Dist. 49, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 49
Articulus Unicus. De beatitudine.
Quaestio I. Quid sit beatitudo.
The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Quaracchi restarts its footnote numbering on every printed page, so the labels are page-qualified: notes 1–9 of page 1000, then notes 1–6 of page 1001. Page 1002 carries a footer register of its own, but it anchors wholly in the following question and is rendered there.
Quantum ergo ad primum proceditur sic, et ostenditur, quod beatitudo sit bonum creatum:
1. Quia beatitudo est perfectio Beati1; sed omnis perfectio creaturae est creata, quia Deus nullius est forma perfectiva: ergo beatitudo est bonum creatum.
2. Item, omne creatum, quod non est transcendens, ut ens et unum, est alicuius generis determinati; sed beatitudo est bonum creatum, ut probatum est2, et non est transcendens, eo quod in paucissimis reperitur: ergo etc.
3. Item, quod est generis determinati et est in aliquo, ita quod sine eo res potest esse, est in genere accidentis3; sed beatitudo est huiusmodi: ergo est in genere accidentis.
4. Item, omne bonum generis determinati, secundum quod homo denominatur qualis, et quod est perfectio ipsius animae, est in prima specie qualitatis, quae est habitus et dispositio; sed beatitudo est bonum creatum et generis determinati, ut probatum est4, et perficit naturam; hoc constat: ergo etc.
Contra:
1. Quod non sit bonum creatum, videtur: quia beatitudo satiat nostrum appetitum; sed nihil satiat animae humanae appetitum nisi sola Trinitas, quia, cum sit nata capere Deum5, nihil minus Deo ipsam implet: ergo etc.
2. Item, beatitudo est finis ultimus, ultra quem non est finis alius6; sed finis universalis est solum bonum increatum, sicut principium primum: ergo etc.
3. Item, quod non sit generis determinati, videtur: quia, ut dicit Boethius7, « Beatitudo est status omnium bonorum congregatione perfectus »: ergo complectitur omne bonum; sed omne bonum in pluribus generibus determinatur, non in uno: ergo etc.
4. Item, quod non sit in genere accidentis, videtur: quia beatitudo est nobilissima omnium perfectionum; sed accidentalis forma minus habet de nobilitate quam substantialis: ergo impossibile est, quod beatitudo sit in genere accidentis8.
5. Item, quod non sit in qualitate, videtur: quia Philosophus9 definit felicitatem dicens, quod est « actus secundum virtutem perfectus »; et quod ita sit, patet: quia habitus perficitur per actum: si ergo beatitudo est ultima perfectio, est actus; sed actus est in genere actionis: ergo etc.
Conclusio
Conclusio. Beatitudo sumta pro obiecto beatificante est bonum increatum, sumta vero pro forma animam informante est bonum creatum.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod beatitudo est finis satians nostrum appetitum. Satians autem nostrum appetitum est dupliciter: vel sicut obiectum, vel sicut informans. Satians nostrum appetitum sicut obiectum solus Deus est, ad quem capiendum humana anima ordinatur1. Satians autem sicut informans est ipsa influentia Dei in animam, quae est ipsa deiformitas et satietas.
Secundum hoc nomen beatitudinis commune est secundum prius et posterius ad beatitudinem increatam, quae est finis satians ut obiectum, et ad creatam, quae est satians ut informans; et per prius dicitur de beatitudine increata, per posterius de creata, quia non satiat influentia obiecti nisi propter obiectum.
Ad argumenta:
Ad 1, 2. Et ex hoc patet primum, quia Beda2 et Augustinus loquuntur de obiecto satiante; similiter de fine, qui terminat intentionem, et non de fine, qui informat.
Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non est generis determinati; dico, quod immo. Quod obiicit, quod est status continens omnia bona; dico, quod complecti omnia bona, hoc potest esse dupliciter: vel secundum veritatem, vel secundum aequivalentiam. Secundum veritatem non oportet, quod omnis generis bonum contineat; continet tamen secundum aequivalentiam, quia continet tantum bonum, quod sufficit et aequivalet, immo praeponderat omni bono; et tale non potest esse generis determinati3.
Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nobilior est perfectio substantialis; dicendum, quod istud est verum quantum ad primum esse, non tamen quantum ad esse secundum sive bene esse, immo accidentalis forma est perfectio ipsius compositi quantum ad bene esse, sicut patet de colore et odore in rosa4. — Aliter potest dici, quod accidens est duplex. Quoddam namque est, quod causatur ex principiis subiecti, et tale ignobilius est substantiali forma, pro eo quod ab ipsa habet originem; quoddam, quod causatur a superiori, et tale potest esse nobilius, pro eo quod dirigit et coniungit. Et quia beatitudo iungit animam summo Deo, ubi est terminatio omnis appetitus; et ortum habet a Deo, non ab anima: ideo patet illud.
Ad 5. Ad illud quod quaeritur, cuius generis sit; dicendum, quod beatitudo creata non dicit actum pure, quia constat, quod actus gloriosus ab aliquo in habitu5 procedit; nec dicit habitum pure, quia dicit perfectionem summam, quae est in actu continuo: ideo necesse est, quod dicat habitum ut actum sive in actu, sicut si diceret scientiam, quae semper est in considerando. Quia vero principalius dicit habitum et deiformitatem; ideo, etsi dicat rem duplicis generis, tamen principalius generis qualitatis. Et est exemplum, quia figura dicit dispositionem qualitatis in quantitate, principalius tamen dispositionem; unde dicit qualitatem in quantitate et est in genere qualitatis6. Similiter intelligendum est in proposito.
I. Doctrina de beatitudine magni momenti est et late patet in quaestionibus theologicis. De ea plura habent S. Thom., hic q. 1-3; S. I. II. q. 2-5. et q. 9-12; Scot., I. Sent. d. 1. q. 1-5. (de beatitudine obiectiva) et hic q. 1-12 (de beatitudine formali).
Quoad 1. quaestionem communis est distinctio beatitudinis in obiectivam, quae est ipsum bonum appetitum rationalem adaequate satians, et in formalem, quae est subiecti beati coniunctio immediata cum obiecto beatificante, vel potius (secundum communem sententiam) illa operatio animae, qua illud obiectum attingitur, habetur et fruitur. — De formali beatitudine agitur etiam infra q. 4; de qua exortae sunt plures opiniones. Prima, quae est falsa et attribuitur quibusdam antiquis, praesertim Ioan. a Ripa, posuit, eam esse increatam ipsius Dei visionem, intellectui creato unitam; quam bene refutat S. Bonav., III. Sent. d. 14. a. 1. q. 1. — Secunda fuit Henrici Gand. (Quodl. 13. q. 12.), qui primo dicit, veram beatitudinem humanam et angelicam consistere non solum in actu voluntatis et intellectus, in quibus non est nisi beatitudo creata ratione ipsorum actuum; deinde prosequitur: « Principalius consistit in ipso obiecto, quod est ipsa beatitudo increata... in qua per actum beatitudinis voluntatis creatae ipsa anima humana mediante voluntate se transformat, ut convertatur in illud, prout possibile est secundum naturam » etc. Denique concludit, quod beatitudo « principalius perficit essentiam animae [per quandam « circuminsessionem sive illapsum »] quam potentias, quia in illa principalius habetur Deus, qui est finis et beatitudo, quam in potentiis, quia illam perficit quodam modo per suam essentiam ». Contra hanc opinionem diffuse disputat Scot. (hic q. 2. n. 25. seqq.). — Tertia opinio est Scoti (hic q. 2.), S. Thomae (hic q. 1. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2; S. I. II. q. 3. a. 2; S. c. Gent. III. c. 25. seqq.) et fere communis, quae ponit beatitudinem formaliter in actu secundo sive in operatione. — Quarta est S. Bonav., quae eandem ponit in « influentia Dei in animam, quae est ipsa deiformitas et satietas » (hic in corp.); porro hoc explicat (ad 5.), ut sit etiam actus, sed simul habitus in actu continuo, et quidem principalius habitus; deinde (q. 4.) docet, quod prius sit in potentiis quam in essentia (contra Henricum Gand.). De hac sententia dicit Richard. a Med. (hic a. 1. q. 4.), quod vera continet, si beatitudinis nomen largiore sensu sumatur, dum proprie beatitudo sit actus nobilissimus. Ipse S. Bonav. hoc insinuat alibi (I. Sent. d. 1. a. 2. q. unica ad 2.), ubi loquitur de fruitione per actum amoris. Sumitur igitur hic beatitudo, quatenus importat dotes animae. Nam, ut idem Richard. (hic a. 3. q. 7.) dicit, visio et fruitio proprie non sunt dotes, « sed actus dotium; dotes enim qualitates sunt. Unde dos visionis est quidam habitus luminosus in intellectu, quo elevatur ad
clare Deum videndum... Unde proprie loquendo, in dotibus animae non consistit beatitudinis essentia, sed in actibus eorum, ad quos ordinantur, sicut habitus ad actum ». — Ideo autem auctor noster hic urget influentiam divinam, ut ostendat, quod ipsa operatio illa beatificans est a Deo ut causa principali simul et obiecto. Quod autem habitus et actus beatificus principalius sit a Deo, ita ut Beati in illo actu magis pati quam agere dici possint; iam inde manifestum est, quod theologia mystica communiter de sublimioribus orationis supernaturalis gradibus viatorum docet, animas in tali statu magis agi sive pati quam agere, licet actus vitales eliciant. Eo fortius hoc valet de Beatis in patria (cfr. III. Sent. d. 31. a. 3. q. 1. ad 1.).
De 1. quaestione praeter laudatos: B. Albert., hic a. 6. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. quaestiunc. 1-3. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et 2 seqq. qq. hic q. 1.
II. Quaestionis 2. conclusio, quam S. August. (vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. ante med.) mirifice probat, praeeuntibus Aristotele et Cicerone, est communiter recepta, sicut etiam distinctio triplicis appetitus, scil. naturalis, sensibilis, rationalis (cfr. II. Sent. d. 38. a. 2. q. 1.). Naturalis appetitus est quaedam inclinatio seu pondus, quo unaquaeque res tendit ad bonum sibi conveniens sive in proprium finem (ibid. a. 1. q. 1.) sive commodum (hic ad 4.). — Ipse appetitus rationalis (voluntas) communiter dividitur in naturalem et deliberativum (liberum), de quo vide II. Sent. d. 22. dub. 3; d. 24. p. 1. a. 2. q. 3. Hic appetitus naturalis dirigitur quadam cognitione naturali (hic ad 1. 2. 3; II. Sent. d. 28. dub. 1; d. 38. dub. 1.); in quo consentit S. Thom. (S. I. II. q. 10. a. 1. q. 2. a. 1. ad 1, ubi ait: « Quod naturaliter desideratur ab homine naturaliter cognoscitur ab eodem »). — Voluntas naturalis semper fertur in bonum; immo etiam quidquid libere vult homo, non vult nisi sub ratione boni, vel simpliciter (finis ultimi), vel boni sibi (II. Sent. d. 34. a. 1. q. 3; d. 25. p. II. q. 3; d. 38. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. et ad 2; d. 39. a. 2. per totum); quod confirmat S. Thom. (S. I. II. q. 1. a. 6; hic q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. 4.). — Voluntas naturalis, licet habeat actus elicitos, tamen non est semper in actu, sed interdum tantum in habitu (II. Sent. d. 39. dub. 2, et S. Thom., S. I. II. q. 10. a. 1. ad 2. — Notandum est, quod S. Bonav. in fine 1. solutionis triplici modo explicat cognitionem naturalem.
III. Observamus etiam, quod in quaestionibus specialioribus de beatitudine variae sunt magistrorum opiniones. Breviter haec tantum notamus.
1. Quoad ipsum beatitudinis appetitum naturalem docet Scotus (hic q. 10. n. 11.), appetitum hunc non addere aliquam perfectionem super naturam absolutam, sed importare solam inclinationem ipsius naturae ad suam perfectionem; ideo voluntatem, quatenus sit natura, nullum habere actum elicitum, per consequens nec cognitionem aliquam requiri ad appetitum naturalem, sed tantum ad actum elicitum. Aliter docent Ss. Bonav. et Thom. (locis citt.).
