad bonum, et timor in relatione ad malum; videtur, quod spes et timor sint unus habitus directivus.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur per simile in moralibus; quoniam duarum extremitatum medietas est una4; sed inter desperationem et praesumtionem est medietas, quae est spes; et inter haec eadem est medietas, quae est timor: ergo spes et timor sunt unus habitus.

p. 569

4. Item, hoc ipsum videtur per simile in theologicis virtutibus; quoniam fides, quae est virtus theologica, una et eadem est, sive per ipsam credantur bona, sive per ipsam credantur mala: ergo si spes et timor generantur ab ipsa fide, et genitum debet assimilari generanti5; videtur ergo, quod sicut fides est unus habitus theologicae virtutis, sic et spes et timor sint unus habitus directivus affectionis.

5. Item, hoc ipsum videtur per simile in peccatis actualibus. Sicut enim per virtutem declinat homo a malo et tendit in bonum, sic per peccatum actuale divertitur a bono incommutabili et convertitur ad commutabile; sed in peccato unus et idem actus est et una et eadem culpa, qua quis avertitur a Deo et convertitur ad commutabile bonum6: ergo similiter erit ex parte virtutis. Si ergo per spem tendit quis in bonum et per timorem declinat a malo; videtur, quod spes et timor sint unus habitus.

Sed contra: 1. Secundum Sanctos et philosophos7 quatuor consueverunt affectiones animi numerari, videlicet gaudium et dolor, spes et timor: si ergo vere quatuor sunt, necesse est, spem et timorem ab invicem differre, secundum quod sunt affectiones. Sed habitus spei dirigit illam affectionem, quae dicitur spes, et habitus timoris aliam: ergo videtur, quod sint habitus diversi.

2. Item, sicut se habent affectiones de praesenti malo et bono ad invicem, sic se habent affectiones de futuro bono et malo8; sed affectiones de praesenti bono et de praesenti malo non solum distinguuntur, sed etiam formaliter opponuntur, ut gaudium et dolor: ergo cum spes sit de futuro bono, timor de futuro malo; videtur, quod spes et timor non solum distinguantur, sed etiam opponantur ad invicem.

3. Item, plus differt habitus virtutis ab habitibus donorum, quam habitus virtutum ad invicem; sed habitus timoris computatur inter dona, habitus spei inter virtutes, secundum quod dicit Gregorius in Moralibus9: ergo si spes differt ab aliis virtutibus, videtur multo fortius, quod differat a timore.

4. Item, quandocumque duo habitus sic se habent, quod unus evacuatur et alter non, illi formaliter distinguuntur; sed timor Domini sanctus permanet in saeculum saeculi10, spes autem evacuatur secundum quod dicit Magister in littera, et infra habetur: ergo spes et timor essentialiter differunt.

5. Item, quorum effectus sunt ad invicem disparati, et ipsa sunt disparata; sed esse securum et esse pavidum opponuntur — spes reddit securum, timor reddit pavidum11 — ergo spes et timor formaliter distinguuntur.

Conclusio.

Spes et timor, sive nominent habitus, sive nominent affectiones animae, diversitatem habent ad invicem.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod timor et spes, sive nominent habitus, sive nominent affectiones animae, diversitatem habent ad invicem. Diversitas enim habituum attenditur penes diversitatem actuum principalium12; quoniam igitur spes consistit in quadam confidentia et erectione, timor vero in quadam fuga et resilitione: hinc est, quod timor et spes habent ad invicem diversitatem ratione suorum actuum. Diversitas autem ipsorum actuum venit ex parte obiecti, in quantum habet rationem motivi. Cum enim anima apprehendit aliquid nondum praesens, sed futurum in ratione convenientis, allicitur affectione spei, si adsit potestas assequendi; cum autem apprehendit in ratione disconvenientis, afficitur affectione timoris, si possit ab illo superveniri13. — Et sic patet, quod spes differt a timore ratione differentiae repertae in actu proprio et etiam in obiecto. Et concedendae sunt rationes, quae hoc ostendunt.

