Dist. 44, Part 2, Art. 3, Q. 1
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 44
Articulus III. De actione ignis.
Consequenter quantum ad tertium articulum quaeritur de actione ignis, de qua duo quaeruntur. Primo quaeritur, utrum ignis ille sit consumtivus corporum. Secundo, utrum sit afflictivus animarum.
Quaestio I. Utrum ignis inferni consumat corpora damnatorum.
Circa primum proceditur sic, et ostenditur, quod ille ignis consumat corpora damnatorum.
1. Augustinus de Natura boni8: « Quoniam volentes corrumpuntur in peccatis, nolentes corrumpuntur in poenis »: ergo si non corrumpuntur nisi ab affligente, et ignis non corrumpit nisi consumendo; videtur, quod ignis ille consumat corpora.
p. 929 2. Item, ille ignis agit in corpora: ergo corpora patiuntur; sed « omnis passio magis facta abiicit a substantia1 »: ergo si abiectio facta a substantia per calorem non est aliud quam consumtio, ergo ille ignis consumit corpora.
3. Item, ad adustionem necessario sequitur inflammatio, et ad inflammationem consumtio: ergo si ignis ille corpora adurit, ergo consumit. Si tu dicas, quod non sequitur, quia salamandra calefit ab igne, et tamen non consumitur in igne, sed renovatur2; contra: hoc non solvit, quia salamandra ab igne non laeditur, sed corpora damnatorum ab igne laeduntur et in igne cruciantur: si igitur ignis, quod laedit, consumit; patet etc.
4. Item, dolor intensus est via ad mortem, sicut patet, ergo magis intensus magis disponit: si ergo ille ignis est causa intensi doloris, contingit, hominem per illum disponi ad mortem ultima dispositione3: ergo necesse est, quod damnatos perimat: ergo pari ratione, quod corpora consumat.
Contra: 1. Isaiae ultimo4: Vermis eorum non morietur, et ignis non exstinguetur; tantum ergo durabit ignis agens, quantum homo patiens; sed ignis ille nunquam exstinguetur nec minuetur: ergo nec corpus consumetur.
2. Item, Magister in littera5: « Augustinus variis exemplis astruit, ea ardere et non consumi ulla consumtione »: ergo etc.
3. Item, ratione videtur: quia omne quod consumitur, perdit aliquam partem sui: ergo si corpora damnatorum consumuntur, sunt in continua deperditione. Sed constat, quod non restaurantur, cum omni refectione careant6; quod autem patitur deperditionem et non habet restaurationem necessario aliquando est totaliter consumtum: ergo etc.
4. Item, omne quod consumitur, necessario efficitur minus potens, ergo et magis passibile: ergo si continue consumuntur, continue illorum poena intenditur, et si hoc, cum duret in infinitum, crescet in infinitum; quod omnino est inconveniens, quod crescat poena, et non crescat culpa7.
Conclusio. Corpora damnatorum ab igne affligentur, sed non corrumpentur quoad esse substantiale.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod si de corporibus damnatorum quaeratur, utrum ab igne affligantur, simpliciter est concedendum. Si autem quaeratur, utrum consumantur, simpliciter est negandum. — Sed si quaeratur, utrum corrumpantur, hoc est distinguendum. Nam corruptio uno modo dicit defectionem rei quantum ad esse substantiale8, et hoc modo idem est quod consumtio; et tali modo non corrumpuntur, cum non moriantur. Alio modo corruptio idem est quod privatio bonae dispositionis; et hoc modo, quoniam a corporibus damnatorum auferetur quies et bona dispositio, quae generat in anima voluptatem; hinc est, quod continue corrumpuntur. Est igitur corruptio afflictionis, non interemptionis sive consumtionis, et haec fit per adustionem ignis.
