Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 44, Part 2, Art. 3, Q. 2

Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 44

Textus Latinus

p. 931

Quaestio II. Utrum ignis inferni affligat spiritum.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum ille ignis sit afflictivus spirituum. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Matthaei vigesimo quinto¹: Ite maledicti in ignem aeternum, qui paratus est diabolo et angelis eius; sed daemones vel angeli sunt substantiae incorporales, et ille ignis non est eis paratus nisi ad poenam et afflictionem: ergo etc.

2. Item, Gregorius in quarto Dialogorum²: «Si diabolus eiusque angeli, cum sint incorporei, corporeo igne sunt cruciandi, quid mirum, si et animae, antequam recipiant corpora, possint igne corporeo cruciari»? quasi dicat: non est mirum.

3. Item, hoc videtur ratione sumta a causis superioribus: quia divina iustitia rectissime ordinat omnia in poena, secundum quod sapientia ordinat in natura: si ergo peccatum est dispositio vilissima, ergo spiritus infectus peccato ad hoc, quod debite ordinetur, debet ordinari sub infima creatura. Si ergo infima creatura est substantia corporalis, ordinatio vero peccantium est in poenis: ergo debet

p. 932 substantia spiritualis a corpore puniri vel affligi¹. Si ergo omne quod congruum est, possibile est; et quod est possibile et congruum ponendum est circa opus divinum: ergo ponendum est, spiritum affligi per ignem corporeum.

4. Item, hoc ostenditur per causas inferiores. Anima existens in corpore patitur, corpore non patiente, ergo est passibilis de sua natura; sed eadem est natura animae in corpore et extra corpus: ergo anima extra corpus est passibilis. Probatio maioris manifesta est in dormientibus, qui in somnis gravissime patiuntur, corporibus nihil patientibus². — Ex hoc igitur arguo ulterius sic: anima extra corpus est passibilis; sed omne quod patitur, patitur ab aliquo, quod habet repugnantiam per qualitatem activam et repugnantem³; spiritualia autem non sunt huiusmodi, sed corporalia: ergo si patitur, patitur a corpore. — Quod autem spiritualia non habeant contrarietatem agentem et patientem, expresse apparet per exemplum, quia albedo et nigredo in anima non contrariantur. Apparet etiam per rationem, quia quae abstrahuntur ab esse materiali abstrahuntur per consequens a contrarietate et mutua actione et passione⁴.

Ad oppositum arguitur primo a parte agentis, secundo a parte patientis⁵. A parte agentis sic:

1. «Omne agens, quod agit in aliquid, agit per contrarietatem et contactum»; sed ignis ad animam nec contactus potest esse, nec est contrarietas aliqua: ergo nec potest esse actio aliqua. Primum manifestum est per Philosophum⁶, secundum in se manifestum est.

2. Item, «omne agens, quod agit in aliquid, generat similitudinem suam in passo⁷»; unde calidum non agit in aliquid, nisi illud calefaciat; sed impossibile est, animam esse calidam: ergo impossibile est, quod ignis agat in animam. Si tu dicas ad hoc, quod talis actio non est per naturam, sed supra naturam, et ignis non agit per virtutem innatam, sed per virtutem desuper sibi datam; obiicitur contra hoc de illa virtute: quia illa virtus aut est corporalis, aut spiritualis. Si corporalis, adhuc est inferior anima: ergo non agit in ipsam⁸; si spiritualis; sed omnis virtus spiritualis debet fundari in substantia spirituali: ergo non debet talis virtus esse in igne nec debet dari igni.

3. Item, illa virtus aut est igne nobilior, aut inferior. Si igne inferior: ergo non agit in animam, sicut nec ignis agebat; si superior: ergo cum virtus non debeat esse nobilior substantia, videtur, quod igni non debeat dari. Quodsi tu dicas, quod hoc verum est per naturam; quaeritur tunc: ut quid haec virtus magis datur substantiae ignis quam alicui alii, cum aeque bene possit dari lapidi, sicut igni?

Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur a parte patientis:

4. Sicut ostendit Augustinus in sexto Musicae⁹, impossibile est, magis nobile pati a minus nobili, quia «omne agens praestantius est passo»; sed substantia spiritualis nobilior est corporali: ergo ab ipsa non patitur. Si tu dicas mihi, quod per peccatum facta est inferior; contra hoc est quod dicit Augustinus in tertio de Libero Arbitrio¹⁰, quod «substantia spiritualis, quantumcumque peccat, nobilior est nobilissimo corpore».

5. Item, aeque magna distantia est peccati ad ignem, sicut et animae ad ignem; et ita spirituale est peccatum, sicut et anima: ergo si aequaliter distat¹¹, nunquam per peccatum anima fit actioni proximior vel habilior: ergo si ab igne non patitur per naturam, nec etiam per culpam.

Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur a parte passionis.

6. Nihil affligitur proprie, nisi in ipsum cadat dolor; sed in spiritu separato non cadit dolor: ergo non potest affligi: ergo ab igne non patitur. Probatio minoris: «Dolor, sicut dicit Philosophus¹²,

p. 933 est sensus divisionis partium cum vi»; sed spiritus separatus caret partibus, caret divisione, caret sensu: ergo caret dolore.

Item, hoc ostenditur a parte actionis.

7. Omne puniens laedit¹, omne quod laedit, adimit; sed a spiritu incorporali nihil potest adimi per corpus: ergo non potest laedi, ergo nec affligi: ergo ab igne non patitur.

Conclusio

Ignis inferni affligit etiam spiritus, eos alligando et perceptionem immutando, repugnante cum horrore voluntate.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod circa praedictam quaestionem triplex fuit via.

