Bonaventure

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering on each printed page; the markers here are renumbered continuously across the chunk.

Quaestio VI. De gradibus specierum mendacii.

Sexto et ultimo quaeritur de gradibus specierum mendacii. Dicit enim Augustinus¹, quod «primum genus mendacii est gravissimum, et ultimum est levissimum. Et quanto inter genera mendacii aliquod mendacium accedit ad primum, tanto est gravius; et quanto magis elongatur et accedit ad ultimum, tanto est levius». «Primum autem mendacii genus, ut dicit, est in doctrina religionis »; «ultimum autem est, ut dicit, pro conservatione alienae castitatis ». Contra hoc quod dicit, quod primum est gravissimum, obiicitur sic.

1. Esto quod aliquis dicat, Christum non ascendisse super asellum², ex quadam urbanitate, et alius imponat falsum crimen proximo, ex quo proximus morte damnatur; constans est, quod gravius peccat secundus quam primus; sed primus peccat primo genere mendacii, secundus peccat secundo genere mendacii: ergo secundum genus mendacii est gravius quam primum.

2. Item, aliquis dicit aliquod mendacium in doctrina religionis, quod corrumpit fidem in uno simplici; alius vero dicit mendacium, per quod scinditur unitas ecclesiasticae pacis; constat, quod gravius peccat secundus quam primus, quia seminat inter fratres discordias³, quod maxime Dominus detestatur; et tamen primus peccat primo genere mendacii, secundus vero secundo: ergo redit idem quod prius.

3. Item, possibile est, aliquem mentiri primo genere mendacii ex infirmitate, secundo vero genere mendacii ex certa malitia: si ergo peccatum ex certa malitia est peccatum in Spiritum sanctum, quod est gravius aliis⁴: videtur, quod secundum genus possit esse gravius quam primum.

4. Item, primum genus mendacii est contra fidem, secundum est contra caritatem, generaliter loquendo; sed maius bonum est caritas quam fides⁵: si ergo privationes per habitus dignoscuntur, gravius peccatum est secundum genus mendacii, loquendo generaliter, quam primum.

Est igitur quaestio: quare primum genus peccati Augustinus dicit esse gravissimum?

5. Item, obiicitur contra ultimum gradum. Dicit enim, mendacium, quod fit pro castitate corporis alterius servanda, esse levissimum omnium et levius eo quod fit pro servanda vita. Sed contra: illud mendacium gravius est, in quo magis salvatur⁶ ratio mentiendi; sed mendacium, quod fit serio, plus habet de ratione mentiendi quam mendacium, quod fit ioco: si ergo quodlibet mendacium officiosum fit serio, quodlibet mendacium officiosum est gravius quam iocosum.

6. Item, castitatem non potest quis amittere invitus, vitam corporis potest amittere invitus: ergo magis indiget adiutorio et succursu pro servanda vita quam pro servanda continentia: videtur ergo, quod magis spectet ad officium pietatis, et magis leve peccatum sit mentiri pro servanda vita corporis quam pro servanda continentia carnis.

7. Item, qui perdit vitam perdit spatium merendi et poenitendi, non sic autem qui perdit carnis continentiam: ergo periculosius et damnosius est alicui interfici quam carnaliter violari: ergo magis pium est in tali casu mentiri.

Iuxta hoc quaeritur: si quis est in periculo constitutus de castitate amittenda sua vel aliena, quod sit sibi magis eligendum, utrum mentiri, vel sustinere se vel alium corporaliter⁷ violari.

Quaeritur etiam, utrum melius faciat ille qui mentitur, ut alium trahat de statu periculoso, ut intret religionem, de quo vehementer praesumit, ut possit ipsum per mendacium attrahere; an ille qui simpliciter negligit et non vult mentiri pro alicuius salute. Et videtur, quod primus melius faciat, quia non magnum est facere unum peccatum veniale, ut alius aeternam consequatur salutem. Quod autem secundus melius faciat, videtur, quia maioris perfectionis est in nullo casu mentiri aliqua de causa, secundum quod multipliciter ostendit beatus Augustinus⁸.

Conclusio.

