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Dist. 38, Art. 2, Q. 1

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 38

Textus Latinus
p. 889

Articulus II. De differentia intentionis et voluntatis.

Consequenter quaeritur de secundo principali, videlicet de differentia intentionis et voluntatis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo.

Primo quaeritur, utrum intentio sit in solis rationalibus.

Secundo, utrum intentio in participantibus rationem dicat aliquid ex parte intellectus, vel ex parte affectus.

Quaestio I. Utrum intentio sit in his solis, quae participant rationem.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum intentio sit in his solis, quae participant rationem. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Sicut dicit Glossa super illud Lucae undecimo1: Vide, ne lumen etc.; Glossa: «Lumen animae est intentio»; sed constat, quod intentio non est lumen corporale, sed spirituale: si igitur lumen spirituale est in solis substantiis spiritualibus, quae natae sunt p. 890 illuminari a summa luce, et hae sunt solae creaturae rationales; videtur ergo, quod intentio sit in solis rationalibus.

2. Item, intentio est actus vis collativae — qui enim intendit ab uno in aliud tendit et unum comparat alteri — si ergo vis collativa est in solis participantibus rationem, videtur, quod in eis solis reperiatur intentio2.

3. Item, intentio est illud, secundum quod anima immediatius iungitur ultimo fini: ergo in eis solum est reperiri intentio, quae habent potentiam, mediante qua Deum possunt capere et ei uniri; sed talia sunt sola rationalia, quoniam ipsa sola sunt ad imaginem Dei3: ergo videtur, quod in his solis contingat intentionem reperiri.

4. Item, intentio est supremum in anima, unde ipsa dicitur esse caput nostrum et oculus noster4; sed illa, in quibus communicamus cum irrationalibus creaturis, sunt infima et citra rationem: ergo videtur, quod in nulla alia creatura a rationali contingat intentionem reperiri.

Sed contra: 1. In omni eo quod operatur per intentionem, est reperire intentionem; sed «natura, ut dicit Philosophus5, est operans per intentionem»: ergo videtur, quod in re naturali est intentionem reperire et ponere.

2. Item, omne illud quod movetur ad aliquid et, eo obtento, quiescit, cum6 movebatur, illud intendebat; nisi enim illud intenderet, non moveretur ad eius absentiam, nec quiesceret ad eius praesentiam. Si igitur res naturales sunt huiusmodi, ut patet, cum lapis movetur deorsum; videtur, quod intentio non tantummodo sit in rationalibus, sed etiam in rebus naturalibus.

3. Item, omne quod facit aliquod opus ordinatum ad finem ab illo diversum, operatur per intentionem; sed naturae irrationales sunt huiusmodi, sicut patet in aranea, quae facit telam ad capiendas muscas7: ergo videtur etc.

4. Item, intentio est regula appetitus: ergo si non est ponere aliquid in universo privatum regimine et ordine, videtur, quod ubicumque est ponere appetitum, est ponere intentionem. Sed appetitus non solum est in substantiis rationalibus, sed etiam irrationalibus8: ergo etc.