Aliqui enim philosophorum negaverunt simpliciter, spiritum incorporeum posse cruciari, attendentes ad eius incorruptibilitatem, pro eo quod senserunt, omne incorruptibile² esse impassibile. — Sed iste est error manifestus. Si enim dolor necessario generatur ex amore cum privatione amati, sicut aliquis dolet de morte patris, et ex odio cum praesentia rei displicentis, sicut aliquis dolet de exaltatione inimici; cum nihil prohibeat in sensum spiritualem cadere amorem et alias duas conditiones, nihil prohibet cadere dolorem. — Amplius, si «contraria nata sunt fieri circa idem³», et spiritus incorporeus potest gaudere; quare etiam et non dolere, cum naturaliter in mente eius possint affectiones quatuor alternari?

Et ideo aliorum philosophorum modernorum positio fuit, quod substantia spiritualis dolere potest et pati, non per actionem alicuius, sed potius per privationem. Posuerunt enim et intellexerunt, quod anima desiderat summum Bonum, quo potest privari propter mala merita in hac vita, et ideo ex eius carentia generatur in ea maxima tristitia; et hanc poenam dixerunt esse post hanc vitam, et non aliam, sicut non est aliud gaudium spiritibus nisi in contemplatione summi Boni. — Et ista positio fuit Algazelis⁴, quae licet veritati magis appropinquaverit, quam praedicta, nihilominus tamen deficit. Si enim originali peccato, ubi est pura privatio iustitiae, debetur poena damni et carentia beatitudinis aeternae; actuali peccato, quod quidem non tantum consistit in privatione, immo etiam in deordinata delectatione, non tantum debetur aeternae beatitudinis carentia, immo etiam poena aliqua afflictiva. — [margo: Conclusio.] Et ideo dicit fides christiana, quod spiritus separati cruciantur non tantum per summi Boni absentiam, sed etiam per afflictivi praesentiam. Ad quod credendum sufficit auctoritas Veritatis, Matthaei vigesimo quinto⁵: Ite maledicti in ignem aeternum etc.

[margo: Modus huius afflictionis. Opinio 1.] Sed intelligentia magis requirit, quomodo istud possit ratione persuaderi. Et ideo huius rei intelligentiam quidam conati sunt dare aspiciendo ad ordinem divinae iustitiae, sicut in opponendo⁶ tactum est. Cum enim duplex sit ordo, scilicet naturae et divinae iustitiae, primus conditionis, secundus retributionis; et anima secundum naturam sit superior igne, merito tamen peccati efficitur inferior corpore: ideo divina iustitia et animam subiicit igni merito peccati et ignem superponit animae, faciendo ipsum instrumentum divinae iustitiae. — Et per hoc volunt omnia obiecta solvere, quia omnia sumuntur secundum ordinem naturae, aspiciendo ad animae dignitatem et ignis naturalem virtutem; haec autem actio competit igni per virtutem sibi datam, per quam est divinae iustitiae instrumentum et passio competit animae propter peccati demeritum. —

[margo: Non satisfacit.] Sed ista positio adhuc non satisfacit intellectui. Non enim quaerimus hic, quid divina iustitia possit, sed qualiter hoc quod facit, naturae consonum sit⁷. — Amplius, si ignis agit per virtutem sibi datam, quare magis deputatur huic actioni quam terra? Et videtur, quod terra magis, quia peccator, cum sit infimus, debet subiici infimae creaturae; terra autem est infimum omnium elementorum et faex: ergo si qualitas ignis naturalis nihil facit ad agendum in animam, sed solum virtus⁸ superaddita; si terrae daretur, aeque bene ageret, et ordo divinae iustitiae ibi clarius appareret.

p. 934 [margo: Opinio 2.] Et ideo alii sumere volunt rationem ex parte naturae ipsius animae, quem modum sumere possumus ab Augustino in duodecimo super Genesim¹, ubi ostendit, quod anima pati potest, corpore non patiente, etiam acerbissimas passiones, sicut et ibi probat per exempla in somnis et in quadam aegritudine et in vexationibus. Si ergo anima secum trahit affectiones et imagines corporales et per illas et in illis pati poterat in corpore praeter corpus, etiam ad ignis absentiam; multo magis, cum separata erit, pati poterit in illis et per illas, praesente igne infernali; quia, quamvis ibi non sit passio corporalis, est tamen ibi passio animalis sive spiritualis, quae vera passio est et vera afflictio, ac per hoc vera punitio. — [margo: Non sufficit.] Sed nec istud fideli animae sufficit, pro eo quod credimus, spiritus angelicos, qui carent imaginibus et affectionibus ex corpore tractis, igne corporeo cruciari. — Credimus etiam, quod poena illa infernalis sit per veram ignis actionem, non per phantasticam imaginationem. — Amplius, si substantia spiritualis certa² est, quod ab igne laedi non potest; ergo imaginatio ignis non generat in ea terrorem nec passionem, nisi aliud occurrat quam ipsius animae natura vel dispositio ex corpore contracta.