Si autem quaeratur, quomodo istud possit capi et intelligi; possumus ad hoc manuduci et exemplo et ratione. Videmus, quaedam in igne vivere et non deficere, sicut ponit Augustinus exemplum de salamandra in vigesimo primo de Civitate Dei9. Si ergo mirabilius est, aliquod animal in igne conservari sine afflictione quam affligi sine consumtione; et istud est secundum naturam possibile: ergo nec istud debet iudicari impossibile. — Quodsi dicas, hoc non esse simile: quia natura illius animalis conformis est igni, natura vero humani corporis omnino difformis; responderi potest dupliciter: uno modo, quod quamvis natura humani corporis secundum statum praesentem sit ab igne consumtibilis, nihil prohibet, quin Creator, qui naturam, quam voluit, omnibus et singulis dedit, talem naturam homini dare possit10. Nec mirum, cum homo ante lapsum alterius dispositionis et naturae corpus habuerit quam post lapsum, quia prius possibile ad mortalitatem, modo neces-
p. 930 sarium ad mortem. — Hoc ipsum persuaderi potest exemplis sumtis a parte ignis; ideo enim ille ignis urit et non consumit, quia pabulum non requirit. Et est exemplum manifestum in inflammatione auri ab igne, quod quidem inflammatur, sed non consumitur, quia igni non praebet pabulum. Sic nec humanum corpus igni infernali. — Evidentissimum autem exemplum ponit Augustinus1 de igne, qui est in partibus Siciliae, sicut patet aspicientibus, quod « ille ignis montes illos ab antiquissimis temporibus aestuare facit, et tamen adhuc integri perseverant: et isti sunt satis idonei testes, quod non omne quod uritur, consumitur ». — In legenda etiam beati Nicolai scribitur, quod in partibus orientalibus quidam ignis invenitur, qui appositam sibi manum vehementer affligit, et tamen de manu nihil consumit. Sic ergo ex his exemplis colligitur, quod possibile est, aliquid in igne ardere, et tamen non deficere.
Ex quibus etiam possumus colligere rationem huiusmodi, quoniam hoc venit ex parte agentis et ex parte patientis. Isti enim igni data est virtus ad inflammandum, non ad consumendum; et corpori data est natura possibilis ad patiendum, non ad deficiendum. — Si autem quaeratur ratio huius, dicendum, quod est a parte naturae possibilitas ad suscipiendum, ex parte Dei est potestas ad dandum, ex parte finis est congruitas ad sic faciendum, quia in infinitum debet homo in corpore cruciari, ut manifestetur Dei iustitia infinita. Nec sunt ista duo incompossibilia, quod aliquod corpus tangatur a calido et non consumatur, cum videamus, naturaliter aliquod corpus tangi a frigido, quod potius calefacit, quam infrigidet, sicut exemplum manifestum est in aqua et calce2. Et sicut illa corpora uruntur et non consumuntur, ita etiam compositum ex anima et corpore affligitur et non moritur. Et tamen ad hoc similiter possumus manuduci exemplo et ratione; exemplo: quia anima immortalis in corpore affligitur, quia dolor est animae proprie, et tamen non occiditur3. Quid ergo prohibet similiter intelligi in ipsis damnatis? — Quodsi dicas, hoc non esse simile: quia anima non composita est ex contrariis, secundum quod natura humani corporis; respondere possumus, quod istud non obsistit, « cum aliqua corruptibilia, utpote vermes, in aquis calidissimis reperiri queant, quarum fervorem nemo impune pertractat », sicut dicit Augustinus4. Si igitur quae mortalia sunt et corruptibilia possunt in his calidissimis vivere sine afflictione; pari ratione immortalia et passibilia corpora affligi possunt sine interemptione. — Si autem quaeratur ratio huius, dici potest, quod hoc est propter coniunctionem animae ad carnem indissolubilem. Quod enim homo moriatur dolore, hoc non est, quia dolor sit contrarius vitae, cum dolor non sit nisi in substantia vivente — unde sequitur: si dolet, sentit, et si sentit, vivit — sed quia anima non est indissolubili vinculo corpori alligata; ideo intensus dolor eam expellit de praesenti habitaculo. Nunc enim est carcer temporalis, sed tunc erit perpetuus5. — His visis, satis facile est ad obiecta respondere. Concedo enim rationes probantes, quod ignis non est consumtivus corporum.