Conclusio. Intentio proprie est in solis rationalibus, in sensualibus minus proprie, in naturalibus improprie.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod circa hanc quaestionem duplex est modus dicendi, qui ad praesens occurrit. Unus est, ut distinguamus in modo operandi per intentionem penes proprium et alienum. Videtur enim satis rationabiliter posse dici, quod quaedam sunt, quae moventur per intentionem propriam, quaedam, quae moventur per intentionem alienam. Per intentionem propriam moventur illa quae finem praecognoscunt et operationem suam ad finem conferunt et referunt. Per intentionem alienam moventur illa quae intra se non habent potentiam discernendi; reguntur tamen et diriguntur ab eo qui discernit, sicut sagitta ab arcu emissa moveri potest dici per intentionem, non, inquam, arcus vel sagittae, sed sagittantis. — Per hunc quidem modum satis rationabiliter posset9 dici, quod omnes res naturales per intentionem dicuntur moveri, pro eo quod moventur, sicut Deus instituit et sicut gubernat et regit; ipse enim in omni operatione est principalis motor. Et secundum hunc modum dicendi intentio proprie reperitur in solis substantiis rationalibus, licet irrationalia secundum aliquem modum dicendi per intentionem operari dicantur. — Sed quamvis iste modus dicendi rationabilis10 sit et veritatem dicat; non tamen videtur sufficienter dicere, cum dicit, quod natura ideo dicitur operari per intentionem, non ratione propriae intentionis, sed ratione intentionis alienae; quia non dicit sufficienter, dum naturae assignat intentionem11 alienam tantum. Secundum hoc enim casualia et fortuita, cum non fiant praeter divinam intentionem, non deberent dici facta praeter intentionem. Rursus, cum videamus, quod naturalia appetitum habeant, mediante quo tendunt ab uno in alterum, et unaquaeque res habeat vim suam regitivam, mediante qua ad finem proprium inclinatur; videtur, quod naturalia non tantum habeant moveri intentione extrinseca et aliena, sed etiam quod moveantur intentione propria et intrinseca12. p. 891 Et propterea est alius modus dicendi, quia, sicut triplex est appetitus, videlicet naturalis, sensualis sive animalis et rationalis, et quilibet istorum appetituum habet suum regimen, non absurde regimen cuiuslibet istorum trium appellatur intentio; maxime tamen proprie intentio vocatur regimen appetitus rationalis. — Et ratio huius est, quia ad regimen et directivum appetitus naturalis plus spectat dirigi quam dirigere; ad directivum vero appetitus rationalis proprie spectat dirigere: directivum vero appetitus brutalis quodammodo medium tenet13. Et hinc est, quod naturalia moventur quadam necessitate, rationalia vero mera libertate, bruta vero moventur quadam impetuositate, quae est infra libertatem et supra necessitatem; non enim possunt se omnino reprimere, et tamen possunt ad oppositas partes tendere14. Sicut igitur regula directiva operationis reperitur in rationalibus proprie, in sensualibus minus proprie, in naturalibus improprie; sic et intentio.

Et per hoc patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam, et ad rationes ad utramque partem. Nam intentio proprie accepta, secundum quod dicit lumen, per quod est collatio et tendentia in Deum, attenditur circa animae supremum15; et ideo hoc modo in solis rationalibus reperitur, sicut illae rationes ostendunt. Intentio vero, prout dicit ordinationem et directionem appetitus ad aliquem terminum vel finem quietantem, non tantummodo est in rationalibus, immo etiam in brutis, sicut aliae rationes ad aliam partem ostendunt. Et sic patet, quod utraeque diversis viis verum concludunt, et propterea concedendae sunt.

Scholion

I. Quid sit intentio, explicatur in seq. quaestione (cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 96. m. 3. a. I. § I, et S. Thom., S. I. II. q. 12. a. I.). Differt autem intentio ab electione. Electio enim directe respicit ea quae sunt ad finem, tamen in relatione ad finem; intentio autem directe respicit finem, tamen in relatione ad ea quae sunt ad finem (de electione cfr. Itiner. mentis ad Deum, c. 3; de intentione IV. Sent. d. 6. p. II. a. 2. q. I. 2.). — S. Bonav. cum Alexandro Hal. et Petro de Tar. distinguit intentionem in sensu largiore et in sensu proprio, dum S. Thom. hoc loco intentionem definit tantum in sensu stricto. Hinc oritur etiam diversus modus loquendi in solutione huius quaestionis. Nam S. Thomas respondet secundum primam opinionem, in respons. positam, solisque rationalibus creaturis intentionem attribuit; de qua opinione S. Bonav. iudicat, eam esse rationabilem et veritatem dicere, videri autem eandem non sufficere. Ratio autem, quam pro hac assertione affert, in se est verissima omnibusque probata, scilicet, quod etiam naturalibus rebus insit quidam appetitus ad perfectionem suam et Dei similitudinem suo modo acquirendam (cfr. S. Thom., S. I. q. 44. a. 4; S. c. Gent. III. c. 19. seqq.). Immo etiam ipse S. Thom. (locis citt. et alibi) verbo intendere utitur in sensu largiore, scilicet de appetitu naturali rerum irrationabilium, quando dicit, «quod omnia intendunt assimilari Deo», vel quod «unaquaeque creatura intendit consequi suam perfectionem». Hinc dicit Dionys. Carth. (hic q. 3.): «Videtur tamen positio Bonaventurae aptior esse. Certum est namque, quod omnis potentia tendat in suum obiectum, etiam intellectus speculationis etc.». Sed tota haec differentia consistit in modo loquendi, sicut etiam alia in solvenda seq. (2.) quaestione differentia, quae aliquatenus cohaeret cum prima. Nam S. Thom. cum Richardo, Scoto aliisque dicit, quod intentio proprie est actus voluntatis, «tamen praesupposita ordinatione rationis ordinantis aliquid in finem» (S. I. II. q. 12. a. I. in corp. et ad 3.). Idem secundum rem, sed aliis verbis S. Bonav. dicit hic in corp. et ad 3.

