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Dist. 36, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 36

Textus Latinus
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QUAESTIO II.

Utrum passiones animae poenae tantum sint, an poenae simul et peccata.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum passiones animae sint poenae tantum, an poenae simul et peccata. Et quod sint poenae et peccata, videtur.

1. Omne illud, pro quo quis meretur mortem aeternam, est peccatum; sed pro passionibus animae meretur quis mortem aeternam, Matthaei quinto1: Qui irascitur fratri suo reus erit gehennae ignis: ergo ira, quae est passio animae, est culpa; pari ratione et aliae passiones animae.

2. Item, omne illud, quod directe repugnat virtuti, est culpa; sed ira et invidia et aliae passiones animae repugnant virtutibus: ergo etc.

3. Item, omne illud, quod est contra rationem rectam, est culpa; sed passio animae, quae « est dolor de alieno bono2 », est contra rationem rectam, quae de illo iudicat esse gaudendum: ergo etc.

4. Item, illud maxime tenet rationem culpae, quod maxime est impugnativum gratiae; sed invidentia gratiae fraternae maxime repugnat gratiae Spiritus sancti3: ergo cum haec sit passio animae et poena, videtur, quod passiones animae sint peccata.

5. Item, ad hoc ipsum est ratio Augustini, in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum4. Arguit enim sic: « Omnis perturbatio est passio; omnis cupiditas est perturbatio: ergo omnis cupiditas est passio »; sed planum est, quod cupiditas est culpa: ergo peccatum est passio, et e converso; redit igitur idem quod prius.

Sed contra: 1. « In omni peccato, sicut vult Augustinus in libro de Libero Arbitrio5 regnat libido »; ubicumque autem regnat libido, ibi est improba delectatio: ergo omne peccatum, in quantum peccatum, delectat. Sed huiusmodi passiones animae eam puniunt et contristant: ergo videtur, quod non sint peccata.

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2. Item, omnis culpa actualis est voluntaria; sed istae passiones animae non sunt voluntariae6: ergo non sunt culpa, sed tantum poena.

3. Item, omni culpa vituperamur; « passionibus autem animae non laudamur nec vituperamur », sicut vult Philosophus7: ergo passiones animae non sunt peccata.

4. Item, « opposita sunt nata esse in eodem genere8 », sed nulla virtus est passio, cum omnis virtus sit in genere habitus: ergo nullum vitium sive peccatum est passio.

5. Item, in omni peccato est conversio ad commutabile bonum; in huiusmodi autem passionibus animae, quae sunt invidia, ira, tristitia, potius est taedium boni et aversio quam conversio: ergo tales passiones animae non sunt culpae.

CONCLUSIO.

Passiones quaedam animae et poenae et peccata sunt, quatenus oriuntur vel ex corruptione concupiscentiae, vel ex inordinato amore voluntatis deliberativae.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sicut expresse dicit Magister in littera9 et probat per auctoritatem Augustini, multae sunt passiones animae, quae sunt non solum poenales, verum etiam culpabiles, sicut ira et invidia. Licet autem huiusmodi passiones peccata sint, tamen peccata non sunt in quantum passiones, sicut idem Augustinus dicit, et habetur in littera10: « Omnis autem passio, in quantum ipsa aliquis patitur, non est peccatum »; sed huiusmodi passiones peccata sunt ratione inordinationis voluntatis coniunctae vel antecedenter, vel consequenter.

Propter quod notandum est, quod quaedam est passio illata ab extrinseco, et circa hanc non consistit meritum nec demeritum, nisi in quantum a voluntate respuitur vel acceptatur. Unde occidi pro Christo non est meritorium, nisi in quantum volitum est ab eo qui occiditur. Unde proprie loquendo, in talibus passionibus passio non est meritoria11, sed sufferentia passionis.

