Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 38, Dubia

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 38

Textus Latinus

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# DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt quaestiones circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit de mendacio obstetricum, quod propter misericordiam veniale fuit peccatum, non tamen nullum. Sed contra hoc obiicitur per illud quod dicit Gregorius in Glossa super primum¹ Exodi: « Benignitatis earum merces, quae in aeterna vita remunerari poterat, per culpam mendacii in terrenam recompensationem commutata est »; sed nihil commutat mercedem aeternam in temporalem nisi mortale peccatum: ergo videtur, quod mortaliter peccaverunt. — Item, videtur, quod hic contradicat Hieronymus Gregorio. Hieronymus² enim dicit, quod aedificavit eis Dominus domos spirituales: ergo non videtur, quod retribuerit eis in praesenti.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod circa hoc est duplex modus dicendi. Quidam³ volunt dicere, quod mendacium obstetricum habuit duplicem respectum, videlicet ad vitam puerorum et ad vitam propriam; mentiebantur enim pro utraque servanda. Et secundum quod habuit respectum ad vitam puerorum, sic erat ex pietate; secundum autem quod habuit respectum ad servandam vitam propriam, quam magis dilexerunt quam veritatem, sic erat ex libidine. Et primo modo erat peccatum veniale, quia erat mendacium officiosum; secundo modo erat peccatum mortale, quia procedebat ex mala radice, videlicet ex libidinoso amore vitae propriae⁴, et eo tempore, quo veritas confitenda esset: et ideo haec culpa abstulit eis mercedem, quam meruerant ex pietate, quam prius habuerant servando parvulos ex timore Dei. Et secundum hoc dicunt currere diversas Sanctorum auctoritates. — Sed iste modus satis calumniabilis est, quia durum videtur dicere,

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quod aliquis pro servanda proprii corporis salute mortaliter peccet, dicendo aliquod mendacium leve.

Alius modus dicendi est, quod in ipsis obstetricibus duo est considerare, pietatis beneficium praecedens et mendacium subsequens. Et primum fuit ex quadam naturali pietate nec erat meritorium, sed disponebat ad meritum; mendacium vero subsequens disponebat⁵ ad contrarium: et ideo pietas praecedens fuit temporaliter remunerata propter mendacium, non quia mendacium illud auferret vitam gratiae prius habitae, sed quia ad gratiam habendam viam praecluderet, quod quidem bene potest facere peccatum veniale. Et hoc est quod vult Gregorius dicere, cum dicit: « Benignitatis earum merces, quae in aeterna vita remunerari poterat »; poterat, inquam, non potentia disposita et propinqua, sed potentia remota. — Et ex hoc patet, quod nulla est controversia inter Gregorium et Augustinum⁶, nulla etiam est contrarietas inter eos et Hieronymum, quia non vult dicere Hieronymus, quod obstetrices habuerint domos spirituales per assecutionem gratiae, sed quia quodam modo ad gratiam praeparatae fuerunt per timorem et pietatem⁷.

Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod quartum sola mentiendi fallendique libidine fit, quod merum mendacium est. Contra hoc enim obiicitur: videtur enim, quod nullum tale sit mendacium, quia, secundum quod dicit Dionysius⁸, « nullus operatur ad malum aspiciens ». Si ergo mentiri de se malum est, videtur, quod nullus unquam mentiatur solummodo aspiciens ad ipsum mendacium. — Item, libido est radix omnium malorum⁹: ergo non solum convenit quarto generi mendacii, sed etiam omni mendacio, quod fit ex libidine: ergo penes hoc non debet assignari aliquod genus mendacii. — Item, mendacium, quod fit sola libidine mentiendi, nullum habet excusatorium; et peccatum quanto minus habet excusationis, tanto est gravius¹⁰: ergo videtur, quod illud mendacium sit primum et capitale inter omnia mendacia et non sit quartum genus.

