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Dist. 38, Art. 1, Q. 4

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 38

Textus Latinus
p. 888

Quaestio IV. Utrum malae voluntates habeant unicum finem.

Quarto quaeritur, utrum malae voluntates habeant unicum finem. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Augustinus super illum locum Psalmi1: Scrutans corda etc.: « Finis curae et cogitationis humanae est delectatio, ad quam quisque nititur pervenire »: si ergo omnes voluntates malae finaliter quaerunt delectationem, videtur, quod omnium voluntatum malarum sit unum finem assignare.

2. Item, malarum voluntatum est unus malus exitus sive terminus, sicut dicitur ad Romanos sexto2: Quorum finis mors est: ergo si earum contingat esse unum terminum, pari ratione videtur, quod contingat esse unum finem ultimum.

3. Item, quae conveniunt in principio conveniunt et in fine ultimo; sed omnes malae voluntates conveniunt in principio, sicut dicit Augustinus in libro de Vera Religione3: « Planum est, inquit, in toto malefaciendi genere nihil aliud quam libidinem dominari ». Si ergo conveniunt in uno principio, utpote in libidine, videtur pari ratione, quod conveniant in uno fine.

4. Item, vitium imitatur virtutem secundum apparentiam4; unde sicut virtus nunquam quiescit citra beatitudinem veram, ita vitium inquirit beatitudinem simulatam: ergo sicut omnes virtutes faciunt tendere voluntatem ad unum finem, scilicet beatitudinem; sic videtur, quod omnia vitia faciant tendere voluntatem ad unum finem, scilicet qui habeat similitudinem cum vero fine.

Sed contra: 1. Contrariarum voluntatum contrariae sunt delectationes, ubi autem sunt delectationes contrariae, ibi sunt fines diversi; sed voluptates faciunt voluntates sibi invicem repugnare: ergo faciunt diversos fines habere.

2. Item, mala voluntas ponit finem in creatura; sed impossibile est, quod in una creatura inveniat nostra voluntas sufficientiam, cum nihil sufficiat voluntati humanae nisi sola Trinitas5: si ergo voluntas non quiescit nisi in eo fine, in quo ponit sufficientiam; videtur necessario, quod voluntas mala diversos sibi fines constituat.

3. Item, malae voluntatis appetitus ortum et radicem habet ex libidine; sed libido est quo quis amat bonum proprium6: si ergo bonum proprium necessario diversificatur in diversis, necesse est, diversarum voluntatum diversos fines reperiri.

4. Item, unitas et conformitas voluntatum bonarum venit ex unitate amoris, in quo uniuntur et colligantur7. Si ergo amor, in quo diversi colligantur et uniuntur, unicam debet habere radicem, in pluribus repertam, cum hoc non conveniat amori libidinis, sed solum amori caritatis, qui est amor Spiritus sancti; videtur, quod malarum voluntatum non sit finis unicus, sed diversi.

Conclusio

Voluntates malae differentes non unum, sed diversos fines sibi constituunt.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod e contrario est in bonis voluntatibus et in malis. Nam bonarum voluntatum unicus est finis, sive bonae voluntates sint diversae diversitate numerali8, sive diversitate formali. Diversitatem autem numeralem voco, quando plures homines in eodem genere affectionis afficiuntur circa aliquid; diversitatem autem formalem voco, quando idem homo diversis habitibus virtutum afficitur circa diversa. Sive enim sic, sive sic, licet contingat plures fines proximos et proprios assignare, tamen finem ultimum et principalem necesse est esse unicum, videlicet ipsum Deum.

Et ratio huius est et perfectio amoris moventis, et perfectio appetibilis quietantis. Quia enim amor caritatis liberalis est, et non quaerit quod suum est, sed bonum commune9; hinc est, quod plures homines, ex caritate moti, idem bonum appetunt finaliter. Rursus, quia appetibile illud completissimum est, in quo non solum contingit reperire bonum perfectum, sed etiam omne bonum; hinc est, quod omnes voluntates, quantumcumque diversae10, inveniunt finem suum, in quo quietantur.

