Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 1, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 4

Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 1

Textus Latinus

p. 19

Quaestio IV. De Sacramentorum efficacia.

Quarto quaeritur, utrum Sacramenta sint gratiae effectiva. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia ista assignatur differentia Sacramentorum novae legis ad Sacramenta veteris legis, quod haec efficiunt, illa solum figurant¹; sed quod efficit est causa efficiens: ergo Sacramenta novae legis sunt gratiae effectiva.

2. Item, Hugo² dicit, « quod Sacramenta novae legis infusa sibi primum benedictione sanctificant »; et alibi dicit, quod sunt « ex sanctificatione sanctificantia »; sed non sanctificatur anima nisi per gratiam: ergo efficiunt ipsam gratiam in anima.

3. Item, Magister in definitione Sacramenti in littera³ dicit, quod « Sacramentum est quod similitudinem gerit et causa existit »; sed non formalis neque finalis neque materialis, ut supra monstratum est: ergo a divisione est causa efficiens.

4. Item, idem ratione videtur, quia signum institutum humana institutione potest in nobis aggenerare spiritualem cognitionem et affectionem, sicut circulus ante domum aggenerat cognitionem in anima transeuntis, quod ibi sit vinum; et patibulum et signa belli aggenerant timorem: ergo si divina institutio multo potentior est quam humana, et Sacramenta sunt signa secundum divinam institutionem⁴; possunt in nobis aggenerare multo nobiliorem effectum: ergo possunt efficere gratiam.

5. Item, « opposita nata sunt fieri circa idem⁵ »; unde nihil est susceptibile culpae, nisi sit susceptibile gratiae, et e converso: cum ergo caro, quae est quid corporale, possit adeo vitiari, ut efficiat et generet culpam in anima, quae sibi unitur; ergo Sacramentum corporale poterit sanctificari adeo, quod transfundat gratiam: nihil ergo prohibet, quod efficiat in anima gratiam spiritualem.

6. Item, sicut in generatione carnis est generans et generatus et ulterius quo mediante fit generatio; ita in spirituali regeneratione est regenerans Christus, regeneratus homo, et illud quo mediante fit regeneratio, scilicet Sacramentum: ergo sicut semen, quod erat medium in generatione carnali, defert culpam, eadem ratione Sacramentum defert gratiam, quae facit filium⁶; sed non defert essentialiter: ergo defert causaliter. Si dicas, quod non est simile, quia facilius est male facere sive vitiare quam bene facere; hoc nihil est: quia nunquam Adam fuit potentior ad malum vel eius culpa, quin Christus sit potentior ad bonum et eius passio⁷; sed Adam sua culpa potuit vitiare omnem carnem: ergo Christus sua passione potuit adeo sanctificare Sacramenta, ut ipsa sanctificata animas sanctificarent et gratiam darent.

7. Item, dicit Anselmus de Conceptu virginali⁸, quod « si Adam stetisset, transfunderet iustitiam originalem »; sed hoc non potest esse nisi mediante carne corporali: ergo multo magis Christus potest mediante corporali Sacramento transfundere iustitiam gratuitam.

Contra: 1. Omnis causa efficiens est nobilior suo effectu, et nullum corporale nobilius est aliquo spirituali: cum igitur gratia sit spiritualis, Sacramentum corporale, ut dicit Hugo⁹; nullum Sacramentum est causa efficiens ipsius gratiae.

2. Item, Magister in littera¹⁰ dicit, quod « non est gratia ab illis, sed per illa »: ergo videtur, quod non sint sicut canales, non sicut fons: ergo non sunt causa efficiens gratiae, sicut nec canales aquae.

3. Item, Hugo¹¹ dicit, quod « gratia non est ex ipsis Sacramentis, sed in ipsis »; sed constat, quod in ipsis dicit causam efficientem, sicut patet ibi: ergo etc.

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4. Item, super illud Psalmi¹²: Benedicam Dominum, qui tribuit mihi intellectum; Glossa dicit: « Deus per semetipsum irradiat pias mentes »: ergo cum illa irradiatio fiat per lumen gratiae, constat, quod gratia est a Deo immediate: non ergo a Sacramentis.

5. Item, « virtus est, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur¹³ »: si ergo non operatur in nobis virtutem per subiectam creaturam, per consequens nec gratiam.

6. Item, ordo debet servari in agentibus: ergo Deus per minus nobile non debet influere in magis nobile; sed anima nobilior est Sacramento: ergo Deus non influit per Sacramentum gratiam in animam: ergo gratia a solo Deo est effective. Si igitur Sacramentum est gratiae causa, hoc est solum dispositive.

Quaeritur ergo, utrum Sacramentum sit causa disponens ad gratiam. Quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia si Sacramenta novae legis essent solum causa sine qua non, tunc ergo in ratione causandi non differrent a Sacramentis legis veteris et essent in onus¹⁴; sed hoc est inconveniens: ergo etc.

2. Item, tam Hugo¹⁵ quam Magister in littera quam etiam alii dicunt, quod Deus per Sacramenta regenerat animam: ergo Sacramentum est medium actionis divinae in animam; sed omne medium agendi aut est deferens virtutem, aut disponens; sed Sacramentum non defert: ergo disponit.

3. Item, « Sacramenta sunt medicinae spirituales¹⁶ »; sed medicina corporalis disponit ad sanitatem corporalem: ergo medicina spiritualis disponit ad sanitatem spiritualem.

4. Item, si nihil disponerent nec cooperarentur ad sanitatem animae, aeque bene sine his posset fieri salus, sicut cum eis: ergo imposita nobis in nova lege potius dicenda sunt onera quam medicamina, et lex nova lex oneris, non suavitatis¹⁷.

Sed contra: 1. Dispositio praecedit illud, ad quod disponit, non solum natura, sed etiam tempore¹⁸; sed simul est Sacramenti perceptio et gratiae infusio tempore: ergo Sacramentum non disponit ad gratiam.

2. Item, gratia ex nihilo et subito creatur¹⁹, ergo nullo indiget disponente ad hoc, ut sit: ergo Sacramenta non disponunt ad gratiam. — Si dicas, quod non disponunt ad hoc, quod gratia sit, sed ad hoc, quod insit ipsi animae, unde habilitant ipsam animam disponendo ad gratiae susceptionem; contra: esse gratiae est suum inesse, cum sit accidens²⁰: ergo si non habet dispositionem ad hoc, quod sit, nec ad hoc, quod insit.

3. Item, si Sacramenta disponunt animam et habilitant, ergo influunt in ipsam; sed nullum corporale influit in aliquod spirituale²¹: ergo Sacramenta, cum sint corporalia, non influunt in animam: ergo non habilitant ipsam nec disponunt.

Si dicas forte, quod in ipsis Sacramentis est aliqua virtus spiritualis, per quam influunt in animam; quaeritur ergo ratione huius, utrum in Sacramentis sit aliqua virtus, per quam influant in ipsam animam. Et quod non, videtur:

1. Quia illa virtus aut est substantia, aut accidens. Si substantia, aut Deus, aut Angelus, aut anima; nullum horum esse²², certum est, quia si illa virtus est de Sacramento, tunc Deus est de Sacramento. Si accidens, sed nullum accidens spirituale est in subiecto corporali: ergo aut illa virtus est corporalis, et sic non influet; aut si est spiritualis, non est in Sacramento.

2. Item, illa virtus est bonum, constat; aut ergo est bonum magnum, aut mediocre, aut parvum, sicut dividit Augustinus²³. Non de maioribus, quia tunc esset gratia; nec virtus gratuita, quae est in sola anima; non mediocre, quia talia sunt potentiae animae: ergo est bonum infimum. Sed hoc est bonum corporale: ergo illa virtus non est spiritualis et non influit in animam.

3. Item, nullum corporale recipitur in spirituali corporaliter, sed solum spiritualiter²⁴: ergo similiter nullum spirituale recipitur in corpore spiritualiter, sed corporaliter: ergo illa virtus, cum sit in Sacramentis, est ibi corporaliter, et ita non est potens influere in animam: ergo frustra est ibi.

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4. Item, « omne quod recipitur in aliquo, est ibi per modum recipientis et non recepti », sicut dicit Boethius²⁵: ergo illa virtus recipitur in Sacramento corporali per modum corporis: ergo etc. — Si dicas, quod verum est, loquendo naturaliter; sed illa virtus est ibi mirabiliter, et supra naturam; contra: quantumcumque sit ibi supra²⁶ naturam et qualitercumque, tamen est ignobilior ipsa anima; non ergo influit in ipsam: ergo si non ponitur ob aliud, manifestum est etc.

