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Quaest. 6

Quaestiones disputatae de scientia Christi · Quaestio VI: Utrum anima Christi comprehendat ipsam sapientiam increatam

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Quaestio VI. Utrum anima Christi comprehendat ipsam sapientiam increatam.

Supposito, quod anima Christi sit sapiens sapientia increata pariter et creata, quaeritur consequenter, utrum comprehendat ipsam sapientiam increatam. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Ioannis tertio2: Non ad mensuram dat Deus spiritum; Glossa: « Hominibus ad mensuram, Filio vero non ad mensuram; sed sicut totum ex se toto genuit, ita incarnato Filio totum Spiritum suum dedit, non partialiter et per subdivisiones, sed generaliter et universaliter »; sed iuxta mensuram spiritus dati mensura est in cognitione veri: ergo si anima Christi immenso modo accepit Spiritum sanctum, immenso modo cognoscit Deum; et hoc non est aliud quam comprehendere ipsam divinam sapientiam: ergo etc.

2. Item, Augustinus, decimo tertio de Trinitate, capitulo decimo nono3: « In Verbo intelligo verum Dei Filium, in carne verum hominis filium, utrumque in una persona Dei et hominis ineffabilis gratiae largitate coniunctum ». Gratia igitur unionis est ineffabilis, ergo immensa et incomprehensibilis; sed iuxta quantitatem gratiae est quantitas cognitionis: ergo si cognitione incomprehensibili infinitum est comprehensibile; quantaecumque sit immensitatis, comprehendetur ab anima sibi unita.

3. Item, Hugo dicit de Sapientia Christi4: « Anima Christi habet omnia per gratiam, quae Deus habet per naturam »; sed Deus per naturam habet comprehensionem suae sapientiae: ergo anima Christi hoc habet per gratiam.

4. Item, tantum vel plus est esse Deum quam comprehendere Deum; sed gratia unionis potest in hoc, ut faciat creaturam esse Deum: ergo multo fortius faciet creaturam comprehendere Deum. Sed non aliam quam Christi animam: ergo etc.

5. Item, Bernardus ad Eugenium5 dicit, quod est unitas nativa, dignativa et superdignativa; illa unitas dignativa non est tanta, quanta est unitas Trinitatis, quae est superdignativa, et maior quam nativa; sed tam in unitate nativa quam in unitate superdignativa unum extremorum comprehenditur ab altero, et e converso: ergo pari ratione videtur et multo fortiori in unitate dignativa. Sed secundum hanc unitur anima Christi cum sapientia increata: ergo etc.

6. Item, Isidorus6: « Trinitas sibi soli nota est et homini assumto », et constat, quod hoc non intelligitur de quacumque notitia, sed de illa solum, in qua non communicat Trinitas cum creatura pura; sed ista non est nisi cognitio comprehensiva: ergo hanc habet creatura unita.

7. Item, Cassiodorus7: « Illam lucem inaccessibilem sanitas mentis super omnes claritates intelligit »; sed anima unita Verbo fuit sanissima: ergo intelligebat illam super omnem aliam claritatem: ergo aut nullam aliam claritatem comprehendebat, aut si aliquam comprehendebat, et illam.

8. Item, gratia unionis excedit quantamcumque gratiam comprehensionis improportionaliter: ergo improportionaliter facit Deum cognosci clarius; sed hoc non est aliud quam comprehendere divinam sapientiam: ergo etc. Nihil enim improportionaliter excedit omne finitum nisi infinitum8.

9. Item, Augustinus nono de Trinitate9 dicit, quod quia anima simplex est, ideo, cum se novit, totaliter se novit, non secundum partem: ergo cum

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sapientia aeterna sit simplex, si ab anima Christi cognoscitur, totaliter cognoscitur; sed rem totaliter cognoscere non est aliud quam comprehendere: ergo etc.

10. Item, haec est per se vera: simplex, cum attingitur, totum attingitur1; ergo simplicius totaliter attingitur, et simplicissimum totalissime attingitur; sed Verbum increatum habet summam simplicitatem: ergo totalissime attingitur. Sed hoc est ipsum perfectissime comprehendere: ergo perfectissime comprehenditur ab anima Christi.

11. Item, anima Christi in cognoscendo Verbum aut totum habet patens, aut aliquid Verbi habet latens et aliquid patens. Si omnino habet patens: ergo omnino comprehendit; si aliquid habet latens et aliquid patens: ergo in Verbo est aliquid et aliquid. Sed hoc est inconveniens, quia non esset summa simplicitas2: ergo etc.