Respondeo: Ad hoc dicendum est, quod mendacium illud dicitur fieri ex libidine, quo quidem homo mentitur solum, ut placeat sibi. — Propter quod notandum est, quod libido multipliciter dicitur. Uno modo dicitur libido improba voluntas; et sic est radix mortalium peccatorum. Alio modo dicitur libido quaecumque immoderata delectatio; et sic libido dicitur a libendo¹¹, et hoc modo non solum est radix mortalium, sed etiam venialium. Hoc autem dupliciter potest accipi: vel communiter, prout quaerit finem in actu proprio, aut consequenti, aut specialiter, prout in actu proprio quiescit. Primo quidem modo communis est omni peccato; secundo vero modo penes ipsam accipitur differentia mendacii, quod fit ex libidine, quod, inquam, non dicitur fieri ex libidine¹², quia procedat ex mala voluntate, sed quia homo in mentiendo non quaerit aliud quam semetipsum oblectare in ipso mendacio. Et huiusmodi minus malum est quam illud, in quo intendit alii nocere, et maius malum est quam illud, in quo intendit alii prodesse; et ideo medium locum tenet inter¹³ mendaciorum genera.

Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur, quod nullus operatur ad malum aspiciens; dicendum, quod in mendacio duo sunt, videlicet veritatis absentia et quaedam ars et astutia. Et licet non delectetur quis in absentia veritatis; contingit tamen, aliquem delectari in quadam arte et astutia mentiendi; et hoc aliquo modo habet speciem boni. Et ratione illius dicit Augustinus¹⁴, quod sola mentiendi libidine contingit aliquem mentiri.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod libido est radix omnium malorum; dicendum, quod libido ibi sumitur large; sed hic appropriatur ad delectationem, quae habetur in ipso actu mentiendi, qua quis finem in se quaerit et non in altero; quae ideo constituit speciem mendacii, quoniam in aliis speciebus mendacii homo non tantum in se, sed etiam in aliis finem quaerit.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod illud mendacium dicitur¹⁵ esse maximum; dicendum, quod hoc non est verum, quia magnitudo mendacii attenditur secundum maiorem obliquationem intentionis; magis autem obliquatur qui in mendacio intendit alium offendere, quam semetipsum delectare: et ideo ratio illa non valet¹⁶.

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Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Mendacium est falsa vocis significatio cum intentione fallendi. Obiicitur enim contra hoc, quia abstracti et concreti eadem est definitio. Sed mentiri potest quis sine falsa vocis significatione, secundum quod Magister dicit post¹⁷, videlicet cum quis, intendens dicere falsum, dicit verum: ergo ista non est recta definitio. — Item, sicut mendacium contingit esse in verbis, ita etiam contingit esse in factis¹⁸: ergo non tantum debet dici falsa vocis significatio, sed etiam falsa operis significatio. — Item, videtur, quod praedicta notificatio non conveniat omni mendacio, quia qui mentitur mendacio officioso non intendit fallere, sed prodesse; et qui etiam mentitur mendacio iocoso non intendit nisi se delectare¹⁹: ergo non videtur ista definitio omni mendacio convenire.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, sicut tactum fuit in praecedentibus²⁰, ad completum esse mendacii duo concurrunt, videlicet falsa vocis significatio sicut materiale, et fallendi intentio sicut formale; et ideo recte est assignata praedicta notificatio mendacii.

Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod abstracti et concreti eadem est definitio; dicendum, quod mendacium, sicut prius²¹ tactum est, non tantum dicit comparationem ad mentientem, sed etiam ad ipsam rem, de qua fit sermo; mentiri vero proprie dicit comparationem ad ipsum mentientem; et ideo plus claudit in se mendacium quam mentiri, nec est idem omnino mentiri et mendacium dicere, sicut Magister in littera²² dicit aperte. Nec sequitur, quod, si aliquis mentitur, quod dicat mendacium, si proprie accipiatur mendacium, nisi forte large accipiatur mendacium ad mendacium secundum quid et simpliciter.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod mendacium non solummodo est in verbis, sed etiam in factis; dicendum, quod etsi aliquo modo est in factis, secundum quod innuit Ambrosius²³, proprie tamen loquendo in verbis est, secundum quod dicit Augustinus. Verba enim sunt proprie signa indicantia mentis conceptum, pro eo quod ab interiori procedunt et voluntarie formantur; et quoniam mendacium respectum dicit ad id quod est in mente interius: hinc est, quod proprie est in sermonibus et vocibus et per falsam vocis significationem definitur, licet et in aliis aliquo modo analogice et per posterius reperiatur.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ista notificatio non convenit mendacio iocoso et officioso; dicendum, quod notificatio ista per prius convenit mendacio pernicioso; iocoso autem et officioso convenit quodam modo quasi per posterius. Unde vocabulum fallendi in notificatione mendacii non tantum importat decipere, sed etiam falsum dicere; et hoc est omni mendacio commune et generale. Falsum enim dicere exterius quodam modo fallere est, dum²⁴ homo id dicit, quod potest hominem ad falsitatem deducere et deducendo ad falsitatem fallere et decipere.

Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod Iacob matre auctore fecit, ut falleret patrem, videtur non esse mendacium, sed mysterium. Videtur enim hoc non habere veritatem, quia Iacob dixit falsum cum intentione fallendi patrem; intendebat enim significare, quod ipse esset Esau: ergo videtur, quod simpliciter fuit mendacium: ergo videtur, quod simpliciter fuerit²⁵ mentitus. — Item, mendacium est ita malum, quod nullo modo potest fieri bonum, nec per se nec per dispensationem aliquam²⁶: videtur ergo, quod nullo Spiritus sancti consilio nec matris imperio potuit ipse Iacob a mendacio excusari.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod secundum beatum Augustinum²⁷ et etiam Ambrosium Iacob vir sim-

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plex a mendacio excusatur et quantum ad id quod dixit verbo, et quantum ad id quod fecit in facto; verbo enim dixit et facto simulavit, se esse Esau. Quantum ad id quod dixit verbo, excusatur, quia non intendebat patrem fallere, sed dirigere; non intendebat etiam²⁸ dicere, se esse Esau quantum ad personam, sed quantum ad dignitatem primogeniturae et benedictionis, quam sibi a Deo vindicaverat. Et hoc, inquam, non propria auctoritate, sed matris imperio et Spiritus sancti consilio dicebat; qui quidem Spiritus sanctus in uno et eodem vocabulo multiplicem habet intelligentiam. — Quantum etiam ad id quod fecit facto, simulando, se esse Esau, non peccavit, quia secundum Ambrosium factum illud figuram praetendebat futurorum. Unde propter praefigurationem et rectam intentionem, quae dirigebatur secundum Spiritus sancti inspirationem, dicit Augustinus, Iacob non commisisse mendacium³¹, sed implesse mysterium iuxta Scripturae testimonium²⁹, quae dicit eum virum simplicem, non dolosum.³⁰³²

English Translation

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# DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

Doubt I.

In this section there are questions concerning the letter, and first it is asked about this which he says concerning the lie of the midwives, that on account of mercy it was a venial sin, yet not no [sin] at all. But against this it is objected through that which Gregory says in the Gloss upon the first [chapter]¹ of Exodus: « The reward of their kindness, which could have been recompensed in eternal life, was changed, through the fault of the lie, into an earthly recompense »; but nothing changes the eternal reward into a temporal one except mortal sin: therefore it seems that they sinned mortally. — Likewise, it seems that here Jerome contradicts Gregory. For Jerome² says that the Lord built spiritual houses for them: therefore it does not seem that he requited them in the present.

I respond: It must be said that concerning this there is a twofold manner of speaking. Some³ wish to say that the lie of the midwives had a twofold respect, namely to the life of the boys and to their own life; for they lied for the preservation of both. And according as it had respect to the life of the boys, thus it was out of piety; but according as it had respect to the preservation of their own life, which they loved more than the truth, thus it was out of lust. And in the first way it was a venial sin, because it was an officious lie; in the second way it was a mortal sin, because it proceeded from an evil root, namely from a lustful love of their own life⁴, and at that time when the truth ought to have been confessed: and therefore this fault took away from them the reward which they had merited out of the piety which they had previously had in preserving the little ones out of the fear of God. And according to this they say that the diverse authorities of the Saints are reconciled. — But this manner [of speaking] is quite open to censure, because it seems hard to say

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that someone should sin mortally for the preservation of his own body's safety, by speaking some light lie.