Contra: 1. Beda²⁷ dicit, quod « Dominus contactu mundissimae carnis suae dedit vim regenerativam aquis »: ergo aliqua vis collata est ipsis aquis; sed haec non potuit esse nisi creata, quia collata est creaturae, et cum esset ad regenerandum, non potuit esse nisi spiritualis, quia operis spiritualis virtus est spiritualis: ergo etc.

2. Item, Augustinus dicit, et habetur in tertia distinctione²⁸: « Quae est virtus aquae, ut corpus tangat et cor abluat »? Ergo aliqua virtus est in Sacramento, qua abluitur cor: ergo spiritualis.

3. Item, videmus, quod opera divinae iustitiae fiunt ministerio creaturae corporalis, quae habet a Deo vim aliquam, per quam possit agere in animam — alioquin non posset — sicut patet in igne purgatorio²⁹: ergo in operibus misericordiae, quae fiunt per Sacramenta, erit, quod Sacramenta habeant aliquam virtutem a Deo sibi collatam, per quam agant in animam.

4. Item, videmus, quod si aliquis contritus accedat ad baptismum, etsi non conferatur ei gratia, quia iam habet eam, tamen confertur ei remissio omnis poenae, quam non habebat prius³⁰: ergo baptismus supra collationem gratiae addit remissionem poenae: ergo aliqua virtus est in baptismo praeter virtutem gratiae; eadem ratione in aliis Sacramentis novae legis.

5. Item, si nulla esset virtus ibi, tunc ergo rediret inconveniens saepe dictum, quod non differrent a Sacramentis veteris legis.

Conclusio

Probabilis est opinio, cum suis rationibus primo posita, quod Sacramenta respectu gratiae gratum facientis sint causa sine qua non, respectu vero characteris et ornatus sint causa efficiens, respectu denique efficaciae gratiae et sanationis potentiarum sint causa disponens. Probabilis etiam est alia opinio, quae negat, ipsis Sacramentis datam esse virtutem efficientem per modum qualitatis absolutae, non relativae.

Respondeo: Aliqui volunt dicere, quod in Sacramentis³¹ est aliqua virtus creata, per quam influunt in animam et habent rationem causandi differenter. Dicunt enim, quod in Sacramentis datur gratia gratum faciens; datur etiam in eis gratia gratis data, sicut est character et ornatus animae; datur etiam debilitatio fomitis sive expeditio potentiarum, haec est efficacia gratiae. Dicunt ergo, quod respectu gratiae gratum facientis sunt sicut causa sine qua non; respectu characteristicationis³² et ornatus sint sicut causa efficiens; respectu illius virtutis, respectu scilicet debilitationis fomitis sive roboris potentiarum, sunt causa disponens. — Et hoc manifestum est. Nam sicut videmus, quod in purgatione per ignem purgatorium est ipsa anima purgabilis, habens reatum vel maculam venialem; est³³ gratia intra animam, quia sine ipsa non fieret purgatio; est rursus virtus ignis: sic in Sacramento est anima habens defectum et debilitatem potentiarum; est iterum gratia in anima intus operans; est iterum virtus Sacramenti exterior; et his concurrentibus roborantur et sanantur potentiae, et gratia fit efficacior in sua operatione mediante virtute Sacramenti. Sic ergo dicunt, quod Sacramentum est causa gratiae ut sine qua non, scilicet gratum facientis; est causa characteris et ornatus efficiens; est causa efficaciae³⁴ gratiae et sanationis potentiarum ut disponens; et hoc per virtutem, quae est in ipso Sacramento, spiritualem et a Deo collatam sibi. — His visis, manifesta est secundum hos responsio ad obiecta.

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Solutio oppositorum quaestionis principalis. 1, 2. Ad illud enim quod quaeritur primo, utrum sint causa efficiens gratiae gratum facientis; dicunt, quod non. Quod ergo obiicitur de differentia horum Sacramentorum et illorum³⁵; dicunt, quod differentia attenditur ratione characteristicationis et ornatus et efficaciae gratiae. Et sic respondent ad illud Hugonis, quod de illa sanctificatione intelligitur.

3. Similiter dicunt de eo quod dicit Magister, quod sit³⁶ causa; tamen si intelligatur quantum ad gratiam gratum facientem, dicunt, quod est causa sine qua non. — Aliter etiam dicunt, quod potest dici, quod sit causa disponens vel ad hoc, quod insit, vel ad hoc, quod efficax sit, et hoc ratione operis operati; non sic autem erat in illis Sacramentis.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod signum ex humana institutione generat cognitionem et affectionem spiritualem; dicunt, quod hoc est solum dispositive³⁷ sive occasionaliter, non effective; immo ipsa anima conferendo in semetipsa cognitionem generat et affectionem; sicut patet exemplo manifesto, quod alii vident patibulum et timent, alii non; tamen per hoc non potest ostendi, quod Sacramentum sit causa efficiens gratiae.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de transfusione culpae mediante carne, dicunt, quod sicut gratia non est in aliquo corporali, sic nec culpa. Sed tamen vitiositas in carne habere potest rationem efficiendi culpam in anima; non sic virtus Sacramenti gratiam. Et causa huius est, quia gratia est effectus nobilior omni virtute corporali et fit ex nihilo, et hoc³⁸ est solius Dei; sed effectus culpae dicit ignobilitatem et imperfectionem et defectum. Ideo omnia argumenta illa non valent, quae fiunt per similitudinem gratiae ad culpam.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Christus potentior est in bonum; dicunt, quod verum est; nec tamen sequitur ex hoc, quodsi Adam transmittit culpam mediante carne, quod Christus transmittat gratiam mediante Sacramento. Nam istud esset inordinatio; praeterea, sicut creatura non potest recipere potestatem creandi, sic nec dandi gratiam³⁹.

7. Ad illud Anselmi dicunt, quod non intelligitur, quod transfunderet iustitiam carne mediante, sed quod omnes posteri haberent illam iustitiam a Deo, quia non esset impedimentum ex parte carnis.

Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum Sacramentum sit causa disponens; dicunt, quod sic, sicut tactum fuit⁴⁰; quia disponit ad efficaciam gratiae, remittendo fomitem, qui impedit operationem gratiae; vel, sicut tactum fuit⁴¹, disponit ad hoc, quod gratia insit animae, quamvis non disponat ad hoc, quod sit. Et hoc est dicere, quod gratia comparatur ad causam efficientem, comparatur ad substantiam suscipientem. Sacramentum autem non disponit a parte agentis, qui est Deus, sed a parte suscipientis, quod est anima.

2. Et sic patet responsio ad illud quod obiicitur, quod gratia est ex nihilo; dicunt enim, quod Sacramentum non disponit ad gratiam ratione eius ex quo, sed ratione eius in quod recipitur⁴².

Ad argumenta pro parte negativa primae quaestionis lateralis. 1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod dispositio praecedit illud, ad quod disponit; dicunt, quod non semper praecedit tempore, sicut patet in dispositione, quae est necessitas sive in dispositione ultima⁴³; sic Sacramentum digne susceptum disponit dispositione ultima, quae simul est tempore cum gratia, sed natura prior, sicut ex parte illius.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si disponit, influit; dicunt, quod influit. — Quod ergo obiicitur⁴⁴, quod nullum corporale influit in spirituale; dicunt, quod in Sacramento est aliqua virtus spiritualis, per quam influit in animam. Tamen illa ratio non valet secundum eos, quia in anima mundanda est considerare ipsam substantiam et ipsam maculam, a qua mundatur; et licet secundum substantiam sit superior omni corpore, tamen ratione maculae vel defectus est inferior.

Ad argumenta pro parte negativa secundae quaestionis lateralis. Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum sit in Sacramentis ponere virtutem creatam; dicunt, quod sic. 1. Quod ergo quaeritur, utrum substantia, aut⁴⁵ accidens; dicunt, quod accidens. — Quod iterum quaeritur, utrum accidens corporale, aut spirituale; dicunt, quod spirituale. — Quod obiicitur postea, quod accidens spirituale non est in subiecto corporali; dicunt, quod verum est naturaliter, sed ipsum Sacramentum habet illam virtutem supra naturam secundum ordinem divinae misericordiae, sicut

p. 23 virtus est in igne purgatorio secundum ordinem divinae iustitiae supra naturam ignis. Et quod amplius est ex parte hac, quia Sacramentum non est subiectum naturale sive secundum naturam; et ideo non est mirum, si habeat virtutem supra naturam.

2. Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum sit bonum maximum etc.; dicunt, quod virtus illa ponenda est inter bona mediocria, quia est infra gratiam et supra corpus. — Si obiicias, quod tale bonum est animae potentiae; dicunt, quod Augustinus non excludit propter hoc, quin alia sint; sed illud dicit exemplando vel arctando bonum ad subiectum humanum⁴⁶. — Si vero obiicias, quod non aget vel influet in potentias animae, cum sit mediocre, et influxus sit a superiori; dicunt, quod non influit in potentias ratione potentiarum, sed ratione ipsarum deficientium per culpam.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de receptione substantiae spiritualis; dicunt, quod non est simile: quia, si substantia spiritualis reciperet corporale corporaliter, tunc derogaretur ipsi substantiae nec perficeretur in ipsa receptione; sed si aliquod materiale⁴⁷ recipiat spirituale spiritualiter, non derogaretur ei in aliquo.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omne quod recipitur, est in recipiente per modum recipientis; dicunt, quod hoc verum est de receptione naturali; sed haec est supra naturam. Praeterea, ipsum Sacramentum, secundum quod huiusmodi, est medicina spiritualis; et ideo debet habere virtutem spiritualem. In naturalibus autem⁴⁸ maxime consideratur materia, sed in divinis maxime et principaliter consideratur finis; ideo, quia in Sacramentis non consideratur ratio materiae, sed finis, conveniens fuit secundum ipsos virtutem spiritualem in eis ponere.

Ad aliud⁴⁹ secundum eos iam responsum est, quia nobilior est virtus ista, minus nobilis anima lapsa, non ratione substantiae, sed ratione lapsus. — Et patent hoc modo cetera obiecta secundum hanc opinionem. Et haec opinio est magnorum⁵⁰.

Opinio 2 cum conclusione. Est etiam aliorum magnorum circa hoc opinio dicentium, quod in Sacramentis non sit causalitas neque virtus aliqua, nec effectiva nec dispositiva ad gratiam, quae sit qualitas vel proprietas aliqua absoluta, sed per quandam assistentiam. Sacramento enim dicunt assistere divinam virtutem, quae est causa gratiae, et fidem et devotionem suscipientis⁵¹, quae disponit ad gratiam. — Et adducunt simile: quoniam ad verbum Elisaei, Naaman se lavante, astitit virtus divina effectiva sanitatis et devotio et obedientia Naaman dispositiva; nulla tamen causalitas fuit nec in verbo Elisaei nec in aqua Iordanis⁵². Si ergo Dominus ita instituisset, ut ad verbum Elisaei non solum ipse Naaman, sed ceteri accedentes curarentur, et hoc ex quadam pactione, ita quod semper assisteret vis divina; aqua illa diceretur curare et sanare lepram et esse causa curationis et habere virtutem curandi. Sic in Sacramentis dicunt quod ad prolationes verbi assistit virtus divina aquis et infundit gratiam et regenerat, dum homo subiicit se per fidei professionem et obedientiam. Dicunt ergo, quod Sacramenta dicuntur habere virtutem et dicuntur causa et dicuntur efficere secundum communem modum loquendi propter assistentiam divinae virtutis.

Et si tu quaeras, utrum habeant virtutem aliquam creatam super⁵³ increatam; respondent, quod praeter virtutem increatam est dicere aliquam virtutem habere Sacramentum, sed extenso nomine virtutis. Si enim virtus dicat aliquam qualitatem vel naturam sive essentiam advenientem Sacramento, sicut virtus proprie dicitur, sic secundum eos non est dicendum, quod habeat virtutem⁵⁴; sed extenditur nomen virtutis ad aliquam ordinationem, ut quando aliquid habet efficacem ordinationem ad aliquid, dicitur habere virtutem respectu illius. — Et ponunt hoc exemplum: rex statuit, ut qui habent tale signum, habeant centum libras⁵⁵. Post istam institutionem signum illud non habet aliquam proprietatem absolutam, quam non haberet prius; ad aliquid tamen est ordinatum, ad quod non erat prius; et quia habet efficacem ordinationem, dicitur habere virtutem, ut faciat aliquem habere centum marcas; et dicitur illud signum valere centum marcas, et tamen nihil plus habet de bonitate nunc quam prius. — Si ergo quaeras, quid sit illa virtus in illo signo; dicetur, quod non est aliquid absolutum, sed ad aliquid⁵⁶. — Sic dicunt, quod Sacramenta sunt talia signa a Deo instituta, ut qui ea susceperit debito modo habeat tantum de gratia vel habeat gratiam ad hunc actum; illa, inquam, ordina-

p. 24 tio est in ipso Sacramento, spiritualem et a Deo collatam sibi⁵⁷. Et rationes illius disponunt hominem, ut habeat gratiam, quia efficaciter ordinat ad habendam et suscipiendam gratiam.

Pactio divina. Rursus dicunt, quod ex tali pactione Dominus astrinxit se quodam modo ad dandum gratiam suscipienti Sacramentum; astringit enim quodam modo Deum ad conferendum, et ideo⁵⁸ dicitur habere virtutem ad efficiendum et etiam disponendum. Et sicut extenditur nomen virtutis, ita verbum efficiendi, vel disponendi, quia nec efficit nec disponit influendo, sed efficaciter ordinando. Et sicut haec extenduntur, ita et nomen causae, quia non dicitur causa, secundum quod est principium operandi, sed secundum quod est ratio ordinandi.

Ratio consentit. Huic positioni pietas fidei non repugnat, et ratio consentit⁵⁹. — Consentit namque ratio, quia valde difficile est intelligere, qualiter illa virtus detur sicut qualitas absoluta; difficilius, quando detur; difficile etiam est intelligere, cui detur, verbo scilicet, an elemento, quae sunt duo nihil unum facientia; difficile etiam est scire, quamdiu duret; difficile vel est similiter valde intelligere, quomodo influat; difficile etiam, cuius naturae sit in seipsa; et multa talia. Alii vero⁶⁰ positioni satis faciliter ratio concordat.

Fides non repugnat. Pietas etiam fidei non repugnat. Cavendum est enim, ne, dum nimis damus corporalibus signis ad laudem, subtrahamus honorem gratiae curanti et animae suscipienti. — Haec autem opinio non nimis dat neque subtrahit aliquid honoris debiti. Sicut igitur litterae regiae anulo regis sigillatae magnae sunt dignitatis et virtutis et valoris et magna dicuntur et⁶¹ posse et facere, tamen in eis nulla virtus est absoluta, sed sola ordinatio per assistentiam virtutis regiae — quod patet, quia, mortuo rege, non plus curatur de litteris suis quam de aliis, tamen nihil absolutum amiserunt — sic intelligendum in Sacramentis, et sic loquuntur Sanctorum auctoritates secundum communem usum.

Quaestio incidens solvitur. Et rationes ad oppositum patent. — Et si tu quaeras; super quid fundatur relatio, et quomodo advenit sine donatione proprietatis? dicendum, quod in institutionibus signorum; ut quando nummus fit arrha, nihil datur de novo ipsi nummo⁶².

Iudicium auctoris. Utraque harum positionum satis videtur probabilis, haec tamen mihi videtur ad sustinendum facilior; nescio tamen, quae sit verior, quia cum loquimur de his quae sunt miraculi, non multum adhaerendum est rationi. Concedimus igitur, quod Sacramenta novae legis sunt causa et efficiunt et disponunt, extenso nomine, ut dictum est, et hoc securum est dicere; utrum autem plus habeant, nec volo affirmare nec negare. Et secundum hanc ultimam viam omnia quaesita patent.

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English Translation

Question IV. On the efficacy of the Sacraments.

Fourth, it is asked whether the Sacraments are effective of grace. And that they are, it seems:

1. Because this difference is assigned between the Sacraments of the new law and the Sacraments of the old law, that the former produce an effect, the latter only prefigure¹; but what produces an effect is an efficient cause: therefore the Sacraments of the new law are effective of grace.

2. Likewise, Hugh² says, "that the Sacraments of the new law, the blessing being first infused into them, sanctify"; and elsewhere he says that they are "sanctifying from sanctification"; but the soul is not sanctified except through grace: therefore they produce grace itself in the soul.

3. Likewise, the Master in the definition of a Sacrament in the text³ says that "a Sacrament is that which bears a likeness and exists as a cause"; but not as a formal nor final nor material cause, as was shown above: therefore by division it is an efficient cause.