p. 570

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur per simile in naturalibus, quod idem est pondus, quod facit recedere ab uno oppositorum et accedere ad alterum: dicendum, quod non est omnino simile in voluntario amore et in naturali pondere: quoniam motus naturalis, maxime localis, necessario duos habet terminos, videlicet terminum ad quem et terminum a quo; nec potest aliquod corpus recedere a termino a quo, nisi tendendo ad terminum ad quem; unde ad unum et eundem actum requiruntur illa duo extrema, ita quod unum est in ratione principii, et alterum in ratione termini. Et propterea in naturalibus unum est pondus, per quod mobile recedit ab uno situ et appropinquat ad alium; in voluntariis autem secus est. Quando enim sunt duo opposita, anima potest affici circa unum, nihil considerans de altero; potest enim affici circa bonum, nihil considerans de malo, et e converso circa malum nihil considerans de bono; et ideo diversis affectibus et motibus habet moveri circa opposita. Et propterea non sequitur, quod unicus sit affectus sive habitus affectivus, qui dirigit respectu oppositorum, sicut in naturalibus unum est pondus14.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in disciplinabilibus una est scientia oppositorum; dicendum, quod non est simile, duplici ratione. Prima quidem ratio est, quia voluntas separat ea quae naturaliter sunt coniuncta; unde aliquis vult antecedens, et tamen nollet consequens; cognitio autem non separat ea quae naturaliter sunt coniuncta; unde qui novit antecedens quodammodo novit et consequens. Quoniam ergo per consequentiam in ipso15 ad opposita sequuntur oppositae proprietates, per quas habent cognosci — ut si album disgregat, nigrum congregat — hinc est, quod unus potest esse habitus cognitivus oppositorum, quamvis non sit habitus unus affectivus. — Alia etiam dissimilitudo est, quia potentia cognitiva consimili actu et consimili ratione negotiari potest super utrumque oppositorum; iudicat enim de recto et obliquo per rationem ipsius recti16; sed affectiva non sic, immo si appetit unum oppositorum, reliquum respuit; si amat unum, reliquum odit, per se loquendo. Et ratio huius est, quia affectiva magis unit ipsi affectibili, quam cognitiva cognoscibili — unde « amor transformat amantem in amatum17 » — et propterea non sequitur, quod si una possit esse cognitio oppositorum, secundum quod sunt opposita, propter hoc oppositorum habeat esse affectio una, vel etiam una virtus affectionis directiva.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur per simile in moralibus, quod duarum extremitatum una est medietas; dicendum, quod verum est, quod una est medietas punctalis; sed large accepta medietate, non habet veritatem: quoniam inter duo extrema multum distantia plures possunt esse medietates, ita quod una appropinquat uni extremo, et altera alii. Et sic potest esse in timore et spe respectu praesumtionis et desperationis, quia timor magis approximat ad extremitatem desperationis, spes autem ad extremitatem praesumtionis18. — Aliter etiam potest dici, quod istud intelligitur de medietate, quae conficitur ex utroque extremo, sicut largitas inter prodigalitatem et avaritiam dicitur esse medietas. Spes autem et timor non sunt huiusmodi medietates, sicut ex praecedentibus patet. — Posset etiam responderi per interemptionem19: quia timor et spes non sunt medietates extremitatum earundem, sed diversarum. Spes enim medium tenet inter desperationem et praesumtionem, sed timor inter temeritatem et timiditatem sive pusillanimitatem; et sic non oportet, quod timor et spes conveniant in medietate virtutis, vel unitate affectionis.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur per simile in fide, dicendum, quod non est simile, pro eo quod, licet fides sit malorum et bonorum, tamen est sub unica ratione, videlicet sub ratione veri20. Praeterea, est habitus spectans ad cognitionem, qui non diversificatur propter obiectorum contrarietatem; spes autem et timor sunt habitus affectivi, qui non respiciunt bonum et malum sub una ratione, sed spes respicit sub ratione convenientis, timor sub ratione disconvenientis: ideo non est simile hinc et inde. Si tu obiicias, quod principiatum debet assimilari suo principio21; dicendum, quod illud est verum in generatione univoca. Quod autem dicitur fides generare spem et timorem, hoc non est secundum univocationem, sed hoc est per quandam dispositionem, per quam dicimus, quod habitus cognitivus generat affectum, quia ad ipsum praeparat et disponit.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur per simile in conversione et aversione; dicendum, quod aversio et conversio uno modo nominant actus, alio modo nominant circumstantias circa actum. Secundum quod nominant actum, sic sunt diversi motus; alia enim est affectio contemptus, qua anima avertitur ab uno, et affectio appetitus, qua convertitur ad reliquum. Secundum autem quod nominant circumstantias sive relationes circa actum, sic possunt esse circa unum et eundem actum et circa idem peccatum, quia unum et idem potest simul et semel ad diversa comparari et diversis relationibus ad illa referri. Et sic non est simile de affectione timoris et spei, quia non potest simul et semel potentia una nec uno actu circa diversa et contraria affici. Propterea non sequitur, quodsi aversio et conversio possunt esse circa unam actionem et formam, quod similiter timor et spes habeant esse circa unam et eandem affectionem.