Et ideo, cum non possit sufficiens ratio sumi ex parte divinae iustitiae, quae rationem nostram quietet, nec ex parte solius animae, quae fidei concordet; [margo: Conclusio 1.] ideo sumi potest ratio aspiciendo ad utrumque per hunc modum. «Dolor enim, sicut patet per Augustinum decimo quarto de Civitate Dei³ est dissensus ab his rebus, quae nobis nolentibus accidunt». Ad hoc ergo, quod dolor generetur in anima ab aliquo, [margo: Requisita 4.] duo concurrunt ex parte animae, scilicet perceptio ex parte cognitionis et detestatio ex parte affectionis. Similiter duo requiruntur ex parte agentis: unum est, quod immutet animae perceptionem; aliud est, quod violenter et inseparabiliter adhaereat contra repugnantiam voluntatis. — [margo: Determinantur.] Ex his quatuor duo sunt secundum ordinem naturae, et alia duo secundum ordinem divinae iustitiae. Quod enim ignis immutet cognitionem⁴ animae, et anima percipiat actionem et calorem ignis; hoc est de potentia naturali utriusque; et hoc patet sic. [margo: Explicatur.] Cum enim ignis agit in compositum ex anima et corpore, ibi duplex est passio: una naturalis, et haec est calefactio corporis; alia animalis, et haec est immutatio sensus. Prima passio est vera passio, quia est ab igne ut vere agente; secunda passio est ab anima se ipsam movente et ab igne occasionem praebente, secundum quod dicit Augustinus in sexto Musicae⁵. Sicut ergo, postquam separatur anima, corpus potest pati ab igne passione naturali, quia potest calefieri et inflammari, et hoc per naturalem potentiam utriusque; sic spiritus pati potest passione animali et ab igne praesenti immutari naturali potentia ignis et animae.

Duo igitur sunt ibi per ordinem naturae, alia duo per ordinem divinae iustitiae. Quod enim ignis animae indissolubiliter alligetur, et anima in eo recludatur ut in carcere, divinae iustitiae est, ad quam spectat malefactorem in carcere recludere⁶. Quod iterum anima refugiat ignis calorem, qui per naturam nocere non potest, et trepidet timore, ubi timor non est⁷, hoc divinae iustitiae est, quae facit trepidare peccatores, immittendo terrorem et horrorem eius rei, qua per naturam sunt superiores. Et quamvis sit illud divinae iustitiae, hoc non est contra ordinem naturae, sive spiritum trepidare quod trepidandum non est, sive spiritum alligari corpori. — Et hoc est quod innuit Augustinus in vigesimo primo de Civitate Dei⁸, quod sicut anima in hominis conditione iungitur corpori ut dans ei vitam, quamvis illud sit spirituale, et hoc corporale, et ex illa coniunctione vehementer concipit ad corpus amorem; sic ligatur igni ut accipiens ab eo poenam, et ex illa coniunctione vehementer concipit horrorem ac per hoc et dolorem, qui verus est, et ex vero igne corporali et ex vera applicatione corporalis ignis ad spiritum causatur secundum quatuor praehabitas conditiones. — His visis, satis facile est ad obiecta respondere.

1. 2. 3. Quod enim obiicitur de actione, quod est per contrarietatem et contactum; istud intelligitur de actione naturali, cui respondet passio naturalis; et hoc est ad generandam speciem consimilem in passo secundum naturam; hic autem est passio animalis, qua quidem generatur similitudo spiritualis in passo. Unde Gregorius in quarto Dialogorum⁹ dicit, quod animae in eo ardent, quod ardorem vident; non tamen intendit dicere, quod visio sit tota causa ardoris, sed perceptio ignis

p. 935 praesentis cum horrore generat dolorem, quia non est cognitio speculationis tantum, sed potius experientiae. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad sequens et etiam ad alias rationes, quia non oportet ibi poni, virtutem creatam dari igni, per quam agat in animam.

4. 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur ex parte patientis, quod anima nobilior est corpore; dicendum, quod sicut nunc ignis dicitur agere in animam coniunctam carni et ibi generare dolorem, non quia ignis omnino sit faciens, sed quia per causationem ignis anima habet necessariam occasionem agendi in se et patiendi a se, cum ipsa sit se ipsam movens, sicut dicit Augustinus in sexto Musicae¹; sic intelligendum est in anima separata; sed quod fit hic mediante corpore, ibi fit immediate. Unde nec in coniuncta nec in separata agit vere efficiendo, sed occasionem praebendo, et tamen vere dicitur affligere et vere punire, sicut vere dicitur immutare, quamvis anima speciem potius in se faciat, quam a corpore aliquo fiat in ea. — Nec obstat istud quod obiicitur de peccato: quia peccatum non sic disponit spiritum ad passionem, ut faciat ipsum vere materialem respectu ignis, cum sit superior per naturam; sed meretur apud divinam iustitiam, ut, salva natura animae, Deus ipsam igni alliget et alligando incarceret², incarcerando horrorem sui carceris immittat, ac per hoc ipsa anima ad praesentiam carceris vero dolore et moestitia se affligat.

[margo: Notandum.] 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur de dolore, quod est divisio partium; dicendum, quod illa non est definitio generalis, sed solummodo doloris, qui est animae ex carne; sed illa quam assignat Augustinus, «dolor est dissensus ab his rebus» etc. Ut enim ostendit Augustinus in vigesimo primo de Civitate Dei³, dolor potius venit ex impedimento operationis animae quam ex corporis sectione, sicut patet in paralyticis, in quibus est partium sectio sine afflictione, quia anima in illis non habet operationem, quae ibi impediatur; et quoniam potentiae animae, quae sunt eius partes, quodam modo possunt in suis operationibus inquietari et impediri occasione accepta; hinc est, quod spiritus dolere potest et affligi.

[margo: Notandum.] 7. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod puniens laedit et quod laedit adimit; dicendum, quod sicut in ademptione peccati adimitur aliquid de substantia vel potentia animae, non solum de habilitate ad gratiam et iustitiam⁴; sic per ignem punitivum adimitur illa habilitas, secundum quam anima est habilis ad gloriae et beatitudinis laetitiam; nec semper nova adimitur, sed illa ademptio est afflictionis continuatio, sicut supra⁵ dictum est de ademptione, quae fit in corpore. — Et haec dicta sufficiant.