12. Item, si aliquid latet, aut illud est Deus, aut non. Si non: ergo propter latentiam illius nihilominus comprehendit Deum. Si est Deus: ergo Deus latet animam Christi; sed nulla anima, quam Deus latet, est beata: ergo secundum hoc anima Christi non est3 beata. Sed hoc est absurdum: ergo et illud, ex quo hoc sequitur.

13. Item, sicut est in Deo vere immensitas, ita vere est in Deo simplicitas; sed sicut immensitatis est nunquam omnino capi, ita simplicitatis est a quocumque capitur totaliter capi: ergo qua ratione dicitur incomprehensibilis ratione immensitatis, dicetur comprehensibilis ratione simplicitatis.

14. Item, si in puncto idem esset essentia et virtus, quod attingeret ipsum totaliter secundum essentiam attingeret ipsum totaliter secundum potentiam; sed in Deo idem est sua essentia et virtus sua, et quidquid est essentiale in ipso totum est idem et simplicissimum: aut ergo nihil Dei attingitur, aut si aliquid attingitur, totum et totaliter attingitur4, ergo totum et totaliter comprehenditur: ergo non solum anima Christi Verbum comprehendit, sed omnis anima, quae qualitercumque Deum cognoscit.

15. Item, Beda5 dicit, quod « animam nihil minus Deo implere potest »; sed si capacitas animae posset aliquo finito impleri, aliquod minus Deo ipsam repleret: ergo extendit se animae capacitas ad infinitum ut infinitum. Sed anima Christi comprehendit omne, ad quod se extendit sua capacitas, cum sit plene perfecta: ergo comprehendit infinitum.

16. Item, anima Christi diligit Deum, quantum debet diligi; sed debet diligi Deus sine modo et mensura6: ergo cum tantum cognoscat, quantum diligit, cognoscit ergo sine mensura: ergo etc.

17. Item, natura intellectus est, quod vigoratur in intelligendo summum intelligibile7: ergo quanto anima Christi clarius intelligit, tanto nata est ad clarius intelligendum: ergo vel nunquam habebit statum, vel totaliter comprehendet Verbum sibi unitum.

18. Item, si aliquid esset, quod capiendo aliquid ampliaretur eius capacitas, aut nunquam impleretur per illud, aut infinitum apponeretur; sed capacitas animae Christi est talis: ergo vel remanet ex aliqua parte sui vacua, vel8 comprehendit sapientiam infinitam.

19. Item, tantum distat finitum ab infinito, quantum distat creatum ab increato; sed distantia creati ab increato non impedit, quin intellectus elevet se ad cognoscendum increatum sub ratione increati; ergo pari ratione finitum poterit elevari ad cognoscendum infinitum sub ratione infiniti. Sed hoc non est dari in alio quam in anima Christi: ergo etc.

20. Item, quantum distat finitas ab infinitate, tantum distat simplicitas a compositione; sed intellectus animae Christi, licet habeat aliquam compositionem, tamen capit et cognoscit ipsum Verbum sub ratione simplicitatis summae: ergo similiter9 sub ratione summae infinitatis. Sed hoc est comprehendere totam Verbi sapientiam: ergo anima Christi comprehendit sapientiam increatam.

Contra: 1. Damascenus, primo libro10, capitulo quarto: « Infinitus est Deus et incomprehensibilis, et hoc substantiae eius comprehensibile infinitas et incomprehensibilitas eius »: ergo quod dicatur incomprehensibile, non est ratione sui, sed respectu naturae creatae: si ergo anima Christi est creatura, incomprehensibilis est ei sapientia increata.

2. Item, Augustinus, duodecimo de Civitate Dei11: « Quidquid scitur scientis comprehensione finitur »; sed infinitum nullo modo potest esse finitum finito: ergo nullo modo comprehenditur a finito. Sed anima Christi est finita, cum sit creatura: ergo etc.

3. Item, omne cognoscens cognoscit secundum facultatem cognoscentis12; sed facultas cognoscentis

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animae Christi finita est: ergo quidquid cognoscit cognoscit ut finitum et modo finito: ergo nullo modo comprehendit infinitum.

4. Item, omne, quod comprehendit aliquid, in se totaliter capit, ergo vel maius est illo, vel aequale illi; sed anima Christi non est maior Verbo aeterno nec aequalis: ergo nullo modo ipsum comprehendit.