II. Plerique commentatores Magistri utramque huius articuli quaestionem unica quaest. absolvunt. — Alex. Hal., loc. cit. Scot., in utroque Scripto, hic q. unica. — S. Thom., hic a. 3; Sum. loc. cit. — B. Albert., hic a. 5. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 1. 2. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 1. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. I. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., loc. cit.

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English Translation

Article II. On the difference of intention and will.

Next there is inquiry concerning the second principal point, namely concerning the difference of intention and will. And about this two things are asked.

First it is asked, whether intention is in rational beings alone.

Second, whether intention, in those things that share in reason, denotes something on the side of the intellect, or on the side of the affection.

Question I. Whether intention is only in those things which share in reason.

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether intention is only in those things which share in reason. And that it is so, seems [to be the case].

1. As the Gloss says upon that passage of Luke, chapter eleven1: Take heed, lest the light etc.; the Gloss: «The light of the soul is intention»; but it is established that intention is not a corporeal light, but a spiritual one: if therefore spiritual light is in spiritual substances alone, which are born to be p. 890 illumined by the highest light, and these are the only rational creatures; it seems therefore that intention is in rational beings alone.

2. Likewise, intention is an act of the comparative power — for he who intends tends from one thing to another and compares one thing to another — if therefore the comparative power is only in those which share in reason, it seems that intention is found in them alone2.

3. Likewise, intention is that by which the soul is most immediately joined to the ultimate end: therefore intention is to be found only in those which have the power by means of which they can lay hold of God and be united to Him; but such are the rational beings alone, since they alone are unto the image of God3: therefore it seems that it is in these alone that intention can be found.

4. Likewise, intention is the highest thing in the soul, whence it is called our head and our eye4; but those things in which we have community with irrational creatures are the lowest and below reason: therefore it seems that in no creature other than the rational can intention be found.

On the contrary: 1. In everything which operates through intention, intention is to be found; but «nature, as the Philosopher says5, is something that operates through intention»: therefore it seems that in a natural thing intention is to be found and posited.

2. Likewise, everything which is moved toward something and, once that is obtained, comes to rest, was intending that thing when6 it was being moved; for unless it intended that thing, it would not be moved toward its absence, nor come to rest at its presence. If therefore natural things are of this kind, as is evident, since a stone is moved downward; it seems that intention is not only in rational beings, but also in natural things.

3. Likewise, everything which makes some work ordered to an end distinct from itself operates through intention; but irrational natures are of this kind, as is evident in the spider, which makes its web for catching flies7: therefore it seems, etc.

4. Likewise, intention is the rule of appetite: therefore if nothing in the universe is to be posited as deprived of governance and order, it seems that wherever there is appetite to be posited, there intention is to be posited. But appetite is not only in rational substances, but also in irrational ones8: therefore, etc.

Conclusion. Intention is properly in rational beings alone, in sensual ones less properly, in natural ones improperly.