Est et alia passio, quae ortum habet ab intrinseco. Et haec dupliciter potest oriri, quia quaedam oritur ex corruptione naturae, quaedam vero ex conversione voluntatis liberae. — Et illa quae oritur ex corruptione naturae, in duplici differentia est; quoniam natura corrupta est vitiosa corruptione per concupiscentiam, et corrupta est corruptione poenali per mortalitatem inflictam. Illae igitur passiones, quae oriuntur ex corruptione naturae, ut est corrupta poenali corruptione, tenent rationem poenae tantum, ut fames et sitis; illae vero, quae oriuntur ab ipsa, ut est corrupta corruptione vitiosa, non tantum habent rationem poenae, sed etiam culpae; sicut sunt inordinatae affectiones animae, quae consurgunt ex morbo concupiscentiae, et tales sunt passiones irae et invidiae et consimiles12.

Secundum autem quod huiusmodi passiones oriuntur ex conversione voluntatis ad aliquod bonum amabile, sic, secundum quod voluntas habet converti dupliciter, passiones huiusmodi sunt in duplici genere. Voluntas enim aliquando convertitur ad bonum simpliciter, et tunc detestatur et odit quod adversatur illi bono, utpote peccatum; et hoc modo passiones inde consurgentes sunt iustae et meritoriae. — Convertitur etiam voluntas aliquando ad bonum proprium et ad bonum ut nunc; et tunc passiones, quae inde consurgunt, culpabiles sunt et malae, sicut et voluntas, a qua oriuntur; sed non habent plenam rationem mali et culpae, nisi quando in voluntate consummantur, utpote cum aliquis vult irasci et invidere et etiam contristari. — Et sic patet, quod huiusmodi passiones animae peccata sunt, et in quantum oriuntur ex corruptione concupiscentiae13, et in quantum ortum habent ex inordinato amore voluntatis deliberativae. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, aliquas passiones animae esse peccata.

1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur primo in contrarium, quod libido regnat in omni peccato; dicendum, quod verum est, secundum quod libido dicitur improba voluntas; sed non oportet, secundum quod libido dicitur immoderata delectatio1415. — Nihilominus tamen potest dici, quod et in istis peccatis reperitur libido respectu proprii motivi. Nam invidus delectatur in boni singularitate, et iracundus delectatur in adeptione vindictae. Immo quod plus est, sicut vir iustus ex rectitudine voluntatis delectatur dolendo de malo culpae, sic etiam invidus quandam refectionem invenit in dolendo de aliena prosperitate, ita quod delectatio est de uno, et tristitia est de altero. Quemadmodum enim aliquis, dum amisit illud quod multum dilexit, vehementer tristatur, et magna est illi consolatio posse tristari, et ibi solum invenit quietem in fletu et dolore, sicut Augustinus in quarto Confessionum16 dicit de se; sic invidus in dolendo de bono alieno in illa passione

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invenit quandam delectationem in eo, quod placet sibi de bono alieno contabescere; illa tamen delectatio multum est respersa amaritudine.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod passiones sunt involuntariae; dicendum, quod involuntarium dicitur dupliciter, sicut et voluntarium: uno modo dicitur voluntarium, cuius principium est voluntas; alio modo dicitur voluntarium, quod concomitatur voluntas17. Et secundum hunc duplicem modum dupliciter dicitur involuntarium: uno modo, ut dicatur involuntarium, quod non est a voluntate efficiente; alio modo, ut dicatur involuntarium, quod non fit cum voluntate concomitante. Primo igitur modo accipiendo involuntarium, sic veritatem habet de passionibus, quae fiunt ab extrinseco, quia earum18 principium est extra; voluntarium autem est, cuius principium est in ipso. Non autem habet veritatem in passionibus, quae sunt ab intrinseco, sicut prius ostensum est, immo possunt esse voluntariae, non solum sicut a voluntate concomitante, immo sicut a voluntate causante, dum diligit aliquid inordinate.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod passionibus non laudamur nec vituperamur; dicendum, quod hoc verum est, per se loquendo; prout tamen radicem habent ex voluntate, et voluntas concomitatur eis, et laudari possumus et vituperari, sicut prius ostensum est. Ideo ratio illa non concludit, quod huiusmodi passiones non sint peccata, sed quod peccata non sint, in quantum eis patimur.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nulla virtus est passio; iam patet responsio. Nam aliqua virtus potest circa passiones consistere, sicut patientia et fortitudo, prout illae passiones efficiuntur voluntariae. Sic et in proposito intelligendum est esse. — Nihilominus tamen potest dici, quod quamvis passio non sit virtus nisi ex actu voluntatis simul coexistentis, potest tamen aliqua passio, in quantum egreditur a natura vitiata et corrupta, esse peccatum. Nec valet illa ratio, cum plura exigantur ad complendum bonum quam ad committendum malum19.