5. Item, omni eo, quod anima comprehendit, potest aliquid maius cogitari, quia, cum fines eius attingat, adhuc ultra cogitatus eius potest protendi; sed sapientia Dei nihil maius cogitari potest: ergo necesse est, sapientiam Dei apprehendi ab anima Christi incomprehensibiliter.

6. Item, anima Christi, licet summe sit unita Verbo, non tamen claudit in se Verbum quantum ad existentiam, pro eo quod existit extra eam, et alicubi est Verbum, ubi non est anima Christi sibi unita: ergo pari ratione nec intellectus animae Christi capiet in se totaliter divinam sapientiam: ergo non comprehendit ipsam.

7. Item, comprehendere aliquid est plene illud capere; plene autem capere infinitum non est nisi per actum infinitum; actus autem infinitus esse non potest, nisi sit virtus infinita; nec virtus potest esse infinita, nisi pariter et substantia infinita sit: si ergo anima Christi comprehenderet divinam sapientiam1; cum illa sit infinita, esset infinita quoad substantiam, virtutem et operationem. Sed hoc est falsum et impossibile: ergo etc.

8. Item, quod comprehendit aliquid secundum quantitatem molis coextenditur cum illo ad coaequalitatem extensionis: ergo quod comprehendit aliquid secundum excellentiam claritatis aequatur illi secundum claritatem; sed impossibile est, animam Christi aequari divinae sapientiae secundum claritatem, cum illa sit pura lux, et ipsa sit tenebra, in quantum creatura2: ergo impossibile est, aeternam Dei sapientiam comprehendi ab anima Christi.

9. Item, aeternitas comparatur ad aeviternitatem sicut circulus maior ad minorem; sed impossibile est, maiorem circulum a minori comprehendi: ergo impossibile est, substantiam aeternam comprehendi a substantia aeviterna. Sed sapientia Dei est aeterna, anima Christi non est aeterna, sed aeviterna3: ergo etc.

10. Item, quod comprehendit aliquid perfectissime cognoscit illud: ergo si anima Christi comprehendit aeternam sapientiam, necesse est, eam esse summe sapientem, ergo per consequens summe beatam: ergo est aequalis Deo in beatitudine et bonitate, caret ergo principio et fine: ergo non est creatura nec anima. Si ergo haec sunt inconvenientia, et multa alia, quae possunt ex hoc sequi; impossibile est, divinam sapientiam ab anima Christi comprehendi.

Conclusio. Anima Christi non potest proprie comprehendere sapientiam increatam.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod, sicut habitum est ex quaestione praeambula, ad cognitionem cuiuscumque creaturae perfectam et certitudinalem concurrit non tantum lucis aeternae praesentia, sed etiam lucis aeternae influentia; non tantum Verbum increatum, verum etiam verbum intus conceptum; non tantum sapientia aeterna, verum etiam notitia animae impressa; non tantum veritas causans, verum etiam veritas informans. Cum igitur anima Christi et quaelibet anima, quae Deum cognoscit, cognoscat secundum mensuram influentiae4 Verbi et notitiae intus informantis mentem; huiusmodi autem verbum et notitia, cum habeat esse creatum, ac per hoc et limitatum, non possit divinae sapientiae adaequari, cum ipsa sit per omnem modum infinita: fatendum est, quod sapientia increata comprehendi non potest ab anima sibi unita nec ab alia quacumque creatura, secundum quod comprehendi dicitur aliquid, quod comprehendens totum et totaliter secundum omnem modum capit in se ipso, iuxta quod dicit Augustinus ad Paulinam, de Videndo Deo5: « Plenitudinem Dei nullus non solum oculis corporis, sed nec ipsa mente aliquando comprehendit; aliud est enim videre, aliud videndo totum comprehendere, quandoquidem id videtur, quod praesens utcumque sentitur; totum autem comprehenditur, quod ita videtur, ut nihil eius lateat videntem, aut cuius fines circumspici possunt ». Ad huiusmodi autem visionem necessario requiritur, ut comprehendens secundum actum, habitum et virtutem vel aequetur ipsi comprehenso, vel excedat; et hoc nullo modo potest esse in anima Christi, vel in aliqua creatura in comparatione ad sapientiam aeternam; cum illa sit infinita, haec autem finita, ideo illa improportionaliter excedit istam. Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus nono de Trinitate, capitulo undecimo6: « In quantum Deum novimus, similes ei sumus, sed non ad aequalitatem similes, quia non tantum eum novimus, quantum ipse sese ». Et post:

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« Cum Deum novimus, quamvis meliores efficiamur, quam eramus, antequam nossemus, maxime cum eadem notitia placita digneque amata verbum est; fit aliqua Dei similitudo illa notitia, tamen inferior est, quia in inferiore natura est; creatura quippe animus, Creator autem Deus ». Cum igitur anima Christi non possit in cognoscendo Verbum aeternum gignere verbum illi aequale, manifestum est, quod non potest illud comprehendere, proprie accepta comprehensione. — Unde concedendae sunt rationes ad istam partem.