1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur de corruptione, iam patet responsio: loquitur enim de corruptione afflictionis, non desitionis6; prima non ponit consumtionem sicut secunda.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod passio magis facta abiicit a substantia; dicendum, quod substantia patiens in duplici differentia est: aut quia potest recipere formam contrariam suae perfectioni quantum ad esse; aut quia potest suscipere contrariam dispositionem quantum ad bene esse. Primo modo passio intensa corrumpit simpliciter auferendo esse; secundo modo aufert bene esse. Unde damnati semper sunt et semper male sunt; ideo semper vivunt et semper moriuntur. — Si autem obiicias mihi, quod quidquid sit illud quod abiicitur, cum non sit infinitum, videtur totum abiici aliquando, ac per hoc locum actioni et passioni non relinqui; responderi potest, quod semper est abiectio et corruptio, non quia novum aliquid semper adimatur, sed quia per continuam actionem eiusdem rei ademptio continuatur. — Exemplum huius manifestum est in suo opposito. Sicut enim Beati continue reficiuntur, non quia semper novum aliquid recipiant, sed quia in suo praemio conservantur et continuantur; sic damnati continue affliguntur et corrumpuntur, quia salutis et quietis eis privatio per continuam actionem ignis continuatur. — Et huius exemplum clarum est in generatione radii, qui dicitur semper oriri et semper a sole egredi, non quia sol semper aliquid novum emittat, sed quia primum lumen missum continuat7. Sic ignis dicitur semper damnatos affligere, non quia novam dispositionem de novo afferat, sed quia continue agendo a priori afflictione non cessat.
3. 4. Ad duo sequentia iam patet responsio: quia nec inflammatio consumtionem, nec dolor necessario infert mortem, sed solum secundum statum praesentem; ideo, variato statu, necessaria consequentia non est inter ista.
I. Constat, damnatorum corpora igne infernali esse passura, non tamen consumenda. Quod ut explicent, nonnulli putaverunt, corpora damnatorum non pati ab igne materialiter sive poena physica ac reali, sed damnatorum poenam esse potius intentionalem seu animalem (i. e. secundum animam sensitivam). Ipse S. Thom. huic opinioni primitus adhaesit, scil. in Comment. (hic q. 3. a. 1. quaestiunc. 2. 3; Suppl. q. 86. a. 2. 3.); unde etiam posuit, « eadem (corpora) esse incorruptibilia per naturam, non quod sit aliquod incorruptionis principium in corporibus damnatorum, sed per defectum principii moventis ad corruptionem » (quaestiunc. 2. ad 2.), quia scil. « cessante motu caeli, nulla qualitas erit sufficiens, ut corpus humanum alterare possit a sua naturali qualitate » (ibid. in corp.). De hac ratione Durand. (hic q. 10. n. 12.) inter alia dicit: « Illud autem non potest teneri, saltem Parisiis, cum sit articulus condemnatus; dicit enim articulus, quod dicere, quod cessante motu caeli, si ignis esset iuxta stuppam, non combureret ipsam, error est » (cfr. Collectio iudiciorum Caroli Duplessis d'Argentré, tom. I. p. 197; sed etiam Bonav., tom. II. pag. 30. scholion). — Attamen idem S. Thom. alibi (S. c. Gent. IV. c. 89.) confitetur, quod illa corpora « affligentur ab igne corporeo, in quantum qualitas ignis propter suam excellentiam contrariatur aequalitati complexionis et harmoniae, quae est sensui connaturalis, licet eam solvere non possit » etc. Porro ab eodem in Opusculo 10. a. 19. seq. haec incorruptibilitas non soli animae informanti, sed etiam operationi divinae virtutis tribuitur. — Richard. a Med. (hic a. 2. q. 7.) ex triplicis causae concursu repetit istam incorruptibilitatem, scilicet ex parte dispositionis materiae, in qua incorporatus est ignis ille; ex parte dispositionis ipsorum corporum; et principaliter ex parte divinae ordinationis. — Quoad fabulam illam de salamandra, quasi longiore tempore vivere possit in igne, idem scribit: « Quod sive verum sit, sive non, tamen pilos eius ab illo igne non consumi; quod ego ipse expertus sum ». — Cum Richardo in solvenda quaestione concordat S. Bonaventura.