Another manner of speaking is that in the midwives themselves there are two things to consider, the preceding benefit of piety and the lie that follows. And the first was out of a certain natural piety, and was not meritorious, but disposed toward merit; but the lie that followed disposed⁵ toward the contrary: and therefore the preceding piety was temporally rewarded on account of the lie, not because that lie took away the life of grace previously had, but because it would block the way to the having of grace, which indeed a venial sin can well do. And this is what Gregory means to say, when he says: « The reward of their kindness, which could have been recompensed in eternal life »; could, I say, not by a power disposed and proximate, but by a remote power. — And from this it is plain that there is no controversy between Gregory and Augustine⁶, nor is there any contrariety between them and Jerome, because Jerome does not mean to say that the midwives had spiritual houses through the attainment of grace, but because in a certain manner they were prepared for grace through fear and piety⁷.

Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says, that the fourth [kind] is made by the lust of lying and deceiving alone, which is mere lying. For against this it is objected: for it seems that no such thing is a lie, because, according to what Dionysius says⁸, « no one works while looking toward evil ». If therefore to lie is of itself evil, it seems that no one ever lies merely looking toward the lie itself. — Likewise, lust is the root of all evils⁹: therefore it belongs not only to the fourth kind of lie, but also to every lie that is made out of lust: therefore no kind of lie ought to be assigned according to this. — Likewise, the lie which is made by the lust of lying alone has nothing excusing [it]; and the less excuse a sin has, the graver it is¹⁰: therefore it seems that that lie is the first and chief among all lies and is not a fourth kind.

I respond: To this it must be said that that lie is said to be made out of lust, by which indeed a man lies only that he may please himself. — On account of which it is to be noted that lust is said in many ways. In one way lust is called a wicked will; and thus it is the root of mortal sins. In another way lust is called any immoderate delight whatever; and thus lust is named from taking pleasure (libendo)¹¹, and in this way it is the root not only of mortal but also of venial [sins]. Now this can be taken in two ways: either commonly, according as it seeks the end in its own act, or in a consequent [act], or specially, according as it rests in its own act. In the first way indeed it is common to every sin; but in the second way the difference of that lie is taken with respect to it, [the lie] which is made out of lust, which, I say, is not said to be made out of lust¹² because it proceeds from an evil will, but because man in lying seeks nothing other than to delight himself in the lie itself. And a [lie] of this kind is a lesser evil than that in which one intends to harm another, and a greater evil than that in which one intends to benefit another; and therefore it holds a middle place among the¹³ kinds of lies.

To that, then, which is first objected, that no one works while looking toward evil; it must be said that in a lie there are two things, namely the absence of truth and a certain art and cunning. And although one is not delighted in the absence of truth; yet it happens that someone is delighted in a certain art and cunning of lying; and this in some manner has the appearance of good. And by reason of that Augustine says¹⁴ that by the lust of lying alone it happens that someone lies.

To that which is objected, that lust is the root of all evils; it must be said that lust is there taken broadly; but here it is appropriated to the delight which is had in the very act of lying, by which one seeks the end in himself and not in another; which therefore constitutes a species of lie, since in the other species of lie man seeks the end not only in himself, but also in others.

To that which is objected, that that lie is said¹⁵ to be the greatest; it must be said that this is not true, because the magnitude of a lie is attended to according to the greater deviation of the intention; but he deviates more who in a lie intends to offend another, than [he who intends] to delight himself: and therefore that argument is not valid¹⁶.

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Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says: A lie is a false signification of the voice with the intention of deceiving. For against this it is objected, that of the abstract and the concrete the definition is the same. But one can lie without a false signification of the voice, according to what the Master says afterward¹⁷, namely when someone, intending to say what is false, says what is true: therefore this is not a correct definition. — Likewise, just as a lie happens to be in words, so also it happens to be in deeds¹⁸: therefore it ought to be called not only a false signification of the voice, but also a false signification of the deed. — Likewise, it seems that the aforesaid definition does not befit every lie, because he who lies with an officious lie does not intend to deceive, but to benefit; and he also who lies with a jocose lie intends nothing but to delight himself¹⁹: therefore it does not seem that this definition befits every lie.