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English Translation

Question II. Whether the fire of hell afflicts the spirit.

Secondly it is asked whether that fire is afflictive of spirits. And that it is, it seems.

1. Matthew, chapter twenty-five¹: Go, you cursed, into the eternal fire, which was prepared for the devil and his angels; but demons and angels are incorporeal substances, and that fire was prepared for them only for punishment and affliction: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, Gregory in the fourth book of the Dialogues²: «If the devil and his angels, though they are incorporeal, are to be tormented by a corporeal fire, what wonder is it if souls too, before they receive their bodies, can be tortured by a corporeal fire»? as if he were to say: it is no wonder.

3. Likewise, this seems [to follow] from a reason drawn from higher causes: because divine justice most rightly orders all things in punishment, just as wisdom orders [them] in nature: if therefore sin is the vilest disposition, then a spirit infected with sin, in order that it be duly ordered, ought to be ordered beneath the lowest creature. If therefore the lowest creature is a corporeal substance, and the ordering of sinners is [placed] among punishments: therefore

p. 932 a spiritual substance ought to be punished or afflicted by a body¹. If therefore everything that is fitting is possible; and what is possible and fitting ought to be posited concerning the divine work: therefore it must be posited that a spirit is afflicted through a corporeal fire.

4. Likewise, this is shown through lower causes. A soul existing in the body suffers while the body does not suffer, therefore it is passible of its own nature; but the nature of the soul is the same in the body and outside the body: therefore the soul outside the body is passible. The proof of the major is manifest in sleepers, who in dreams suffer most grievously while their bodies suffer nothing². — From this therefore I argue further thus: the soul outside the body is passible; but everything that suffers, suffers from something that has a repugnance through an active and repugnant quality³; but spiritual things are not of this kind, but corporeal things are: therefore if it suffers, it suffers from a body. — But that spiritual things do not have an acting and suffering contrariety appears expressly through an example, because whiteness and blackness in the soul are not contrary. It also appears through reason, because things that are abstracted from material being are consequently abstracted from contrariety and from mutual action and passion⁴.

To the opposite it is argued first on the part of the agent, secondly on the part of the patient⁵. On the part of the agent thus:

1. «Every agent that acts upon something acts through contrariety and contact»; but between fire and the soul there can be neither contact, nor is there any contrariety: therefore there can be no action either. The first is manifest through the Philosopher⁶, the second is manifest in itself.

2. Likewise, «every agent that acts upon something generates its own likeness in the patient⁷»; whence the hot does not act upon anything unless it makes it hot; but it is impossible that the soul be hot: therefore it is impossible that fire act upon the soul. If you say to this that such an action is not by nature, but above nature, and that the fire does not act by an innate power, but by a power given to it from above; it is objected against this concerning that power: because that power is either corporeal or spiritual. If corporeal, it is still inferior to the soul: therefore it does not act upon it⁸; if spiritual; but every spiritual power ought to be founded in a spiritual substance: therefore such a power ought not to be in fire nor ought it to be given to fire.

3. Likewise, that power is either nobler than the fire or inferior. If inferior to the fire: then it does not act upon the soul, just as neither did the fire; if superior: then, since a power ought not to be nobler than [its] substance, it seems that it ought not to be given to fire. But if you say that this is true by nature; then it is asked: why is this power given to the substance of fire rather than to some other, since it could equally well be given to a stone as to fire?

Likewise, this same thing is shown on the part of the patient:

4. As Augustine shows in the sixth [book] of the Music⁹, it is impossible for the more noble to suffer from the less noble, because «every agent is more excellent than the patient»; but a spiritual substance is nobler than a corporeal one: therefore it does not suffer from it. If you say to me that through sin it has been made inferior; against this is what Augustine says in the third [book] of On Free Will¹⁰, that «a spiritual substance, however much it sins, is nobler than the noblest body».

5. Likewise, the distance of sin from fire is as great as that of the soul from fire; and sin is spiritual, just as the soul is: therefore, if it is equally distant¹¹, never through sin does the soul become nearer or more apt to being acted upon: therefore, if it does not suffer from fire by nature, neither does it [suffer] by fault.

Likewise, this same thing is shown on the part of the passion.

6. Nothing is properly afflicted unless pain fall upon it; but upon a separated spirit pain does not fall: therefore it cannot be afflicted: therefore it does not suffer from fire. The proof of the minor: «Pain, as the Philosopher says¹²,

p. 933 is the sense of the division of parts by force»; but a separated spirit lacks parts, lacks division, lacks sense: therefore it lacks pain.

Likewise, this is shown on the part of the action.

7. Everything that punishes harms¹, everything that harms takes away; but from an incorporeal spirit nothing can be taken away through a body: therefore it cannot be harmed, therefore neither afflicted: therefore it does not suffer from fire.

Conclusion

The fire of hell afflicts spirits also, by binding them and altering their perception, the will resisting with horror.

I respond: For the understanding of the aforesaid it must be noted that concerning the aforesaid question there were three ways.

For some of the philosophers denied absolutely that an incorporeal spirit can be tormented, attending to its incorruptibility, on the ground that they held that everything incorruptible² is impassible. — But that is a manifest error. For if pain is necessarily generated from love together with the privation of the loved thing, as when someone grieves over the death of a father, and from hatred together with the presence of a displeasing thing, as when someone grieves over the exaltation of an enemy; since nothing prevents love and the other two conditions from falling into the spiritual sense, nothing prevents pain from falling [into it]. — Furthermore, if «contraries are naturally apt to come to be about the same thing³», and an incorporeal spirit can rejoice; why then can it not also grieve, since naturally in its mind the four affections can alternate?

