Dist. 40, Dubia
Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 40
DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.
Dub. I.
In parte ista sunt quaestiones circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod sextum praeceptum est: Non concupisces uxorem proximi tui. Si enim prius est concupiscere quam moechari, videtur, quod illud mandatum non deberet sexto loco, immo tertio loco poni inter praecepta secundae tabulae. — Item, nihil debet praecipi, nisi quod est in nostra potestate1; sed natura, quamdiu corrupta est, habet pronitatem concupiscendi: ergo videtur, quod concupiscentia non debeat in Decalogo prohiberi. — Item, sicut contingit concupiscere uxorem hominis, ita etiam contingit concupiscere filiam et concubinam: ergo non videtur, quod in mandato illo sufficienter prohibeatur carnis concupiscentia.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod moechia se habet ex additione ad concupiscentiam, quia moechari est in corde et opere, concupiscere est in corde. Et quia prohibitio dicit negationem utriusque; et negationes se habent e contrario affirmationibus2: ideo prohibitio concupiscentiae addit supra prohibitionem moechiae; et generaliter prohibitio peccati cordis addit supra prohibitionem peccati operis. Plus enim est prohibere peccatum cordis quam peccatum operis, quia peccatum operis praesupponit peccatum cordis. Et ideo ista duo mandata, in quibus prohibetur concupiscentia, ultimo loco sunt ordinata3. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad illud quod primo obiicitur.
Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nihil debet praecipi, quod non est in nostra potestate; dicendum, quod est concupiscentia, quae consistit in sensualitate, et est concupiscentia, quae est in consensu rationis progressivo ad opus. Prima est veniale nec prohibetur, sed cohibetur4. Secunda vero est peccatum mortale, et prohibetur, in quantum est progressiva ad opus. Unde istius mandati explicatio et intellectus insinuatur decimo octavo5 Ecclesiastici, ubi dicitur: Fili, post concupiscentias tuas non eas; ubi simpliciter non prohibetur concupiscere, sed post concupiscentias ambulare consentiendo et in actum progrediendo.
Ad illud quod obiicitur de concupiscentia filiae et concubinae, dicendum, quod filia et concubina dupliciter potest concupisci: aut in possessionem, ut redigatur in servitutem et famulatum, aut ad operis carnalis consummationem. Et primum prohibetur per septimum praeceptum: Non concupisces rem; secundum vero prohibetur per mandatum illud, quia prohibetur concupiscentia carnis contra legitimum torum. Unde desiderare filiam alicuius in uxorem non est prohibitum, sed desiderare eam in fornicationem et meretricem; et hoc clauditur in sexta prohibitione6.
Dub. II.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Septimum praeceptum est: Non concupisces domum proximi tui: quia quod licitum est acquirere pretio licitum est affectu7 desiderare; sed domum proximi licitum est pretio emere: ergo licitum est eam desiderare et concupiscere. Si tu dicas, quod ibi accipitur concupiscentia pro inordinato desiderio; sic similiter non licet concupiscere rem propriam. — Item, sicut contingit inordinate desiderare domum proximi, ita contingit inordinate desiderare dignitatem proximi: ergo sicut illud prohibetur, ita et illud debuit prohiberi. Si tu dicas, quod illud clauditur in hac prohibitione; contra hoc est: quia concupiscentia dignitatis spectat ad superbiam et vanam gloriam, concupiscentia domus ad avaritiam: ergo cum ista sint diversorum generum, videtur, quod in una prohibitione non claudantur.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod in verbo isto prohibetur concupiscentia rei8 alienae, secundum quod aliquis concupiscit aliquid in possessionem, quaerens in illo sufficientiam. Unde non tantum prohibetur concupiscentia bonorum temporalium, ut domus et pecudis, sed etiam cuiuscumque alterius rei, quam quis vellet alii praeripere. Et hoc quidem prohibetur, intelligendo per se, ut quis non concupiscat alienum manens alienum; vel etiam intelligitur contra iuris ordinem, hoc est, quando quis vellet proximum damnificari in re propter suam utilitatem; tunc enim non diligit proximum sicut se. Unde in verbo isto prohibetur omnis avaritia et cupiditas.
Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur: quod licet pretio acquirere licet concupiscere; dicendum, quod concupiscere dicit ibi appetitum immoderatum habendi cum damno proximi, et in hoc ipso9 etiam clauditur appetitus immoderatus, prohibitio etiam respectu rei propriae, penes quam consistit peccatum cupiditatis et avaritiae.
Ad illud quod obiicitur de ambitione dignitatis et honoris, dicendum, quod si dignitas et honor appetatur in ratione sufficientiae, sic spectat ad crimen avaritiae et in isto mandato prohiberi habet. Si autem in ratione excellentiae, sic potest dici, quod prohibetur per primum mandatum, in quo praecipitur reverentia Dei. — Posset tamen dici, quod utroque modo clauditur in prohibitione septimi, quia utrobique est amor boni proprii, et una est ratio deordinandi respectu proximi, licet multiplex sit ratio deordinandi respectu sui. Ideo sub una prohibitione habet claudi utraque concupiscentia; et magis prohibetur concupiscentia domus quam concupiscentia dignitatis, quia manifestior erat10 et sensibilior, et etiam Iudaei magis proni erant ad avaritiam.
Dub. III.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod diversa Sacramenta sunt Legis novae et veteris, quia illa tantum significabant, haec conferunt gratiam. Contra hoc obiicitur, quod nullus salvari potest sine gratia: ergo si Sacramenta veteris Legis gratiam non conferebant, videtur, quod nullus in Lege illa salvatus fuerit; quod est impium dicere. Si tu dicas, quod in Sacramentis illis dabatur gratia, sed tamen non virtute Sacramentorum illorum; in Sacramentis autem novae Legis datur gratia virtute ipsorum, quia sunt «ex sanctificatione sanctificantia», sicut dicit Hugo11; obiicitur contra hoc: quia gratia est per creationem: ergo solus Deus habet virtutem conferendi gratiam12: ergo si in istis et illis conferebat, videtur, quod inter haec Sacramenta et illa nulla sit differentia.
Respondeo: Intelligendum est ad hoc, quod duplex est circa quaestionem istam opinio celebris et famosa.