Maximum mendacium est illud quod fit in doctrina religionis; levissimum vero, quod fit pro servanda castitate corporis, vel pro aliquo simili.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, secundum quod beatus Augustinus dicit, gradus mendaciorum sequitur ordinem, ita quod primum est magnum, et ultimum minimum. — Et ratio huius est ista: quoniam, secundum quod vult Philosophus⁹, «si maximum in uno genere excedit maximum in alio genere, simpliciter hoc genus excedit illud ». Unde ad hoc, quod aliquod genus excedat alterum, non est necesse, quod singula illius generis excedant singula alterius generis, sed quod summum in illo genere sit maius omnibus ceteris alterius generis. Quoniam ergo inter mendacia omnia illud est maximum, quo quis intendit alteri nocere in via veritatis et salutis, quia infert ei nocumentum spirituale et irrecompensabile et quantum ad maxima bona; hinc est, quod mendacium, quod est in doctrina religionis, cum sit ad hoc ordinatum, est inter cetera mendacia maximum et summum. — Ulterius, quia non potest aliquis maiori causa moveri ad mentiendum quam pro servando bono spirituali vel annexo spirituali; hinc est, quod illud mendacium est levissimum, quod fit pro servanda castitate corporis, vel pro aliquo simili; et sic gradatim descendendo et ascendendo est¹⁰ videre in ceteris aliis. Unde valde rationabiliter beatus Augustinus species mendaciorum distinxit et gradus ordinavit.

1. 2. 3. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium de illo qui mentitur dicendo, Christum non ascendisse super asellum, vel aliquod consimile, qui non ita mentitur, sicut ille qui suo mendacio proximum interficit; dicendum, quod verum est; sed tamen ex hoc non sequitur, quod gradus ille non excedat istum, pro eo quod illud non est summum mendacium in doctrina religionis, sed quando quis ex certa scientia et malitia impugnat veritatem secundum pietatem¹¹, ut fidem christianam et bonos mores subvertat, hoc, inquam, modo mentiendi non contingit reperire gravius mendacium in secundo genere. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad duas rationes sequentes, videlicet de mendacio, quod inducit schisma, et de mendacio, quod est ex certa malitia: quoniam mendacium in doctrina religionis non tantum inducit infidelitatem, immo et schisma et cetera mala; nec tantum est ex infirmitate, immo ex certa malitia.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod primum mendacii genus opponitur fidei, secundum vero opponitur caritati; dicendum, quod ratio illa dupliciter deficit. Primum quidem, quia non sequitur, si aliqua duo bona sic se habent, quod unum excedat reliquum, quod similiter sit et in eorum privationibus reperire, quoniam, sicut negationes e contrario se habent affirmationibus¹², sic etiam esse potest in privationibus et habitibus. Unde nihil impedit, quod caritas sit maius bonum quam fides; et tamen maius malum est infidelitas quam odium. Et ratio huius est, quia plus privat infidelitas quam ipsum odium. — Alius etiam defectus est ibi, quia mendacium, quod est in doctrina religionis, non tantum repugnat fidei, sed etiam moribus bonis. Veritas enim secundum pietatem, quae est in doctrina religionis, non tantum consistit in credendis, verum etiam in agendis; unde si quis diceret, fornicationem non esse vitandam, et parentes non esse honorandos, mentiretur primo genere mendacii. Et quia in doctrina religionis non tantum docetur, quid credendum, sed etiam quid secundum singulas virtutes operandum: hinc est, quod illud mendacium potest opponi cuilibet virtuti et bono spirituali, licet primo et principaliter opponatur ipsi fidei.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur ulterius, quod mendacium iocosum est magis leve quam officiosum; dicendum, quod falsum est, quia in neutro illorum mendaciorum intendit quis decipere alium; intendit tamen dicere falsum in uno, ut delectet, in altero, ut prosit¹³. Minus autem inordinata est intentio, quando intendit prodesse, quam quando intendit delectari. Cum ergo dicit, quod mendacium iocosum non fit serio; dicendum, quod falsum est, quia serio mentitur quis illo mendacio, non tamen ad seducendum, sed ad delectandum.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod magis pium est mentiri pro servanda vita quam pro servanda continentia; dicendum, quod falsum est. Licet enim non possit aliquis alicui invito auferre virtutem continentiae, quantum ad id quod mentis est; quia tamen potest auferre illud quod est ei annexum, videlicet continentiam carnis, in cuius ablatione maximum est periculum propter carnis lubricum: ex hoc est, quod magis accedit ad pietatem mentiri pro illa continentia servanda quam pro vita, secundum quod vita spiritualis praefertur vitae carnali. Unde etsi pietas naturalis aliquo modo plus mo-