p. 889

— Econtra est in malis voluntatibus propter imperfectionem amoris et appetibilis. Propter imperfectionem namque amoris libidinosi voluntates solo numero differentes diversos habent fines, propterea quod amor libidinosus semper quaerit quod suum est; et quia semper quaerit bonum proprium, ideo etsi multi ex amore libidinoso conveniant in actum unum, tamen unusquisque quaerit finem suum proprium, ut patet in adultero et meretrice, quia iste quaerit delectationem, et illa quaerit nummum. — Propter imperfectionem etiam appetibilis necesse est, diversas voluntates formaliter differentes habere diversos fines. Quia enim luxuria appetit iucunditatem et laetitiam, et avaritia sufficientiam, et superbia excellentiam; et haec omnia non contingit reperire circa eandem rem creatam, sed circa diversas: hinc est, quod voluntates malae differentes formaliter non unum, sed diversos fines sibi constituunt. — Unde concedendae sunt rationes, quae hoc ostendunt.

1. Ad illud quod primo obiicitur, quod delectatio est finis curae et cogitationis: dicendum, quod in ratione illa est figura dictionis, pro eo quod non eadem delectatio est finis curae et cogitationis humanae, sed diversae. Unde stat ibi delectatio in sua generalitate et magis habet ibi suppositionem simplicem quam personalem; et ideo, cum per delectationem descendit ad finis unitatem, fit sophisticatio secundum figuram dictionis ex commutatione suppositionis11.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod malarum voluntatum est unus malus exitus, ergo unus malus finis: dicendum, quod non est simile. Nam malae voluntates differunt in conversione, sed conveniunt in aversione; et malus exitus principalius respicit aversionem quam conversionem, finis vero movens principalius respicit conversionem quam aversionem. Ideo non sequitur, quod quamvis12 sit unus exitus quoad mortem damnationis, quod propter hoc sit unus finis motivus quantum ad quietem delectationis.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod malae voluntates conveniunt in principio, videlicet in libidine; dicendum, quod in principio non conveniunt nisi per quandam conformitatem. Nam alia est libido in uno, et alia in alio; et ideo non sequitur ex hoc, quod conveniant in finem unicum. Attamen, etsi in principio convenirent, non propter hoc necesse esset, quod convenirent in termino13. Nam malum semper procedit in dispersionem, bonum vero semper redit ad unitatem. Quanto enim aliquid magis colligitur, tanto magis vigoratur et est perfectius; quanto vero magis dispergitur, tanto magis recedit a perfectione et complemento. Et ideo dicit Philosophus, quod « malum est multifariam, et bonum uno modo ».

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod vitium imitatur virtutem; dicendum, quod sic imitatur, quod plus habet de dissimilitudine quam de similitudine; magis enim virtuti contrariatur, quam ei conformetur. Et ideo potius inferri potest, quod malae voluntates habeant fines diversos, si bonae habent unicum, quam e converso. Quia enim in hoc consistit perfectio virtutis, vitium magis in hoc a virtute deficit, quam eam imitari possit. Et sic patet, quod malarum voluntatum non est unus finis, sed diversi14.

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English Translation

Question IV. Whether evil wills have a single end.

Fourthly it is asked whether evil wills have a single end. And that they do, it seems.

1. Augustine, on that passage of the Psalm1: Searching hearts etc.: « The end of human care and thought is the delight to which each one strives to attain »: if therefore all evil wills finally seek delight, it seems that one end can be assigned for all evil wills.

2. Likewise, of evil wills there is one evil outcome or terminus, as is said in Romans, chapter six2: Whose end is death: therefore, if it happens that they have one terminus, by parity of reasoning it seems that it happens that they have one ultimate end.

3. Likewise, things that agree in their beginning agree also in their ultimate end; but all evil wills agree in their beginning, as Augustine says in the book On True Religion3: « It is plain, he says, that in the whole class of wrongdoing nothing else holds sway than lust ». If therefore they agree in one beginning, namely in lust, by parity of reasoning it seems that they agree in one end.

4. Likewise, vice imitates virtue according to appearance4; whence, just as virtue never rests short of true beatitude, so vice seeks a feigned beatitude: therefore, just as all virtues make the will tend to one end, namely beatitude; so it seems that all vices make the will tend to one end, namely one that has a likeness to the true end.

On the contrary: 1. Of contrary wills the delights are contrary, and where there are contrary delights, there are diverse ends; but pleasures make wills mutually repugnant: therefore they make them have diverse ends.