Quidam namque voluerunt dicere, quod in utrisque Sacramentis datur gratia, sed differenter: quia in illis dabatur ratione fidei et devotionis ipsius suscipientis, ita quod nullo modo ratione Sacramenti sive operis operati. In Sacramentis autem
novae Legis secus est, quia constant ex verbo et elemento; et cum Dominus instituit verbum, dedit illi virtutem, per quam influit et agit in animam vel disponendo ad gratiae susceptionem, vel imprimendo characteris consignificationem, vel adminiculando ipsi gratiae ad animae curationem et fomitis debilitationem. Et hoc videtur dicere Augustinus14: «Quae est virtus aquae, ut corpus tangat et cor abluat, nisi faciente verbo»? Et magister Hugo de sancto Victore videtur id idem sentire, qui dicit15, quod «Sacramenta novae Legis prius sanctificantur per verbum et postmodum sanctificant, ut sic sint ex sanctificatione sanctificantia». Et hunc modum dicendi sustinent viri periti et fide digni:
Sed difficile videtur mihi intelligere, virtutem illam simul esse verbo et elemento collatam, quantum ad essentiam et naturam, quantum ad eius existentiam, quantum ad durationis mensuram et etiam quantum ad operationis efficaciam; quae omnia necesse est ponere et explicare16 circa virtutem illam, si quis dicat, quod aliqua qualitas detur verbo et elemento, per quam agat et influat in ipsam animam.
Difficile namque est intelligere illius virtutis essentiam. Cum enim non sit substantia, sed accidens quoddam et in genere boni; dubium est, utrum debeat reponi inter bona maxima, vel media, vel minima17. Et si inter bona maxima reponatur, iam gratia erit; gratia autem existens in uno subiecto, non habet virtutem agendi in aliud. Si vero gratia non est nec virtus, quomodo ergo dicitur secundum veritatem sanctificare ipsum Sacramentum et eum qui suscipit Sacramentum? — In quo etiam genere sit et cuius speciei sit, utrum videlicet in diversis Sacramentis diversificetur formaliter illa virtus, homini parum intelligenti difficile est capere. — Et si inter bona media, vel minima reponitur, quomodo talis virtus facit rectitudinem18 et sanationem ipsius animae, quae inter bona maxima computantur?
Non solum autem difficile est intelligere huius virtutis essentiam, sed etiam subsistentiam. Qualiter enim accidens spirituale substantificabitur in subiecto corporali, cum secundum naturae ordinem, quem Deus non pervertit per miraculum, substantia sit nobilior sua proprietate? — Aut si ponitur illa virtus spiritualis19 ut in subiecto in verbo et elemento, quare non similiter ipsa gratia, quae debet infundi animae? quod nescio si aliquis recte intelligens dicat. — Aut si est in subiecto corporali, quomodo una virtus et qualitas absoluta simul poterit esse in duobus subiectis, verbo videlicet et elemento, ex quibus, etsi fiat unum Sacramentum, non tamen fit unum per naturam et essentiam? Unitas autem virtutis, secundum quod vult Damascenus20, correspondet unitati substantiae et naturae. Aut ergo in uno Sacramento non est una virtus, sed plures; aut illa virtus composita est; aut unum accidens simplex et spirituale et impartibile simul erit in diversis subiectis; quod totum valde difficile est intelligere de illa virtute.
Nec solum ista duo difficile est intelligere de illa virtute, sed etiam durationis mensuram. Dubium enim videtur, utrum Deus dederit virtutem illam, quando primo instituit, an de novo det. Sed quomodo a principio dedit his quae nondum erant, sicut verbis, quae quotidie de novo formantur? Si de novo dat, tunc quotidie in Sacramentis non solum gratiam, sed etiam alia accidentia creat; et tamen non consuevit dici, quod creationis opus currat nunc nisi21 circa exitum animae in esse et circa infusionem gratiae. — Et si desinat esse statim, prolato verbo, quomodo creavit Deus tam nobilem virtutem, ut ita cito deficeret? — Et rursus, si datur verbo, cum non22 detur verbo in scripto nec in mente, datur in pronuntiatione; et tunc difficile erit explicare, utrum detur in principio, vel in medio, vel in fine: quia nec in principio verbi nec in medio est actio illius virtutis. Si vero in fine, tunc, cum verbum desinat esse, et deficiente verbo, desinat virtus verbi, simul incipiet virtus et desinet. Aut si ante finem daretur; quando ante23 detur et quantum duret, difficile est insinuare.
Nec tantum illud, sed etiam multo difficilius est explicare operationis illius virtutis efficaciam, utrum scilicet agat generatione aequivoca, vel univoca, generando sibi simile, vel dissimile. — Difficile etiam est24, utrum influat omnino aliquid ab extrinseco, an educat aliquid de potentia in actum. Pri-
mum est soli Deo possibile, secundum autem difficile est explicare. — Difficile est etiam intelligere, quomodo characteris impressio possit esse ab illa virtute, cum character videatur esse in superiori parte, in qua solus Deus potest influere. Unde substantia intelligibilis beata, quantumcumque magnae sit excellentiae, secundum quod dicit Augustinus26, non potest facere ad nostram iustificationem, vel illuminationem aliquid interius formando, sed solum exterius excitando. Quomodo ergo hoc poterit virtus data elemento vel verbo, cum non videatur esse capax tantae virtutis? — Postremo, in Sacramento altaris, in quo fit subito transsubstantiatio panis secundum se totum in corpus Christi — quod quidem non potest esse nisi ab infinita virtute — quomodo verbum prolatum ab homine, cum sit finitae virtutis, poterit ad istam transsubstantiationem aliquid operari? Et certe, si illud verbum virtutem non habet agentem, multo minus verba aliorum Sacramentorum.