veat ad servandam vitam naturae, tamen pietas gratuita, quae movetur secundum regulam fidei, magis movet ad conservandam vitam gratiae et virtutis.

7. Ad illud vero quod obiicit, quod qui aufert vitam aufert spatium poenitendi et merendi; dicendum, quod et simul cum hoc aufert spatium peccandi, et nescitur, utrum homo liberatus a morte vitam futuram expendat in bonis, vel in malis; ideo non est simile hinc et inde.

Ad illud vero quod quaeritur de aliquo, qui est in periculo constitutus; dicendum, quod ille qui est in periculo constitutus de amittenda integritate carnis, aut est perfectus amator continentiae, aut imperfectus. Si perfectus est, ut possit de continentia mentis confidere, non debet propter hoc mendacium dicere pro vitanda corruptione carnis, quoniam, sicut dixit Lucia¹⁴, «si me invitam violaveris, castitas mihi duplicabitur ad coronam». In tali enim sustinere passionem illam potest esse sine culpa, sed mentiri non potest esse sine culpa. Si autem est imperfectus, rationabiliter debet timere, ne succumbat, si ad illum statum venerit; et ideo tali propter infirmitatem suam conceditur redimere periculum maioris peccati per minus peccatum. Unde si probabiliter videt, quod per mendacium possit declinare stuprum, sanius consilium est isti aliquod falsum dicere, quam corruptionem illam sustinere. Et hoc est quod dicit beatus Augustinus in libro de Mendacio¹⁵: «Illa peccata, quae ita committuntur in homine, ut eum faciant immundum, etiam peccatis nostris evitare debemus; ac per hoc nec peccata dicenda sunt, quia ideo fiunt, ut illa immunditia evitetur»; — quod intelligendum est, non quod non sint simpliciter peccata, sed quia non sunt gravia. Et sicut dicimus de viro imperfecto respectu sui, sic etiam intelligendum est de viro imperfecto respectu alterius imperfecti; et ita debet homo cavere periculum alienum, sicut et proprium.

Ad illud quod ultimo quaeritur, utrum sanius sit consilium mentiri, ut alius reducatur ad viam veritatis; dicendum, quod nec perfecto nec imperfecto convenit mentiri propter hoc, ut alterum ad viam veritatis provocet, quia non indiget Deus nostro mendacio; nec debet aliquis credere, quod aliquis convertatur a malo per falsi suggestionem, sed potius per Spiritus sancti inspirationem, quia, secundum quod dicit Gregorius¹⁶, « in vanum laborat sermo praedicatoris, nisi intus operetur gratia Salvatoris »¹⁷.

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Question VI. On the degrees of the species of lies.

Sixthly and last it is asked concerning the degrees of the species of lies. For Augustine¹ says that «the first kind of lie is the gravest, and the last is the lightest. And by however much, among the kinds of lie, some lie draws near to the first, by so much is it graver; and by however much it is removed farther and draws near to the last, by so much is it lighter». «But the first kind of lie, as he says, is in the teaching of religion »; «and the last, as he says, is for the preservation of another's chastity ». Against this which he says, that the first is the gravest, it is objected thus.

1. Suppose that someone says that Christ did not ascend upon the ass², out of a certain pleasantry, and another lays a false charge upon his neighbor, by which the neighbor is condemned to death; it is established that the second sins more gravely than the first; but the first sins by the first kind of lie, the second sins by the second kind of lie: therefore the second kind of lie is graver than the first.

2. Likewise, someone tells some lie in the teaching of religion, which corrupts the faith in one simple person; but another tells a lie by which the unity of ecclesiastical peace is split apart; it is established that the second sins more gravely than the first, because he sows discords among brothers³, which the Lord most of all detests; and yet the first sins by the first kind of lie, but the second by the second: therefore the same returns as before.