2. Likewise, an evil will sets its end in a creature; but it is impossible that in one creature our will should find sufficiency, since nothing suffices for the human will except the Trinity alone5: if therefore the will does not rest except in that end in which it sets its sufficiency; it seems necessary that the evil will constitutes diverse ends for itself.

3. Likewise, the appetite of an evil will has its origin and root from lust; but lust is that by which one loves one's own good6: if therefore one's own good is necessarily diversified in diverse persons, it is necessary that diverse ends be found for diverse wills.

4. Likewise, the unity and conformity of good wills comes from the unity of love, in which they are united and bound together7. If therefore love, in which diverse persons are bound together and united, ought to have a single root, found in many, since this does not belong to the love of lust, but only to the love of charity, which is the love of the Holy Spirit; it seems that of evil wills there is not a single end, but diverse ones.

Conclusion

Differing evil wills constitute for themselves not one, but diverse ends.

I respond: It must be said that it is the contrary in good wills and in evil ones. For of good wills there is a single end, whether the good wills be diverse by numerical diversity8 or by formal diversity. I call diversity numerical when several men are affected in the same genus of affection toward something; and I call diversity formal when the same man is affected by diverse habits of the virtues toward diverse things. For whether in the one way or the other, although it may happen that several proximate and proper ends are assigned, nevertheless the ultimate and principal end must necessarily be single, namely God himself.

And the ground of this is both the perfection of the moving love and the perfection of the desirable thing that gives rest. For because the love of charity is liberal, and does not seek what is its own, but the common good9; hence it is that several men, moved by charity, finally seek the same good. Again, because that desirable thing is most complete, in which one can find not only a perfect good, but also every good; hence it is that all wills, however diverse10, find their end, in which they rest.

— On the contrary, it is otherwise in evil wills, on account of the imperfection of love and of the desirable thing. For on account of the imperfection of lustful love, wills differing in number alone have diverse ends, because lustful love always seeks what is its own; and because it always seeks its own good, therefore, even if many through lustful love agree in one act, nevertheless each one seeks his own proper end, as is plain in the adulterer and the harlot, for the one seeks delight and the other seeks money. — On account of the imperfection of the desirable thing as well, it is necessary that diverse wills formally differing have diverse ends. For because luxury seeks pleasantness and gladness, and avarice sufficiency, and pride excellence; and all these cannot be found in the same created thing, but in diverse things: hence it is that evil wills formally differing constitute for themselves not one, but diverse ends. — Whence the arguments which show this are to be granted.

1. To that which is objected first, that delight is the end of care and thought: it must be said that in that argument there is a figure of diction, for the reason that it is not the same delight that is the end of human care and of thought, but diverse ones. Whence delight there stands in its generality and has there rather a simple supposition than a personal one; and therefore, when through delight one descends to a unity of end, a sophism arises according to the figure of diction from a commutation of supposition11.

2. To that which is objected, that of evil wills there is one evil outcome, therefore one evil end: it must be said that it is not alike. For evil wills differ in conversion, but agree in aversion; and the evil outcome regards aversion more principally than conversion, whereas the moving end regards conversion more principally than aversion. Therefore it does not follow that, although12 there is one outcome as regards the death of damnation, that on account of this there is one motive end as regards the rest of delight.

3. To that which is objected, that evil wills agree in their beginning, namely in lust; it must be said that in their beginning they agree only by a certain conformity. For the lust in one is one thing, and that in another is another; and therefore it does not follow from this that they agree in a single end. And yet, even if they agreed in their beginning, it would not on account of this be necessary that they agree in their terminus13. For evil always proceeds toward dispersion, but good always returns to unity. For the more a thing is gathered together, the more it is strengthened and is more perfect; but the more it is dispersed, the more it recedes from perfection and completion. And therefore the Philosopher says that « evil is in many ways, and good in one way ».