5. Ad ultimum iam patet responsio. Nam istae passiones oriuntur ex conversione voluntatis ad commutabile bonum, et ideo peccata sunt; nunquam enim quis invideret alicui, nisi nimis amaret proprium bonum; et ut vult Damascenus20, « ira vindex est laesae concupiscentiae »; immo generaliter, sicut ostendit Augustinus in decimo quarto de Civitate Dei, omnes huiusmodi passiones ortum habent ex amore.

SCHOLION

I. Quaestio est de passionibus poenalibus generaliter sumtis, quatenus omnes poenales affectiones animae comprehendunt, ut explicatur in textu. Passio, qua passio, non est nec peccatum nec meritum, sed tantum quatenus multipliciter relationem habet ad voluntatem. — Quomodo autem anima pati possit, explicatur IV. Sent. d. 44. p. II. a. 3. q. 2; quomodo per passionem quis meretur, III. Sent. d. 18. a. 1. q. 3. De passionibus, ut sunt animae affectiones, cfr. III. Sent. d. 26. a. 1. q. 1. et praecipue S. Thom., S. I. II. q. 22. et seqq.

II. S. Thom., hic a. 2; S. I. II. q. 24. a. 1-4. — B. Albert., hic a. 5; S. p. II. tr. 22. q. 132. m. 1. a. 3. et m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.

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English Translation

QUESTION II.

Whether the passions of the soul are punishments only, or punishments and sins at once.

Secondly it is asked, whether the passions of the soul are punishments only, or punishments and sins at once. And that they are punishments and sins, it seems.

1. Everything for which one merits eternal death is sin; but for the passions of the soul one merits eternal death, Matthew the fifth1: He who is angry with his brother shall be liable to the fire of Gehenna: therefore anger, which is a passion of the soul, is guilt; by parity of reasoning, the other passions of the soul also.

2. Likewise, everything which directly opposes a virtue is guilt; but anger and envy and the other passions of the soul oppose the virtues: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, everything which is against right reason is guilt; but a passion of the soul, which « is grief over another's good2 », is against right reason, which judges concerning that [good] that it ought to be rejoiced over: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, that most holds the character of guilt which is most impugnative of grace; but envy of a brotherly grace is most opposed to the grace of the Holy Spirit3: therefore since this is a passion of the soul and a punishment, it seems that the passions of the soul are sins.

5. Likewise, to this same point there is the reasoning of Augustine, in the book Of Eighty-three Questions4. For he argues thus: « Every disturbance is a passion; every desire is a disturbance: therefore every desire is a passion »; but it is plain that desire is guilt: therefore sin is a passion, and conversely; the same thing therefore returns as before.

On the contrary: 1. « In every sin, as Augustine holds in the book On Free Will5, lust reigns »; but wherever lust reigns, there is wicked delight: therefore every sin, insofar as it is sin, delights. But passions of this kind punish and sadden it [the soul]: therefore it seems that they are not sins.

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2. Likewise, every actual guilt is voluntary; but these passions of the soul are not voluntary6: therefore they are not guilt, but only punishment.

3. Likewise, by every guilt we are blamed; « but by the passions of the soul we are neither praised nor blamed », as the Philosopher holds7: therefore the passions of the soul are not sins.

4. Likewise, « opposites are by nature in the same genus8 », but no virtue is a passion, since every virtue is in the genus of habit: therefore no vice or sin is a passion.

5. Likewise, in every sin there is a conversion to a changeable good; but in passions of the soul of this kind, which are envy, anger, sadness, there is rather a weariness of the good and an aversion than a conversion: therefore such passions of the soul are not guilts.

CONCLUSION.