4. Likewise, the same seems so by reasoning, because a sign instituted by human institution can engender in us spiritual cognition and affection, as a hoop before a house engenders cognition in the soul of a passer-by that there is wine there; and the gibbet and the signs of war engender fear: therefore if divine institution is much more powerful than human, and the Sacraments are signs according to divine institution⁴; they can engender in us a much nobler effect: therefore they can produce grace.

5. Likewise, "opposites are by nature produced about the same thing⁵"; whence nothing is susceptible of fault unless it is susceptible of grace, and conversely: since therefore the flesh, which is something corporeal, can be so vitiated as to produce and generate fault in the soul to which it is united; therefore a corporeal Sacrament will be able to be so sanctified as to transmit grace: nothing therefore prevents it from producing in the soul spiritual grace.

6. Likewise, just as in the generation of flesh there is a begetter and one begotten and further that by means of which the generation takes place; so in spiritual regeneration there is the regenerator, Christ, the regenerated man, and that by means of which the regeneration takes place, namely the Sacrament: therefore just as the seed, which was the means in carnal generation, transmits fault, by the same reasoning the Sacrament transmits grace, which makes [one] a son⁶; but it does not transmit it essentially: therefore it transmits it causally. If you say that it is not similar, because it is easier to do ill or to vitiate than to do well; this is nothing: for Adam was never more powerful for evil, or his fault, than Christ is more powerful for good, and His passion⁷; but Adam by his fault was able to vitiate all flesh: therefore Christ by His passion was able so to sanctify the Sacraments that they, being sanctified, should sanctify souls and give grace.

7. Likewise, Anselm says in On the Virginal Conception⁸ that "if Adam had stood, he would have transmitted original righteousness"; but this could not be except by means of corporeal flesh: therefore much more can Christ, by means of a corporeal Sacrament, transmit gratuitous righteousness.

On the contrary: 1. Every efficient cause is nobler than its effect, and nothing corporeal is nobler than anything spiritual: since therefore grace is spiritual, [and] the Sacrament corporeal, as Hugh says⁹; no Sacrament is an efficient cause of grace itself.

2. Likewise, the Master in the text¹⁰ says that "grace is not from them, but through them": therefore it seems that they are not as channels, [but] not as a fount: therefore they are not an efficient cause of grace, just as channels are not [the efficient cause] of water.

3. Likewise, Hugh¹¹ says that "grace is not from the Sacraments themselves, but in them"; but it is established that in them signifies the efficient cause, as is plain there: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, upon that [verse] of the Psalm¹²: I will bless the Lord, who has given me understanding; the Gloss says: "God through Himself irradiates pious minds": therefore since that irradiation takes place through the light of grace, it is established that grace is from God immediately: therefore not from the Sacraments.

5. Likewise, "virtue is that which God works in us without us¹³": if therefore He does not work virtue in us through a subjected creature, consequently neither [does He work] grace.

6. Likewise, order ought to be observed among agents: therefore God ought not to flow into a more noble thing through a less noble one; but the soul is nobler than the Sacrament: therefore God does not flow grace into the soul through the Sacrament: therefore grace is from God alone effectively. If therefore the Sacrament is a cause of grace, this is only dispositively.

It is asked therefore whether the Sacrament is a cause disposing to grace. That it is, it seems:

1. Because if the Sacraments of the new law were only a cause without which not, then they would not differ in the manner of causing from the Sacraments of the old law, and they would be a burden¹⁴; but this is unfitting: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, both Hugh¹⁵ and the Master in the text, and also others, say that God regenerates the soul through the Sacraments: therefore the Sacrament is a means of the divine action upon the soul; but every means of acting either transmits virtue or disposes; but the Sacrament does not transmit: therefore it disposes.

3. Likewise, "the Sacraments are spiritual medicines¹⁶"; but corporeal medicine disposes to corporeal health: therefore spiritual medicine disposes to spiritual health.

4. Likewise, if they disposed nothing nor cooperated toward the health of the soul, salvation could come about equally well without them as with them: therefore what is imposed on us in the new law would rather have to be called burdens than medicines, and the new law a law of burden, not of sweetness¹⁷.

But on the contrary: 1. A disposition precedes that to which it disposes, not only by nature, but also in time¹⁸; but the reception of the Sacrament and the infusion of grace are simultaneous in time: therefore the Sacrament does not dispose to grace.

2. Likewise, grace is created out of nothing and suddenly¹⁹, therefore it needs nothing disposing toward this, that it should be: therefore the Sacraments do not dispose to grace. — If you say that they do not dispose to this, that grace should be, but to this, that it should be in the soul itself, whence they make the soul itself fit by disposing it to the reception of grace; on the contrary: the being of grace is its being-in, since it is an accident²⁰: therefore if it has no disposition toward this, that it should be, neither [has it any] toward this, that it should be in.

3. Likewise, if the Sacraments dispose and make fit the soul, then they flow into it; but no corporeal thing flows into any spiritual thing²¹: therefore the Sacraments, since they are corporeal, do not flow into the soul: therefore they do not make it fit nor dispose it.

If you say perhaps that in the Sacraments themselves there is some spiritual virtue, through which they flow into the soul; it is asked therefore by reason of this whether in the Sacraments there is some virtue through which they flow into the soul itself. And that there is not, it seems:

1. Because that virtue is either a substance or an accident. If a substance, then either God, or an Angel, or the soul; that it is none of these²² is certain, because if that virtue is of the Sacrament, then God is of the Sacrament. If an accident, but no spiritual accident is in a corporeal subject: therefore either that virtue is corporeal, and so will not flow [into the soul]; or if it is spiritual, it is not in the Sacrament.

2. Likewise, that virtue is a good, this is established; therefore it is either a great good, or a middling one, or a small one, as Augustine divides²³. Not among the greater [goods], because then it would be grace; nor a gratuitous virtue, which is in the soul alone; not middling, because such are the powers of the soul: therefore it is the lowest good. But this is a corporeal good: therefore that virtue is not spiritual and does not flow into the soul.

3. Likewise, no corporeal thing is received in a spiritual one corporeally, but only spiritually²⁴: therefore likewise no spiritual thing is received in a body spiritually, but corporeally: therefore that virtue, since it is in the Sacraments, is there corporeally, and so is not able to flow into the soul: therefore it is there in vain.

4. Likewise, "everything that is received in something is there according to the mode of the receiver and not of the received," as Boethius says²⁵: therefore that virtue is received in the corporeal Sacrament according to the mode of a body: therefore etc. — If you say that this is true, speaking naturally; but that virtue is there miraculously, and above nature; on the contrary: however much it be there above²⁶ nature and in whatever manner, still it is more ignoble than the soul itself; therefore it does not flow into it: therefore if it is not posited for some other reason, it is manifest etc.

On the contrary: 1. Bede²⁷ says that "the Lord by the contact of His most pure flesh gave a regenerative power to the waters": therefore some power was conferred upon the waters themselves; but this could not be except created, because it was conferred upon a creature, and since it was for regenerating, it could not be except spiritual, because the virtue of a spiritual work is spiritual: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Augustine says, and it is found in the third distinction²⁸: "What is the virtue of the water, that it touches the body and cleanses the heart?" Therefore there is some virtue in the Sacrament by which the heart is cleansed: therefore a spiritual one.

3. Likewise, we see that the works of divine justice are done by the ministry of a corporeal creature, which has from God some power through which it can act upon the soul — otherwise it could not — as is plain in the fire of purgatory²⁹: therefore in the works of mercy, which are done through the Sacraments, it will be the case that the Sacraments have some virtue conferred upon them by God, through which they act upon the soul.

4. Likewise, we see that if someone contrite approaches baptism, even though grace is not conferred on him, because he already has it, nevertheless the remission of all punishment is conferred on him, which he did not have before³⁰: therefore baptism adds, over and above the conferral of grace, the remission of punishment: therefore there is some virtue in baptism besides the virtue of grace; by the same reasoning in the other Sacraments of the new law.

5. Likewise, if there were no virtue there, then the unfitting [consequence] often mentioned would return, that they would not differ from the Sacraments of the old law.

Conclusion

Probable is the opinion, with its reasons, first set down, that the Sacraments, with respect to grace that makes [one] pleasing, are a cause without which not; but with respect to the character and adornment, are an efficient cause; and finally, with respect to the efficacy of grace and the healing of the powers, are a disposing cause. Probable too is the other opinion, which denies that there was given to the Sacraments themselves an efficient virtue after the manner of an absolute, not a relative, quality.