4. To that which is objected, that vice imitates virtue; it must be said that it imitates in such a way that it has more of dissimilarity than of similarity; for it is more contrary to virtue than conformed to it. And therefore it can rather be inferred that evil wills have diverse ends, if good wills have a single one, than the converse. For because the perfection of virtue consists in this, vice falls short of virtue in this more than it can imitate it. And thus it is plain that of evil wills there is not one end, but diverse ones14.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Psalm. 7, 10. Verba Augustini vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 4. — Pro illum locum ed. I illud.
    Psalm 7:10. For the words of Augustine, see here in the text of the Master, c. 4. — For illum locum (that passage) ed. I reads illud.
  2. Vers. 21: Nam finis illorum mors est. — Pro est unus malus exitus Vat. est frequentius unus malus exitus.
    Verse 21: For their end is death. — For est unus malus exitus (there is one evil outcome) the Vatican edition reads est frequentius unus malus exitus (there is more often one evil outcome).
  3. Sententia Augustini hic allata invenitur l. de Lib. Arb. c. 3. n. 8. Vide supra d. 31. a. 2. q. 3. in corp. et d. 36. a. 1. q. 2. arg. 1. ad oppos.
    The opinion of Augustine here cited is found in On Free Choice bk. 1, c. 3, n. 8. See above d. 31, a. 2, q. 3, in the body, and d. 36, a. 1, q. 2, arg. 1 to the opposite.
  4. Iuvenalis, Sat. 14, 109. ait: Fallit enim vitium specie virtutis et umbra. Cfr. Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 8; August., Epist. 167. (alias 29.) c. 2. n. 6, et IV. contra Iulian. Pelagian. c. 3. n. 20. — Mox pro ita vitium inquirit beatitudinem simulatam cod. cc et ed. I ita nec vitium citra beatitudinem simulatam.
    Juvenal, Satire 14, 109, says: For vice deceives by the appearance and shadow of virtue. Cf. Aristotle, Ethics II, c. 8; Augustine, Letter 167 (alias 29), c. 2, n. 6, and Against Julian the Pelagian IV, c. 3, n. 20. — Shortly after, for ita vitium inquirit beatitudinem simulatam (so vice seeks a feigned beatitude) cod. cc and ed. I read ita nec vitium citra beatitudinem simulatam.
  5. Cfr. Aristot., VII. Moral. Eudem. c. 2. et 9. (c. 7.).
    Cf. Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics VII, c. 2 and 9 (c. 7).
  6. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2, et August., l. Confess. l. n. 1.
    See here in the text of the Master, c. 2, and Augustine, Confessions bk. 1, n. 1.
  7. Secundum Augustinum: vide supra pag. 150, nota — Codd. X Z et ed. I qua quis pro quo quis.
    According to Augustine: see above p. 150, note —. Codices X, Z and ed. I read qua quis for quo quis.
  8. Cfr. Aristot., VII. Moral. Eudem. c. 4. (c. 2.).
    Cf. Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics VII, c. 4 (c. 2).
  9. Vat. materiali, et paulo post pariter materialem.
    The Vatican edition reads materiali, and a little after, likewise, materialem.
  10. Cod. cc et ed. I hic interiiciunt sit.
    Cod. cc and ed. I here insert sit.
  11. Epist. I. Cor. 13, 5: [Caritas] non quaerit quae sua sunt. Et ibid. 10, 24: Nemo quod suum est quaerat, sed quod alterius. — De fallacia figurae dictionis cfr. tom. I. pag. 740, nota 6. et de suppositione eiusque speciebus ibid. d. 4. q. 1. schol.
    Epistle I Corinthians 13:5: [Charity] does not seek the things that are its own. And ibid. 10:24: Let no one seek what is his own, but what is another's. — On the fallacy of the figure of diction cf. tom. I, p. 740, note 6; and on supposition and its species ibid. d. 4, q. 1, scholion.
  12. Vat. ibid. subiicit ibi. — Pro quamvis Vat. si, codd. P W et edd. 2, 3, 4 cum finis. Post pauca voci damnationis cod. bb addit aeternae.
    The Vatican edition ibid. adds ibi. — For quamvis (although) the Vatican edition reads si, codd. P W and edd. 2, 3, 4 read cum finis. A little after, to the word damnationis cod. bb adds aeternae.
  13. Vide supra pag. 635, nota 3. Cfr. ibid. nota 4. — Paulo superius pro redit ad unitatem cod. cc et ed. I tendit ad unitatem.
    See above p. 635, note 3. Cf. ibid. note 4. — A little earlier, for redit ad unitatem (returns to unity) cod. cc and ed. I read tendit ad unitatem (tends to unity).
  14. Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    See the scholion to the preceding question. ---
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