I respond: It must be said that, as was touched upon in the preceding [discussions]²⁰, to the complete being of a lie two things concur, namely a false signification of the voice as the material, and the intention of deceiving as the formal; and therefore the aforesaid description of a lie is correctly assigned.

But to that which is objected, that of the abstract and the concrete the definition is the same; it must be said that a lie (mendacium), as was touched upon before²¹, states a relation not only to the one lying, but also to the thing itself, about which the speech is made; but to lie (mentiri) properly states a relation to the one lying himself; and therefore a lie encloses more in itself than to lie, nor is to lie and to speak a lie altogether the same, as the Master in the letter²² plainly says. Nor does it follow that, if anyone lies, he speaks a lie, if a lie is taken properly, unless perhaps a lie be taken broadly, [taking] a lie for a lie in a certain respect and simply.

To that which is objected, that a lie is not only in words, but also in deeds; it must be said that although in some manner it is in deeds, according to what Ambrose intimates²³, yet properly speaking it is in words, according to what Augustine says. For words are properly signs indicating the concept of the mind, for the reason that they proceed from within and are voluntarily formed; and since a lie states a relation to that which is in the mind interiorly: hence it is that it is properly in speeches and voices and is defined through a false signification of the voice, although it is also found in others in some manner analogically and by way of the posterior.

To that which is objected, that this description does not befit the jocose and officious lie; it must be said that this description befits the pernicious lie first; but it befits the jocose and officious lie in a certain manner as it were by way of the posterior. Hence the word deceiving in the description of a lie does not only import to deceive, but also to speak what is false; and this is common and general to every lie. For to speak what is false exteriorly is in a certain manner to deceive, while²⁴ a man says that which can lead a man to falsity and, by leading [him] to falsity, deceive and beguile [him].

Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says, that Jacob, with his mother as the author, acted so as to deceive his father, [and yet] it seems not to be a lie, but a mystery. For it seems that this does not have truth, because Jacob spoke what was false with the intention of deceiving his father; for he intended to signify that he himself was Esau: therefore it seems that it was simply a lie: therefore it seems that he simply lied²⁵. — Likewise, a lie is so evil that it can in no way become good, neither of itself nor through any dispensation²⁶: it seems therefore that by no counsel of the Holy Spirit nor by the command of his mother could Jacob himself be excused from a lie.

I respond: It must be said that according to blessed Augustine²⁷ and also Ambrose, Jacob, a simple

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man, is excused from a lie both as regards that which he said by word, and as regards that which he did in deed; for by word he said and by deed he simulated that he was Esau. As regards that which he said by word, he is excused, because he did not intend to deceive his father, but to direct [him]; nor did he intend even²⁸ to say that he was Esau as regards the person, but as regards the dignity of the birthright and of the blessing, which he had claimed for himself from God. And this, I say, he said not by his own authority, but by the command of his mother and the counsel of the Holy Spirit; which Holy Spirit indeed in one and the same word has a manifold understanding. — Also as regards that which he did in deed, by simulating that he was Esau, he did not sin, because according to Ambrose that deed held forth a figure of things to come. Hence on account of the prefiguration and the right intention, which was directed according to the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, Augustine says that Jacob did not commit a lie³¹, but fulfilled a mystery, according to the testimony of Scripture²⁹, which calls him a simple man, not crafty.³⁰³²