I respond: Some wish to say that in the Sacraments³¹ there is some created virtue through which they flow into the soul and have an account of causing differently. For they say that in the Sacraments is given grace that makes [one] pleasing; there is also given in them grace freely given, as is the character and adornment of the soul; there is also given a weakening of the tinder [of sin] or an expediting of the powers, [and] this is the efficacy of grace. They say therefore that with respect to grace that makes pleasing they are as a cause without which not; with respect to the characterization³² and adornment they are as an efficient cause; with respect to that virtue, namely with respect to the weakening of the tinder or the strengthening of the powers, they are a disposing cause. — And this is manifest. For just as we see that in the purgation by the fire of purgatory there is the soul itself, purgeable, having guilt or a venial stain; there is³³ grace within the soul, because without it the purgation would not take place; there is again the virtue of the fire: so in the Sacrament there is the soul having the defect and weakness of the powers; there is again grace working within the soul; there is again the exterior virtue of the Sacrament; and with these concurring the powers are strengthened and healed, and grace becomes more efficacious in its operation by means of the virtue of the Sacrament. Thus therefore they say that the Sacrament is a cause of grace as without which not, namely of [grace] making pleasing; is an efficient cause of the character and adornment; is a cause of the efficacy³⁴ of grace and of the healing of the powers as disposing; and this through the virtue which is in the Sacrament itself, spiritual and conferred upon it by God. — These things seen, the response to the objections is manifest according to these [thinkers].

Solution of the opposing [arguments] of the principal question. 1, 2. For to that which is asked first, whether they are an efficient cause of grace that makes pleasing; they say, no. To that, then, which is objected concerning the difference between these Sacraments and those³⁵; they say that the difference is regarded by reason of the characterization and adornment and of the efficacy of grace. And thus they respond to that of Hugh, that it is understood of that sanctification.

3. Similarly they speak of that which the Master says, that it is³⁶ a cause; nevertheless, if it be understood as to grace that makes pleasing, they say that it is a cause without which not. — Otherwise too they say that it can be said to be a disposing cause, either toward this, that [grace] be in, or toward this, that it be efficacious, and this by reason of the work worked; but it was not so in those [old] Sacraments.

4. To that which is objected, that a sign from human institution generates spiritual cognition and affection; they say that this is only dispositively³⁷ or occasionally, not effectively; rather the soul itself, by conferring within itself, generates the cognition and affection; as is plain by a manifest example, that some see the gibbet and fear, others do not; nevertheless by this it cannot be shown that the Sacrament is an efficient cause of grace.

5. To that which is objected concerning the transmission of fault by means of the flesh, they say that just as grace is not in anything corporeal, so neither is fault. But nevertheless viciousness in the flesh can have an account of producing fault in the soul; not so [does] the virtue of the Sacrament [have an account of producing] grace. And the cause of this is that grace is an effect nobler than every corporeal virtue and is made out of nothing, and this³⁸ belongs to God alone; but the effect of fault bespeaks ignobility and imperfection and defect. Therefore all those arguments which are made through the likeness of grace to fault are not valid.

6. To that which is objected, that Christ is more powerful for good; they say that it is true; nor however does it follow from this that, if Adam transmits fault by means of the flesh, Christ should transmit grace by means of the Sacrament. For this would be a disorder; furthermore, just as a creature cannot receive the power of creating, so neither [can it receive the power] of giving grace³⁹.

7. To that of Anselm they say that it is not understood that he would transmit righteousness by means of the flesh, but that all his posterity would have that righteousness from God, because there would be no impediment on the part of the flesh.

To that which is asked, whether the Sacrament is a disposing cause; they say that it is, as was touched upon⁴⁰; because it disposes to the efficacy of grace, by remitting the tinder which impedes the operation of grace; or, as was touched upon⁴¹, it disposes to this, that grace be in the soul, although it does not dispose to this, that it be. And this is to say that grace is compared to the efficient cause, [and] is compared to the receiving substance. But the Sacrament does not dispose on the part of the agent, who is God, but on the part of the receiver, which is the soul.

2. And thus the response is plain to that which is objected, that grace is from nothing; for they say that the Sacrament does not dispose to grace by reason of that out of which [it is made], but by reason of that in which it is received⁴².

To the arguments for the negative part of the first lateral question. 1. To that which is objected, that a disposition precedes that to which it disposes; they say that it does not always precede in time, as is plain in the disposition which is a necessity or in the ultimate disposition⁴³; thus the Sacrament worthily received disposes by the ultimate disposition, which is simultaneous in time with grace, but prior in nature, as on the part of the latter.

3. To that which is objected, that if it disposes, it flows in; they say that it does flow in. — To that, then, which is objected⁴⁴, that no corporeal thing flows into a spiritual one; they say that in the Sacrament there is some spiritual virtue through which it flows into the soul. Nevertheless that argument is not valid according to them, because in the soul to be cleansed one must consider the substance itself and the stain itself, from which it is cleansed; and although according to substance it is superior to every body, nevertheless by reason of the stain or defect it is inferior.

To the arguments for the negative part of the second lateral question. To that which is asked, whether one is to posit in the Sacraments a created virtue; they say that one is. 1. To that, then, which is asked, whether a substance or⁴⁵ an accident; they say, an accident. — To that which is again asked, whether a corporeal accident or a spiritual one; they say, a spiritual one. — To that which is objected afterward, that a spiritual accident is not in a corporeal subject; they say that this is true naturally, but the Sacrament itself has that virtue above nature according to the order of the divine mercy, just as

virtue is in the fire of purgatory above the nature of the fire according to the order of the divine justice. And what is more, on this account, because the Sacrament is not a natural subject or one according to nature; and therefore it is no wonder if it has a virtue above nature.

2. To that which is asked, whether it is a greatest good etc.; they say that that virtue is to be placed among middling goods, because it is below grace and above body. — If you object that such a good belongs to the soul's power; they say that Augustine does not exclude, on this account, that there be others; but he says that by way of example or by restricting the good to the human subject⁴⁶. — But if you object that it will not act or flow into the powers of the soul, since it is middling, and the influx is from a superior; they say that it does not flow into the powers by reason of the powers, but by reason of them as deficient through fault.

3. To that which is objected concerning the reception of a spiritual substance; they say that it is not similar: because, if a spiritual substance were to receive a corporeal thing corporeally, then a derogation would be done to that substance, nor would it be perfected in the reception; but if some material⁴⁷ thing receives a spiritual one spiritually, no derogation would be done to it in anything.

4. To that which is objected, that everything which is received is in the receiver according to the mode of the receiver; they say that this is true of natural reception; but this is above nature. Furthermore, the Sacrament itself, as such, is a spiritual medicine; and therefore it ought to have a spiritual virtue. But in natural things⁴⁸ matter is chiefly considered, whereas in divine things the end is chiefly and principally considered; therefore, because in the Sacraments the account of matter is not considered, but [that of] the end, it was fitting according to them to posit a spiritual virtue in them.

To the other [argument]⁴⁹ it has, according to them, already been responded, that that virtue is nobler [and] the fallen soul less noble, not by reason of substance, but by reason of the fall. — And in this way the other objections are plain according to this opinion. And this opinion is [the opinion] of great [thinkers]⁵⁰.

Opinion 2, with its conclusion. There is also the opinion of other great [thinkers] about this, who say that in the Sacraments there is no causality nor any virtue, neither effective nor dispositive toward grace, which is a quality or some absolute property, but [that it is] by a certain assistance. For they say that the divine virtue, which is the cause of grace, assists the Sacrament, and [also] the faith and devotion of the receiver⁵¹, which disposes to grace. — And they adduce a similitude: that at the word of Elisha, with Naaman washing himself, the divine virtue stood by as effective of health, and Naaman's devotion and obedience as dispositive; yet there was no causality either in the word of Elisha or in the water of the Jordan⁵². If therefore the Lord had so instituted that at the word of Elisha not only Naaman himself, but [all] others approaching should be cured, and this from a certain pact, such that the divine power should always stand by; that water would be said to cure and heal leprosy and to be the cause of the cure and to have the virtue of curing. So in the Sacraments they say that at the pronouncing of the word the divine virtue stands by the waters and infuses grace and regenerates, while a man subjects himself by the profession of faith and obedience. They say therefore that the Sacraments are said to have virtue and are said [to be] a cause and are said to effect according to the common mode of speaking, on account of the assistance of the divine virtue.