2. Idem non approbat doctrinam Ss. Thomae, Bonav. et multorum, quod voluntas naturaliter determinetur ad beatitudinem tantum in generali, non vero in particulari; sed putat, quod voluntas appetitu naturali appetat beatitudinem etiam in particulari; sed appetitu elicito velit « ut in pluribus beatitudinem in universali vel particulari maiori inclinatione naturali quam ulla habituali »; denique, quod sub neutra determinatione ipsa velit eam necessario, sed contingenter (ibid. n. 3-6.).
3. Attamen cum S. Thoma (S. I. II. q. 10. a. 2.) aliisque communiter Scot. admittit quoad actum deliberativum distinctionem inter motum voluntatis quoad exercitium et quoad specificationem actus, et quod beatitudo non est obiectum nolendi, nec miseria est obiectum volendi, unde voluntas non est libera secundum specificationem [quoad haec obiecta], tamen potest actum suspendere, quia libera est quoad exercitium. Aliud enim est, ut dicit, non posse velle miseriam aut nolle beatitudinem, aliud est non posse non nolle aut non velle. — Nominales autem admittunt libertatem in appetendo beatitudinem etiam quoad specificationem, econtra Henr. Gand. (Quodl. 4. q. 11.) hoc vult esse necessarium etiam quoad exercitium.
4. Denique quoad verba in fine corporis, quod anima veram beatitudinem appetat naturaliter, controvertitur inter scholam S. Thomae et Scoti. Illa tenet, claram visionem Dei, utpote finem supernaturalem, non posse appeti naturaliter, cum ad hoc anima non habeat inclinationem, ne inchoatam quidem. Altera autem distinguit inter exigentiam et capacitatem passivam naturae et docet, beatitudinem in Deo quoad exigentiam et exsecutionem esse finem supernaturalem, quoad inclinationem vero finem naturalem. — Trigosus aliique volunt, S. Bonaventuram stare pro prima opinione; sed Barth. de Barberiis (Cursus theolog. t. 1. disp. 4. q. 2.) rectius tenet, eum consentire Scoto, hoc excepto, quod ipse velit, hanc inclinationem habere aliquem actum imperfectum, tendentem ad beatitudinem in generali, quod negat Scotus, ut diximus. Loci principales auctoris nostri de hac re sunt II. Sent. d. 19. a. 3. q. 1. in corp. et ad 4, d. 28. a. 2. q. 1. ad 3, d. 22. dub. 3; I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. q. 1. fundam. 5, d. 8. p. I. a. 2. q. 2. ad 7. 8, d. 42. q. 1.
De 2. quaestione praeter locos citt.: S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3; S. I. II. q. 3. a. 8. — B. Albert., hic a. 7. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. 2. — Durand., hic q. 8.
IV. De 3. quaestione cfr. infra p. II. a. 1. q. 1. 2. Alii commentatores Lombardi plerumque hanc quaestionem ita praecise positam non tractant, sed in quaestionibus de dotibus corporis eadem principia adhibere solent. S. Thom. eandem solutionem habet hic q. 2. a. 2. ad 6; d. 44. q. 2. a. 4. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 1.
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Sole Article. On beatitude.
Question I. What beatitude is.
As to the first, then, one proceeds thus, and it is shown that beatitude is a created good:
1. Because beatitude is the perfection of the Blessed1; but every perfection of a creature is created, since God is the perfective form of nothing: therefore beatitude is a created good.
2. Likewise, everything created which is not transcendent, as being and one are, belongs to some determinate genus; but beatitude is a created good, as has been proved2, and is not transcendent, seeing that it is found in very few: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, that which is of a determinate genus and is in something in such a way that the thing can be without it, is in the genus of accident3; but beatitude is of this sort: therefore it is in the genus of accident.
4. Likewise, every good of a determinate genus, according to which a man is denominated as being of such a quality, and which is a perfection of the soul itself, is in the first species of quality, which is habit and disposition; but beatitude is a created good and of a determinate genus, as has been proved4, and it perfects nature; this is agreed: therefore etc.