p. 571
Scholion

I. De timore eiusque essentia et speciebus, praesertim quatenus est habitus et donum Spiritus S., diffuse tractatur infra d. 34. p. II. per totam. De eodem, ut est passio, disputat S. Thom., S. I. II. q. 41. seqq. et hic q. 1. a. 3; ut est donum, ibid. II. II. q. 19. a. 5; et de hac quaestione hic q. 1. a. 3. — Praeter S. Thomam: Petr. a Tar., hic a. 1. quaestiunc. 2.

II. Sequenti (2.) quaestioni occasionem dederunt verba Magistri, hic in 2. arg. affirm. relata. Ad mentem Seraphici breviter respondet S. Thom. (hic q. 2. a. 1. ad 3; cfr. S. II. II. q. 17. a. 1. ad 2.) his verbis: « Habitus spei, quae est virtus, ex meritis non procedit, sed obiectum, id est ipsa res sperata, pro meritis redditur, et ideo etiam actus spei in suum obiectum tendit ex praesuppositione meritorum; et secundum hoc dicitur ex meritis provenire ratione sui actus »22. — Praeter S. Thom.: Petrus a Tar., hic a. 4. quaestiunc. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 3. ad 3.

III. Quoad 3. quaestionem communis est doctrina, quod in via generationis spes sit prior caritate; licet verum sit, quod spes et omnis motus appetitionis ex amore proveniat, qui tamen non est amor caritatis, ut in solut. ad 2. 3. explicatur. De hac 3. quaestione: S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 3. quaestiunc. 2; S. loc. cit. a. 8. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 3. quaestiunc. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. (de spe, ut est passio).

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English Translation

Article II. On hope according to a relational consideration.

Consequently hope is considered according to a relational consideration. And concerning this five things are asked. First it is asked about hope itself by comparison to the gift of fear. Second by comparison to the use of merit. Third it is asked about it by comparison to the habit of charity. Fourth it is asked about the same by comparison to its proper object1. Fifth and last it is asked about it by comparison to its subject.

Question I. Whether fear and hope are one and the same habit, or diverse.

Concerning the first, one proceeds thus and inquires about hope by comparison to the gift of fear, and the question is whether fear and hope are one and the same habit, or diverse. And that they are the same habit, it seems it can be shown:

1. First, through a likeness in natural things: since it is one and the same weight by which a body recedes from one differentiation of position and approaches another; but that is affection in spirits which weight is in bodies, as Augustine holds2: therefore it is one and the same affective habit by which one recedes from evil and by which one tends toward good. But by fear everyone recedes from evil, by hope tends toward good: therefore fear and hope are one and the same habit.

2. Likewise, this same thing seems through a likeness in matters of teaching; for « of opposites there is the same discipline, as of the straight and the curved, of the healthy and the sick3 »: therefore if the habit of virtue is a kind of art, it seems that one and the same habit can order its possessor and direct him toward opposites: therefore if hope directs the soul in comparison to good, and fear in relation to evil; it seems that hope and fear are one directive habit.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems through a likeness in moral matters; since the mean of two extremes is one4; but between despair and presumption there is a mean, which is hope; and between these the mean is the same, which is fear: therefore hope and fear are one habit.

4. Likewise, this same thing seems through a likeness in the theological virtues; since faith, which is a theological virtue, is one and the same, whether through it good things are believed, or through it evil things are believed: therefore if hope and fear are generated from faith itself, and the begotten ought to be assimilated to its begetter5; it seems therefore that just as faith is one habit of theological virtue, so also hope and fear are one directive habit of affection.

5. Likewise, this same thing seems through a likeness in actual sins. For just as through virtue a man turns away from evil and tends toward good, so through actual sin he is turned aside from the unchangeable good and converted to the changeable; but in sin there is one and the same act and one and the same fault, by which one is averted from God and converted to the changeable good6: therefore it will be similarly on the side of virtue. If therefore through hope one tends toward good and through fear turns away from evil; it seems that hope and fear are one habit.