De hac 1. quaestione praeter laudatos: Scot., infra d. 49. q. 13. n. 10. — B. Albert., hic a. 39. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 3.
II. Quoad 2. quaestionem, quae est satis difficilis, communiter conceditur, substantias spirituales non posse naturaliter a rebus corporeis immutari et ratione alicuius contrarietatis affligi; nihilominus tenendum esse, animas separatas daemonesque reapse materiali igne infernali affligi. Quod ut explicent, magistri diversas opiniones in medium protulerunt. Praeter solutiones duas insufficientes, hic relatas, notanda est tertia, a S. Thoma (hic q. 3. a. 3. quaestiunc. 3.) notata, quod « quamvis ignis corporeus non possit animam exurere, tamen anima apprehendit ipsum ut nocivum sibi ». Neque haec solutio nodum solvere sufficit, nisi determinetur, ut clare ostendit Scot. (hic q. 2. n. 3.). — Henricus Gand. (Quodl. 8. q. 34.), reiectis quinque opinionibus, sexto concludit: « Restat igitur, ut videtur, quod Deus naturae spiritus angelici et humanae vim, qua pati possit ab igne corporali, imprimit supernaturaliter, vel si utrique naturaliter inest, licet nobis latet, ut sic illam temperet, ut peccatis poenam correspondentem per illam sustineat ». — Alii recentiores cum Suarez putant, ignem ut instrumentum divinum immittere spiritibus damnatis realem quandam qualitatem supernaturalem. — Tamen antiqui Scholastici, non excepto Durando, talem actum physice realem immissum non admittunt, sed daemones animasque per actum intentionalem cruciari docent; de quo Scot. (loc. cit. n. 7.) dicit, quod ignis ille est obiectum disconveniens dupliciter: primo ut detinens spiritum definitive, quod fit operatione divina; secundo ut immutans obiective, detestante voluntate istam alligationem quoad locum, qua etiam operatio impeditur. S. Thomam cum Scoto in hoc convenire, « quod ignis in animam agit non per modum influentis, sed per modum detinentis », asserit Gotti (tom. I. tr. 9. q. 9. dub. 4. § 3.). Attamen Scot. quoad actionem ignis instrumentaliter cooperantem ad illam detentionem recedere a S. Thoma videtur. — S. Bonav. idem de illa detentione docet; tamen asserit, horrorem detestationis etiam supernaturaliter immitti. — Richard. a Med. bene recenset diversas opiniones et magis explicat relatam antiquorum sententiam.
Praeter locos citt.: S. Thom., S. I. q. 64. a. 3. 4, et praecipue S. c. Gent. IV. q. 90. — B. Albert., hic a. 37. 40. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 4. — Richard. a Med. hic, a. 2. q. 9. — Durand., hic q. 11.
---
Article III. On the action of fire.
Next, as regards the third article, inquiry is made concerning the action of fire, about which two questions are asked. First it is asked whether that fire is consumptive of bodies. Second, whether it is afflictive of souls.
Question I. Whether the fire of hell consumes the bodies of the damned.
Concerning the first the procedure is thus, and it is shown that that fire consumes the bodies of the damned.
1. Augustine, On the Nature of the Good8: « Since the willing are corrupted in sins, the unwilling are corrupted in punishments »: therefore if they are not corrupted except by that which afflicts, and fire does not corrupt except by consuming, it seems that that fire consumes the bodies.
2. Likewise, that fire acts upon the bodies: therefore the bodies suffer; but « every passion, the more intense it is made, casts away from the substance1 »: therefore if the casting-away made from the substance through heat is nothing other than consumption, then that fire consumes the bodies.
3. Likewise, upon burning there necessarily follows inflammation, and upon inflammation consumption: therefore if that fire burns the bodies, therefore it consumes [them]. If you should say that it does not follow, because the salamander is heated by fire and yet is not consumed in the fire but is renewed2; on the contrary: this does not solve [it], because the salamander is not harmed by the fire, but the bodies of the damned are harmed by the fire and are tormented in the fire: if therefore fire, which harms, consumes; it is evident, etc.