Apparatus Criticus

Vers. 21. Glossa, quae apud Strabum et Lyranum est ordinaria, sumta est ex Gregor., XVIII. Moral. c. 3. n. 6: Benignitatis earum merces, quae eis in aeterna potuit vita retribui, pro admixta culpa mendacii in terrenam est recompensationem declinata. — Pro in terrenam cod. bb in temporalem, plures codd. in nostram.
Verse 21. The Gloss, which in Strabus and Lyra is the ordinary [Gloss], is taken from Gregory, Morals XVIII, c. 3, n. 6: « The reward of their kindness, which could have been requited to them in eternal life, was, on account of the admixed fault of the lie, turned aside into an earthly recompense. » — For into an earthly codex bb [reads] into a temporal, several codices into ours.
Libr. XVIII. in Isai. 65, 21: Quales sibi aedificasse et obstetrices dicuntur in Exodo, quae timebant Deum, licet scriptum sit in Hebraico, a Deo eis aedificatas domos, quia timuerunt eum (Exod. 1, 21.).
Book XVIII, On Isaiah 65, 21: « Of what sort the midwives also are said in Exodus to have built for themselves, [the midwives] who feared God, although it is written in the Hebrew that the houses were built for them by God, because they feared him (Exod. 1, 21). »
Codd. NU addunt enim, et subinde cod. N cum cod. K substituit voluerunt pro volunt.
Codices NU add for (enim), and likewise codex N with codex K substitutes they wished (voluerunt) for they wish (volunt).
Guliel. Antissiodor., S. p. III. tr. 23. c. 4. q. 2: Mendacium obstetricum potuit esse mortale, potuit esse veniale; quia si radix fuit mortalis, id est, si magis dilexerunt vitam suam temporalem quam Deum, tunc mendacium fuit mortale; si vero venialis, mendacium fuit veniale nec facit illas indignas vita aeterna. — Paulo inferius pro esset cod. U erat.
William of Auxerre, Summa, p. III, tr. 23, c. 4, q. 2: « The lie of the midwives could be mortal, could be venial; because if the root was mortal, that is, if they loved their temporal life more than God, then the lie was mortal; but if [the root was] venial, the lie was venial and does not make them unworthy of eternal life. » — A little below, for ought to be (esset) codex U [reads] was (erat).
Codd. minus congrue disponit. Aliquanto superius pro duo est cod. T duo sunt.
The codices, less fittingly, [read] disposes (disponit). Somewhat above, for there are two things (duo est) codex T [reads] there are two (duo sunt).
Cuius verba exhibent textum huius dubii; cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. — Immediate post supplevimus ex codd. AU HZ bb cc nulla etiam est contrarietas inter eos, a qua lectione codd. KLU aa in eo solum discedunt, quod omittant contrarietas. Codd. FN legunt et eos, cod. B inter eos.
Whose words present the text of this doubt; cf. here the letter of the Master, c. 1. — Immediately after, we have supplied from codices AU HZ bb cc nor is there any contrariety between them, from which reading codices KLU aa diverge only in this, that they omit contrariety. Codices FN read and them, codex B between them.
Vide de hoc dubio Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 123. m. 6; B. Albert., hic a. 5; S. Thom., hic a. 4. ad 3.; Petr. a Tar., hic a. 5. ad 5.; Richard. a Med., hic q. 4. ad 4.
See on this doubt Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. II, q. 123, m. 6; Blessed Albert, here a. 5; St. Thomas, here a. 4, ad 3; Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 5, ad 5; Richard of Middleton, here q. 4, ad 4.
De Div. Nom. c. 4. § 31. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 801, nota 6.
On the Divine Names, c. 4, § 31. Cf. vol. I, p. 801, note 6.
Epist. I. Tim. 6, 10: Radix enim omnium malorum est cupiditas.
First Epistle to Timothy 6, 10: « For the root of all evils is covetousness. »
Cfr. II. Sent. d. 21. a. 3. q. 3. — Superius pro nullum habet excusatorium cod. A nullam habet excusationem.
Cf. II Sentences, d. 21, a. 3, q. 3. — Above, for has nothing excusing [it] (nullum habet excusatorium) codex A [reads] has no excuse (nullam habet excusationem).