Haec omnia et multa alia circa hoc valde difficile est intelligere et explicare. Quae non idcirco narro, quia credam esse insolubilia, vel ut per ipsam istam improbem positionem, sed ut ostendam, me ipsam non plene intelligere, et ideo nec affirmare nec negare velle; quia, etsi ipsam non clare intelligam, hoc tamen scio et intelligo, quod plura potest Deus facere et etiam in ipsis Sacramentis facit, quam nos possumus intelligere27. Unde confugiendo ad mirabilem Dei potentiam, omnia ista possumus facile declinare. Et secundum istum modum dicendi satis plana esset responsio ad quaestionem propositam, si ipsius modi plana esset intelligentia. Et haec positio in quarto libro28 diffusius est explicata, ubi respondetur ad praemissa.
Alius est hic modus dicendi. Supposito, quod in Sacramentis novae Legis «divina virtus secretius operatur»29, quia hoc est ipsius fidei et sententiae communis: dixerunt aliqui, Sacramenta novae Legis habere respectu iustificationis virtutem influentem, promerentem, disponentem et efficaciter ordinantem: virtutem influentem ratione Spiritus sancti assistentis; virtutem promerentem ratione meriti passionis ad Sacramentum concurrentis31; virtutem disponentem ratione devotionis ipsius fidelis Sacramentum suscipientis; virtutem denique efficaciter ordinantem ratione divinae pactionis instituentis. Sic enim instituit Dominus, ut ad talis verbi prolationem et Sacramenti susceptionem mirabilis in suscipientibus fieret operatio et suscipientium sanatio et iustificatio; et pro tanto dicuntur Sacramenta novae Legis habere virtutem. — Et differunt in hoc a Sacramentis Legis veteris, praecipue quantum ad ipsam efficacem ordinationem, quia non interveniebat ibi pactio in illis Sacramentis, per quam efficax et infallibilis fieret ordinatio ad gratiam, secundum quod in Sacramentis novae Legis; ut patet in institutione baptismi, ubi dixit32: Qui crediderit et baptizatus fuerit salvus erit. — In aliis etiam tribus modis habendi virtutem differentia est penes magis completum et minus completum, quia in Sacramentis novae Legis Spiritus sanctus influens iustitiam plenius assistit, et passio Christi meritoria efficacius concurrit. In cuius signum de latere Christi profluxerunt sanguis et aqua33, et per consequens Sacramenta, de quibus fundatur Ecclesia. — Abundantior etiam est devotio suscipientis tum propter incrementum fidei propriae, quod factum est in nova Lege, tum etiam propter subsidium fidei totius Ecclesiae, quia in fide Ecclesiae suscipiuntur ecclesiastica Sacramenta34. — Et propter istum quadruplicem modum habendi virtutem dicuntur Sacramenta Legis novae iustificare et esse causa gratiae. — Nec volunt qui hanc positionem sustinent in Sacramentis novae Legis amplius ponere, tum quia ista satis videntur sufficere ad nostram sanationem et iustificationem; tum etiam, quia ex isto quadruplici modo habendi virtutem satis manifestatur nobilitas Sacramentorum novae Legis in se ipsis; tum etiam, quia secundum hoc satis apparet differentia Sacramentorum novae Legis et veteris35; tum etiam, quia nec expressa auctoritas nec ratio videtur cogere amplius illis dare, et humilitas fidei non tantum debet refugere diminutionem, verum etiam superfluitatem, et laudabilius quodam modo videtur diminute dicere quam ampliare.
Hunc modum dicendi et huius quaestionis determinationem plures sustinent36 bene intelligentes. Et dominus Gulielmus, Parisiensis episcopus, in determinando in scholis Fratrum Minorum approbavit
istum modum dicendi coram fratre Alexandro bonae memoriae. — Et istum modum dicendi dupliciter potest quis sustinere et intelligere: vel ita, quod omnino affirmet, nullo alio modo esse virtutem in Sacramentis novae Legis quam modis praedictis; vel quod hoc modo affirmet, virtutem in eis esse, ita tamen, quod non neget, alium modum praeter hos existendi virtutem in Sacramentis esse possibilem. Et primus modus repugnat priori modo dicendi; secundus autem modus dicendi priori opinioni non repugnat, quia nihil dicit, quod illa non dicat, immo etiam nihil dicit, quod communis opinio non teneat — nullus enim recte sentiens negat, quin omnibus dictis modis Sacramenta novae Legis virtutem habeant — sed si quis plus dicit, huic positioni non contradicit, sed addit.
Sed forte videbitur alicui calumniabile, quod dictum est, virtutem Spiritus sancti Sacramento assistere, quin potius in nomine Sacramenti claudi deberet intelligi tanquam de eius integritate, propter illud quod dicitur primae Ioannis quinto37: Tres sunt, qui testimonium dant in terra: spiritus, aqua et sanguis, et hi tres unum sunt; et in libro de Unitate et uno38 dicitur, quod sunt unum Sacramento: et ideo non debet dici, quod Spiritus sanctus assistat Sacramento, tanquam cum eo connumeretur; sed propter ipsam unitatem, quae praedicta est, quam efficit Spiritus sanctus in Sacramento, ipsi Sacramento debet attribui.
Sed certe, etsi hic modus dicendi videatur differre a praedicto, tamen secundum rem idem est, licet vocabula sint diversa. Quod enim dicuntur ista, tria unum Sacramento, hoc non est, quod ex ipsis fiat unum per essentiam, sed quod fiat unum per ordinem, quia scilicet ordinantur ad unum effectum; et hoc nihil aliud est dicere, quam unum alteri assistere. — Item, omne quod est de integritate Sacramenti, aut est res tantum, aut significatio tantum, aut res et signum39. Si ergo Spiritus influens iustitiam ponitur de unitate Sacramenti, cum non sit signum nec res et signum, erit tantummodo sicut res, et ita non habebit rationem causantis, sed potius rationem effectus; et ita Spiritus non staret pro ipsa virtute influente, sed potius pro ipsa gratia Spiritus sancti infusa ipsi animae in Sacramenti susceptione. — Item, non est quaestio, utrum Spiritus sanctus in Sacramento infundat gratiam, sed de hoc est quaestio, utrum Sacramentum, secundum quod dicitur «invisibilis gratiae visibilis forma40, ita quod similitudinem eius gerat et causa existat», habeat virtutem aliquam, per quam influat in animam. Non videtur ergo hoc facere ad propositum. — Postremo, Spiritus sanctus sanctificans et meritum passionis et elementum exterius non solummodo reperiuntur in Sacramentis Legis novae, sed etiam in Sacramentis veteris Legis. Hoc ergo non sufficit dicere ad assignandum differentiam istorum Sacramentorum et illorum. — Aut ergo modus iste dicendi nihil aliud dicit, aut si dicit, parum dicit et modicum ad propositum facit.