On the contrary: 1. According to the Saints and the philosophers7 four affections of the soul are accustomed to be numbered, namely joy and grief, hope and fear: if therefore there are truly four, it is necessary that hope and fear differ from one another, according as they are affections. But the habit of hope directs that affection which is called hope, and the habit of fear another: therefore it seems that they are diverse habits.

2. Likewise, just as affections concerning present evil and good stand to one another, so stand affections concerning future good and evil8; but affections concerning present good and present evil are not only distinguished, but also formally opposed, as joy and grief: therefore since hope is of future good, fear of future evil; it seems that hope and fear are not only distinguished, but also opposed to one another.

3. Likewise, the habit of virtue differs more from the habits of gifts than the habits of virtues from one another; but the habit of fear is reckoned among the gifts, the habit of hope among the virtues, according as Gregory says in the Morals9: therefore if hope differs from the other virtues, it seems much more strongly that it should differ from fear.

4. Likewise, whenever two habits so stand that one is done away with and the other not, those are formally distinguished; but the holy fear of the Lord remains forever and ever10, hope however is done away with, according as the Master says in the text, and is had below: therefore hope and fear differ essentially.

5. Likewise, those whose effects are disparate from one another are themselves also disparate; but to be secure and to be fearful are opposed — hope renders one secure, fear renders one fearful11 — therefore hope and fear are formally distinguished.

Conclusion.

Hope and fear, whether they name habits or name affections of the soul, have diversity from one another.

I respond: It must be said that fear and hope, whether they name habits or name affections of the soul, have diversity from one another. For the diversity of habits is attended to according to the diversity of principal acts12; since therefore hope consists in a certain confidence and uplifting, fear however in a certain flight and recoil: hence it is that fear and hope have diversity from one another by reason of their acts. But the diversity of their acts comes from the side of the object, insofar as it has the character of a motive. For when the soul apprehends something not yet present, but future, under the character of the fitting, it is enticed by the affection of hope, if there is the power of attaining it; but when it apprehends it under the character of the unfitting, it is affected by the affection of fear, if it can be overtaken by it13. — And thus it is clear that hope differs from fear by reason of the difference found in its proper act and also in its object. And the reasons which show this are to be conceded.

1. But to that which is first objected through a likeness in natural things, that it is the same weight which makes a body recede from one of the opposites and approach the other: it must be said that it is not altogether alike in voluntary love and in natural weight: since natural motion, especially local, necessarily has two termini, namely the terminus to which and the terminus from which; nor can any body recede from the terminus from which, except by tending toward the terminus to which; whence for one and the same act those two extremes are required, so that one is in the character of principle, and the other in the character of terminus. And therefore in natural things there is one weight, by which a movable thing recedes from one place and draws near to another; but in voluntary things it is otherwise. For when there are two opposites, the soul can be affected about one, considering nothing of the other; for it can be affected about good, considering nothing of evil, and conversely about evil, considering nothing of good; and therefore it has to be moved about opposites by diverse affects and motions. And therefore it does not follow that there is a single affect or affective habit which directs in respect of opposites, as in natural things there is one weight14.

2. To that which is objected, that in matters of teaching there is one knowledge of opposites; it must be said that it is not alike, for a twofold reason. The first reason indeed is that the will separates those things which are naturally joined; whence someone wills the antecedent, and yet would not will the consequent; but cognition does not separate those things which are naturally joined; whence he who knows the antecedent in a way knows also the consequent. Since therefore through consequence in itself15 opposite properties follow upon opposites, by which they come to be known — as if the white disperses, the black gathers — hence it is that there can be one cognitive habit of opposites, although there is not one affective habit. — There is also another dissimilarity, because the cognitive power can deal with each of the opposites by a like act and a like account; for it judges of the straight and the oblique by the account of the straight itself16; but the affective is not so, rather if it desires one of the opposites, it spurns the other; if it loves one, it hates the other, properly speaking. And the reason of this is that the affective unites itself more to the thing-to-be-affected-by than the cognitive to the knowable — whence « love transforms the lover into the beloved17 » — and therefore it does not follow that, if there can be one cognition of opposites, according as they are opposite, on account of this there should be one affection of the opposites, or even one directive virtue of affection.