And if you ask whether they have any created virtue over and above⁵³ the uncreated one; they answer that, besides the uncreated virtue, one may say that the Sacrament has some virtue, but by an extended sense of the name of virtue. For if virtue signifies some quality or nature or essence supervening upon the Sacrament, as virtue is properly said, then according to them it is not to be said that it has virtue⁵⁴; but the name of virtue is extended to some ordination, so that when something has an efficacious ordination toward something, it is said to have virtue with respect to it. — And they put this example: a king ordains that those who have such a token shall have a hundred pounds⁵⁵. After this institution that token does not have any absolute property which it would not have had before; yet toward something it is ordained, toward which it was not before; and because it has an efficacious ordination, it is said to have virtue, so as to make someone have a hundred marks; and that token is said to be worth a hundred marks, and yet it has nothing more of goodness now than before. — If therefore you ask what that virtue in that token is; it will be said that it is not something absolute, but toward something⁵⁶. — Thus they say that the Sacraments are such tokens instituted by God, that whoever shall have received them in the due manner has such-and-such of grace or has grace for this act; that ordina-

tion, I say, is in the Sacrament itself, spiritual and conferred upon it by God⁵⁷. And the reasons of it dispose the man so that he may have grace, because it efficaciously ordains toward having and receiving grace.

The divine pact. Again they say that, from such a pact, the Lord bound Himself in a certain manner to giving grace to the one receiving the Sacrament; for it binds God in a certain manner to conferring, and therefore⁵⁸ it is said to have virtue for effecting and also for disposing. And just as the name of virtue is extended, so [is] the word "to effect," or "to dispose," because it neither effects nor disposes by flowing in, but by efficaciously ordaining. And just as these are extended, so also [is] the name of cause, because it is not called a cause insofar as it is a principle of operating, but insofar as it is an account of ordaining.

Reason consents. To this position the piety of faith is not repugnant, and reason consents⁵⁹. — For reason consents, because it is very difficult to understand how that virtue is given as an absolute quality; more difficult, when it is given; difficult also to understand to what it is given, namely to the word or to the element, which are two things making no one [thing]; difficult also to know how long it lasts; difficult likewise it is very [much] to understand how it flows in; difficult also, of what nature it is in itself; and many such things. But to the other⁶⁰ position reason agrees quite easily.

Faith is not repugnant. The piety too of faith is not repugnant. For care must be taken lest, while we give too much to corporeal signs for [their] praise, we subtract honor from the grace that cures and from the soul that receives. — But this opinion neither gives too much nor subtracts anything of due honor. Just as, therefore, royal letters sealed with the king's ring are of great dignity and virtue and value, and are said to be able to do great things and to do them⁶¹, yet in them there is no absolute virtue, but only an ordination through the assistance of the royal virtue — which is plain, because, the king being dead, his letters are cared for no more than others, yet they have lost nothing absolute — so it is to be understood in the Sacraments, and so the authorities of the Saints speak according to common usage.

An incidental question solved. And the reasons to the opposite are plain. — And if you ask upon what the relation is founded, and how it comes about without the donation of a property? it must be said, [it is founded] in the institutions of signs; as when a coin becomes an earnest-pledge, nothing is given anew to the coin itself⁶².

The author's judgment. Each of these positions seems probable enough; this one, however, seems to me easier to maintain; yet I do not know which is truer, because when we speak of things that belong to the miraculous, we must not adhere too much to reason. We grant therefore that the Sacraments of the new law are a cause and effect and dispose, by an extended sense [of the names], as has been said, and this it is safe to say; but whether they have more, I will neither affirm nor deny. And according to this last way all the questions are plain.