Et ideo sustineatur, quicumque praedictorum modorum magis placet, quia primus satis pius est, secundus vero satis sobrius est, si sustineatur illo modo, quo dictum est; et hoc modo in quarto libro41 sustinetur, sicut patet consideranti. Et idcirco hic repetii, non propter hoc, ut nova superadderentur, sed ut ostenderetur, quod a communi positione non dissonat, cui pro viribus meis in omnibus praecedentibus libris adhaesi tanquam viae securiori, et sicut scio et possum, mihi et aliis consimilibus parum intelligentibus persuadeo adhaerendum; et quoniam per totum librum hoc diligentius observavi — sicut advertenti clarius apparebit — ut in his quaestionibus dubiis et difficilibus, in quibus non potui deprehendere, quae esset via communis, quia sapientes opinantur contrarie sapientibus, sic unam partem tanquam magis probabilem sustinerem, ut tamen aliam minime improbarem.
Sufficit enim in dubiis scire, quid sapientes senserunt, nec est utile contentionibus deservire. Multa dicimus et deficimus in verbis, consummator autem sermonum ipse est42 Dominus noster Iesus Christus, de quo factus est sermo in hoc tertio libro, cui immensas gratias ago, quia adiuvit pervenire ad consummationem istius opusculi, miseratus paupertatem scientiae et ingenii; in quo tertius iste liber ultimo est notatus43. Quem rogo, ut faciat provenire mihi ad obedientiae meritum et ad fratrum profectum, propter quae duo labor iste a principio fuit assumtus. Ipsi ergo, de quo factus est sermo, Domino nostro Iesu Christo, regi saeculorum immortali et invisibili, qui pro nobis factus est homo et crucem subiit et gratiam multiplicem contulit et mandata dedit, secundum quod in hoc libro explanatum est, sit omnis honor et gloria per infinita saecula saeculorum. Amen44.
EXPLICIT LIBER TERTIUS FRATRIS BONAVENTURAE SUPER SENTENTIAS.
DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.
Doubt I.
In this part there are questions concerning the text, and first it is asked about that which he says, that the sixth precept is: Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife. For if to covet is prior to committing adultery, it seems that that commandment ought not to be set down in the sixth place, but rather in the third place among the precepts of the second tablet. — Likewise, nothing ought to be commanded except what is in our power1; but nature, so long as it is corrupted, has a proneness to coveting: therefore it seems that concupiscence ought not to be forbidden in the Decalogue. — Likewise, just as it happens that one covets a man's wife, so too it happens that one covets his daughter and his concubine: therefore it does not seem that the concupiscence of the flesh is sufficiently forbidden in that commandment.
I respond: It must be said that adultery stands by an addition over concupiscence, since to commit adultery is in heart and in deed, but to covet is in the heart. And since a prohibition states the negation of both; and negations stand contrariwise to affirmations2: therefore the prohibition of concupiscence adds something over the prohibition of adultery; and generally the prohibition of the sin of the heart adds something over the prohibition of the sin of deed. For it is more to forbid the sin of the heart than the sin of deed, since the sin of deed presupposes the sin of the heart. And therefore those two commandments, in which concupiscence is forbidden, are ordered in the last place3. — And by this is made plain the answer to that which is objected first.
To that which is objected, that nothing ought to be commanded which is not in our power; it must be said that there is a concupiscence which consists in sensuality, and there is a concupiscence which is in the consent of reason moving forward to a deed. The first is venial and is not forbidden, but is restrained4. But the second is mortal sin, and is forbidden, insofar as it moves forward to a deed. Hence the explanation and meaning of this commandment is intimated in Ecclesiasticus 185, where it is said: Son, go not after thy lusts; where to covet is not simply forbidden, but to walk after one's lusts by consenting and proceeding into act.
To that which is objected concerning the concupiscence of a daughter and a concubine, it must be said that a daughter and a concubine can be coveted in two ways: either into possession, that one may be reduced to servitude and service, or for the consummation of a carnal deed. And the first is forbidden by the seventh precept: Thou shalt not covet the thing; but the second is forbidden by that commandment, since the concupiscence of the flesh against the lawful marriage-bed is forbidden. Hence to desire someone's daughter for a wife is not forbidden, but to desire her for fornication and as a harlot; and this is comprised under the sixth prohibition6.
Doubt II.
Likewise it is asked about that which he says: The seventh precept is: Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's house: since what it is lawful to acquire for a price it is lawful to desire by affection7; but it is lawful to buy one's neighbor's house for a price: therefore it is lawful to desire and covet it. If you say that there concupiscence is taken for an inordinate desire; in this way likewise it is not lawful to covet one's own property. — Likewise, just as it happens that one inordinately desires a neighbor's house, so it happens that one inordinately desires a neighbor's dignity: therefore just as the former is forbidden, so also the latter ought to have been forbidden. If you say that the latter is comprised under this prohibition; against this is: that the concupiscence of dignity pertains to pride and vainglory, the concupiscence of a house to avarice: therefore since these belong to diverse genera, it seems that they are not comprised under one prohibition.
I respond: It must be said that in this saying there is forbidden the concupiscence of another's thing8, insofar as one covets something into possession, seeking in it sufficiency. Hence not only is the concupiscence of temporal goods forbidden, such as a house and cattle, but also of any other thing whatsoever which one would wish to snatch away from another. And this indeed is forbidden, understood in itself, so that one not covet another's thing while it remains another's; or it is also understood as against the order of right, that is, when one would wish his neighbor to be harmed in his property for his own advantage; for then he does not love his neighbor as himself. Hence in this saying all avarice and cupidity are forbidden.
To that, therefore, which is objected first: that what it is lawful to acquire for a price it is lawful to covet; it must be said that to covet there means an immoderate appetite of having with harm to one's neighbor, and in this very thing9 there is also comprised the immoderate appetite, and the prohibition even with respect to one's own thing, in which the sin of cupidity and avarice consists.