I respond: For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that concerning this question there is a twofold mode of speaking which presents itself at present. The one is that we distinguish in the mode of operating through intention according to what is proper and what is alien. For it seems that it can be said with sufficient reasonableness that there are certain things which are moved by their own intention, and certain things which are moved by an alien intention. By their own intention are moved those things which foreknow the end and direct and refer their operation to the end. By an alien intention are moved those things which within themselves do not have the power of discerning; yet they are governed and directed by him who discerns, just as an arrow shot from a bow can be said to be moved through intention — not, I say, the intention of the bow or of the arrow, but of the one who shoots. — In this mode, indeed, it could9 be said with sufficient reasonableness that all natural things are said to be moved through intention, inasmuch as they are moved as God has appointed and as He governs and rules; for He Himself in every operation is the principal mover. And according to this mode of speaking intention is properly found in rational substances alone, although irrational things may, according to some mode of speaking, be said to operate through intention. — But although this mode of speaking is reasonable10 and states the truth, nevertheless it does not seem to state it sufficiently, when it says that nature is said to operate through intention not by reason of its own intention, but by reason of an alien intention; because it does not state it sufficiently, while it assigns to natures only an alien intention11. For according to this, chance and fortuitous events, since they do not come to pass apart from the divine intention, ought not to be said to come to pass apart from intention. Again, since we see that natural things have appetite, by means of which they tend from one thing to another, and each thing has its own governing power, by means of which it is inclined to its proper end; it seems that natural things not only are moved by an extrinsic and alien intention, but also that they are moved by a proper and intrinsic intention12. p. 891 And therefore there is another mode of speaking, since, just as appetite is threefold, namely natural, sensual or animal, and rational, and each of these appetites has its own governance, not absurdly is the governance of each of these three called intention; yet most properly is intention called the governance of the rational appetite. — And the reason for this is that to the governance and direction of the natural appetite it pertains rather to be directed than to direct; but to the directing of the rational appetite it properly pertains to direct: while the directing of the brute appetite holds, as it were, a middle position13. And hence it is that natural things are moved by a certain necessity, rational things by pure liberty, but brutes are moved by a certain impetuosity, which is below liberty and above necessity; for they cannot altogether restrain themselves, and yet they can tend toward opposite directions14. As therefore the directive rule of operation is found in rational beings properly, in sensual ones less properly, in natural ones improperly; so also is intention.

And through this is evident the answer to the proposed question, and to the reasons on both sides. For intention properly taken, according as it denotes a light through which there is comparison and tending toward God, is regarded as belonging to the highest part of the soul15; and therefore in this mode it is found in rational beings alone, as those reasons show. But intention, according as it denotes the ordering and direction of appetite toward some terminus or quieting end, is not only in rational beings, but even in brutes, as the other reasons for the other side show. And so it is evident that both [sets of reasons] conclude what is true by different ways, and therefore are to be conceded.

Scholion

I. What intention is, is explained in the following question (cf. Alex. of Hales, Summa p. II. q. 96. m. 3. a. I. § I, and St. Thomas, Summa I–II. q. 12. a. I.). But intention differs from election. For election directly regards the things which are unto the end, yet in relation to the end; whereas intention directly regards the end, yet in relation to the things which are unto the end (on election cf. Itinerarium mentis ad Deum, c. 3; on intention IV Sent. d. 6. p. II. a. 2. q. I. 2.). — St. Bonaventure, with Alexander of Hales and Peter of Tarentaise, distinguishes intention in the broader sense and in the proper sense, while St. Thomas in this place defines intention only in the strict sense. From this also arises the diverse mode of speaking in the solution of this question. For St. Thomas answers according to the first opinion, set down in the response, and attributes intention to rational creatures alone; concerning which opinion St. Bonaventure judges that it is reasonable and states the truth, but that the same seems not to suffice. The reason, however, which he brings forward for this assertion, is in itself most true and proved by all, namely, that even in natural things there is a certain appetite for acquiring, in their own way, their perfection and the likeness of God (cf. St. Thomas, Summa I. q. 44. a. 4; Summa contra Gentiles III. c. 19. seqq.). Indeed, even St. Thomas himself (in the places cited and elsewhere) uses the word to intend in the broader sense, namely concerning the natural appetite of irrational things, when he says that «all things intend to be assimilated to God», or that «each creature intends to attain its own perfection». Hence Dionysius the Carthusian says (here q. 3.): «Yet the position of Bonaventure seems to be the more fitting. For it is certain that every power tends toward its object, even the intellect of speculation, etc.». But this whole difference consists in the mode of speaking, just as also the other difference to be resolved in the following question (2.), which is somewhat connected with the first. For St. Thomas, with Richard, Scotus, and others, says that intention is properly an act of the will, «yet presupposing the ordering of the reason ordering something to an end» (Summa I–II. q. 12. a. I. in corp. and ad 3.). The same thing in substance, but in other words, St. Bonaventure says here in the body and in [the reply to] the third.