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Apparatus Criticus

1
Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 6.
Cf. the text of the Master here, c. 6.
2
Libr. I de Sacram. p. XI c. 5; vide etiam supra q. 3 ad 5. — Seq. eius sententia, in qua pro ex sanctificatione cod. Z ex benedictione, habetur ibid. c. 2. Cfr. p. IX c. 2.
On the Sacraments, bk. I, pt. XI, c. 5; see also above, q. 3, ad 5. — His following sentence, in which for from sanctification cod. Z [reads] from blessing, is found ibid. c. 2. Cf. pt. IX, c. 2.
3
Hic lit. Magistri, c. 4. — De minori vide supra q. 3. — In conclusione pro a divisione (Vat. addit sufficienti) codd. M O planius per locum a divisione, quem describit Aristot., II Rhetor. c. 30. (c. 23.): Alius locus a divisione: ut, si omnes qui iniuriam faciunt, trium rerum aliqua impelluntur, vel hac, vel ista, vel illa; et duabus rebus impelli nullo modo potuit, de tertia vero necesse ipsi adversarii insimulant. Cfr. Boeth., II de Different. topic.
The text of the Master here, c. 4. — On the minor [premise] see above, q. 3. — In the conclusion, for by division (the Vatican edition adds sufficient) codd. M O more plainly [read] by the topic from division, which Aristotle describes, Rhetoric II, c. 30 (c. 23): Another topic [is] from division: as, if all who do injury are impelled by some one of three things, either by this, or that, or the other; and they could in no way be impelled by two things, then the adversaries necessarily charge [them] with the third. Cf. Boethius, On Topical Differences, bk. II.
4
De quo vide supra q. 2. — Inferius post aggenerare cod. Z prosequitur sive efficere aliquem nobiliorem etc.
On which see above, q. 2. — Lower down, after to engender, cod. Z continues or to effect any nobler [thing] etc.
5
Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Oppositis, et II Topic. c. 3. (c. 7.). — Quod anima possit infici a carne, ostensum est II Sent. d. 31 a. 2 q. 1 seqq., ubi etiam de seq. arg. — In fine arg. pro quod efficiunt (permulti codd. et edd. incongrue efficiant) codd. F H aa quin efficiat.
Aristotle, Categories, the chapter On Opposites, and Topics II, c. 3 (c. 7). — That the soul can be infected by the flesh was shown in Sentences II, d. 31, a. 2, q. 1 ff., where [there is] also [a treatment] of the following argument. — At the end of the argument, for that they effect (very many codd. and edd. incongruously [read] that they may effect) codd. F H aa [read] but rather that it effects.
6
Cod. K supplet Deo, Vat. spiritualem et adoptionis.
Cod. K supplies to God, the Vatican edition [reads] spiritual and of adoption.
7
Respicitur Rom. 5, 6 seqq. — Aristot., VII Topic. c. 3. (c. 4.): Quemadmodum in aliis corrumpere quam facere facilius, sic et in his destruere quam construere. Cfr. II Ethic. c. 6, et Dionys. de Div. Nom. c. 4 §31. — Pro quin Christus codd. AE (la secunda manu) K L V aa bb cc quam Christus.
Romans 5, 6 ff. is referred to. — Aristotle, Topics VII, c. 3 (c. 4): Just as in other things it is easier to corrupt than to make, so too in these [it is easier] to destroy than to construct. Cf. Ethics II, c. 6, and Dionysius, On the Divine Names, c. 4, §31. — For than that Christ codd. AE (la, by a second hand) K L V aa bb cc [read] than Christ.
8
Cap. 10 et 24. (Cfr. tom. II pag. 784, nota 3.). Vide etiam I [libro] Cur Deus homo, c. 18. — Pro stetisset cod. Z non peccasset. — Inferius pro potest transfundere codd. A K N W Y aa transfundit.
Chs. 10 and 24 (cf. tom. II, p. 784, note 3). See also bk. I of Why God [became] Man, c. 18. — For had stood cod. Z [reads] had not sinned. — Lower down, for can transmit codd. A K N W Y aa [read] transmits.
9
Libr. I de Sacram. p. IX c. 2. Vide supra pag. 13, nota 2. — De maiori cfr. August., VI de Musica c. 5 n. 8, et 83 Qq. q. 2; Avicenna, Metaph. tr. 6 c. 3: Causa dignior est causato.
On the Sacraments, bk. I, pt. IX, c. 2. See above, p. 13, note 2. — On the major [premise] cf. Augustine, On Music VI, c. 5, n. 8, and 83 Questions, q. 2; Avicenna, Metaphysics, tr. 6, c. 3: The cause is worthier than the caused.
10
Hic c. 5.
Here, c. 5.
11
Libr. I de Sacram. p. IX c. 4. Vide supra pag. 17, nota 4. — Inferius edd. omittunt ibi.
On the Sacraments, bk. I, pt. IX, c. 4. See above, p. 17, note 4. — Lower down the edd. omit there.
12
Psalm. 15, 7; sed Glossa Augustini refertur a Strabo et Lyrano in Ps. 118, 73: Da mihi intellectum. Verba August. vide tom. III pag. 895, nota 1. Cfr. etiam 83 Qq. q. 53 n. 2.
Psalm 15, 7; but the Gloss of Augustine is reported by Strabo and [Nicholas of] Lyra on Ps. 118, 73: Give me understanding. For Augustine's words see tom. III, p. 895, note 1. Cf. also 83 Questions, q. 53, n. 2.
13
De hac ex August. delibata definitione virtutis vide II Sent. lit. Magistri, d. XXVII c. 5. — Codd. F H (V a secunda manu) post virtus est addunt qualitas, cod. I (a secunda manu) bona qualitas mentis, ut ait Augustinus.
On this definition of virtue drawn from Augustine see Sentences II, text of the Master, d. XXVII, c. 5. — Codd. F H (V by a second hand) after virtue is add a quality, cod. I (by a second hand) a good quality of the mind, as Augustine says.
14
Cfr. II Sent. d. 26 q. 3 seq. — Pro et subito cod. N in subiecto.
Cf. Sentences II, d. 26, q. 3 ff. — For and suddenly cod. N [reads] in the subject.
15
Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 4, et III Sent. d. 40 q. 3.
See the text of the Master here, c. 4, and Sentences III, d. 40, q. 3.
16
Libr. I de Sacram. p. IX c. 2, et II p. VI c. 2. — Hic lit. Magistri c. 4, et infra d. III c. 9. Vide etiam August., I de Peccator. mer. et remiss. etc. c. 31 n. 60 seqq., et II c. 27 n. 43.
On the Sacraments, bk. I, pt. IX, c. 2, and bk. II, pt. VI, c. 2. — The text of the Master here, c. 4, and below, d. III, c. 9. See also Augustine, On the Merits and Remission of Sins etc., bk. I, c. 31, n. 60 ff., and bk. II, c. 27, n. 43.
17
Hugo a S. Vict., I de Sacram. p. IX c. 5.
Hugh of St. Victor, On the Sacraments, bk. I, pt. IX, c. 5.
18
Respicitur Matth. 11, 30: Iugum enim meum suave est etc. — Cod. A quam suavitatis, qui cod. etiam cum pluribus aliis ante oneris omittit lex.
Matthew 11, 30 is referred to: For my yoke is sweet etc. — Cod. A [reads] than of sweetness, which cod., together with several others, also omits law before of burden.
19
Vide tom. II pag. 682, nota 3.
See tom. II, p. 682, note 3.
20
Cfr. II Sent. d. 26 q. 3 seq. — Pro et subito cod. N in subiecto.
Cf. Sentences II, d. 26, q. 3 ff. — For and suddenly cod. N [reads] in the subject.
21
Aristot., VII Metaph. text. 2. (VI c. 1.) docet, quod accidens nominat non tam ens quam ens entis, quoniam subiectum ei naturaliter determinatum est. — Pro dispositionem codd. A K aa disponere.
Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, text 2 (VI, c. 1), teaches that accident names not so much a being as a being of a being, since its subject is naturally determined for it. — For disposition codd. A K aa [read] to dispose.
22
August., VI de Musica c. 5 n. 8, et XII de Gen. ad lit. c. 20 n. 42: Neque enim [corpus] habet eam vim, ut formet aliquid spiritale.
Augustine, On Music VI, c. 5, n. 8, and On Genesis to the Letter XII, c. 20, n. 42: For [the body] does not have such a power as to form anything spiritual.
23
Ex codd. M O supplevimus esse, pro quo non pauci alii codd. est; cod. L omittit esse certum. Aliquanto superius post aliqua virtus codd. V Z addunt spiritualis.
From codd. M O we have supplied to be, for which not a few other codd. [read] is; cod. L omits to be certain. Somewhat above, after some virtue, codd. V Z add spiritual.
24
Libr. II de Lib. Arb. c. 19 n. 50. Vide II Sent. lit. Magistri, d. XXVII c. 3. — Pro dividit codd. B C D I V et cod. 4 dicit. In fine arg. pro et non cod. G et sic non, cod. H ergo non.
On Free Choice, bk. II, c. 19, n. 50. See Sentences II, text of the Master, d. XXVII, c. 3. — For divides codd. B C D I V and cod. 4 [read] says. At the end of the argument, for and not cod. G [reads] and thus not, cod. H therefore not.
25
Vide Aristot., II de Anima text. 121. (c. 12.) et III text. 37 seqq. (c. 8.). — Cod. S prosequitur a permutata proportione [cfr. tom. III pag. 684, nota 3.], ergo similiter etc. Inferius post sed cod. bb addit solum.
See Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 121 (c. 12), and III, text 37 ff. (c. 8). — Cod. S continues by an inverted proportion [cf. tom. III, p. 684, note 3], therefore likewise etc. Lower down, after but, cod. bb adds only.
26
Libr. V de Consol. prosa 4, ubi agens de cognitione dicit: «Omne enim quod cognoscitur, non secundum sui vim, sed secundum cognoscentium potius comprehenditur facultatem». Si verba istius axiomatis attendantur, inveniuntur in Libro de Causis, proposit. 10; cfr. ibid. proposit. 20 seqq.
On Consolation [of Philosophy], bk. V, prose 4, where, treating of cognition, he says: "For everything that is known is comprehended not according to its own power, but rather according to the faculty of the knowers." If the words of that axiom be attended to, they are found in the Book of Causes, proposition 10; cf. ibid. proposition 20 ff.
27
Edd. contra. Inferius pro ergo si non cod. N ergo quia non.
The edd. [read] on the contrary. Lower down, for therefore if not cod. N [reads] therefore because not.
28
Libr. I in Luc. 3, 21. Cfr. lib. I in Matth. 3, 13 et in Marc. 1, 9, nec non Homil. 11 in festo Epiphaniae (alias in Octava Epiphan.). Vide infra lit. Magistri, d. III c. 5. — In fine arg. non pauci codd. omittunt est.
[Bede,] bk. I on Luke 3, 21. Cf. bk. I on Matthew 3, 13, and on Mark 1, 9, as also Homily 11 on the feast of the Epiphany (alias on the Octave of the Epiphany). See below, text of the Master, d. III, c. 5. — At the end of the argument, not a few codd. omit is.
29
Lit. Magistri, c. 1. — Cod. aa cum textu originali et Magistro: Unde est haec tanta virtus aquae etc. Circa finem arg. pro abluitur cor, quod exhibent codd. V aa et [edd.] 1, codd. H K quae abluit cor, alii qua abluit cor.