To that which is objected concerning the ambition of dignity and honor, it must be said that if dignity and honor be sought under the aspect of sufficiency, in this way it pertains to the crime of avarice and is to be forbidden in this commandment. But if under the aspect of excellence, in this way it can be said that it is forbidden by the first commandment, in which reverence of God is enjoined. — Yet it could be said that in both ways it is comprised under the prohibition of the seventh, since in both there is love of one's own good, and there is one ground of disorder with respect to one's neighbor, although the ground of disorder with respect to oneself is manifold. Therefore under one prohibition both concupiscences are to be comprised; and the concupiscence of a house is forbidden more than the concupiscence of dignity, since it was more manifest10 and more perceptible, and also the Jews were more prone to avarice.
Doubt III.
Likewise it is asked about that which he says, that the Sacraments of the new and the old Law are diverse, since the latter only signified, but the former confer grace. Against this it is objected that no one can be saved without grace: therefore if the Sacraments of the old Law did not confer grace, it seems that no one was saved in that Law; which it is impious to say. If you say that in those Sacraments grace was given, but yet not by the power of those Sacraments; whereas in the Sacraments of the new Law grace is given by their power, since they are "sanctifying from sanctification," as Hugh says11; it is objected against this: that grace is by creation: therefore God alone has the power of conferring grace12: therefore if it conferred it in both these and those, it seems that there is no difference between these Sacraments and those.
I respond: It must be understood, as to this, that concerning this question there is a twofold celebrated and famous opinion.
For some wished to say that in both kinds of Sacraments grace is given, but differently: because in the former it was given by reason of the faith and devotion of the very recipient, so that in no way by reason of the Sacrament or of the work worked. But in the Sacraments of the
new Law it is otherwise, since they consist of word and element; and when the Lord instituted the word, he gave it a power, by which it flows in and acts upon the soul either by disposing it to the reception of grace, or by imprinting the con-signification of a character, or by ministering to grace itself for the healing of the soul and the weakening of the tinder of sin. And this Augustine seems to say14: "What is the power of water, that it touch the body and wash the heart, except by the action of the word?" And master Hugh of St. Victor seems to feel the same thing, who says15 that "the Sacraments of the new Law are first sanctified through the word and afterward sanctify, so that thus they are sanctifying from sanctification." And this manner of speaking is upheld by men skilled and worthy of faith:
But it seems difficult to me to understand that that power is conferred simultaneously upon word and element, as to its essence and nature, as to its existence, as to its measure of duration, and also as to the efficacy of its operation; all of which it is necessary to posit and explain16 concerning that power, if one says that some quality is given to word and element, by which it may act and flow into the soul itself.
For it is difficult to understand the essence of that power. For since it is not a substance, but a certain accident and in the genus of the good; it is doubtful whether it ought to be placed among the greatest goods, or the middling, or the least17. And if it be placed among the greatest goods, it will now be grace; but grace existing in one subject does not have the power of acting upon another. But if it is neither grace nor a power, how then is it said in truth to sanctify the Sacrament itself and him who receives the Sacrament? — In what genus too it is and of what species it is, namely whether in diverse Sacraments that power is formally diversified, is difficult for a man of little understanding to grasp. — And if it be placed among the middling goods, or the least, how does such a power produce the rectitude18 and healing of the soul itself, which are reckoned among the greatest goods?
But not only is it difficult to understand the essence of this power, but also its subsistence. For how will a spiritual accident be substantiated in a corporeal subject, since according to the order of nature, which God does not overturn by miracle, a substance is nobler than its property? — Or if that spiritual power19 is posited as in a subject in word and element, why is not grace itself likewise so, which ought to be infused into the soul? which I know not whether anyone rightly understanding would say. — Or if it is in a corporeal subject, how will one absolute power and quality be able to be simultaneously in two subjects, namely word and element, of which, even if one Sacrament is made, nevertheless one thing is not made by nature and essence? But the unity of a power, according to what Damascene holds20, corresponds to the unity of substance and nature. Either therefore in one Sacrament there is not one power, but several; or that power is composite; or one simple and spiritual and indivisible accident will be simultaneously in diverse subjects; all of which is very difficult to understand concerning that power.
Nor are these two things alone difficult to understand concerning that power, but also its measure of duration. For it seems doubtful whether God gave that power when he first instituted it, or gives it anew. But how did he from the beginning give to those things which did not yet exist, such as words, which are daily formed anew? If he gives it anew, then daily in the Sacraments he creates not only grace, but also other accidents; and yet it is not wont to be said that the work of creation runs now except21 in regard to the soul's coming into being and in regard to the infusion of grace. — And if it ceases to be at once, the word having been uttered, how did God create so noble a power, that it should fail so quickly? — And again, if it is given to the word, since it is not22 given to the word in writing nor in the mind, it is given in the utterance; and then it will be difficult to explain whether it is given at the beginning, or in the middle, or at the end: since neither at the beginning of the word nor in the middle is there the action of that power. But if at the end, then, when the word ceases to be, and the word failing, the power of the word would cease, the power will begin and cease at once. Or if it were given before the end; when it is given before23 and how long it lasts, it is difficult to indicate.
Nor only that, but it is also much more difficult to explain the efficacy of the operation of that power, namely whether it acts by equivocal generation, or univocal, generating something like itself, or unlike. — It is also difficult24 whether it flows in something altogether from without, or draws something out of potency into act. The
first is possible to God alone, but the second is difficult to explain. — It is also difficult to understand how the impression of a character can be from that power, since a character seems to be in a higher part, into which God alone can flow. Hence a beatified intelligible substance, however great its excellence, according to what Augustine says26, cannot do anything toward our justification or illumination by forming anything inwardly, but only by stirring outwardly. How then will a power given to element or word be able to do this, since it does not seem to be capable of so great a power? — Lastly, in the Sacrament of the altar, in which the transubstantiation of the bread according to its whole self into the body of Christ takes place suddenly — which indeed cannot be except from an infinite power — how will a word uttered by a man, since it is of finite power, be able to effect anything toward that transubstantiation? And surely, if that word does not have an acting power, much less do the words of the other Sacraments.