3. To that which is objected through a likeness in moral matters, that of two extremes there is one mean; it must be said that it is true that there is one punctual mean; but the mean taken broadly does not have truth: since between two extremes far distant there can be several means, so that one draws near to one extreme, and another to the other. And so it can be in fear and hope with respect to presumption and despair, because fear approaches more to the extreme of despair, but hope to the extreme of presumption18. — It can also be said otherwise that this is understood of the mean which is constituted out of both extremes, as liberality between prodigality and avarice is said to be a mean. But hope and fear are not means of this kind, as is clear from what precedes. — It could also be answered by removal19: because fear and hope are not means of the same extremes, but of diverse ones. For hope holds the middle between despair and presumption, but fear between rashness and timidity or pusillanimity; and so it is not necessary that fear and hope agree in a mean of virtue, or in a unity of affection.

4. To that which is objected through a likeness in faith, it must be said that it is not alike, for the reason that, although faith is of evils and of goods, nevertheless it is under a single account, namely under the account of the true20. Moreover, it is a habit pertaining to cognition, which is not diversified on account of the contrariety of objects; but hope and fear are affective habits, which do not regard good and evil under one account, but hope regards under the account of the fitting, fear under the account of the unfitting: therefore it is not alike on this side and on that. If you object that the principiated ought to be assimilated to its principle21; it must be said that that is true in univocal generation. But as for what is said, that faith generates hope and fear, this is not according to univocation, but this is through a certain disposition, by which we say that a cognitive habit generates an affect, because it prepares and disposes toward it.

5. To that which is objected through a likeness in conversion and aversion; it must be said that aversion and conversion in one mode name acts, in another mode name circumstances about an act. According as they name an act, thus they are diverse motions; for the affection of contempt, by which the soul is averted from one thing, is one thing, and the affection of appetite, by which it is converted to the other, another. But according as they name circumstances or relations about an act, thus they can be about one and the same act and about the same sin, because one and the same thing can at once and together be compared to diverse things and be referred to them by diverse relations. And so it is not alike with the affection of fear and of hope, because one power cannot at once and together, nor by one act, be affected about diverse and contrary things. Therefore it does not follow that, if aversion and conversion can be about one action and form, that likewise fear and hope should be about one and the same affection.

Scholion

I. Concerning fear and its essence and species, especially insofar as it is a habit and a gift of the Holy Spirit, there is a diffuse treatment below at d. 34, p. II, throughout. Concerning the same, as it is a passion, St. Thomas disputes, Summa I-II, q. 41 ff., and here q. 1, a. 3; as it is a gift, ibid. II-II, q. 19, a. 5; and concerning this question here q. 1, a. 3. — Besides St. Thomas: Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 1, quaestiuncula 2.

II. To the following (2nd) question the words of the Master, related here in the 2nd affirmative argument, gave occasion. To the mind of the Seraphic Doctor St. Thomas briefly responds (here q. 2, a. 1, ad 3; cf. Summa II-II, q. 17, a. 1, ad 2) in these words: « The habit of hope, which is a virtue, does not proceed from merits, but the object, that is the thing itself hoped for, is rendered for merits, and therefore also the act of hope tends toward its object out of the presupposition of merits; and according to this it is said to come from merits by reason of its act »22. — Besides St. Thomas: Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 4, quaestiuncula 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 4, q. 3, ad 3.

III. As to the 3rd question it is common doctrine that in the way of generation hope is prior to charity; although it is true that hope and every motion of appetite proceeds from love, which however is not the love of charity, as is explained in the solutions ad 2 and 3. Concerning this 3rd question: St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 3, quaestiuncula 2; the Saint, loc. cit., a. 8. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 3, quaestiuncula 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 1 (on hope, as it is a passion).