And therefore the position of other modern philosophers was that a spiritual substance can grieve and suffer, not through the action of anything, but rather through privation. For they posited and held that the soul desires the highest Good, of which it can be deprived on account of evil merits in this life, and therefore from the lack of it the greatest sadness is generated in it; and this punishment they said to be after this life, and no other, just as there is no other joy for spirits except in the contemplation of the highest Good. — And this was the position of Algazel⁴, which, although it came nearer to the truth than the aforesaid, nonetheless still falls short. For if to original sin, where there is pure privation of justice, there is owed the punishment of loss and the lack of eternal beatitude; to actual sin, which indeed consists not only in privation but also in disordered delight, there is owed not only the lack of eternal beatitude, but also some afflictive punishment. — [margin: Conclusion.] And therefore the Christian faith says that separated spirits are tormented not only through the absence of the highest Good, but also through the presence of an afflictive [thing]. For believing which the authority of Truth suffices, Matthew, chapter twenty-five⁵: Go, you cursed, into the eternal fire etc.

[margin: The mode of this affliction. Opinion 1.] But understanding requires further how this can be shown by reason. And therefore some have tried to give the understanding of this matter by looking to the order of divine justice, as was touched upon in the opposing arguments⁶. For since order is twofold, namely of nature and of divine justice, the first of creation, the second of retribution; and the soul according to nature is superior to fire, yet by the merit of sin it becomes inferior to the body: therefore divine justice both subjects the soul to fire by the merit of sin and sets fire over the soul, making it the instrument of divine justice. — And by this they wish to solve all the objections, because all are taken according to the order of nature, looking to the dignity of the soul and the natural power of fire; but this action belongs to fire through a power given to it, through which it is the instrument of divine justice, and the passion belongs to the soul on account of the demerit of sin. —

[margin: It does not satisfy.] But this position still does not satisfy the intellect. For we are not asking here what divine justice can do, but how this which it does is consonant with nature⁷. — Furthermore, if the fire acts through a power given to it, why is it assigned to this action rather than earth? And it seems that earth [rather], because the sinner, since he is the lowest, ought to be subjected to the lowest creature; but earth is the lowest of all the elements and their dregs: therefore if the natural quality of fire does nothing toward acting upon the soul, but only the superadded power⁸; if it were given to earth, it would act equally well, and the order of divine justice would there appear more clearly.

p. 934 [margin: Opinion 2.] And therefore others wish to draw the reason on the part of the nature of the soul itself, which mode we can draw from Augustine in the twelfth [book] On Genesis¹, where he shows that the soul can suffer, while the body does not suffer, even the most bitter passions, as he there also proves by examples in dreams and in a certain sickness and in vexations. If therefore the soul draws with it corporeal affections and images, and through them and in them was able to suffer in the body apart from the body, even at the absence of fire; much more, when it is separated, will it be able to suffer in them and through them, with the infernal fire present; because, although there be no corporeal passion there, there is nonetheless an animal or spiritual passion there, which is a true passion and a true affliction, and through this a true punishment. — [margin: It does not suffice.] But this too does not suffice for a soul faithful [to belief], because we believe that the angelic spirits, which lack images and affections drawn from a body, are tormented by a corporeal fire. — We believe also that that infernal punishment is through a true action of fire, not through a fantastical imagination. — Furthermore, if a spiritual substance is certain² that it cannot be harmed by fire; then the imagination of fire does not generate in it terror or passion, unless something else occur than the nature of the soul itself or a disposition contracted from a body.

And therefore, since a sufficient reason cannot be drawn on the part of divine justice, which would quiet our reason, nor on the part of the soul alone, which would accord with faith; [margin: Conclusion 1.] therefore a reason can be drawn by looking to both in this manner. «For pain, as is clear through Augustine in the fourteenth [book] of the City of God³, is a dissent from those things which happen to us against our will». For this then, that pain be generated in the soul by something, [margin: The four requisites.] two things concur on the part of the soul, namely perception on the part of cognition and detestation on the part of affection. Likewise two things are required on the part of the agent: one is that it alter the perception of the soul; the other is that it adhere violently and inseparably against the resistance of the will. — [margin: They are determined.] Of these four, two are according to the order of nature, and the other two according to the order of divine justice. For that the fire alter the cognition⁴ of the soul, and that the soul perceive the action and heat of the fire; this belongs to the natural power of both; and this is clear thus. [margin: It is explained.] For when fire acts upon the composite of soul and body, there is a twofold passion there: one natural, and this is the heating of the body; the other animal, and this is the alteration of sense. The first passion is a true passion, because it is from the fire as truly acting; the second passion is from the soul moving itself and from the fire offering the occasion, according to what Augustine says in the sixth [book] of the Music⁵. As therefore, after the soul is separated, the body can suffer from fire by a natural passion, because it can be heated and set aflame, and this through the natural power of both; so the spirit can suffer by an animal passion and be altered by the fire present through the natural power of the fire and of the soul.

Two things therefore are there through the order of nature, two others through the order of divine justice. For that the fire be indissolubly bound to the soul, and the soul be enclosed in it as in a prison, belongs to divine justice, to which it pertains to enclose a malefactor in prison⁶. That again the soul shrink from the heat of the fire, which by nature cannot harm it, and tremble with fear where there is no fear⁷, this belongs to divine justice, which makes sinners tremble by sending in the terror and horror of that thing over which by nature they are superior. And although that be [a matter] of divine justice, this is not against the order of nature, whether it be the spirit trembling at what is not to be trembled at, or the spirit being bound to a body. — And this is what Augustine intimates in the twenty-first [book] of the City of God⁸, that just as the soul in the condition of man is joined to a body as giving it life, although the former is spiritual and the latter corporeal, and from that conjunction it vehemently conceives love toward the body; so it is bound to the fire as receiving from it punishment, and from that conjunction it vehemently conceives horror and through this also pain, which is true, and is caused both from the true corporeal fire and from the true application of the corporeal fire to the spirit according to the four aforesaid conditions. — These things seen, it is quite easy to reply to the objections.