On the contrary:
1. That it is not a created good seems so: because beatitude satisfies our appetite; but nothing satisfies the appetite of the human soul except the Trinity alone, since, as the soul is born to receive God5, nothing less than God fills it: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, beatitude is the ultimate end, beyond which there is no other end6; but the universal end is only the uncreated good, just as it is the first principle: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, that it is not of a determinate genus seems so: because, as Boethius says7, « Beatitude is a state made perfect by the gathering together of all goods »: therefore it embraces every good; but every good is determined within several genera, not within one: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, that it is not in the genus of accident seems so: because beatitude is the noblest of all perfections; but an accidental form has less of nobility than a substantial one: therefore it is impossible that beatitude should be in the genus of accident8.
5. Likewise, that it is not in quality seems so: because the Philosopher9 defines happiness by saying that it is « an act perfect according to virtue »; and that it is so is clear: because a habit is perfected through act: if therefore beatitude is the ultimate perfection, it is an act; but act is in the genus of action: therefore etc.
Conclusion
Conclusion. Beatitude, taken for the beatifying object, is an uncreated good; but taken for the form informing the soul, it is a created good.
I respond: It must be said that beatitude is the end satisfying our appetite. Now what satisfies our appetite does so in two ways: either as an object, or as informing. What satisfies our appetite as an object is God alone, to the receiving of whom the human soul is ordered1. But what satisfies as informing is the very inflowing of God into the soul, which is deiformity itself and satiety itself.
According to this, the name beatitude is common, by priority and posteriority, to uncreated beatitude, which is the end satisfying as object, and to created beatitude, which is what satisfies as informing; and it is said by priority of uncreated beatitude, by posteriority of created, since the inflowing of the object does not satisfy except on account of the object.
To the arguments:
To 1 and 2. And from this the first is clear, because Bede2 and Augustine are speaking of the satisfying object; and likewise of the end which terminates the intention, and not of the end which informs.
To 3. To that which is objected, that it is not of a determinate genus: I say that on the contrary it is. As to the objection that it is a state containing all goods, I say that to embrace all goods can be so in two ways: either according to truth, or according to equivalence. According to truth it is not necessary that it contain the good of every genus; it does, however, contain it according to equivalence, because it contains so great a good as suffices and is equivalent, indeed outweighs every good; and such a good cannot be of a determinate genus3.
To 4. To that which is objected, that a substantial perfection is nobler: it must be said that this is true with respect to first being, but not with respect to second being or well-being; on the contrary, an accidental form is the perfection of the composite itself with respect to well-being, as is clear of colour and scent in a rose4. — It can also be said otherwise, that accident is twofold. For there is one kind which is caused from the principles of the subject, and such is more ignoble than the substantial form, in that it has its origin from it; and another which is caused by something higher, and such can be nobler, in that it directs and joins. And because beatitude joins the soul to the most high God, where there is the terminus of every appetite, and has its rise from God, not from the soul: therefore that point is clear.
To 5. To that which is asked, of what genus it is: it must be said that created beatitude does not name act purely, since it is agreed that a glorious act proceeds from something in habit5; nor does it name habit purely, since it names the highest perfection, which is in continuous act: therefore it is necessary that it name habit as act or in act, as if one were to say knowledge, which is always in considering. But because it names habit and deiformity more principally, therefore, even though it names a thing of a twofold genus, nevertheless it is more principally of the genus of quality. And there is an example: because figure names a disposition of quality in quantity, yet more principally the disposition; hence it names quality in quantity and is in the genus of quality6. The same is to be understood in the case at hand.
I. The doctrine concerning beatitude is of great moment and extends widely in theological questions. On it more is to be found in St. Thomas, here q. 1-3; S. I. II. q. 2-5 and q. 9-12; Scotus, I. Sent. d. 1. q. 1-5 (on objective beatitude) and here q. 1-12 (on formal beatitude).