Libr. IV. Hypognost. (inter opera Augusti) c. 2: Quaerendum est igitur, cur hoc malum, de quo agitur, libido dicatur. Sine dubio a libendo, id est, a libitu per derivationem libido est nuncupata. — De duplici acceptione libidinis vide II. Sent. d. 31. a. 2. q. 3. in corp. — Superius pro multipliciter codd. dupliciter, et subinde voci mortalium cod. U praemittit omnium. Aliquanto inferius pro vel consequenti edd. et plures codd. aut consequenti.
Book IV, Hypognosticon (among the works of Augustine), c. 2: « It must therefore be asked why this evil, of which we treat, is called lust (libido). Without doubt lust is named from taking pleasure (libendo), that is, from pleasure (libitu), by derivation. » — On the twofold acceptation of lust see II Sentences, d. 31, a. 2, q. 3, in the body. — Above, for in many ways (multipliciter) the codices [read] in two ways (dupliciter), and likewise before the word mortal codex U prefixes of all. Somewhat below, for or in a consequent (vel consequenti) the editions and several codices [read] or in a consequent (aut consequenti).
In edd. omittitur ex libidine, et paulo inferius pro in quo bis substituitur quo tantum.
In the editions out of lust (ex libidine) is omitted, and a little below for in which (in quo), twice, which (quo) only is substituted.
Cod. N inter alia.
Codex N [reads] among other things (inter alia).
In textu huius dubii. — Paulo ante pro aliquo modo edd. inter alios (sic) codd. alio modo.
In the text of this doubt. — A little before, for in some manner (aliquo modo) the editions [read] among others (so) the codices in another manner (alio modo).
Ita codd. AV, alii cum edd. debet.
Thus codices AV; the others, with the editions, [read] ought (debet).
Idem dub. solvit Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 123. m. 7; B. Albert., hic a. 3. et 6. seq.; S. Thom., hic a. 2; Petr. a Tar., hic a. 2.
The same doubt is resolved by Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. II, q. 123, m. 7; Blessed Albert, here a. 3 and 6 f.; St. Thomas, here a. 2; Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 2.
Cap. 4. — Maior fundatur in eo, quod abstractum et concretum, licet sub uno respectu distinguantur (abstractum enim significat formam tantum, concretum autem formam ut afficientem subiectum), sub alio tamen idem sunt, scil. respectu formae, quae in creatis ut abstracta induit rationem universalis et praedicatur de concretis ut de suis inferioribus. Cfr. Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 21. (VI. c. 6.), et de Praedicam. c. de Substantia, necnon VI. Topic. c. 4. (c. 9.), ubi monet, « si sit quidem habitus [in abstracto] definitio, considerandum in habente [in concreto], si quidem habentis, in habitu ». Vide etiam Averroem in V. Metaph. text. 14, ubi impugnat Avicennam, qui docet, concretum primarie significare subiectum et secundarie formam. — In fine arg. cod. A supplet mendacii.
Chapter 4. — The major [premise] is founded on this, that the abstract and the concrete, although under one respect they are distinguished (for the abstract signifies the form only, but the concrete the form as affecting the subject), under another respect are the same, namely with respect to the form, which in created things, as abstract, takes on the character of the universal and is predicated of the concretes as of its inferiors. Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, text 21 (VI, c. 6), and On the Categories, the chapter on Substance, as well as Topics VI, c. 4 (c. 9), where he advises, « if indeed there be a definition of the disposition [in the abstract], it must be considered in the one having [it] [in the concrete], if indeed [it be a definition] of the one having, [it must be considered] in the disposition. » See also Averroes on Metaphysics V, text 14, where he impugns Avicenna, who teaches that the concrete primarily signifies the subject and secondarily the form. — At the end of the argument codex A supplies of a lie (mendacii).
Ut insinuat Aristot., IV. Ethic. c. 7.
As Aristotle intimates, Ethics IV, c. 7.
Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. seq.
See here the letter of the Master, c. 1 f.
Quaest. 1.
Question 1.
Quaest. 1. — Inferius pro proprie dicit comparationem cod. U dicitur proprie per comparationem.
Question 1. — Below, for properly states a relation (proprie dicit comparationem) codex U [reads] is properly said by relation (dicitur proprie per comparationem).