4. Likewise, intense pain is a way to death, as is evident, therefore the more intense the more it disposes [to death]: if therefore that fire is the cause of intense pain, it happens that a man is disposed through it to death by the ultimate disposition3: therefore it is necessary that it destroy the damned: therefore by parity of reasoning, that it consume the bodies.
On the contrary: 1. Isaiah, last [chapter]4: Their worm shall not die, and the fire shall not be extinguished; therefore the fire as agent will last only as long as the man as patient; but that fire will never be extinguished nor diminished: therefore neither will the body be consumed.
2. Likewise, the Master in the text5: « Augustine by various examples establishes that they burn and are not consumed by any consumption »: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, it seems by reason: because everything that is consumed loses some part of itself: therefore if the bodies of the damned are consumed, they are in continual loss. But it is agreed that they are not restored, since they lack all refreshment6; but that which suffers loss and does not have restoration is necessarily at some time totally consumed: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, everything that is consumed necessarily becomes less powerful, therefore also more passible: therefore if they are continually consumed, their punishment is continually intensified, and if this, since it lasts to infinity, it will grow to infinity; which is altogether unfitting, that the punishment should grow, and the fault not grow7.
Conclusion. The bodies of the damned will be afflicted by the fire, but will not be corrupted as to substantial being.
I respond: It must be said that if it is asked concerning the bodies of the damned whether they are afflicted by the fire, it is to be conceded simply. But if it is asked whether they are consumed, it is to be denied simply. — But if it is asked whether they are corrupted, this must be distinguished. For corruption in one way means the defect of a thing as to substantial being8, and in this way it is the same as consumption; and in such a way they are not corrupted, since they do not die. In another way corruption is the same as the privation of a good disposition; and in this way, since from the bodies of the damned there will be taken away the rest and good disposition which generates pleasure in the soul, hence it is that they are continually corrupted. It is therefore a corruption of affliction, not of destruction or of consumption, and this happens through the burning of the fire.
But if it is asked how this can be grasped and understood; we can be led to this both by example and by reason. We see that certain things live in fire and do not fail, as Augustine sets down the example of the salamander in the twenty-first [book] of the City of God9. If therefore it is more marvelous that some animal be preserved in fire without affliction than to be afflicted without consumption; and this is possible according to nature: therefore neither ought this to be judged impossible. — But if you should say that this is not similar: because the nature of that animal is conformed to fire, but the nature of the human body is altogether unlike [it]; it can be answered in two ways: in one way, that although the nature of the human body according to the present state is consumable by fire, nothing prevents that the Creator, who gave to all and each the nature which He willed, could give such a nature to man10. Nor is it a wonder, since man before the fall had a body of another disposition and nature than after the fall, because before [it was] capable of mortality, now neces-
sary to death. — This same thing can be persuaded by examples taken from the side of fire; for that fire burns and does not consume for this reason, that it does not require fuel. And there is a manifest example in the kindling of gold by fire, which indeed is kindled, but is not consumed, because it does not offer fuel to the fire. So neither [is] the human body [consumed] by the infernal fire. — But a most evident example Augustine sets down1 concerning the fire which is in the region of Sicily, as is evident to those beholding, that « that fire makes those mountains to seethe from the most ancient times, and yet they still remain whole: and these are sufficiently fit witnesses that not everything which is burned is consumed ». — In the legend of blessed Nicholas also it is written that in the eastern parts a certain fire is found, which vehemently afflicts a hand set to it, and yet consumes nothing of the hand. Thus therefore from these examples it is gathered that it is possible for something to burn in fire and yet not fail.