All these things and many others concerning this it is very difficult to understand and explain. Which things I do not relate because I believe them to be insoluble, or in order through them to disprove this position, but in order to show that I do not fully understand it, and therefore wish neither to affirm nor deny it; because, even though I do not clearly understand it, this nevertheless I know and understand, that God can do more, and even in the Sacraments themselves does more, than we can understand27. Hence by taking refuge in the wonderful power of God, we can easily evade all these things. And according to this manner of speaking the answer to the proposed question would be plain enough, if the understanding of the manner itself were plain. And this position is more diffusely explained in the fourth book28, where the foregoing is answered.
There is here another manner of speaking. Granted that in the Sacraments of the new Law "the divine power works more secretly"29, since this belongs to faith itself and to the common opinion: some have said that the Sacraments of the new Law have, with respect to justification, an influencing, a meriting, a disposing, and an efficaciously ordaining power: an influencing power by reason of the assisting Holy Spirit; a meriting power by reason of the merit of the Passion concurring with the Sacrament31; a disposing power by reason of the devotion of the faithful one receiving the Sacrament; and finally an efficaciously ordaining power by reason of the divine covenant of the one instituting. For so the Lord instituted, that at the utterance of such a word and the reception of the Sacrament a wonderful operation should come to be in the recipients, and a healing and justification of those receiving; and to that extent the Sacraments of the new Law are said to have power. — And they differ in this from the Sacraments of the old Law, especially as to the efficacious ordination itself, since there did not intervene in those Sacraments a covenant by which an efficacious and infallible ordination to grace might be made, such as in the Sacraments of the new Law; as is plain in the institution of baptism, where he said32: He who believes and is baptized shall be saved. — In the other three modes also of having power there is a difference in respect of the more complete and the less complete, since in the Sacraments of the new Law the Holy Spirit, flowing in justice, more fully assists, and the meritorious Passion of Christ more efficaciously concurs. In sign of which from the side of Christ flowed blood and water33, and consequently the Sacraments, upon which the Church is founded. — More abundant too is the devotion of the recipient, both on account of the increase of one's own faith, which came about in the new Law, and also on account of the support of the faith of the whole Church, since the ecclesiastical Sacraments are received in the faith of the Church34. — And on account of this fourfold mode of having power the Sacraments of the new Law are said to justify and to be a cause of grace. — Nor do those who uphold this position wish to posit anything more in the Sacraments of the new Law, both because these things seem sufficient enough for our healing and justification; and also because from this fourfold mode of having power the nobility of the Sacraments of the new Law in themselves is sufficiently manifested; and also because according to this the difference of the Sacraments of the new Law and of the old appears sufficiently35; and also because neither express authority nor reason seems to compel one to grant them more, and the humility of faith ought to shrink not only from diminution, but also from superfluity, and in a certain way it seems more praiseworthy to speak by way of diminution than to enlarge.
This manner of speaking and the determination of this question many uphold36 who understand well. And lord William, bishop of Paris, in determining in the schools of the Friars Minor, approved
this manner of speaking in the presence of brother Alexander of good memory. — And this manner of speaking one can uphold and understand in two ways: either so that one altogether affirms that there is no power in the Sacraments of the new Law in any other way than the aforesaid ways; or so that one affirms in this way that there is power in them, yet in such a way that one does not deny that another mode, besides these, of a power existing in the Sacraments is possible. And the first mode is repugnant to the former manner of speaking; but the second mode of speaking is not repugnant to the former opinion, since it says nothing which that does not say, nay rather it says nothing which the common opinion does not hold — for no one rightly thinking denies that in all the said modes the Sacraments of the new Law have power — but if one says more, he does not contradict this position, but adds to it.
But perhaps it will seem to someone open to calumny, what has been said, that the power of the Holy Spirit assists the Sacrament, since rather it ought to be understood as comprised within the name of the Sacrament as belonging to its integrity, on account of that which is said in 1 John 537: There are three that give testimony on earth: the spirit, the water, and the blood, and these three are one; and in the book On Unity and the One38 it is said that they are one in the Sacrament: and therefore it ought not to be said that the Holy Spirit assists the Sacrament, as though it were numbered along with it; but on account of that unity which was aforesaid, which the Holy Spirit effects in the Sacrament, it ought to be attributed to the Sacrament itself.
But surely, even though this manner of speaking seems to differ from the aforesaid, nevertheless in reality it is the same, although the words are diverse. For that these three are said to be one in the Sacrament, this is not that out of them one thing is made by essence, but that one thing is made by order, since namely they are ordered to one effect; and this is to say nothing other than that one assists another. — Likewise, everything that belongs to the integrity of a Sacrament is either thing only, or signification only, or thing and sign39. If therefore the Spirit flowing in justice be posited as belonging to the unity of the Sacrament, since it is neither a sign nor a thing-and-sign, it will be only as a thing, and thus it will not have the character of a cause, but rather the character of an effect; and thus the Spirit would not stand for the influencing power itself, but rather for the very grace of the Holy Spirit infused into the soul in the reception of the Sacrament. — Likewise, there is no question whether the Holy Spirit infuses grace into the Sacrament, but about this is the question, whether the Sacrament, according as it is said to be "the visible form of invisible grace40, so that it bears its likeness and exists as its cause," has any power by which it may flow into the soul. This therefore does not seem to make for the purpose. — Lastly, the sanctifying Holy Spirit and the merit of the Passion and the external element are found not only in the Sacraments of the new Law, but also in the Sacraments of the old Law. This therefore does not suffice to say for assigning the difference of these Sacraments and those. — Either therefore this manner of speaking says nothing else, or if it says something, it says little and makes little for the purpose.
And therefore let whoever of the aforesaid modes pleases more be upheld, since the first is pious enough, but the second is sober enough, if it be upheld in that way in which it has been said; and in this way it is upheld in the fourth book41, as is plain to one who considers. And for this reason I have repeated it here, not on this account, that new things might be added, but that it might be shown that it is not dissonant from the common position, to which, to the best of my powers, in all the preceding books I have adhered as to the safer way, and, as I know and am able, I persuade myself and others of like little understanding that it ought to be adhered to; and since throughout the whole book I have observed this more diligently — as will appear more clearly to one who attends — that in these doubtful and difficult questions, in which I could not discern what was the common way, since the wise have opinions contrary to the wise, I have thus upheld one part as the more probable, yet so that I might in no way disprove the other.