3. Likewise, it is possible that someone lie by the first kind of lie out of infirmity, but by the second kind of lie out of settled malice: if therefore a sin out of settled malice is a sin against the Holy Spirit, which is graver than the others⁴: it seems that the second kind can be graver than the first.

4. Likewise, the first kind of lie is against faith, the second is against charity, generally speaking; but charity is a greater good than faith⁵: if therefore privations are discerned by their habits, the second kind of lie is a graver sin, speaking generally, than the first.

It is therefore a question: why does Augustine say that the first kind of sin is the gravest?

5. Likewise, it is objected against the last degree. For he says that the lie which is made for the preservation of another's bodily chastity is the lightest of all and lighter than that which is made for the preservation of life. But on the contrary: that lie is graver in which the account of lying is more preserved⁶; but a lie which is made in earnest has more of the account of lying than a lie which is made in jest: if therefore every officious lie is made in earnest, every officious lie is graver than a jocose one.

6. Likewise, one cannot lose chastity unwillingly, [but] one can lose bodily life unwillingly: therefore one has more need of help and succor for the preservation of life than for the preservation of continence: it seems therefore that it pertains more to the office of piety, and is a lighter sin, to lie for the preservation of bodily life than for the preservation of the continence of the flesh.

7. Likewise, he who loses life loses the space of meriting and of repenting, but not so he who loses the continence of the flesh: therefore it is more perilous and more harmful for someone to be killed than to be carnally violated: therefore it is more pious in such a case to lie.

In connection with this it is asked: if someone is set in danger of losing his own or another's chastity, what ought rather to be chosen by him, whether to lie, or to allow himself or another to be carnally⁷ violated.

It is also asked whether he does better who lies, in order to draw another from a perilous state, that he may enter religion, of whom he strongly presumes that he can attract him by the lie; or he who simply neglects and is unwilling to lie for someone's salvation. And it seems that the first does better, because it is no great thing to do one venial sin, that another may attain eternal salvation. But that the second does better seems [to be the case], because it is of greater perfection in no case to lie for any cause whatever, according as blessed Augustine shows in many ways⁸.

Conclusion.

The greatest lie is that which is made in the teaching of religion; but the lightest [is that] which is made for the preservation of bodily chastity, or for something similar.

I respond: It must be said that, according as blessed Augustine says, the degrees of lies follow an order, in such a way that the first is great, and the last least. — And the reason of this is this: that, according as the Philosopher holds⁹, «if the greatest in one genus exceeds the greatest in another genus, this genus simply exceeds that one ». Whence, for some genus to exceed another, it is not necessary that the individuals of that genus exceed the individuals of the other genus, but that the highest in that genus be greater than all the rest of the other genus. Since therefore among all lies that is the greatest by which someone intends to harm another in the way of truth and of salvation, because he inflicts upon him a spiritual and irrecompensable harm and as regards the greatest goods; hence it is that the lie which is in the teaching of religion, since it is ordered to this, is among the other lies the greatest and highest. — Further, since one cannot be moved to lying by a greater cause than for the preservation of a spiritual good or of one annexed to the spiritual; hence it is that that lie is the lightest which is made for the preservation of bodily chastity, or for something similar; and thus, descending and ascending step by step, it is¹⁰ to be seen in the other [cases] also. Whence very reasonably did blessed Augustine distinguish the species of lies and order their degrees.

1. 2. 3. To that therefore which is first objected to the contrary, concerning him who lies by saying that Christ did not ascend upon the ass, or something similar, who does not so lie as he who by his lie kills his neighbor; it must be said that it is true; but yet from this it does not follow that that degree does not exceed this one, for the reason that this is not the highest lie in the teaching of religion, but [it is] when someone out of settled knowledge and malice attacks the truth according to piety¹¹, so as to subvert the Christian faith and good morals — in this way of lying, I say, it does not happen to find a graver lie in the second kind. — And by this is plain the response to the two following reasons, namely concerning the lie which induces schism, and concerning the lie which is out of settled malice: since a lie in the teaching of religion not only induces infidelity, but rather schism and other evils as well; nor is it only out of infirmity, but rather out of settled malice.