Certain passions of the soul are both punishments and sins, insofar as they arise either from the corruption of concupiscence, or from the disordered love of the deliberative will.

I respond: It must be said that, as the Master expressly says in the text9 and proves through the authority of Augustine, there are many passions of the soul which are not only penal, but also culpable, such as anger and envy. But although passions of this kind are sins, nevertheless they are not sins insofar as they are passions, as the same Augustine says, and it is had in the text10: « But every passion, insofar as one undergoes it, is not sin »; rather passions of this kind are sins by reason of the disorder of the will joined [to them] either antecedently, or consequently.

On account of which it is to be noted that a certain passion is brought in from without, and around this there consists neither merit nor demerit, except insofar as it is rejected or accepted by the will. Hence to be killed for Christ is not meritorious, except insofar as it is willed by him who is killed. Hence properly speaking, in such passions the passion is not meritorious11, but the suffering of the passion [is].

There is also another passion, which has its origin from within. And this can arise in two ways, because one arises from the corruption of nature, but another from the conversion of the free will. — And that which arises from the corruption of nature is in a twofold difference; since nature is corrupt with a vicious corruption through concupiscence, and is corrupt with a penal corruption through inflicted mortality. Those passions, therefore, which arise from the corruption of nature, as it is corrupt with a penal corruption, hold the character of punishment only, such as hunger and thirst; but those which arise from it [nature], as it is corrupt with a vicious corruption, hold not only the character of punishment, but also of guilt; such as are the disordered affections of the soul, which spring up from the disease of concupiscence, and such are the passions of anger and of envy and the like12.

But according as passions of this kind arise from the conversion of the will to some lovable good, thus, according as the will has to convert itself in two ways, passions of this kind are in a twofold genus. For the will sometimes converts itself to the good simply, and then it detests and hates what is adverse to that good, namely sin; and in this way the passions arising therefrom are just and meritorious. — The will sometimes also converts itself to its own good and to the good as-now; and then the passions which arise therefrom are culpable and evil, just as also the will from which they arise; but they do not have the full character of evil and of guilt, except when they are consummated in the will, namely when someone wills to be angry and to envy and even to be saddened. — And thus it is clear that passions of this kind of the soul are sins, both insofar as they arise from the corruption of concupiscence13, and insofar as they have their origin from the disordered love of the deliberative will. — The reasons, therefore, showing that some passions of the soul are sins, are to be granted.

1. But to that which is first objected to the contrary, that lust reigns in every sin; it must be said that this is true, according as lust is called a wicked will; but it is not necessary, according as lust is called immoderate delight1415. — Nevertheless it can be said that even in these sins lust is found with respect to its proper motive. For the envious man delights in the singularity of [his own] good, and the angry man delights in the obtaining of vengeance. Indeed, what is more, just as the just man from the rectitude of his will delights in grieving over the evil of guilt, so also the envious man finds a certain refreshment in grieving over another's prosperity, so that the delight is over one thing, and the sadness over another. For just as someone, when he has lost that which he greatly loved, is vehemently saddened, and it is a great consolation to him to be able to be saddened, and there alone does he find rest in weeping and grief, as Augustine in the fourth [book] of the Confessions16 says of himself; so the envious man, in grieving over another's good, in that passion

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finds a certain delight in this, that it pleases him to waste away over another's good; that delight, nevertheless, is much sprinkled with bitterness.

2. To that which is objected, that the passions are involuntary; it must be said that the involuntary is said in two ways, just as also the voluntary: in one way that is called voluntary whose principle is the will; in another way that is called voluntary which the will accompanies17. And according to this twofold mode the involuntary is said in two ways: in one way, that the involuntary be that which is not from an efficient will; in another way, that the involuntary be that which does not come about with an accompanying will. Taking the involuntary, therefore, in the first way, thus it holds the truth concerning the passions which come about from without, because their18 principle is outside; but the voluntary is that whose principle is in itself. But it does not hold the truth in the passions which are from within, as was shown before, but rather they can be voluntary, not only as from an accompanying will, but rather as from a causing will, while it loves something in a disordered way.