As to the 1st question, the common distinction of beatitude is into the objective, which is the good itself adequately satisfying rational appetite, and the formal, which is the immediate conjunction of the blessed subject with the beatifying object, or rather (according to the common opinion) that operation of the soul by which that object is attained, possessed, and enjoyed. — Of formal beatitude there is also treatment below in q. 4; concerning which several opinions have arisen. The first, which is false and is attributed to certain of the ancients, especially John of Ripa, held it to be the uncreated vision of God himself, united to the created intellect; which St. Bonaventure well refutes, III. Sent. d. 14. a. 1. q. 1. — The second was that of Henry of Ghent (Quodl. 13. q. 12.), who first says that true human and angelic beatitude consists not only in the act of the will and of the intellect, in which there is only created beatitude by reason of those acts; then he continues: « It consists more principally in the object itself, which is uncreated beatitude itself... in which, through the act of beatitude of the created will, the human soul itself, by means of the will, transforms itself, so that it is converted into that object, so far as is possible according to nature » etc. Finally he concludes that beatitude « more principally perfects the essence of the soul [through a certain « circuminsession or indwelling »] than the powers, because in the essence God, who is the end and beatitude, is more principally possessed than in the powers, since it perfects the essence in a certain way through its own essence ». Against this opinion Scotus disputes at length (here q. 2. n. 25. seqq.). — The third opinion is that of Scotus (here q. 2.), of St. Thomas (here q. 1. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2; S. I. II. q. 3. a. 2; S. c. Gent. III. c. 25. seqq.) and is nearly the common one, which places beatitude formally in second act or in operation. — The fourth is St. Bonaventure's, which places it in the « inflowing of God into the soul, which is deiformity itself and satiety » (here in the body); and further he explains this (ad 5.) so that it is also act, but at the same time habit in continuous act, and indeed more principally habit; then (q. 4.) he teaches that it is prior in the powers than in the essence (against Henry of Ghent). Of this opinion Richard of Middleton (here a. 1. q. 4.) says that it contains what is true, if the name beatitude be taken in a broader sense, whereas properly beatitude is the noblest act. St. Bonaventure himself intimates this elsewhere (I. Sent. d. 1. a. 2. q. unica ad 2.), where he speaks of enjoyment through the act of love. Beatitude is therefore taken here inasmuch as it implies the dowries of the soul. For, as the same Richard (here a. 3. q. 7.) says, vision and enjoyment are not properly dowries, « but acts of the dowries; for the dowries are qualities. Hence the dowry of vision is a certain luminous habit in the intellect, by which it is elevated to
seeing God clearly... Hence, properly speaking, the essence of beatitude does not consist in the dowries of the soul, but in the acts to which they are ordered, as habit to act ». — And for this reason our author here presses the divine inflowing, in order to show that that beatifying operation itself is from God as principal cause and at the same time as object. But that the beatific habit and act are more principally from God, so that the Blessed in that act can be said rather to undergo than to act, is manifest from this, that mystical theology commonly teaches, concerning the higher grades of supernatural prayer in wayfarers, that souls in such a state are rather acted upon or undergo than act, although they elicit vital acts. This holds all the more strongly of the Blessed in the fatherland (cfr. III. Sent. d. 31. a. 3. q. 1. ad 1.).
On the 1st question, besides those praised: Bl. Albert, here a. 6. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1. a. 1. quaestiunc. 1-3. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Denis the Carthusian, on this and the 2 following questions, here q. 1.
II. The conclusion of the 2nd question, which St. Augustine (see here the text of the Master, c. 1. before the middle) proves admirably, with Aristotle and Cicero going before him, is commonly received, as is also the distinction of the threefold appetite, namely natural, sensible, rational (cfr. II. Sent. d. 38. a. 2. q. 1.). The natural appetite is a certain inclination or weight by which each thing tends to the good suited to it, whether to its proper end (ibid. a. 1. q. 1.) or to its advantage (here ad 4.). — The rational appetite itself (the will) is commonly divided into the natural and the deliberative (the free), on which see II. Sent. d. 22. dub. 3; d. 24. p. 1. a. 2. q. 3. This natural appetite is directed by a certain natural cognition (here ad 1. 2. 3; II. Sent. d. 28. dub. 1; d. 38. dub. 1.); in which St. Thomas agrees (S. I. II. q. 10. a. 1. q. 2. a. 1. ad 1, where he says: « What is naturally desired by man is naturally known by him »). — The natural will is always borne towards the good; indeed even whatever a man wills freely, he wills only under the aspect of good, either simply (of the ultimate end), or of the good for himself (II. Sent. d. 34. a. 1. q. 3; d. 25. p. II. q. 3; d. 38. a. 1. q. 1. in the body and ad 2; d. 39. a. 2. throughout); which St. Thomas confirms (S. I. II. q. 1. a. 6; here q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. 4.). — The natural will, although it has elicited acts, is nevertheless not always in act, but sometimes only in habit (II. Sent. d. 39. dub. 2, and St. Thomas, S. I. II. q. 10. a. 1. ad 2. — It is to be noted that St. Bonaventure at the end of the 1st solution explains natural cognition in a threefold way.