4. To that which is objected, that the first kind of lie is opposed to faith, but the second is opposed to charity; it must be said that that reasoning fails in two ways. First indeed, because it does not follow that, if any two goods are so disposed that one exceeds the rest, that the like is to be found also in their privations, since, just as negations are disposed contrariwise to affirmations¹², so too it can be in privations and habits. Whence nothing prevents charity from being a greater good than faith; and yet infidelity is a greater evil than hatred. And the reason of this is, because infidelity deprives more than hatred itself. — There is also another defect there, because a lie which is in the teaching of religion not only conflicts with faith, but also with good morals. For the truth according to piety, which is in the teaching of religion, consists not only in things to be believed, but also in things to be done; whence if someone were to say that fornication is not to be avoided, and that parents are not to be honored, he would lie by the first kind of lie. And because in the teaching of religion not only is it taught what is to be believed, but also what is to be done according to each virtue: hence it is that that lie can be opposed to any virtue whatever and to a spiritual good, although first and principally it is opposed to faith itself.

5. To that which is objected further, that a jocose lie is lighter than an officious one; it must be said that it is false, because in neither of those lies does someone intend to deceive another; he intends nevertheless to say what is false in the one, in order to delight, in the other, in order to benefit¹³. But the intention is less disordered when it intends to benefit than when it intends to be delighted. When therefore he says that a jocose lie is not made in earnest; it must be said that it is false, because someone lies in earnest by that lie, not however for the purpose of seducing, but for the purpose of delighting.

6. To that which is objected, that it is more pious to lie for the preservation of life than for the preservation of continence; it must be said that it is false. For although one cannot take from someone unwilling the virtue of continence, as regards that which is of the mind; yet because one can take away that which is annexed to it, namely the continence of the flesh, in the taking-away of which there is the greatest danger on account of the slipperiness of the flesh: from this it is that it draws nearer to piety to lie for the preservation of that continence than for life, according as the spiritual life is preferred to the carnal life. Whence although natural piety in some way moves more to the preservation of the life of nature, yet gratuitous piety, which is moved according to the rule of faith, moves more to the conservation of the life of grace and of virtue.

7. To that indeed which it objects, that he who takes away life takes away the space of repenting and of meriting; it must be said that together with this he also takes away the space of sinning, and it is not known whether a man delivered from death would spend his future life in good things, or in evil things; therefore it is not similar on the one side and on the other.

To that indeed which is asked concerning someone who is set in danger; it must be said that he who is set in danger of losing the integrity of the flesh is either a perfect lover of continence, or an imperfect one. If he is perfect, so that he can have confidence in the continence of the mind, he ought not on this account to tell a lie for the avoiding of the corruption of the flesh, since, as Lucy said¹⁴, «if thou violate me unwilling, my chastity will be doubled unto a crown». For in such [a case] to endure that suffering can be without fault, but to lie cannot be without fault. But if he is imperfect, he ought reasonably to fear lest he succumb, if he come into that state; and therefore to such a one, on account of his infirmity, it is conceded to redeem the danger of a greater sin by a lesser sin. Whence if he probably sees that by a lie he can avert the rape, the sounder counsel is for him to say something false, than to endure that corruption. And this is what blessed Augustine says in the book On Lying¹⁵: «Those sins which are so committed in a man as to make him unclean, we ought to avoid even by our [own] sins; and on this account they are not even to be called sins, because they are done for this, that that uncleanness may be avoided»; — which is to be understood, not that they are not simply sins, but that they are not grave. And just as we say of an imperfect man with respect to himself, so too it is to be understood of an imperfect man with respect to another imperfect [man]; and so a man ought to beware of another's danger, just as also of his own.

To that which is asked last, whether it be the sounder counsel to lie, in order that another be brought back to the way of truth; it must be said that it befits neither the perfect nor the imperfect to lie for this, that he provoke another to the way of truth, because God does not need our lie; nor ought anyone to believe that anyone is converted from evil by the suggestion of what is false, but rather by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, because, according as Gregory says¹⁶, « the speech of the preacher labors in vain, unless within the grace of the Savior works »¹⁷.

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