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Codd. hic subiectum, et subinde in fine ultimae propositionis obiectum pro subiectum; sed haec lectio non respondet ordini quaestionum, quae infra tractantur. — (P. 568, n. 1.)
    The codices here read subiectum, and then at the end of the last proposition obiectum for subiectum; but this reading does not correspond to the order of the questions which are treated below. — (P. 568, n. 1.)
  2. Libr. XIII. Confess. c. 9. n. 10; XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 28; VI. de Trin. c. 10. n. 12. Cfr. supra pag. 289, nota 5. — In seqq. respicitur illud Ps. 33, 15: « Diverte a malo et fac bonum », et illud Prov. 3, 7: « Time Deum et recede a malo ». — (P. 568, n. 2.)
    Book XIII of the Confessions, c. 9, n. 10; On the City of God XI, c. 28; On the Trinity VI, c. 10, n. 12. Cf. above, p. 289, note 5. — In what follows there is regard to that text of Ps. 33:15: « Turn away from evil and do good », and that of Prov. 3:7: « Fear God and recede from evil ». — (P. 568, n. 2.)
  3. Aristot., I. Prior. c. 1. 37. (c. 35.) 40. (c. 38.); II. c. 26. (c. 28.); I. Topic. c. 12, ubi Philosophus propositionem: « Contrariorum eadem disciplina [ἐπιστήμη] », ut rationalem (λογικήν) i. e. ad logicam pertinentem significat. — (P. 568, n. 3.)
    Aristotle, Prior Analytics I, c. 1, 37 (c. 35), 40 (c. 38); II, c. 26 (c. 28); Topics I, c. 12, where the Philosopher signifies the proposition « of contraries there is the same discipline [ἐπιστήμη] » as rational (λογικήν), i.e. as pertaining to logic. — (P. 568, n. 3.)
  4. Cfr. Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 6. seqq. — (P. 568, n. 4.)
    Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II, c. 6 ff. — (P. 568, n. 4.)
  5. Vide supra pag. 186, nota 10. et pag. 188, nota 1. — De maiori cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3, et supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 3. — Pro debet cod. Z habet. — (P. 569, n. 1.)
    See above, p. 186, note 10, and p. 188, note 1. — On the major see here the text of the Master, c. 3, and above, d. 23, a. 1, q. 3. — For debet cod. Z reads habet. — (P. 569, n. 1.)
  6. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 42. a. 3. q. 2. — Pro avertitur a Deo edd. convertitur a Deo. — (P. 569, n. 2.)
    Cf. II Sent. d. 42, a. 3, q. 2. — For avertitur a Deo the editions read convertitur a Deo. — (P. 569, n. 2.)
  7. Vide supra pag. 556, nota 5. — Circa finem arg. post aliam Vat. addit quae dicitur timor. — (P. 569, n. 3.)
    See above, p. 556, note 5. — Near the end of the argument, after aliam the Vatican edition adds quae dicitur timor. — (P. 569, n. 3.)
  8. Damasc., II. de Fide orthod. c. 12. (ipse sequitur Nemesium episc. Emesen., de Natura hominis, c. 17.): Oportet scire, quod rerum hae quidem sunt bonae, hae vero malae. Exspectatum bonum concupiscentiam [ἐπιθυμίαν] constituit, praesens vero laetitiam. Similiter exspectatum malum, timorem; praesens vero tristitiam. Cfr. Ioan. de Rupella, Sum. de Anima, p. II. c. 10. — (P. 569, n. 4.)
    Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith II, c. 12 (he himself follows Nemesius, bishop of Emesa, On the Nature of Man, c. 17): It must be known that of things some are good, others evil. The expected good constitutes concupiscence [ἐπιθυμίαν], but the present good, gladness. Likewise the expected evil, fear; but the present evil, sadness. Cf. John of La Rochelle, Summa de Anima, p. II, c. 10. — (P. 569, n. 4.)
  9. Libr. I. c. 27. n. 38, ubi illud Iob 1, 2: Natique sunt ei septem filii et tres filiae, interpretans docet, septem filios Iob totidem significare dona Spiritus sancti (in quibus est etiam timor), tres vero filias tres virtutes: spem, fidem, caritatem. — Circa initium arg. pro habitus virtutis cod. Z habitus virtutum, et subinde pro habitus virtutum edd. cum nonnullis codd. habitus virtutis. — (P. 569, n. 5.)
    Book I, c. 27, n. 38, where, interpreting that text of Job 1:2, And there were born to him seven sons and three daughters, he teaches that the seven sons of Job signify the same number of gifts of the Holy Spirit (among which is also fear), but the three daughters the three virtues: hope, faith, charity. — Near the beginning of the argument, for habitus virtutis cod. Z reads habitus virtutum, and then for habitus virtutum the editions with some codices read habitus virtutis. — (P. 569, n. 5.)