III. We observe also that in the more special questions on beatitude the opinions of the masters vary. We note only these briefly.
1. As to the natural appetite of beatitude itself, Scotus teaches (here q. 10. n. 11.) that this appetite adds no perfection over absolute nature, but implies only an inclination of nature itself to its own perfection; and therefore that the will, inasmuch as it is nature, has no elicited act, and consequently that no cognition is required for the natural appetite, but only for the elicited act. Ss. Bonaventure and Thomas teach otherwise (in the places cited).
2. The same author does not approve the doctrine of Ss. Thomas and Bonaventure and of many, that the will is naturally determined to beatitude only in general, but not in particular; rather he holds that the will by natural appetite desires beatitude even in particular; but that by elicited appetite it wills « for the most part beatitude in the universal or in the particular with a greater natural inclination than any habitual one »; and finally that under neither determination does it will it necessarily, but contingently (ibid. n. 3-6.).
3. Nevertheless, with St. Thomas (S. I. II. q. 10. a. 2.) and others commonly, Scotus admits, as regards the deliberative act, the distinction between the motion of the will as to exercise and as to specification of the act, and that beatitude is not an object of not-willing, nor is misery an object of willing, whence the will is not free according to specification [as regards these objects], yet it can suspend the act, because it is free as to exercise. For it is one thing, as he says, not to be able to will misery or to not-will beatitude, and another not to be able not to not-will or not to will. — The Nominalists, however, admit liberty in desiring beatitude even as to specification; contrariwise Henry of Ghent (Quodl. 4. q. 11.) holds this to be necessary even as to exercise.
4. Finally, as to the words at the end of the body, that the soul desires true beatitude naturally, there is controversy between the school of St. Thomas and that of Scotus. The former holds that the clear vision of God, being a supernatural end, cannot be desired naturally, since for this the soul has no inclination, not even an inchoate one. The latter, however, distinguishes between the exigency and the passive capacity of nature, and teaches that beatitude in God, as to exigency and execution, is a supernatural end, but as to inclination a natural end. — Trigosus and others would have St. Bonaventure stand for the first opinion; but Bartholomew de Barberiis (Cursus theolog. t. 1. disp. 4. q. 2.) more rightly holds that he agrees with Scotus, with this exception, that he himself would have this inclination possess some imperfect act, tending to beatitude in general, which Scotus denies, as we have said. The principal passages of our author on this matter are II. Sent. d. 19. a. 3. q. 1. in the body and ad 4, d. 28. a. 2. q. 1. ad 3, d. 22. dub. 3; I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. q. 1. fundam. 5, d. 8. p. I. a. 2. q. 2. ad 7. 8, d. 42. q. 1.
On the 2nd question, besides the places cited: St. Thomas, here q. 1. a. 3; S. I. II. q. 3. a. 8. — Bl. Albert, here a. 7. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1. a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 2. q. 1. 2. — Durandus, here q. 8.
IV. On the 3rd question cfr. below p. II. a. 1. q. 1. 2. The other commentators on Lombard for the most part do not treat this question posed so precisely, but are wont to apply the same principles in the questions on the dowries of the body. St. Thomas has the same solution here q. 2. a. 2. ad 6; d. 44. q. 2. a. 4. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 4. q. 1.
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- 1Secundum Aristot., I. Ethic. c. 7. et X. c. 7, beatitudo est operatio et actio hominis secundum rationem sive potentiam perfectam et optimam virtutem in vita perfecta.According to Aristotle, I. Ethics c. 7 and X. c. 7, beatitude is the operation and action of man according to reason or a perfect power and the best virtue in a perfect life.