For it suffices in doubtful matters to know what the wise have thought, nor is it useful to be a slave to contentions. We say many things and fall short in words, but the consummator of words is he himself42, our Lord Jesus Christ, of whom the discourse has been made in this third book, to whom I render boundless thanks, because he helped me to come to the consummation of this little work, having pity on the poverty of my knowledge and ability; in which this third book was set down last43. Whom I ask, that he may cause it to come to merit for me through obedience and to the profit of the brethren, on account of which two things this labor was undertaken from the beginning. To him therefore, of whom the discourse has been made, our Lord Jesus Christ, the immortal and invisible King of the ages, who for us was made man and underwent the cross and bestowed manifold grace and gave commandments, according to what has been explained in this book, be all honor and glory through the infinite ages of ages. Amen44.
HERE ENDS THE THIRD BOOK OF BROTHER BONAVENTURE UPON THE SENTENCES.
- Cfr. supra pag. 815, nota 6. — Minor insinuatur Gen. 8, 21: Sensus enim et cogitatio humani cordis in malum prona sunt ab adolescentia sua. Cfr. Rom. 7, 18. seqq., et Gal. 5, 17. — Inferius pro debeat codd. debet.Cf. above, p. 815, note 6. — The minor is intimated in Gen. 8:21: "For the sense and thought of the human heart are prone to evil from its youth." Cf. Rom. 7:18 ff. and Gal. 5:17. — Below, for ought the codices read does.
- Vide supra pag. 853, nota 4. — Pro et negationes edd. quia negationes.See above, p. 853, note 4. — For and negations the editions read since negations.
- Cfr. supra d. 37. a. 2. q. 2.Cf. above, d. 37, a. 2, q. 2.
- Vide supra d. 38. q. 4. ad 2. — Paulo ante pro quae est cod. K quae consistit.See above, d. 38, q. 4, ad 2. — A little before, for which is codex K reads which consists.
- Vers. 30. — August., Serm. 154. (alias 5. de Verbis Apostoli) c. 6. n. 8: Aliud est enim non concupiscere, aliud post concupiscentias suas non ire. Non concupiscere omnino perfecti est; post concupiscentias suas non ire pugnantis est, luctantis est, laborantis est. Cfr. Serm. 151. (alias 45. de Tempore) c. 3. n. 3.Verse 30. — Augustine, Sermon 154 (alias 5, On the Words of the Apostle) c. 6, n. 8: "For it is one thing not to covet, another not to go after one's lusts. Not to covet at all belongs to the perfect; not to go after one's lusts belongs to one fighting, to one struggling, to one laboring." Cf. Sermon 151 (alias 45, On the Season) c. 3, n. 3.
- De quo in dubio seq. — Inferius pro non est prohibitum codd. G K L V aa non prohibetur.Concerning which, in the following doubt. — Below, for is not forbidden codices G K L V aa read is not prohibited.
- Edd. communi affectu. Mox post proximi codd. A K V adnectunt tui. Aliquanto inferius ante similiter plurimi codd. omittunt sic.The editions read by common affection. Shortly, after neighbor's codices A K V append thy. Somewhat below, before likewise very many codices omit thus.
- Cod. A melius omnis rei.Codex A reads better of every thing.
- Codd. G K L V aa omittunt ipso. Inferius pro cupiditatis codd. N U V concupiscentiae.Codices G K L V aa omit very. Below, for of cupidity codices N U V read of concupiscence.
- Cod. N bene est. Paulo superius pro utraque edd. utrobique.Codex N reads is well. A little above, for both the editions read in both places.
- Libr. I. de Sacram. p. XI. c. 2.On the Sacraments book I, part XI, c. 2.
- Psalm. 83, 12: Gratiam et gloriam dabit Dominus. — Mox pro conferebat edd. conferebatur.Psalm 83:12: "The Lord will give grace and glory." — Shortly, for it conferred the editions read it was conferred.
- In Ioan. Evang. tr. 80. n. 3. — Pro faciente cod. A facilitante, non pauci alii codd. cum edd. faciendo, sed contra textum originalem.On the Gospel of John, tract 80, n. 3. — For by the action of codex A reads facilitating, not a few other codices with the editions read by making, but contrary to the original text.
- Libr. I. de Sacram. p. XI. c. 2. — Pro sentire codd. et edd. 1, 2 dicere. Aliquanto inferius pro sustinent cod. A sustinuerunt.On the Sacraments book I, part XI, c. 2. — For to feel the codices and editions 1, 2 read to say. Somewhat below, for uphold codex A reads upheld.
- Codd. K aa exponere, cod. Z exprimere. Mox cum verbis Si quis dicat edd. perperam incipiunt novam propositionem et subinde post difficile omittunt namque.Codices K aa read expound, codex Z express. Shortly, with the words If one says the editions wrongly begin a new sentence and then after difficult omit for.
- Edd. sed. Paulo ante pro constant cod. F consistunt. Inferius pro in animam cod. U in anima.The editions read but. A little before, for consist codex F reads subsist. Below, for into the soul codex U reads in the soul.
- Codd. A U rectificationem.Codices A U read rectification.
- Edd. specialis.The editions read special.
- Libr. III. de Fide orthod. c. 14. 15. et 19.On the Orthodox Faith book III, c. 14, 15, and 19.
- Pro nunc, nisi codd. G H L N V aa non nisi; edd., omisso non post et tamen, subinde legunt creationis opus non currat nisi. Pro currat cod. K existat.For now ... except codices G H L N V aa read not except; the editions, with not omitted after and yet, then read the work of creation does not run except. For runs codex K reads exists.
- Non pauci codd. perperam omittunt non. Inferius pro erit codd. G K L N U V aa est.Not a few codices wrongly omit not. Below, for will be codices G K L N U V aa read is.