  10. Psalm. 18, 10. — De propos. seq. cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 4, nec non infra d. XXXI. lit. Magistri, c. 1, nec non Comment. a. 2. q. 2. — (P. 569, n. 6.)
    Psalm 18:10. — On the following proposition cf. here the text of the Master, c. 4, and also below, d. XXXI, the text of the Master, c. 1, and also the Commentary, a. 2, q. 2. — (P. 569, n. 6.)
  11. Cfr. supra pag. 226, nota 1, et tom. II. pag. 826, nota 9. — (P. 569, n. 7.)
    Cf. above, p. 226, note 1, and tom. II, p. 826, note 9. — (P. 569, n. 7.)
  12. Vide supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 3. — (P. 569, n. 8.)
    See above, d. 23, a. 1, q. 3. — (P. 569, n. 8.)
  13. Pro superveniri edd. superari. — (P. 569, n. 9.)
    For superveniri the editions read superari. — (P. 569, n. 9.)
  14. Ratio, quare in motibus naturalibus non sit nisi una virtus, faciens accessum et recessum mobilis, secundum opinionem Averrois, IV. Phys. text. 43, est, quia quiescens quiescit propter similitudinem continentis [loci], et movetur propter privationem similitudinis inter ipsum et continens. — (P. 570, n. 1.)
    The reason why in natural motions there is only one power, causing the approach and recession of the movable thing, according to the opinion of Averroes, Physics IV, text 43, is that the thing at rest rests on account of likeness to the container [place], and is moved on account of the privation of likeness between itself and the container. — (P. 570, n. 1.)
  15. Aristot., II. Topic. c. 3. (c. 8.) consequentiam in ipso vocat illam, quae fit directo ordine. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 822, nota 1. De exemplo allato: « ut si album disgregat » etc, vide tom. II. pag. 643, nota 9. — Pro per consequentiam in ipso edd. atque complures codd. per consequentia in ipso et paulo superius non vult pro nollet. — (P. 570, n. 2.)
    Aristotle, Topics II, c. 3 (c. 8), calls « consequence in itself » that which comes about in a direct order. Cf. tom. I, p. 822, note 1. On the example adduced: « as if the white disperses » etc., see tom. II, p. 643, note 9. — For per consequentiam in ipso the editions and very many codices read per consequentia in ipso, and a little above non vult for nollet. — (P. 570, n. 2.)
  16. Aristot., I. de Anima, text. 85. (c. 5.): Sufficiens enim est altera pars contrarietatis, se ipsam diiudicare et oppositam; recto enim et ipsum et obliquum cognoscimus; iudex enim utrorumque regula; obliquum autem neque sui ipsius, neque recti. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 36. a. 3. q. 1, d. 38. a. 1. q. 2. ad 4. 5. — (P. 570, n. 3.)
    Aristotle, On the Soul I, text 85 (c. 5): For one part of a contrariety suffices to judge both itself and its opposite; for by the straight we know both itself and the oblique; for the judge is the rule of both; but the oblique is judge neither of itself nor of the straight. Cf. I Sent. d. 36, a. 3, q. 1; d. 38, a. 1, q. 2, ad 4, 5. — (P. 570, n. 3.)
  17. Secundum Hug. a S. Vict., cuius verba videsis tom. II. pag. 4, nota 8. Cfr. ibid. pag. 124, nota 4. — (P. 570, n. 4.)
    According to Hugh of St. Victor, whose words you may see in tom. II, p. 4, note 8. Cf. ibid., p. 124, note 4. — (P. 570, n. 4.)
  18. Cfr. Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 8. — De solut. seq. vide supra a. 1. q. 3. ad 2. et d. 23. a. 1. q. 1. ad 1. — Pro approximat codd. I L U appropinquat. — (P. 570, n. 5.)
    Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II, c. 8. — On the following solution see above, a. 1, q. 3, ad 2, and d. 23, a. 1, q. 1, ad 1. — For approximat codd. I L U read appropinquat. — (P. 570, n. 5.)
  19. Sive per negationem. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 87, nota 4. — In fine solut. ante unitate (quod codd. M O omittunt et cod. Z mutavit in in medietate) auctoritate codd. A K M O Z bb supplevimus vel. — (P. 570, n. 6.)
    Or by negation. Cf. tom. I, p. 87, note 4. — At the end of the solution, before unitate (which codd. M O omit and cod. Z changed into in medietate), on the authority of codd. A K M O Z bb we supplied vel. — (P. 570, n. 6.)