Text of the Master, c. 1. — Cod. aa, with the original text and the Master: Whence is this so great virtue of the water etc. Toward the end of the argument, for the heart is cleansed, which codd. V aa and [edd.] 1 exhibit, codd. H K [read] which cleanses the heart, others by which it cleanses the heart.
30
Cfr. infra d. 20 p. I q. 1 seqq. et d. 44 p. II a. 3. — 2. — Inferius post erit cod. B addit ita, cod. G similiter.
Cf. below, d. 20, pt. I, q. 1 ff., and d. 44, pt. II, a. 3. — 2. — Lower down, after it will be, cod. B adds thus, cod. G likewise.
31
Vide infra lit. Magistri, d. IV c. 5, et Comment. ibid. l. a. 1. q. 2.
See below, text of the Master, d. IV, c. 5, and the Commentary ibid., a. 1, q. 2.
32
Ed. 1 falso addit veteris legis, Vat. novae legis. Pro abluunt codd. F G voluerunt.
Ed. 1 falsely adds of the old law, the Vatican edition of the new law. For they cleanse codd. F G [read] they willed.
33
Vat. characterificationis vel characteris.
The Vatican edition [reads] of the charactering, or of the character.
34
Codd. F H Z (V a secunda manu) est etiam. Aliquanto inferius pro primo est iterum cod. N est etiam; subinde ex codd. A G H K N Y (V a secunda manu) intus operans substituimus pro virtus operans.
Codd. F H Z (V by a second hand) [read] is also. Somewhat lower down, for first there is again cod. N [reads] is also; thereupon, from codd. A G H K N Y (V by a second hand), we have substituted working within for working virtue.
35
Codd. F H (bb a secunda manu) de differentia novorum Sacramentorum et veterum. In fine solut. codd. A E F G I K L V, posito sic pro Et sic, substituunt intelligit pro intelligitur.
Codd. F H (bb by a second hand) [read] concerning the difference of the new Sacraments and the old. At the end of the solution, codd. A E F G I K L V, putting thus for And thus, substitute he understands for it is understood.
36
Simul audi cum codd. F H (I bb a secunda manu) Sacramentum, edd. habent sint. Circa finem solut. post operis operati in codd. G Y Z et ed. 1 additur quod (ed. 1 et) habet virtutem a passione Christi, et subinde cod. Z in illis primis pro in illis.
Read at the same time with codd. F H (I bb by a second hand) Sacrament; the edd. have they are. Toward the end of the solution, after of the work worked, in codd. G Y Z and ed. 1 is added which (ed. 1 and) has virtue from the passion of Christ, and thereupon cod. Z [reads] in those first ones for in those.
37
Codd. V Z sola dispositione.
Codd. V Z [read] by disposition alone.
38
Scilicet creare ex nihilo. — Codd. F G H L et haec. Inferius pro fiunt cod. I sunt.
Namely to create out of nothing. — Codd. F G H L [read] and these. Lower down, for are done cod. I [reads] are.
39
Cfr. I Sent. d. 14 a. 2 q. 2. — Pro creatura cod. Z Sacramentum.
Cf. Sentences I, d. 14, a. 2, q. 2. — For a creature cod. Z [reads] a Sacrament.
40
In corp. quaest. principalis. — Superius pro quaeritur multi codd. et ed. 1 obiicitur.
In the body of the principal question. — Above, for it is asked many codd. and ed. 1 [read] it is objected.
41
Quaest. principal. ad 3. — Edd. prosequuntur quia disponit. Inferius pro suscipientem. Sacramentum autem non, quod habet cod. H, cod. V suscipientem, sed Sacramentum non, alii et edd. suscipientem Sacramentum; non autem. Post pauca pro qui est Deus edd. quod est Deus.
The principal question, ad 3. — The edd. continue because it disposes. Lower down, for the receiver. But the Sacrament does not, which cod. H has, cod. V [reads] the receiver, but the Sacrament does not, others and the edd. the receiving Sacrament; but not. After a little, for who is God the edd. [read] which is God.
42
Codd. D E I R S T U V W et ed. 1 quod recipitur (recipit?), cod. A quo recipitur, cod. B quo recipit, Vat. melius in quo recipitur.
Codd. D E I R S T U V W and ed. 1 [read] which is received (receives?), cod. A by which it is received, cod. B by which it receives, the Vatican edition better in which it is received.
43
Haec dispositio habetur v. g. respectu combustionis ligni in calore concomitante formam ignis introducti; cfr. tom. II pag. 471, nota 2. — Ex parte illa, intelligi: suscipientis.
This disposition is found e.g. with respect to the combustion of wood in the heat accompanying the form of the fire introduced; cf. tom. II, p. 471, note 2. — On the part of the latter, understand: of the receiver.
44
Cod. Z dicitur, codd. A E G K L V W aa bb dicit, codd. F I dicunt. Mox pro quod nullum corporale plures codd. quod corporale non. Circa finem solut. pro omni corpore cod. Z omni corporali.
Cod. Z [reads] it is said, codd. A E G K L V W aa bb he says, codd. F I they say. Soon, for that no corporeal thing several codd. [read] that a corporeal thing does not. Toward the end of the solution, for every body cod. Z [reads] every corporeal thing.
45
Cod. Z supplet sit.
Cod. Z supplies it be.
46
Vide II Sent. d. 26 q. 3 ad 5. — Vat. suppositum humanum. Superius pro animae potentiae Vat. animae potentia. Subinde pro exemplando cod. H exemplificando. Post pauca pro obiiciat substituimus ex codd. E P Q obiicias.
See Sentences II, d. 26, q. 3, ad 5. — The Vatican edition [reads] human supposit. Above, for the soul's power [dative] the Vatican edition [reads] the soul's power [nominative]. Thereupon, for by way of example cod. H [reads] by exemplifying. After a little, for he objects we have substituted, from codd. E P Q, you object.
47
Cod. L aliquod corporale.
Cod. L [reads] some corporeal [thing].
48
Pro autem, quod non pauci codd. omittunt, codd. F H I enim, codd. S T legunt nam in naturalibus.
For but, which not a few codd. omit, codd. F H I [read] for, codd. S T read for in natural things.
49
In cod. M suppletur quod virtus ista est ignobilior anima.
In cod. M is supplied that this virtue is more ignoble than the soul.
50
Edd. hic et paulo inferius addunt Magistrorum.
The edd., here and a little lower down, add of the Masters.
51
Cod. F H Z (I V a secunda manu) subiungunt similiter esse dicunt (cod. V dicuntur). Mox pro disponit edd. cum pluribus codd. disponunt.
Codd. F H Z (I V by a second hand) subjoin they say [it] to be likewise (cod. V are said). Soon, for disposes the edd., with several codd., [read] dispose.
52
Libr. IV Reg. 5, 14.
[The] Fourth [book] of Kings 5, 14.
53
Codd. R S T praeter.
Codd. R S T [read] besides.
54
Vat. addit proprie. Ed. 1 prosequitur sed quod extenditur nomen etc. Subinde cod. F ob aliquam pro ad aliquam.
The Vatican edition adds properly. Ed. 1 continues but that the name is extended etc. Thereupon cod. F [reads] because of some for toward some.
55
Codd. K N aa marcas, quae lectio convenit cum subiexis, ubi fide codd. bis substituimus marcas pro libras, quod habent edd. Paulo ante pro hic exemplum ex codd. F G H I L posuimus hoc exemplum.
Codd. K N aa [read] marks, which reading agrees with what follows, where on the faith of the codd. we have twice substituted marks for pounds, which the edd. have. A little before, for this example [masc.] we have put, from codd. F G H I L, this example [neut.].
56
Sive relatio. — Cod. Z non est ibi quid pro non est aliquid.
Or a relation. — Cod. Z [reads] there is not there anything for it is not something.
57
Ex codd. F G H V (I bb a secunda manu) supplevimus ideo, pro quo cod. Z iam. Paulo superius pro suscipienti cod. G suscipientibus. Aliquanto inferius pro Et sicut extenditur codd. H R cc (K a secunda manu) Et ideo sicut extenditur, cod. Z Et sicut hic extenditur, qui etiam subinde pro extenduntur substituit extenditur virtus.
From codd. F G H V (I bb by a second hand) we have supplied therefore, for which cod. Z [reads] now. A little above, for to the one receiving cod. G [reads] to the ones receiving. Somewhat lower down, for And as it is extended codd. H R cc (K by a second hand) [read] And therefore as it is extended, cod. Z And as it is here extended, which [cod.] also thereupon substitutes the virtue is extended for they are extended.
58
Codd. pietas fidei consentit, et ratio non repugnat, quae lectio subnexis non congruit.
[Some] codd. [read] the piety of faith consents, and reason is not repugnant, which reading does not agree with what follows.
59
Ed. 1 et huic, Vat. et ideo huic. Paulo superius pro nihil cod. X nihilominus, cod. Z hic. Aliquanto inferius pro honorem gratiae curanti et animae permulti codd. et ed. 1 hominem gratiae et a se (codd. I W ad se).
Ed. 1 [reads] and to this, the Vatican edition and therefore to this. A little above, for nothing cod. X [reads] nonetheless, cod. Z here. Somewhat lower down, for honor from the grace that cures and from the soul very many codd. and ed. 1 [read] the man of grace and from himself (codd. I W to himself).
60
Codd. A E L M V W aa bb eo, mox post posse codd. F H S T U omittunt et.
Codd. A E L M V W aa bb [read] it; soon, after to be able, codd. F H S T U omit and.
61
August. V de Trin. c. 16 n. 17: Nummus autem, cum dicitur pretium, relative dicitur, nec tamen mutatus est, cum esse coepit pretium; neque cum dicitur pignus et si qua sunt similia etc. Cfr. infra d. 3 p. II a. 1 q. 2 in fine, et I Sent. d. 30 dub. 3. — In praecedentibus exhibemus lectionem codd., quam, licet sit brevissima, genuinam tamen esse iudicamus. Post in institutionibus signorum supplendum est fundatur, cod. G vero supplet non datur aliquid novum, edd. glossando habent: super ipsis signis (ed. 1 super eo) fundatur relatio; et hoc modo advenit sine proprietatis donatione.
Augustine, On the Trinity V, c. 16, n. 17: A coin, however, when it is called a price, is said relatively, nor yet is it changed when it began to be a price; nor [is it changed] when it is called a pledge, and if there are any like cases etc. Cf. below, d. 3, pt. II, a. 1, q. 2, at the end, and Sentences I, d. 30, dub. 3. — In the preceding [text] we exhibit the reading of the codd., which, although it is very brief, we nevertheless judge to be genuine. After in the institutions of signs one must supply it is founded; cod. G, however, supplies nothing new is given; the edd., by glossing, have: upon the signs themselves (ed. 1 upon it) the relation is founded; and in this way it comes about without the donation of a property.
62
Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
See the scholion to the preceding question. ---