II. Most of the commentators on the Master resolve both questions of this article in a single question. — Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. Scotus, in both of his works, here one question. — St. Thomas, here a. 3; Summa loc. cit. — Bl. Albert, here a. 5. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 1. 2. 3. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 3. q. 1. 2. — Giles of Rome, here q. 2. a. I. — Durandus, here q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, loc. cit.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 35. — Glossa apud Lyranum habetur ut interlinearis et est secundum August., II. de Serm. Domini in monte, c. 13. n. 46, et secundum Bedam, super hunc locum. Cfr. etiam Glossa ordinaria apud Lyranum. — De divisione luminis vide supra pag. 839, nota 1. — Pro a summa luce permulti codd., ut C F H I Iv L R T Y bb ee etc., a sua luce (August., XII. de Trin. c. 16. n. 24; quadam luce sui generis incorporea), de quo vide supra d. 10. a. 2. q. 2.
    Verse 35 [Luke 11:35]. — The Gloss in Lyra is given as interlinear and is according to Augustine, On the Lord's Sermon on the Mount II, c. 13, n. 46, and according to Bede, on this passage. Cf. also the ordinary Gloss in Lyra. — On the division of light see above p. 839, note 1. — For from the highest light very many codices, such as C F H I Iv L R T Y bb ee etc., read from its own light (Augustine, On the Trinity XII, c. 16, n. 24; by a certain incorporeal light of its own kind), on which see above d. 10, a. 2, q. 2.
  2. Cfr. Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 57. (c. 11.); III. Ethic. c. 2. seqq.; I. Magnor. Moral. c. 16. (c. 17.); II. Moral. Eudem. c. 10. seqq.
    Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul III, text 57 (c. 11); Nicomachean Ethics III, c. 2 ff.; Magna Moralia I, c. 16 (c. 17); Eudemian Ethics II, c. 10 ff.
  3. Cfr. supra d. 16. a. 1. q. 1. seqq. et d. 19. a. 1. q. 2. in corp.
    Cf. above d. 16, a. 1, q. 1 ff. and d. 19, a. 1, q. 2, in the body.
  4. Cfr. dictum Augustini, supra pag. 881, nota 1. allatum. — Gregor., X. Moral. c. 23. n. 41, XXVIII. c. 11. n. 30; I. in Ezech. homil. 7. n. 2, intentionem vocat oculum, et XII. Moral. c. 44. n. 50, nec non I. in Ezech. homil. 4. n. 4. eam nominat faciem. — De minori vide supra lit. Magistri, d. XXIV. c. 4. — In conclusione Vat. perperam omittit praepositionem o ante rationali.
    Cf. the saying of Augustine adduced above on p. 881, note 1. — Gregory, Moralia X, c. 23, n. 41, XXVIII, c. 11, n. 30; On Ezekiel I, homily 7, n. 2, calls intention the eye, and Moralia XII, c. 44, n. 50, as well as On Ezekiel I, homily 4, n. 4, names it the face. — On the minor premise see above the text of the Master, d. XXIV, c. 4. — In the conclusion the Vatican edition wrongly omits the preposition in before rational.
  5. Libr. II. Phys. text. 49. et 75. seqq. (c. 5. et 8.).
    Physics book II, text 49 and 75 ff. (c. 5 and 8).
  6. Vat. hic adiicit enim, omisso prius cum edd. 2,3,4 et compluribus codd. et ante eo obtento. In fine arg. Vat. cum cod. ee et edd. 3, 4 pro naturalibus posuit irrationalibus.
    Here the Vatican edition adds enim [for], having previously omitted cum [when], with editions 2, 3, 4 and very many codices [also omitting] et before eo obtento [once that is obtained]. At the end of the argument the Vatican edition, with codex ee and editions 3, 4, has put irrational for natural.