  20. Vide supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 3. ad 4. — In Supplemento Summae Alex. Hal. collat. 55. a. 1, ubi eadem quaestio occurrit, his verbis additur: Fides enim est principaliter circa primam Veritatem, cum credit de futuris bonis et futuris malis, sive de poenis et praemiis; spes autem respicit aliud in Deo, aliud timor; quia spes largitatem Dei respicit, timor iustitiam, et ita diversa in Deo respiciunt sive Deum secundum diversas rationes. Una enim est ergo ratio quantum ad cognitionem, sed non est una ratio quantum ad affectionem. — De ratione seq. vide infra q. 5. et supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 2. — Post Praeterea edd. nec non memoratum Supplementum Sum. Alex. Hal. supplent fides. Subinde pro qui non diversificatur edd. 1, 2 cum multis codd. quia non diversificatur. — (P. 570, n. 7.)
    See above, d. 23, a. 1, q. 3, ad 4. — In the Supplement of the Summa of Alexander of Hales, collation 55, a. 1, where the same question occurs, these words are added: For faith is principally about the first Truth, since it believes concerning future goods and future evils, or concerning punishments and rewards; but hope regards one thing in God, fear another; because hope regards the liberality of God, fear his justice, and thus they regard diverse things in God, or God according to diverse accounts. For there is therefore one account as to cognition, but there is not one account as to affection. — On the following account see below, q. 5, and above, d. 23, a. 1, q. 2. — After Praeterea the editions and also the aforesaid Supplement of the Summa of Alexander of Hales supply fides. Then for qui non diversificatur editions 1, 2 with many codices read quia non diversificatur. — (P. 570, n. 7.)
  21. Sive, ut supra in ipsa obiectione habetur: genitum debet assimilari generanti. — Circa finem solut. pro generat affectum Supplementum Sum. Alex. Hal., loc. cit., rectius, ut nobis videtur, generat affectivum. Idem Supplement. etiam haec in fine addit: Notandum est ergo, quod habitus cognitivus respicit contraria materialiter, sive ut materialia sunt, sed affectio, ut formalia sunt. Unde opinio est de malo et bono praesenti et futuro, non in quantum bonum vel malum. — (P. 570, n. 8.)
    Or, as is had above in the objection itself: the begotten ought to be assimilated to its begetter. — Near the end of the solution, for generat affectum the Supplement of the Summa of Alexander of Hales, loc. cit., more rightly, as it seems to us, generat affectivum. The same Supplement also adds these words at the end: It must be noted therefore that the cognitive habit regards contraries materially, or as they are material, but the affection, as they are formal. Whence the opinion is concerning present and future good and evil, not insofar as it is good or evil. — (P. 570, n. 8.)
  22. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 42. a. 3. q. 2. — Guliel. Mara, hic q. 4. eandem obiectionem sic solvit: Dicendum, quod [si] aversio et conversio dicunt eundem motum per relationes ad terminum a quo et ad quem, non consignificant principium movens; et quia sunt in omni motu et eodem, ideo unum motum [constituunt]. Spes autem et timor dicunt accessum et terminum cum principio movente alio et alio, et ideo motus alius et alius, quia, sicut dicitur in fine IV. (? potius VIII. text. 49. et 82.) Physicorum: Non est unus motus, qui non est ab uno motore. — Vel dicendum, quod aversio et conversio sunt uno modo tantum nomina diversarum relationum sive rationum circa eundem motum, et tunc sunt ab eodem principio; alio modo nomina diversorum motuum, et tunc sunt a diversis principiis, sicut spes et timor. — (P. 571, n. 1.)
    Cf. II Sent. d. 42, a. 3, q. 2. — William of Ware [Guliel. Mara], here q. 4, solves the same objection thus: It must be said that [if] aversion and conversion name the same motion through relations to the terminus from which and to which, they do not co-signify the moving principle; and because they are in one and the same motion, therefore they [constitute] one motion. But hope and fear name an approach and a terminus with a moving principle now one, now another, and therefore a motion now one, now another, because, as is said at the end of Physics IV (? rather VIII, text 49 and 82): There is not one motion which is not from one mover. — Or it must be said that aversion and conversion are in one mode only names of diverse relations or accounts about the same motion, and then they are from the same principle; in another mode names of diverse motions, and then they are from diverse principles, as hope and fear. — (P. 571, n. 1.)
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