From which also we can gather a reason of this kind, namely that this comes from the side of the agent and from the side of the patient. For to this fire is given a power to inflame, not to consume; and to the body is given a nature capable of suffering, not of failing. — But if the reason of this be asked, it must be said that on the part of nature is the possibility of receiving, on the part of God is the power of giving, on the part of the end is the fittingness for so doing, because to infinity a man must be tormented in body, that the infinite justice of God may be manifested. Nor are these two incompossible, that some body be touched by something hot and not be consumed, since we see that naturally some body is touched by something cold which rather heats than cools, as the manifest example is in water and lime2. And just as those bodies are burned and not consumed, so also the composite of soul and body is afflicted and does not die. And yet to this likewise we can be led by example and reason; by example: because the immortal soul is afflicted in the body, since pain belongs properly to the soul, and yet it is not killed3. What then prevents [this] from being similarly understood in the damned themselves? — But if you should say that this is not similar: because the soul is not composed of contraries, according as [is] the nature of the human body; we can answer that this does not stand in the way, « since certain corruptible things, such as worms, can be found in the hottest waters, whose heat no one handles with impunity », as Augustine says4. If therefore things which are mortal and corruptible can live in these hottest [waters] without affliction; by parity of reasoning immortal and passible bodies can be afflicted without destruction. — But if the reason of this be asked, it can be said that this is on account of the union of the soul to the flesh, which is indissoluble. For that a man dies of pain, this is not because pain is contrary to life, since pain is only in a living substance — whence it follows: if he grieves, he feels, and if he feels, he lives — but because the soul is not bound to the body by an indissoluble bond; therefore intense pain expels it from the present dwelling. For now it is a temporal prison, but then it will be perpetual5. — These things having been seen, it is easy enough to reply to the objections. For I concede the reasons proving that fire is not consumptive of bodies.
1. To that then which is objected first concerning corruption, the response is already evident: for it speaks of the corruption of affliction, not of cessation6; the first does not posit consumption as the second [does].
2. To that which is objected, that passion the more intense casts away from substance; it must be said that a suffering substance is in a twofold difference: either because it can receive a form contrary to its perfection as to being; or because it can receive a contrary disposition as to well-being. In the first way intense passion corrupts simply by taking away being; in the second way it takes away well-being. Whence the damned always are and always are ill; therefore they always live and always die. — But if you should object to me that whatever that be which is cast away, since it is not infinite, it seems that the whole is cast away at some time, and thereby no room is left for action and passion; it can be answered that there is always casting-away and corruption, not because something new is always taken away, but because through the continual action of the same thing the taking-away is continued. — An example of this is manifest in its opposite. For just as the Blessed are continually refreshed, not because they always receive something new, but because they are conserved and continued in their reward; so the damned are continually afflicted and corrupted, because the privation of salvation and rest is continued for them through the continual action of the fire. — And a clear example of this is in the generation of a ray, which is said always to arise and always to go forth from the sun, not because the sun always emits something new, but because it continues the first light emitted7. So fire is said always to afflict the damned, not because it brings a new disposition anew, but because acting continually it does not cease from the prior affliction.
3. 4. To the two following [objections] the response is already evident: because neither does inflammation [infer] consumption, nor does pain necessarily infer death, but only according to the present state; therefore, the state being changed, the necessary consequence does not hold between these.
I. It is agreed that the bodies of the damned are to suffer from the infernal fire, yet not to be consumed. In order to explain this, some have thought that the bodies of the damned do not suffer from the fire materially, that is, by a physical and real punishment, but that the punishment of the damned is rather intentional or animal (i.e., according to the sensitive soul). S. Thomas himself at first adhered to this opinion, namely in the Commentary (here q. 3, a. 1, subquestion 2, 3; Suppl. q. 86, a. 2, 3); whence also he held that « the same [bodies] are incorruptible by nature, not that there is any principle of incorruption in the bodies of the damned, but through the defect of a principle moving to corruption » (subquestion 2, ad 2), because namely « the motion of the heaven having ceased, no quality will be sufficient to alter the human body from its natural quality » (ibid. in corp.). Concerning this reasoning Durandus (here q. 10, n. 12) among other things says: « But that cannot be held, at least at Paris, since it is a condemned article; for the article says that to say that, the motion of the heaven having ceased, if fire were next to tow, it would not burn it, is an error » (cf. the Collection of judgments of Charles Duplessis d'Argentré, tom. I, p. 197; but also Bonaventure, tom. II, p. 30, scholion). — However the same S. Thomas elsewhere (Summa contra Gentiles IV, c. 89) confesses that those bodies « will be afflicted by the corporeal fire, inasmuch as the quality of the fire on account of its excellence is contrary to the equality of the complexion and to the harmony which is connatural to sense, although it cannot dissolve it » etc. Further, by the same [author] in Opusculum 10, a. 19 seq., this incorruptibility is attributed not to the informing soul alone, but also to the operation of the divine power. — Richard of Middleton (here a. 2, q. 7) repeats this incorruptibility from the concurrence of a threefold cause, namely from the disposition of the matter in which that fire is incorporated; from the disposition of the bodies themselves; and principally from the divine ordination. — As for that fable about the salamander, as if it could live a longer time in fire, the same [author] writes: « That whether it be true or not, nevertheless its hairs are not consumed by that fire; which I myself have experienced ». — With Richard in solving the question S. Bonaventure agrees.