Ad intelligentiam autem obiectorum in contrarium, quoniam ex triplici via procedunt, videlicet ex immensitate gratiae unionis, ex simplicitate Verbi et sapientiae Dei, ex capacitate et quietatione desiderii ipsius animae cognoscentis; intelligendum est, quod, licet divina natura et humana distent per finitum et infinitum, possunt tamen uniri, salva proprietate utriusque naturae, in unitate hypostasis. Nunquam tamen ipsa divina natura fit finita, nec humana fit infinita. Unde licet Deus sit homo, et homo Deus propter unitatem personae et hypostasis, salvae tamen sunt operationes utriusque naturae et inconfusae, licet invicem praedicentur propter idiomatum communicationem1.

Rursus, licet divinum Verbum sit simplex, est tamen nihilominus infinitum, non quantitate molis, sed quantitate virtutis; quia quanto aliquid simplicius, tanto eius virtus est magis unita; et « virtus magis unita magis est infinita quam virtus multiplicata2 »: et ideo Verbum divinum, hoc ipso quod simplicissimum est, est et infinitissimum; et ideo, licet totum sit, ubicumque est, nunquam tamen circumscribitur nec ab aliquo creato comprehenditur.

Postremo, licet intellectus et affectus animae rationalis nunquam quiescat nisi in Deo et in bono infinito, hoc non est, quia illud comprehendat, sed quia nihil sufficit animae, nisi eius capacitatem excedat. Unde verum est, quod ipsius animae rationalis et affectus et intellectus feruntur in infinitum bonum et verum3 et ut infinitum; sed ferri in illud hoc potest esse sex modis, scilicet credendo, arguendo, admirando, contuendo, excedendo et comprehendendo. Primus modus est imperfectionis et viae, ultimus modus est summae perfectionis et proprius est Trinitatis aeternae et infinitae; secundus et tertius modus pertinent ad progressum viae; quartus et quintus ad consummationem patriae. In via enim possumus divinam immensitatem contemplari ratiocinando et admirando; in patria vero contuendo, quando erimus deiformes effecti, et excedendo, quando erimus omnino inebriati; propter quam ebrietatem dicit Anselmus in fine Proslogii4, quod magis intrabimus in gaudium divinum, quam divinum gaudium intret in cor nostrum. — Et quoniam anima illa Verbo unita et magis est deiformis effecta et magis inebriata propter gratiam non tantum sufficientem, sed etiam superexcellentem; ideo contuetur divinam sapientiam et contuendo excedit in ipsam, licet non comprehendat eam. Et pro hac causa admiratio non tantum habet locum in via, verum etiam in patria; non tantum in Angelis, verum etiam in anima assumta a Deo, ut dicat: Mirabilis facta est scientia tua ex me, confortata est, et non potero ad eam5; sicut Glossa exponit de homine assumto a Verbo, quod « non potest ei aequari in sapientia nec in aliquo alio ». — His visis, de facile respondetur ad obiecta.

1. 2. 3. 4. Ad illud enim quod primo obiicitur de Glossa, quod gratia data est Christo non ad mensuram; et de auctoritate Augustini, quod gratia illa ineffabilis est; et de auctoritate Hugonis et de ratione illa, quam adducit, quod gratia illa facit, quod homo sit Deus6; ad haec omnia respondendum est, quod haec omnia vera sunt et intelligenda secundum concursum duarum naturarum in unam personam; ex quo fit, ut propter immensitatem illius personae et illa unionis gratia dicatur immensa et ineffabilis, et propter unitatem personae possit Deus et ea quae sunt Dei de homine praedicari; non tamen fit ex hoc, quod ipsa anima nec eius virtus et habitus nec actus perdat esse creatum, ac per hoc finitum et limitatum. Et ideo non sequitur, quod competat ei actus comprehensivus sapientiae aeternae, cum ille sit infinitus et ab infinita virtute.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de verbo Bernardi de illa triplici unione vel unitate dicendum, quod non est simile: quia in unitate nativa et superdignativa extrema sunt proportionalia; utraque enim est unitas connaturalis; sed in unitate dignativa secus est, quia ista unitas est solius condescensionis et gratiae; et ideo non est necesse, ex hac parte mutuam esse comprehensionem.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Isidoro, quod Trinitas sibi soli nota est etc.; dicendum, quod hoc non dicit nisi propter communicationem idiomatum, vel propter familiarissimum modum revelationis arcanorum suorum communicatorum illi animae sibi unitae, secundum quod melius patebit in sequenti quaestione7