1. 2. 3. As for what is objected concerning action, that it is through contrariety and contact; this is understood of natural action, to which corresponds a natural passion; and this is toward generating a like species in the patient according to nature; but here it is an animal passion, by which indeed a spiritual likeness is generated in the patient. Whence Gregory in the fourth [book] of the Dialogues⁹ says that souls burn in that they see the burning; yet he does not intend to say that the vision is the whole cause of the burning, but the perception of the fire

p. 935 present, together with horror, generates pain, because it is not a cognition of speculation only, but rather of experience. — And through this the reply is clear to the following [objection] and also to the other reasons, because there is no need to posit there that a created power be given to the fire, through which it might act upon the soul.

4. 5. To that which is objected on the part of the patient, that the soul is nobler than the body; it must be said that just as now the fire is said to act upon the soul joined to flesh and there to generate pain, not because the fire is wholly the doer, but because through the causation of the fire the soul has the necessary occasion of acting upon itself and suffering from itself, since it is what moves itself, as Augustine says in the sixth [book] of the Music¹; so it must be understood in the separated soul; but what here happens by the mediation of the body, there happens immediately. Whence neither in the joined [soul] nor in the separated one does it act by truly effecting, but by offering an occasion, and yet it is truly said to afflict and truly to punish, just as it is truly said to alter, although the soul rather makes the species in itself than that it be made in it by any body. — Nor does this stand in the way which is objected concerning sin: because sin does not so dispose the spirit to passion that it makes it truly material with respect to fire, since it is superior by nature; but it earns before divine justice that, the nature of the soul being preserved, God bind it to the fire and by binding imprison it², and by imprisoning send in the horror of its prison, and through this the soul itself, at the presence of the prison, afflict itself with true pain and sadness.

[margin: To be noted.] 6. To that which is objected concerning pain, that it is the division of parts; it must be said that that is not the general definition, but only of the pain which belongs to the soul from the flesh; but the one that Augustine assigns [is]: «pain is a dissent from those things» etc. For as Augustine shows in the twenty-first [book] of the City of God³, pain comes rather from the impediment of the soul's operation than from the cutting of the body, as is clear in paralytics, in whom there is a cutting of the parts without affliction, because the soul in them has no operation which would there be impeded; and since the powers of the soul, which are its parts, can in a certain way be disturbed and impeded in their operations by an occasion taken; hence it is that the spirit can grieve and be afflicted.

[margin: To be noted.] 7. To that which is objected last, that what punishes harms and what harms takes away; it must be said that just as in the taking away of sin something is taken away from the substance or power of the soul, not only from the aptitude for grace and justice⁴; so through the punitive fire that aptitude is taken away, according to which the soul is apt for the joy of glory and beatitude; nor is a new [thing] always being taken away, but that taking away is the continuation of the affliction, as was said above⁵ concerning the taking away which occurs in the body. — And let these things said suffice.