Concerning this first question, besides those praised [above]: Scotus, below d. 49, q. 13, n. 10. — B. Albert, here a. 39. — Peter of Tarantasia, here q. 2, a. 3.
II. As for the second question, which is quite difficult, it is commonly conceded that spiritual substances cannot naturally be changed by corporeal things and be afflicted by reason of any contrariety; nevertheless it must be held that separated souls and demons are really afflicted by the material infernal fire. In order to explain this, the masters have brought forward diverse opinions. Besides the two insufficient solutions here related, a third is to be noted, marked by S. Thomas (here q. 3, a. 3, subquestion 3), that « although corporeal fire cannot burn the soul, nevertheless the soul apprehends it as harmful to itself ». Nor does this solution suffice to loose the knot, unless it be determined, as Scotus clearly shows (here q. 2, n. 3). — Henry of Ghent (Quodl. 8, q. 34), five opinions being rejected, in the sixth concludes: « It remains therefore, as it seems, that God imprints supernaturally upon the nature of the angelic and human spirit a power, by which it can suffer from corporeal fire, or, if it is naturally in each although it is hidden from us, that He so tempers it that through it [the spirit] may sustain a punishment corresponding to its sins ». — Others more recent, with Suarez, think that fire as a divine instrument sends into the damned spirits a certain real supernatural quality. — Yet the ancient Scholastics, Durandus not excepted, do not admit such a physically real act as sent in, but teach that demons and souls are tortured by an intentional act; concerning which Scotus (loc. cit. n. 7) says that that fire is a disconvenient object in two ways: first as detaining the spirit definitively, which happens by divine operation; second as changing objectively, the will detesting that binding as to place, by which also its operation is impeded. That S. Thomas agrees with Scotus in this, « that fire acts upon the soul not by way of influencing, but by way of detaining », Gotti asserts (tom. I, tr. 9, q. 9, dub. 4, § 3). Yet Scotus, as to the action of the fire cooperating instrumentally toward that detention, seems to depart from S. Thomas. — S. Bonaventure teaches the same concerning that detention; yet he asserts that the horror of detestation is also sent in supernaturally. — Richard of Middleton well reviews the diverse opinions and more [fully] explains the related opinion of the ancients.
Besides the places cited: S. Thomas, Summa I, q. 64, a. 3, 4, and especially Summa contra Gentiles IV, q. 90. — B. Albert, here a. 37, 40. — Peter of Tarantasia, here q. 2, a. 4. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 2, q. 9. — Durandus, here q. 11.
---
- 8Cap. 7. Pro corrumpuntur in poenis textus originalis corrumpantur in poenis.Chapter 7. For corrumpuntur in poenis (are corrupted in punishments) the original text [reads] corrumpantur in poenis.
- 1Aristot., VI. Topic. c. 3. (c. 6.). — Inferius ante per calorem edd. cum pluribus codd. inepte addunt est.Aristotle, Topics VI, c. 3 (c. 6). — Below, before per calorem the editions, with several codices, ineptly add est.
- 2Ut refert August.; cfr. infra corp. quaest. — Paulo superius post adurit cod. aa addit et inflammat.As Augustine reports; cf. below in the body of the question. — A little above, after adurit codex aa adds et inflammat.
- 3Cfr. supra pag. 22, nota 9. — De maiori cfr. I. Machab. 6, 8. seq.Cf. above, p. 22, note 9. — On the major [premise] cf. 1 Maccabees 6, 8 seq.
- 4Vers. 24. Post ignis Vat. cum Vulgata repetit eorum.Verse 24 [Isaiah 66, 24]. After ignis the Vatican [edition], with the Vulgate, repeats eorum.