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7. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Cassiodoro, de luce inaccessibili, quod a sana mente super omnes claritates intelligitur; dicendum, quod illud est verum, accipiendo sanitatem pro perfecta deiformitate. Sed ex hoc non sequitur, quod comprehendatur, pro eo quod aliae claritates sunt minores et comprehensibiles, illa vero maior; et ideo, licet limpidius ab anima cognoscatur quam aliae claritates, non tamen sequitur, quod comprehendatur.

8. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod gratia unionis excedit omnem gratiam comprehensionis; dicendum, quod illud est verum; sed hoc non est, quia gratia unionis det ipsi animae Christi virtutem infinitam, cum ei non auferat esse creaturae, sed quia ponit eam in hypostasi infinita. Operatio autem egrediens a potentia attenditur secundum ipsius potentiae virtutem maiorem vel minorem; et ideo gratia unionis et comprehensionis non sunt eiusdem generis. Propter hoc, quamvis sint improportionales, non sequitur propter hoc, quod gratia unionis eliciat ab anima actum infinitum; sicut non sequitur, quod linea sit actu infinita, licet improportionaliter excedat punctum.

9. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Augustino, quod anima, quia simplex, ideo, cum se novit, totaliter etc.; dicendum, quod hoc est, quia anima habet simplicitatem limitatam, ad quam sequitur finitas et impartibilitas; et ideo, cum se novit, totam et totaliter se novit. Simplicitas autem divinae sapientiae, sicut prius ostensum est, coniuncta est infinitati; et ideo, licet possit a creatura attingi et apprehendi, nunquam tamen potest a creatura comprehendi vel circumscribi.

10. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod haec est per se vera, quod simplex, cum attingitur, totum attingitur; dicendum, quod de simplici finito veritatem habet; de simplici vero infinito quodam modo habet veritatem, quodam modo non. Si sic intelligitur, quod attingitur totum, id est non secundum partem et partem, veritatem habet; si vero intelligatur, quod attingitur totum, id est secundum omnimodam sui plenitudinem et perfectionem, ita quod non excedat comprehendentem, falsitatem habet. Et ideo communiter dictum est et ab antiquo, quod licet totum attingatur, non tamen totaliter; quia totum, cum sit nomen, dicit dispositionem a parte subiecti vel obiecti secundum se; totaliter vero, cum sit adverbium, dicit dispositionem verbi1, ac per hoc ponit omnimodam perfectionem et aequalitatem in actu comprehendentis respectu comprehensi, quod non potest esse in finito respectu infiniti.

11. 12. Ad illud quod obiicitur: aut totum latet, aut totum patet etc.; iam patet responsio, quia totum latet, et totum patet. Totum enim patet apprehendenti, cum non apprehendat secundum partem et partem; totum etiam latet quantum ad comprehensionem, quia nihil Verbi comprehendi potest ab intellectu creato; totum enim est infinitum, et idem ipsum est simplex. Et ideo id ipsum, quod apprehenditur, non comprehenditur. Sicut Verbum aeternum idem et totum et secundum idem2 est in aliqua creatura et est extra illam; sic capitur ab aliqua intelligentia, et tamen non comprehenditur ab illa, quia excedit illam. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad sequens, quod obiicitur, quod si aliquid lateret, non esset intellectus beatus; sicut enim iam dictum est, non dicitur incomprehensibilis propter latentiam alicuius partis, sed propter immensitatem suae simplicitatis.

13. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sicut est vere infinitum, ita vere simplex; dicendum, quod verum est. — Quod ultra obiicitur, quod sicut incomprehensibilitas infinito, ita comprehensibilitas simplici; dicendum, quod falsum est, quia infinitum, eo ipso quod infinitum est, dicit excessum improportionalem respectu cuiuslibet finiti; sed simplex, eo ipso quod simplex, non dicit adaequationem, vel limitationem, nec absolute in se nec in comparatione ad alterum; quia, sicut ostensum fuit prius, simplicissimum, eo quod simplicissimum, necesse est esse infinitum. Cum enim duplex sit quantitas, scilicet molis et virtutis, in quantitate molis simplex et infinitum super diversa fundantur, in quantitate vero virtutis super idem fundantur, quia magnitudo simplicitatis facit ad unitionem3 et magnificationem virtutis; et ideo propter summam simplicitatem non communicatur comprehensibilitas, sed potius incomprehensibilitas et virtus immensa.