3. To that which is objected, that by the passions we are neither praised nor blamed; it must be said that this is true, speaking per se; yet inasmuch as they have their root from the will, and the will accompanies them, we can be both praised and blamed, as was shown before. Therefore that reasoning does not conclude that passions of this kind are not sins, but that they are not sins, insofar as we undergo them.

4. To that which is objected, that no virtue is a passion; the response is now plain. For some virtue can consist around the passions, such as patience and fortitude, inasmuch as those passions are made voluntary. So also in the matter at hand it is to be understood to be. — Nevertheless it can be said that, although a passion is not a virtue except from the act of a will simultaneously coexisting, yet some passion, insofar as it issues from a vitiated and corrupt nature, can be sin. Nor is that reasoning valid, since more things are required to complete the good than to commit the evil19.

5. To the last [objection] the response is now plain. For these passions arise from the conversion of the will to a changeable good, and therefore they are sins; for no one would ever envy another, unless he loved his own good too much; and as Damascene holds20, « anger is the avenger of injured concupiscence »; indeed generally, as Augustine shows in the fourteenth [book] On the City of God, all passions of this kind have their origin from love.

SCHOLION

I. The question is about penal passions taken generally, inasmuch as they comprehend all the penal affections of the soul, as is explained in the text. A passion, as passion, is neither sin nor merit, but only insofar as it has a manifold relation to the will. — But how the soul can undergo [passion] is explained in IV. Sent. d. 44. p. II. a. 3. q. 2; how one merits through passion, in III. Sent. d. 18. a. 1. q. 3. Concerning the passions, as they are affections of the soul, cfr. III. Sent. d. 26. a. 1. q. 1. and especially St. Thomas, Summa I. II. q. 22. and following.