- 5Hic c. 5, ubi vocibus ea ardere praemittit et sempiternis ignibus, et pro ulla consumtione substituit illa combustione.Here c. 5, where before the words ea ardere it prefixes et sempiternis ignibus, and for ulla consumtione it substitutes illa combustione.
- 6Cod. aa allegat Isai. 65, 13. seq.: Ecce, servi mei comedent, et vos esurietis etc.Codex aa cites Isaiah 65, 13 seq.: Behold, my servants shall eat, and you shall be hungry, etc.
- 7Cod. K (I a secunda manu) legit: crescet in infinitum; sed hoc est impossibile, quod crescat... culpa: igitur nullo modo consumuntur. — Cod. aa subiungit ut novum arg. sententiam August., quam supra pag. 922, nota 2. ex Gregorio allegavimus.Codex K (I by a second hand) reads: it will grow to infinity; but this is impossible, that the fault should grow...: therefore in no way are they consumed. — Codex aa subjoins, as a new argument, the opinion of Augustine which above, on p. 922, note 2, we cited from Gregory.
- 8Vide Aristot., V. Phys. text. 7. (c. 1.), et I. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 11. seqq. (c. 3.). — Pro defectionem cod. G desitionem (quod habetur etiam infra in solut. ad 1.), codd. L Y destructionem, Vat. defectionem seu decisionem.See Aristotle, Physics V, text 7 (c. 1), and On Generation and Corruption I, text 11 seq. (c. 3). — For defectionem codex G [reads] desitionem (which is also had below in the solution to [objection] 1), codices L Y destructionem, the Vatican [edition] defectionem seu decisionem.
- 9Cap. 4. n. 1. Ibid. c. 2. ait: Mirabile est enim dolere in ignibus, et tamen vivere; sed mirabilius vivere in ignibus, nec dolere. Si autem hoc creditur [de animalibus viventibus in mediis ignibus], cur non et illud?Chapter 4, n. 1. In the same place, c. 2, he says: For it is marvelous to grieve in fires and yet to live; but more marvelous to live in fires and not to grieve. But if this is believed [concerning animals living in the midst of fires], why not also that?
- 10Cod. K addit ut eius corpus ab igne consumi non possit. — De seq. propos., in qua Vat. ad immortalitatem pro ad mortalitatem, cfr. II. Sent. d. 19. a. 2. et 3. ac August., XXI. de Civ. Dei, c. 8.Codex K adds ut eius corpus ab igne consumi non possit (that its body cannot be consumed by fire). — On the following clause, in which the Vatican [edition reads] ad immortalitatem for ad mortalitatem, cf. II Sent. d. 19, a. 2 and 3, and Augustine, City of God XXI, c. 8.
- 1Libr. XXI. de Civ. Dei, c. 4. n. 1, verbis aliquatenus mutatis.Book XXI of the City of God, c. 4, n. 1, the words being somewhat changed.
- 2Cfr. August., XXI. de Civ. Dei, c. 4. n. 3.Cf. Augustine, City of God XXI, c. 4, n. 3.
- 3Ut ostendit August., XXI. de Civ. Dei, c. 3. n. 2.As Augustine shows, City of God XXI, c. 3, n. 2.
- 4Loc. cit. c. 2. — Superius post secundum quod Vat. supplet est.Loc. cit. c. 2. — Above, after secundum quod the Vatican [edition] supplies est.
- 5Secundum August., loc. cit. c. 3. n. 1. — Mox pro Concedo enim cod. F Concedendae enim sunt.According to Augustine, loc. cit. c. 3, n. 1. — Soon, for Concedo enim codex F [reads] Concedendae enim sunt.
- 6Cod. F destructionis.Codex F [reads] destructionis.
- 7Cfr. II. Sent. d. 2. p. 1. a. 1. q. 3. in corp., ubi etiam ponitur emissum (ita etiam hic codd. F G P R S T X) pro missum.Cf. II Sent. d. 2, p. 1, a. 1, q. 3, in the body, where also emissum is set down (so also here codices F G P R S T X) for missum.