14. Ad illud quod obiicitur de puncto, quod si idem esset in eo essentia et virtus etc.; dicendum, quod Verbum aeternum non comprehenditur, nec secundum essentiam nec secundum potentiam, ab aliqua creatura, quia tam virtus quam essentia immensitatem habet in infinitum excedentem omnem virtutem creatam. Et ideo non est simile de puncto, cuius essentia est circumscripta.

15. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod animam nihil minus Deo implere potest; dicendum, quod illud verum est, sicut tactum est, quia anima non est contenta aliquo bono, quod capiat et comprehendat, quia nihil tale est summum; sed bono tali et tanto, quod capiat et apprehendat per aspectum et affectum, et a quo capiatur per superexcedentiam et excessum.

16. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima Christi tantum diligit, quantum debet; dicendum, quod verum est; sed tamen ex hoc non sequitur, quod tantum diligat Deum, quantum ipse Deus diligit se, quia

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amor, quo Deus se ipsum diligit, est aeternus et immensus et coaequalis amato; affectus autem, quia egreditur a Christi voluntate, non potest esse nisi finitus. — Et quod dicitur, quod modus diligendi Deum est sine modo diligere; hoc non est, quia amor ille careat finitate et mensura, cum illa sit coaequalis omni creaturae, sed quod affectus in amando non debet sibi figere limitem et terminum coarctantem, sed potius excessivo modo toto conatu mentis ferri in illam infinitissimam bonitatem1.

17. 18. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod intellectus vigoratur in intelligendo maximum intelligibile, et quod capacitas eius crescit in capiendo maius; dicendum, quod illud dupliciter potest intelligi: uno modo, quod ipsa ex hoc, quod intelligit summum intelligibile et capit illud, quod vigorosior est et potentior respectu eorum quae sunt infra illud; et hoc habet veritatem2. Alio modo, ut intelligatur, quod maioris adhuc lucis et veritatis capax sit, quam ceperit; et hoc habet falsitatem, quia capacitas animae attenditur secundum quantitatem suae virtutis, quae radicatur super substantiam finitam; et ideo ipsa finita est actu et sufficienter complebilis per deiformitatem finitam, quae, assimilando ipsam ad Deum secundum suam omnimodam possibilitatem, facit eam excedere in bonum infinitum, ac per hoc dat ei perfectionem et statum.

19. 20. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima Christi attingit ad increatum et simplicissimum, licet sit creata et composita, ergo pari ratione ad infinitum, secundum quod infinitum, licet ipsa sit finita; dicendum, quod concedi potest conclusio, quod attingit ad infinitum sicut ad increatum et simplicissimum. Sicut enim ad infinitum non attingit3 comprehendendo, sed apprehendendo et excedendo, sic nec ad increatum et simplicissimum. — Posset tamen dici, quod non est simile hinc et inde: quia cognoscere simplex ut simplex et increatum ut increatum non includit nisi assimilationem cognoscentis ad cognitum; cognoscere autem infinitum ut infinitum non tantum dicit assimilationem, sed etiam quandam adaequationem — infinitum enim ut infinitum nominat quantum — et ideo non sequitur ratio praedicta; sicut non sequitur, si creatura potest Deo assimilari, quod propter hoc possit Deo aequari. — Fatemur autem, animam Christi esse deiformem, non tamen esse Deo aequalem; et ideo concedimus et tenemus, quod ipsam sapientiam sibi unitam, licet clare et perspicue apprehendat, non tamen totaliter comprehendit.

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English Translation

Question VI. Whether the soul of Christ comprehends uncreated wisdom itself.

Granted that the soul of Christ is wise by uncreated wisdom and by created wisdom alike, it is asked next whether it comprehends uncreated wisdom itself. And it seems that it does.

1. John the third2: God does not give the Spirit by measure; the Gloss: « To men by measure, but to the Son not by measure; rather, as he begot the whole from the whole of himself, so to the incarnate Son he gave his whole Spirit, not partially and by subdivisions, but generally and universally »; but the measure in the cognition of the true is according to the measure of the spirit given: therefore if the soul of Christ received the Holy Spirit in an immense manner, in an immense manner it knows God; and this is nothing else than to comprehend the divine wisdom itself: therefore, etc.