  7. Cfr. Aristot., II. Phys. text. 80. (c. 8.), ubi et haec leguntur: Quapropter dubitant quidam, utrum intellectu, aut quodam alio operentur et araneae et formicae et huiusmodi.
    Cf. Aristotle, Physics II, text 80 (c. 8), where these things also are read: Wherefore some doubt whether spiders and ants and the like operate by intellect, or by some other [power].
  8. Vide supra pag. 15, nota 10; pag. 348, nota 3. et pag. 460, nota 6.
    See above p. 15, note 10; p. 348, note 3; and p. 460, note 6.
  9. Edd. praeter 1 potest.
    The editions except [edition] 1 read can [present tense].
  10. Cod. ee probabilis. Mox in antiquioribus codd. deest tamen, et paulo inferius Vat. et edd. 3, 4 omittunt ideo.
    Codex ee reads probable. Soon after, in the older codices tamen [nevertheless] is lacking, and a little below the Vatican edition and editions 3, 4 omit ideo [therefore].
  11. Cfr. supra d. 37. a. 2. q. 2.
    Cf. above d. 37, a. 2, q. 2.
  12. Vide Aristot., II. Phys. text. 1. seqq. et 86. seqq. (c. 1. et 8.). — Post pauca cod. F quod pro quia; dein pro sensualis in cod. T secundis curis substitutum est sensibilis.
    See Aristotle, Physics II, text 1 ff. and 86 ff. (c. 1 and 8). — A little after, codex F [reads] quod for quia; then for sensualis in codex T, by a second hand, sensibilis was substituted.
  13. Cfr. supra pag. 604, nota 5, et Aristot., de Animal. motu, c. 3. seqq. (c. 6. seq.). — Paulo superius pro ad regimen codd. V Y cc et ed. 1 habent ad regitivum, et mox pro spectat dirigere in pluribus codd., ut I K T V W Y bb ee, legitur spectat regere.
    Cf. above p. 604, note 5, and Aristotle, On the Movement of Animals, c. 3 ff. (c. 6 f.). — A little above, for ad regimen [to the governance] codices V Y cc and edition 1 have ad regitivum, and presently for spectat dirigere [it pertains to direct] in several codices, such as I K T V W Y bb ee, is read spectat regere.
  14. De hac re plura videsis supra d. 25. p. I. q. 1. — Paulo superius pro mera libertate, quam lectionem ex codd. F K cc restituimus, edd., excepta 1, cum non paucis codd. corrupte exhibent mera liberalitate.
    On this matter see more above d. 25, p. I, q. 1. — A little above, for mera libertate [pure liberty], which reading we have restored from codices F K cc, the editions, except [edition] 1, with not a few codices, corruptly present mera liberalitate [pure liberality].
  15. Vide supra pag. 642, nota 8. — Aliquanto superius pro dicit, quod in plurimis codd., ut H K X bb cc ee etc., nec non in ed. 1 legitur, Vat. substituit dicitur, quam lectionem iam codd. V W Z exhibent, qui insuper adiiciunt Lucae 11. Inde pro attenditur Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4 posuerunt accipitur, et paulo inferius Vat. sola pro ordinationem habet tendentiam, ordinem, edd. 2, 3, 4 tendentiam.
    See above p. 642, note 8. — Somewhat above, for dicit [denotes], which is read in very many codices, such as H K X bb cc ee etc., as also in edition 1, the Vatican edition has substituted dicitur, which reading codices V W Z already exhibit, which moreover add Luke 11. Hence for attenditur [is regarded] the Vatican edition and editions 2, 3, 4 have put accipitur [is taken], and a little below the Vatican edition alone has for ordinationem [the ordering] tendentiam, ordinem [tending, order], editions 2, 3, 4 tendentiam [tending].
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