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Apparatus Criticus

1
Vers. 41: Discedite a me maledicti etc.
Verse 41: Depart from me, you cursed etc.
2
Cap. 29. Finem exhibet textus originalis sic: possint corporea sentire tormenta.
Chapter 29. The original text gives the ending thus: [souls] can feel corporeal torments.
1
August., III. de Lib. Arb. c. 9. n. 26. seq.: Cui [affectioni peccati] propterea poenalis adhibetur, ut ordinet eam, ubi talem esse non turpe sit et decori universitatis congruere cogat, ut peccati dedecus emendet poena peccati. Hinc fit, ut peccans creatura superior a creaturis inferioribus puniatur; quia illae tam sunt infimae, ut ornari etiam a turpibus animis possint atque ita decori universitatis congruere.
Augustine, On Free Will III, c. 9, n. 26 f.: To it [the disposition of sin] a penal [order] is applied for this reason, that it may order it, where it may compel [it] not to be shameful to be such and to be fitting to the beauty of the universe, so that the punishment of sin may mend the disgrace of sin. Hence it comes about that a sinning superior creature is punished by inferior creatures; because they are so lowly that they can be adorned even by base souls and thus be fitting to the beauty of the universe.
2
Cfr. August., XII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 32. n. 61.
Cf. Augustine, On Genesis to the Letter XII, c. 32, n. 61.
3
Vide Aristot., I. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 50. seqq. (c. 7.).
See Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption I, text 50 ff. (c. 7).
4
Cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 121; III. text. 6. et 37. seqq. (II. c. 12; III. c. 4. et 8.).
Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 121; III, text 6 and 37 ff. (II, c. 12; III, c. 4 and 8).
5
In cod. bb secunda manus bene supplevit: tertio a parte passionis, quarto a parte actionis.
In codex bb a second hand rightly supplied: thirdly on the part of the passion, fourthly on the part of the action.
6
Lib. I. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 43. et 50. seqq. (c. 7.), IX. Metaph. text. 10. (VIII. c. 5.).
Book I of On Generation and Corruption, text 43 and 50 ff. (c. 7); Metaphysics IX, text 10 (VIII, c. 5).
7
Aristot., I. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 51. (c. 7.): Ideo et rationabile iam, ignem calefacere, et frigidum infrigidare, et omnino activum assimilare sibi ipsi patiens. De minori cfr. Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 6. (c. 4.).
Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption I, text 51 (c. 7): And so it is now reasonable that fire heats, and the cold cools, and in general that the active assimilates the patient to itself. On the minor cf. Aristotle, On the Soul III, text 6 (c. 4).
8
Vide supra pag. 20, nota 10. — Voci adhuc nonnulli codd. praemittunt ergo.
See above, p. 20, note 10. — To the word adhuc some codices prefix ergo.
9
Cap. 5. n. 8, ubi ostendit, perabsurdum esse, quod anima fabricatori corpori sit subiecta materies; «nunquam enim anima est corpore deterior, et omnis materia fabricatore deterior». — Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 19. (c. 5.): Semper enim honorabilius est agens patiente, et principium materia. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 748, nota 1.
Chapter 5, n. 8, where he shows that it is utterly absurd that the soul be a subject matter to the body that fashions [it]; «for the soul is never worse than the body, and every matter is worse than what fashions it». — Aristotle, On the Soul III, text 19 (c. 5): For the agent is always more honorable than the patient, and the principle than the matter. Cf. tom. II, p. 748, note 1.
10
Cap. 5. n. 12: Quamvis enim anima nostra peccatis tabefacta sit, sublimior est tamen et melior, quam si in hanc lucem visibilem verteretur. Et vides profecto, de huius lucis eminentia quantum laudent animae Deum, etiam corporis sensibus deditae. Cfr. ibid. n. 16, et IX. de Civ. Dei, c. 9. Codd. et ed. 1 allegant librum secundum, ubi c. 17. n. 46. et c. 18. n. 48. generatim praestantia animae prae corpore asseritur. — Pro peccat codd. G L aa peccatrix.
Chapter 5, n. 12: For although our soul is wasted by sins, it is nevertheless more sublime and better than if it were turned into this visible light. And you see indeed, from the eminence of this light, how much souls praise God, even those given over to the bodily senses. Cf. ibid. n. 16, and City of God IX, c. 9. The codices and ed. 1 cite the second book, where at c. 17, n. 46 and c. 18, n. 48 the general pre-eminence of the soul over the body is asserted. — For peccat codices G L aa [read] peccatrix.
11
Supple hic peccatum, et mox cum codd. E L bb ignis post actioni (Aristot., IX. Metaph. text. 10. sive VIII. c. 5. requirit ad actionem et passionem, ut activum et passivum approximentur). — Edd. distant.
Supply here sin, and shortly, with codices E L bb, of fire after to action (Aristotle, Metaphysics IX, text 10, or VIII, c. 5, requires for action and passion that the active and passive be brought near). — The editions [read] they are distant.
12
Libr. VI. Topic. c. 3. (c. 6.). Cfr. tom. II. pag. 482, nota 3. — Pro minoris Vat. maioris, quae etiam cum ed. 1 superius pro in spiritu separato substituit in spiritum separatum.
Topics Book VI, c. 3 (c. 6). Cf. tom. II, p. 482, note 3. — For of the minor the Vatican [edition reads] of the major, which also, together with ed. 1, above substitutes for in a separated spirit [the reading] into a separated spirit.
1
In libro de Vera et falsa Poenitentia (inter opera August.), c. 19. n. 35. dicitur: Poena enim proprie dicitur laesio, quae punit et vindicat quod quisque commisit. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 41. a. 2. q. 3. in corp.
In the book On True and False Penitence (among the works of Augustine), c. 19, n. 35, it is said: For punishment is properly called a harm which punishes and avenges what each one has committed. Cf. II Sent., d. 41, a. 2, q. 3, in the body.
2
Nonnulli codd. incorporale, Vat. incorruptibile vel incorporale. Inferius pro necessario cod. L manifeste.
Some codices [read] incorporeal, the Vatican [edition] incorruptible or incorporeal. Below, for necessarily codex L [reads] manifestly.
3
Secundum Aristot. supra pag. 19, nota 5. allegatum. De quatuor affectionibus (gaudium, dolor, spes et timor) vide tom. III. pag. 555, nota 7. et pag. 556, nota 5, nec non August., XXI. de Civ. Dei, c. 3. n. 2. — Mox pro incorporeus, quod praebent codd. F G O Q U aa, alii codd. et edd. corporeus.