2. Again, Augustine, in the thirteenth book on the Trinity, chapter nineteen3: « In the Word I understand the true Son of God, in the flesh the true son of man, and both joined in one person of God and man by the bounty of an ineffable grace ». The grace of union, therefore, is ineffable, and so immense and incomprehensible; but the quantity of cognition is according to the quantity of grace: therefore if by an incomprehensible cognition the infinite is comprehensible, then, however great its immensity may be, it will be comprehended by the soul united to it.

3. Again, Hugh says in On the Wisdom of Christ4: « The soul of Christ has by grace all that God has by nature »; but God has by nature the comprehension of his own wisdom: therefore the soul of Christ has this by grace.

4. Again, it is as much or more to be God than to comprehend God; but the grace of union has power to this, that it makes a creature to be God: therefore much more strongly will it make a creature comprehend God. But not any other than the soul of Christ: therefore, etc.

5. Again, Bernard, to Eugenius5, says that there is a native unity, a dignative unity, and a superdignative unity; that dignative unity is not as great as is the unity of the Trinity, which is superdignative, and greater than the native; but both in the native unity and in the superdignative unity one of the extremes is comprehended by the other, and conversely: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems so, and much more strongly, in the dignative unity. But it is according to this that the soul of Christ is united with uncreated wisdom: therefore, etc.

6. Again, Isidore6: « The Trinity is known to itself alone and to the man assumed », and it is clear that this is not understood of just any knowledge, but of that alone in which the Trinity does not share with a mere creature; but that is nothing but comprehensive cognition: therefore the united creature has this.

7. Again, Cassiodorus7: « The health of the mind understands that inaccessible light above all brightnesses »; but the soul united to the Word was most healthy: therefore it understood that light above every other brightness: therefore either it comprehended no other brightness, or, if it comprehended any, it comprehended that one too.

8. Again, the grace of union exceeds any grace of comprehension whatever disproportionately: therefore it disproportionately makes God to be known more clearly; but this is nothing else than to comprehend the divine wisdom: therefore, etc. For nothing exceeds every finite thing disproportionately except the infinite8.

9. Again, Augustine in the ninth book on the Trinity9 says that, because the soul is simple, therefore, when it knows itself, it knows itself totally, not according to a part: therefore, since

eternal wisdom is simple, if it is known by the soul of Christ, it is known totally; but to know a thing totally is nothing else than to comprehend it: therefore, etc.

10. Again, this is true of itself: a simple thing, when it is attained, is attained as a whole1; therefore what is simpler is attained more totally, and what is most simple is attained most totally of all; but the uncreated Word has the highest simplicity: therefore it is attained most totally of all. But this is to comprehend it most perfectly: therefore it is most perfectly comprehended by the soul of Christ.

11. Again, the soul of Christ, in knowing the Word, either has the whole of it open, or has something of the Word hidden and something open. If it has it altogether open: therefore it comprehends it altogether; if it has something hidden and something open: therefore in the Word there is a something and a something. But this is unfitting, because there would not be the highest simplicity2: therefore, etc.

12. Again, if something is hidden, either that thing is God, or it is not. If it is not: therefore, notwithstanding the hiddenness of that thing, it comprehends God. If it is God: therefore God is hidden from the soul of Christ; but no soul from which God is hidden is blessed: therefore, according to this, the soul of Christ is not3 blessed. But this is absurd: therefore so is that from which it follows.

13. Again, just as immensity is truly in God, so simplicity is truly in God; but just as it belongs to immensity never to be grasped altogether, so it belongs to simplicity to be grasped totally by whatever grasps it: therefore by the same account by which it is called incomprehensible by reason of immensity, it will be called comprehensible by reason of simplicity.

14. Again, if in a point essence and power were the same, whatever attained it totally according to essence would attain it totally according to power; but in God his essence and his power are the same, and whatever is essential in him is wholly the same and most simple: either, then, nothing of God is attained, or, if anything is attained, the whole is attained and totally4, and therefore the whole is comprehended and totally: therefore not only does the soul of Christ comprehend the Word, but so does every soul that knows God in any way whatever.

15. Again, Bede5 says that « nothing less than God can fill the soul »; but if the capacity of the soul could be filled by anything finite, something less than God would fill it: therefore the soul's capacity extends itself to the infinite as infinite. But the soul of Christ comprehends everything to which its capacity extends, since it is fully perfect: therefore it comprehends the infinite.

16. Again, the soul of Christ loves God as much as he ought to be loved; but God ought to be loved without mode and without measure6: therefore, since it knows as much as it loves, it therefore knows without measure: therefore, etc.