- Ita cod. A, codd. E F Z (alii multi sunt dubiae lectionis) quantum ante, alii quantum autem, edd., retento quantum, omittunt autem, et deinde etiam et quantum duret. Paulo superius pro deficiente codd. A G H K L V aa desinente. Subinde pro daretur cod. A detur, edd. datur.So codex A; codices E F Z (many others are of doubtful reading) read how much before, others how much however; the editions, retaining how much, omit however, and then also and how long it lasts. A little above, for failing codices A G H K L V aa read ceasing. Then for were given codex A reads be given, the editions is given.
- Cod. K supplet explicare; codd. U Z intelligere; cod. A omittit est.Codex K supplies to explain; codices U Z to understand; codex A omits is.
- Enarrat. in Ps. 118. serm. 18. n. 4: Deus itaque per se ipsum, quia lux est, illuminat pias mentes, ut ea quae divina dicuntur vel ostenduntur, intelligant. Sed si ad hoc ministro utitur Angelo, potest quidem aliquid agere Angelus in mente hominis, ut captet lucem Dei et per hanc intelligat; sed ita dicitur intellectum dare homini et quasi, ut ita dicam, intellectuare hominem, quemadmodum quisquam dicitur lucem dare domui vel illuminare domum, cui fenestram facit etc. — Superius pro in qua (ita codd. et edd.) mallemus in quam.Expositions on Psalm 118, sermon 18, n. 4: "God therefore by his very self, since he is light, illuminates devout minds, that they may understand the things which are said or shown to be divine. But if for this he uses an Angel as minister, the Angel can indeed do something in the mind of a man, that he may catch the light of God and understand through it; but it is so said to give understanding to a man and, so to speak, to make the man understand, in the way in which one is said to give light to a house or to illuminate a house, for which he makes a window, etc." — Above, for in which (so the codices and editions) we should prefer into which.
- Plures codd. perperam ut per ipsam, edd. ut ipse.Several codices wrongly read that through it itself, the editions that he himself.
- Cfr. tom. I. pag. 760, nota 7. — Inferius pro facile cod. U faciliter.Cf. vol. I, p. 760, note 7. — Below, for easily codex U reads more easily.
- Dist. 1. p. 1. q. 4. — Mox pro respondetur cod. U est responsio.Dist. 1, p. 1, q. 4. — Shortly, for is answered codex U reads is the answer.
- Isidor., VI. Etymolog. c. 19. n. 40: Sacramenta dicuntur, quia sub tegumento corporalium rerum virtus divina secretius salutem [vi] eorundem Sacramentorum operatur; unde et a secretis virtutibus, vel a sacris Sacramenta dicuntur. — Mox pro hoc permulti codd. haec. Paulo inferius post habere non pauci codd. adnectunt virtutem.Isidore, Etymologies VI, c. 19, n. 40: "They are called Sacraments, since under the covering of corporeal things the divine power more secretly works the salvation [by the power] of those same Sacraments; whence also from the secret powers, or from the sacred, they are called Sacraments." — Shortly, for this very many codices read these. A little below, after to have not a few codices append power.
- Vide supra d. 19. a. 1. q. 1. et d. 20. q. 4. circa finem corp. — Inferius pro pactionis Vat. passionis.See above, d. 19, a. 1, q. 1, and d. 20, q. 4, near the end of the body. — Below, for of covenant the Vatican edition reads of passion.
- Marc. 16, 16. — Cod. F ubi dicitur. Inferius codd. H K L V aa omittunt virtutem.Mark 16:16. — Codex F reads where it is said. Below, codices H K L V aa omit power.
- Ioan. 19, 34. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 2, nota 19.John 19:34. Cf. vol. I, p. 2, note 19.
- Vide supra d. 28. a. 2. q. 2. in corp. — Paulo ante pro suscipiuntur edd. cum aliquot codd. suscipiunt.See above, d. 28, a. 2, q. 2, in the body. — A little before, for are received the editions with some codices read receive.
- Haec tertia ratio desideratur in edd.This third reason is wanting in the editions.
- Cod. A Hunc modum dicendi in huius quaestionis terminatione plures sustinuerunt.Codex A reads Many upheld this manner of speaking in the determination of this question.
- Vers. 8.Verse 8.
- Quem composuit Boethius et in quo inter divisiones unitatis recenset etiam hanc: Alia dicuntur unum ratione, sed hoc duobus modis: quia ratione consortii, ut ens, intellectus et res, aliquid et vocabulum unum genus; vel ratione unius Sacramenti, ut spiritus, aqua et sanguis dicuntur unum. — Paulo inferius pro assistat plures codd. assistit et pro unitatem cod. U virtutem.Which Boethius composed and in which, among the divisions of unity, he reckons also this one: "Other things are said to be one by reason, but this in two ways: either by reason of association, as being, intellect, and thing, something and a word are one genus; or by reason of one Sacrament, as the spirit, the water, and the blood are said to be one." — A little below, for assists (subj.) several codices read assists (indic.) and for unity codex U reads power.
- Cfr. IV. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. 1. — Inferius pro nec res signum Vat. et res nec signum tantum.Cf. Sentences IV, text of the Master, d. 1. — Below, for nor thing-sign the Vatican edition reads and thing nor sign only.
- De hac Sacramenti definitione vide IV. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. 1. — Superius pro infundat codd. G L V aa effundat.On this definition of a Sacrament see Sentences IV, text of the Master, d. 1. — Above, for infuses codices G L V aa read pours out.
- Dist. 1. p. 1. q. 4.Dist. 1, p. 1, q. 4.
- Eccli. 43, 29: Multa dicemus et deficiemus in verbis; consummatio autem sermonum ipse est in omnibus.Ecclesiasticus 43:29: "We shall say many things and shall fall short in words; but the consummation of words is he himself in all."
- Ultima verba, quae in edd. 1, 2 desiderantur, Vat. sic exhibet in quo tertius iste liber est annotatus; pro notatus codd. G L U V cc vocatus. Superius post quia adiuvit edd. supplent me. — Epist. I. Tim. 1, 17.The last words, which are wanting in editions 1, 2, the Vatican edition gives thus: in which this third book is annotated; for set down codices G L U V cc read called. Above, after because he helped the editions supply me. — Epistle 1 Tim. 1:17.