II. St. Thomas, here a. 2; Summa I. II. q. 24. a. 1-4. — B. Albert, here a. 5; Summa p. II. tr. 22. q. 132. m. 1. a. 3. and m. 2. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 1. a. 3. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 1. q. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 1. a. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 3.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 22: Qui irascitur fratri suo reus erit iudicio. Qui autem dixerit fratri suo: raca reus erit concilio. Qui autem dixerit: fatue, reus erit gehennae ignis.
    Verse 22: He who is angry with his brother shall be liable to judgment. But he who shall say to his brother: raca, shall be liable to the council. But he who shall say: fool, shall be liable to the fire of Gehenna.
  2. Damasc., II. de Fide orthod. c. 14, ubi haec definitio invidiae ponitur. — Pro animae, quam vocem exhibent edd. cum multis codd., codd. I V W Z invidiae.
    Damascene, II. On the Orthodox Faith c. 14, where this definition of envy is set down. — For animae ("of the soul"), which word the editions exhibit with many codices, codd. I V W Z [read] invidiae ("of envy").
  3. Vide infra d. 43. a. 3. q. 1. — Pro fraternae codd. T bb ee et alii cum ed. 2 supernae. Subinde pro repugnat gratiae Spiritus sancti codd. K W X Z bb etc. impugnat Spiritus sancti gratiam, cod. F repugnat Spiritui sancto, alii codd. repugnat gratiam (1).
    See below d. 43. a. 3. q. 1. — For fraternae ("brotherly") codd. T bb ee and others, with ed. 2, [read] supernae ("heavenly"). Thereafter, for repugnat gratiae Spiritus sancti codd. K W X Z bb etc. [read] impugnat Spiritus sancti gratiam, cod. F repugnat Spiritui sancto, other codd. repugnat gratiam (1).
  4. Quaest. 77. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 6. — In non paucis codd., ut F H I L O R S etc., et in edd. 1, 2 habetur tantum maior cum testimonio Augustini; minor et conclusio desunt.
    Question 77. Cfr. here the Master's text, c. 6. — In not a few codices, such as F H I L O R S etc., and in edd. 1, 2 there is had only the major [premise] with the testimony of Augustine; the minor and the conclusion are lacking.
  5. Libr. I. c. 3. n. 8; Clarum est enim, iam nihil aliud quam libidinem in toto male faciendi genere dominari. Cfr. supra pag. 734, nota 9.
    Book I. c. 3. n. 8: For it is clear that now nothing other than lust dominates in the whole kind of evil-doing. Cfr. above p. 734, note 9.
  6. Vide supra pag. 719, nota 1.
    See above p. 719, note 1.
  7. Verba Philosophi vide supra pag. 113, nota 8.
    For the words of the Philosopher see above p. 113, note 8.
  8. Secundum Aristot., de quo vide supra pag. 814, nota 8. — De minori cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Quali, et II. Ethic. c. 5.
    According to Aristotle, concerning whom see above p. 814, note 8. — On the minor cfr. Aristotle, On the Categories c. On Quality, and II. Ethics c. 5.
  9. Cfr. supra pag. 839, nota 1.
    Cfr. above p. 839, note 1.
  10. Hic c. 6.
    Here c. 6.
  11. Hic c. 6. — Mox pro ipsa cod. cc et ed. 1 ipsam.
    Here c. 6. — Soon, for ipsa cod. cc and ed. 1 [read] ipsam.
  12. In codd. K Iv P (Q a prima manu) Z et aliis nec non in Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4 deest passio et pro meritoria legitur meritorium, cui verbo Vat. et edd. 3, 4 insuper praefigunt quid. — Cfr. August., XIII. de Civ. Dei, c. 4-8.
    In codd. K Iv P (Q from the first hand) Z and others, as well as in the Vatican [edition] and edd. 2, 3, 4 passio is lacking and for meritoria there is read meritorium, to which word the Vatican [edition] and edd. 3, 4 moreover prefix quid. — Cfr. Augustine, XIII. On the City of God, c. 4-8.
  13. Cfr. supra d. 30. a. 1. q. 1. seq. — Mox voci passiones edd., excepta 1, addunt animae.
    Cfr. above d. 30. a. 1. q. 1. and following. — Soon, to the word passiones the editions, except 1, add animae.
  14. Cfr. August., IX. de Civ. Dei, c. 4. seq. et XIV. c. 3-11. et 15. n. 2.
    Cfr. Augustine, IX. On the City of God, c. 4. and following, and XIV. c. 3-11. and 15. n. 2.
  15. De hac duplici significatione vocis libidinis vide supra d. 31. a. 2. q. 3. in corp.
    Concerning this twofold signification of the word libido see above d. 31. a. 2. q. 3. in the body.
  16. Cap. 6. n. 11.
    Chapter 6. n. 11.
  17. De hac duplici distinctione voluntarii vide supra d. 25. p. II. q. 4. arg. 1. ad opposit., et de definitione voluntarii, quae in seqq. occurrit, cfr. supra pag. 592, nota 3. Damascenus, II. de Fide orthod. c. 24. ait: Quaecumque propter iram agimus, non praeconsiliantes, voluntarie facimus, non tamen secundum electionem.
    Concerning this twofold distinction of the voluntary see above d. 25. p. II. q. 4. arg. 1. to the contrary, and concerning the definition of the voluntary, which occurs in the following, cfr. above p. 592, note 3. Damascene, II. On the Orthodox Faith c. 24, says: Whatever we do on account of anger, not deliberating beforehand, we do voluntarily, yet not according to choice.
  18. Primae edd. cum multis codd. eorum; perperam.
    The first editions, with many codices, [read] eorum; wrongly.
  19. Bonum enim ex integra causa, malum ex quovis defectu. Cfr. Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 6, et Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 4. § 30. — Paulo superius codd. F bb existentis pro coexistentis.
    For the good is from an entire cause, the evil from any defect whatever. Cfr. Aristotle, II. Ethics c. 6, and Dionysius, On the Divine Names c. 4. § 30. — A little above, codd. F bb [read] existentis for coexistentis.
  20. Libr. II. de Fide orthod. c. 16. Cfr. supra pag. 560, nota 2. — Testimonium Augustini, quod mox signatur, habetur loc. cit. c. 7. n. 2.
    Book II. On the Orthodox Faith c. 16. Cfr. above p. 560, note 2. — The testimony of Augustine, which is soon noted, is had at the cited place c. 7. n. 2.
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