Hic c. 4. — Paulo post pro quod dicat non pauci codd. cum edd. 1, 2 quod dicit. Subinde pro et simpliciter, quod habent codd. GKNUWZ aa bb, in aliis et edd. vel simpliciter.
Here c. 4. — A little after, for that he speaks (quod dicat) not a few codices, with editions 1 and 2, [read] that he speaks (quod dicit). Likewise, for and simply (et simpliciter), which codices GKNUWZ aa bb have, in others and in the editions [it reads] or simply (vel simpliciter).
Cfr. supra pag. 842, nota 7. De sententia Augustini cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3, ex quo textus huius dubii sumtus est. — Quod verba sunt signa conceptuum, docet Aristot., I. Periherm. c. 1, de quo vide supra pag. 686, nota 9. et tom. II. pag. 509, nota 2. — Inferius post pro eo quod ab interiori cod. K supplet mente.
Cf. above, p. 842, note 7. On the opinion of Augustine cf. here the letter of the Master, c. 3, from which the text of this doubt is taken. — That words are signs of concepts, Aristotle teaches, On Interpretation I, c. 1, on which see above, p. 686, note 9, and vol. II, p. 509, note 2. — Below, after for the reason that [they proceed] from within (pro eo quod ab interiori) codex K supplies the mind (mente).
Codd. AV (T primitus) dummodo. — Cfr. de hoc dubio Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 123. m. 1; B. Albert., hic a. 8; S. Thom., hic a. 1; Petr. a Tar., hic a. 1; Richard. a Med., hic q. 1.
Codices AV (T originally) [read] provided that (dummodo). — Cf. on this doubt Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. II, q. 123, m. 1; Blessed Albert, here a. 8; St. Thomas, here a. 1; Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 1; Richard of Middleton, here q. 1.
Plurimi codd. esset, cod. U sit, cod. A legit fuisset mendacium.
Very many codices [read] was (esset), codex U is (sit), codex A reads would have been a lie (fuisset mendacium).
Aristot., IV. Ethic. c. 7: Per se quidem mendacium pravum est et vituperatione dignum, verum autem honestum et laudabile. August., III. Quaest. in Pentateuch. q. 68: Quia iniustum erat mendacium, ideo prohibitum; non quia prohibitum, ideo factum iniustum. — Mox post nullo in codd. AK additur modo.
Aristotle, Ethics IV, c. 7: « A lie of itself indeed is depraved and worthy of blame, but the true is honorable and praiseworthy. » Augustine, Questions on the Pentateuch III, q. 68: « Because a lie was unjust, therefore it was forbidden; not because it was forbidden, was it therefore made unjust. » — Soon after no (nullo) in codices AK is added way (modo).
Contra Mendacium, c. 10. n. 24. — Ambros., II. de Iacob et vita beata, c. 2. n. 6. seqq.
Against Lying, c. 10, n. 24. — Ambrose, On Jacob and the Blessed Life II, c. 2, n. 6 ff.
Cod. A enim.
Codex A [reads] for (enim).
Gen. 25, 27: Iacob autem vir simplex habitabat in tabernaculis. — Aliquanto superius pro praetendebat edd. praeferebat.
Genesis 25, 27: « But Jacob, a simple man, dwelt in tents. » — Somewhat above, for held forth (praetendebat) the editions [read] displayed (praeferebat).
Cfr. supra pag. 570, nota 6.
Cf. above p. 570, note 6.
In edd. additur in Spiritum sanctum. Paulo inferius pro hoc modo, quod cod. K omittit, codd. A Z bb sermo, codd. G H L T primo. Subinde post aliud edd. supplent tamen.
In the editions there is added into the Holy Spirit (in Spiritum sanctum). A little lower, for hoc modo (« in this manner »), which codex K omits, codices A Z bb [read] sermo (« discourse »), codices G H L T primo (« first »). Then, after aliud (« another »), the editions supply tamen (« nevertheless »).
Gen. 27, 27. seqq. et 28. 3. seq. — Idem dub. solvit Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 123. m. 6; B. Albert., hic a. 9; S. Thom., hic a. 3. ad 1; Petr. a Tar., hic a. 5; Richard. a Med., hic q. 2. ad 2.
Genesis 27, 27 ff. and 28, 3 f. — The same dubium is solved by Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 123, m. 6; B. Albert, here a. 9; S. Thomas, here a. 3 ad 1; Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 5; Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 2 ad 2.

← Dist. 38, Art. 1, Q. 6