According to Aristotle, cited above p. 19, note 5. On the four affections (joy, pain, hope and fear) see tom. III, p. 555, note 7, and p. 556, note 5, as well as Augustine, City of God XXI, c. 3, n. 2. — Shortly, for incorporeal, which codices F G O Q U aa give, the other codices and editions [read] corporeal.
4
Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 9, hanc opinionem referens ait: Unde Algazel, V. libro Physicorum, c. 5, dicit de anima, quae in corpore fuit amatrix corporalium voluptatum, quod illa dispositio propter usum imprimitur in ea et inhaeret vehementer desiderium eius ad illam; postea vero, per mortem, instrumento rei desideratae amisso, remanet desiderium eius et amor; et hic est cruciatus ineffabilis. Cfr. Avicenna, Metaph. tr. 9. c. 7, ubi docet: Animae vero malae vident etiam poenam, quam imaginaverant in hoc mundo, et affliguntur ea; forma enim imaginata non est debilior sensibili, sed est maior impressione et claritate, sicut videmus in somnis etc.
Richard of Middleton, here a. 2, q. 9, reporting this opinion, says: Whence Algazel, in the fifth book of the Physics, c. 5, says of a soul which in the body was a lover of corporeal pleasures, that that disposition is impressed in it through use, and its desire toward that [pleasure] clings vehemently; but afterwards, through death, the instrument of the desired thing being lost, its desire and love remain; and this is an ineffable torment. Cf. Avicenna, Metaphysics tr. 9, c. 7, where he teaches: But evil souls see also the punishment which they had imagined in this world, and are afflicted by it; for the imagined form is not weaker than the sensible one, but is greater in impression and clarity, as we see in dreams etc.
5
Vers. 41. — Inferius pro requirit cod. A requiritur.
Verse 41. — Below, for requires codex A [reads] is required.
6
Scilicet fundam. 3. — Aliquanto inferius pro merito tamen edd. cum aliquot codd. merito causae.
Namely, fundamentum 3. — Somewhat below, for yet by merit the editions, with some codices, [read] by the merit of the cause.
7
Simile habetur apud August., II. de Gen. ad lit. c. 1. n. 2. — Inferius pro terra edd. bis (secundo loco etiam multi codd.) terrae, quae lectio, ut sit congrua, requirit, quod pro actioni cum cod. F substituatur actio.
A similar [statement] is found in Augustine, On Genesis to the Letter II, c. 1, n. 2. — Below, for earth the editions twice (in the second place also many codices) [read] to earth, which reading, to be congruous, requires that for to the action one substitute, with codex F, action.
8
Ita cod. aa, in aliis et edd. male videtur. Mox pro volunt codd. L Y tentaverunt.
So codex aa; in the others and in the editions, wrongly, it seems. Shortly, for they wish codices L Y [read] they attempted.
1
Cap. 32. n. 61.
Chapter 32, n. 61.
2
Cod. U creata, cod. L separata, codd. W Y separata; ceteri codd. et edd. certa.
Codex U [reads] created, codex L separated, codices W Y separated; the rest of the codices and the editions [read] certain.
3
Cap. 15. n. 2. Cfr. supra pag. 383, nota 6.
Chapter 15, n. 2. Cf. above, p. 383, note 6.
4
Cod. K perceptionem sive cognitionem.
Codex K [reads] perception or cognition.
5
Cap. 5. n. 9. et 12. — Superius pro vera passio codd. HU naturae passio, edd. a natura, quia est passio vera. Inferius pro quia potest calefieri cod. Z et ab igne praesenti immutari.
Chapter 5, n. 9 and 12. — Above, for a true passion codices H U [read] a passion of nature, the editions from nature, because it is a true passion. Below, for because it can be heated codex Z [reads] and be altered by the fire present.
6
Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 6, verba August.
See here the text of the Master, c. 6, the words of Augustine.
7
Psalm. 52, 6: Trepidaverunt timore, ubi non erat timor. — Superius post per naturam cod. F supplet ei.
Psalm 52:6: They trembled with fear, where there was no fear. — Above, after by nature codex F supplies to it.
8
Cap. 10. n. 1, ubi docet, spiritus corporeis ignibus cruciari «miris et ineffabilibus modis adhaerendo, accipientes ex ignibus poenam, non dantes ignibus vitam. Quia et iste alius modus, quo corporibus adhaerent spiritus et animalia fiunt, omnino mirus est nec comprehendi ab homine potest, et hoc ipse homo est». — In hac sententia inferius pro sic ligatur edd. sic spiritus ligatus. Eaedem edd. superius post hoc supplent tamen, et pro quod trepidandum substituunt ubi trepidandum.
Chapter 10, n. 1, where he teaches that spirits are tormented by corporeal fires «by clinging in wondrous and ineffable ways, receiving punishment from the fires, not giving life to the fires. For that other mode too, by which spirits cling to bodies and animals come to be, is altogether wondrous and cannot be comprehended by man—and this is man himself». — In this passage, below, for is bound thus the editions [read] thus is a spirit bound. The same editions above, after this, supply nevertheless, and for what is to be trembled at substitute where it is to be trembled at.
9
Cap. 29. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 7. — Superius voci istud cod. S praemittit dicendum quod.
Chapter 29. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 7. — Above, to the word this codex S prefixes it must be said that.
1
Cap. 5. n. 9. et 12. — Superius pro generare non pauci codd. aggenerare, et pro causationem codd. E F G M N O Y actionem, multi alii cum ed. 1 curationem, Vat. approximationem vel causationem.
Chapter 5, n. 9 and 12. — Above, for to generate not a few codices [read] to generate in addition, and for causation codices E F G M N O Y [read] action, many others, with ed. 1, procurement, the Vatican [edition] approximation or causation.
2
Ita cod. E, in aliis et edd. incarceretur. Superius pro a corpore Vat. in corpore.
So codex E; in the others and in the editions [it reads] be imprisoned. Above, for by the body the Vatican [edition reads] in the body.
3
Cap. 3. n. 2. Cfr. ibid. XIV. c. 15. n. 2, ubi etiam praenotata definitio doloris occurrit. Clarius tamen quae hic exhibentur proponit August. in VI. Musicae, c. 5. n. 9. seqq. — In fine solut. verbis occasione accepta cod. Y interserit ab extrinseco.
Chapter 3, n. 2. Cf. ibid. XIV, c. 15, n. 2, where also the aforementioned definition of pain occurs. More clearly, however, Augustine sets out what is here presented in the Music VI, c. 5, n. 9 ff. — At the end of the solution, to the words by an occasion taken codex Y inserts from without.
4
Vide II. Sent. d. 35. a. 1. q. 1. et a. 2. q. 3. — De laesione poenae cfr. August., XIX. de Civ. Dei, c. 13. n. 2.
See II Sent., d. 35, a. 1, q. 1 and a. 2, q. 3. — On the harm of punishment cf. Augustine, City of God XIX, c. 13, n. 2.
5
Quaest. praeced. ad 2. — Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
The preceding question, [reply] to 2. — See the scholion to the preceding question.