- 2Arg. praeced. — Aristot. X. Ethic. c. 8. probat, quod beatitudo tantum Deo et hominibus convenit; « at ceterorum animalium nullum est felix ». Cfr. ibid. I. c. 9.The preceding argument. — Aristotle, X. Ethics c. 8, proves that beatitude belongs only to God and to men; « but of the other animals none is happy ». Cfr. ibid. I. c. 9.
- 3Vide Aristot., I. Topic. c. 4, et Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Accidente.See Aristotle, I. Topics c. 4, and Porphyry, On the Predicables, the chapter On Accident.
- 4In praeced. argg. — De prima specie qualitatis cfr. supra pag. 136, nota 3. — Mox pro naturam Vat. cum cod. E a secunda manu animam.In the preceding arguments. — On the first species of quality cfr. above p. 136, note 3. — Shortly after, for naturam the Vatican edition, with codex E by a second hand, reads animam.
- 5August., XIV. de Trin. c. 8. n. 11: Eo quippe ipso imago eius [Dei] est, quo eius capax est eiusque particeps esse potest. — Voci nata cod. G praefigit anima. In fine arg. post implet cod. aa addit Augustinus et Beda, qui etiam a Bonav., infra in solut. ad 1, et II. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 2. fundam. 2, pro eadem sententia allegati sunt (cfr. ibid. nota addita).Augustine, XIV. On the Trinity c. 8. n. 11: For it is his [God's] image by that very thing whereby it is capable of him and can be a partaker of him. — Before the word nata codex G prefixes anima. At the end of the argument, after implet, codex aa adds Augustinus et Beda, who are also alleged by Bonaventure for the same opinion below in the solution ad 1, and II. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 2. fundam. 2 (cfr. the note added there).
- 6Cfr. Aristot., I. Ethic. c. 2. — Subinde pro universalis codd. E K M S aa (I P a secunda manu) ultimus, cod. G ultimus et universalis.Cfr. Aristotle, I. Ethics c. 2. — Thereafter, for universalis codices E K M S aa (I P by a second hand) read ultimus, codex G ultimus et universalis.
- 7Libr. III. de Consol. prosa 2.Book III of The Consolation [of Philosophy], prose 2.
- 8Cfr. de hoc arg. tom. III. pag. 297, nota 1.Cfr. on this argument vol. III, p. 297, note 1.
- 9Vide supra nota 1. — Inferius pro ultima perfectio plures codd. ultimata perfectio.See above, note 1. — Lower down, for ultima perfectio several codices read ultimata perfectio.
- 1Psalm. 102, 5: Qui replet [alias: satiat] in bonis desiderium tuum. Cfr. August., in hunc loc.; Boeth., III. de Consol. prosa 2. et 10.Psalm 102, 5: Who fills [otherwise: satisfies] your desire with good things. Cfr. Augustine, on this passage; Boethius, III. On the Consolation [of Philosophy], prose 2 and 10.
- 2Edd. Boethius. Inferius ex codd. G L Y (I a secunda manu) supplevimus non.The editions read Boethius. Lower down we have supplied non from codices G L Y (I by a second hand).
- 3Cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 4. ad 4. — Pro non potest Vat. cum cod. E a secunda manu bene potest.Cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 4. ad 4. — For non potest the Vatican edition, with codex E by a second hand, reads bene potest.
- 4Vide II. Sent. d. 26. q. 3. ad 1. Ibid. in corp. explicatur seq. solut. — Aliquanto inferius pro et coniungit, quod praebent codd. M O bb, cod. U et quia iungit, alii codd. et cui [codd. I K ei cui, edd. ad eum, cui] iungit. Subinde pro summo Deo codd. I K summo bono.See II. Sent. d. 26. q. 3. ad 1. In the body of the same passage the following solution is explained. — Somewhat lower down, for et coniungit, which codices M O bb give, codex U reads et quia iungit, other codices et cui [codices I K ei cui, the editions ad eum, cui] iungit. Thereafter, for summo Deo codices I K read summo bono.
- 5Vat. perperam actu.The Vatican edition wrongly reads actu.
- 6Cfr. supra pag. 136, nota 3.Cfr. above, p. 136, note 3. ---