17. Again, it is the nature of the understanding that it is invigorated in understanding the highest intelligible7: therefore the more clearly the soul of Christ understands, the more it is fitted for understanding more clearly: therefore either it will never have a settled state, or it will totally comprehend the Word united to it.

18. Again, if there were something such that in grasping something its capacity were enlarged, either it would never be filled by that thing, or an infinite would be added to it; but the capacity of the soul of Christ is such: therefore either it remains empty in some part of itself, or8 it comprehends infinite wisdom.

19. Again, the finite is as far distant from the infinite as the created is from the uncreated; but the distance of the created from the uncreated does not prevent the understanding from raising itself to know the uncreated under the account of the uncreated; therefore by parity of reasoning the finite will be able to be raised to know the infinite under the account of the infinite. But this is not to be granted in any other than in the soul of Christ: therefore, etc.

20. Again, finitude is as far distant from infinity as simplicity is from composition; but the understanding of the soul of Christ, although it has some composition, nevertheless grasps and knows the Word itself under the account of the highest simplicity: therefore likewise9 under the account of the highest infinity. But this is to comprehend the whole wisdom of the Word: therefore the soul of Christ comprehends uncreated wisdom.

Contra: 1. Damascene, in the first book10, chapter four: « God is infinite and incomprehensible, and this alone of his substance is comprehensible, his infinity and his incomprehensibility »: therefore that he is called incomprehensible is not by reason of himself, but in respect of created nature: if therefore the soul of Christ is a creature, uncreated wisdom is incomprehensible to it.

2. Again, Augustine, in the twelfth book on the City of God11: « Whatever is known is bounded by the comprehension of the knower »; but the infinite can in no way be bounded by the finite: therefore in no way is it comprehended by the finite. But the soul of Christ is finite, since it is a creature: therefore, etc.

3. Again, every knower knows according to the capability of the knower12; but the capability of the knower,

that is, of the soul of Christ, is finite: therefore whatever it knows, it knows as finite and in a finite mode: therefore in no way does it comprehend the infinite.

4. Again, everything that comprehends something grasps it totally in itself, and therefore is either greater than it or equal to it; but the soul of Christ is neither greater than the eternal Word nor equal to it: therefore in no way does it comprehend it.

5. Again, than everything that the soul comprehends something greater can be thought, because, since it attains the limits of that thing, its thought can still be stretched beyond; but nothing greater than the wisdom of God can be thought: therefore it is necessary that the wisdom of God be apprehended by the soul of Christ incomprehensibly.

6. Again, the soul of Christ, although it is united to the Word in the highest degree, nevertheless does not enclose the Word within itself as regards existence, since the Word exists outside it, and the Word is somewhere where the soul of Christ united to it is not: therefore by parity of reasoning neither will the understanding of the soul of Christ grasp the divine wisdom totally within itself: therefore it does not comprehend it.

7. Again, to comprehend something is to grasp it fully; but to grasp the infinite fully is only by an infinite act; and an infinite act cannot be unless there is an infinite power; nor can a power be infinite unless the substance also is infinite: if therefore the soul of Christ were to comprehend the divine wisdom1, then, since that wisdom is infinite, the soul would be infinite as regards substance, power, and operation. But this is false and impossible: therefore, etc.

8. Again, what comprehends something according to quantity of mass is coextended with it to an equality of extension: therefore what comprehends something according to excellence of brightness is made equal to it according to brightness; but it is impossible that the soul of Christ be made equal to the divine wisdom according to brightness, since that wisdom is pure light, and the soul is darkness, inasmuch as it is a creature2: therefore it is impossible that the eternal wisdom of God be comprehended by the soul of Christ.

9. Again, eternity is compared to aeviternity as a greater circle to a lesser; but it is impossible that a greater circle be comprehended by a lesser: therefore it is impossible that an eternal substance be comprehended by an aeviternal substance. But the wisdom of God is eternal, and the soul of Christ is not eternal but aeviternal3: therefore, etc.

10. Again, what comprehends something knows it most perfectly: therefore if the soul of Christ comprehends the eternal wisdom, it is necessary that it be supremely wise, and therefore consequently supremely blessed: therefore it is equal to God in blessedness and goodness, and therefore lacks beginning and end: therefore it is neither a creature nor a soul. If therefore these things are unfitting, and many others that can follow from this; then it is impossible that the divine wisdom be comprehended by the soul of Christ.

Conclusio. The soul of Christ cannot properly comprehend uncreated wisdom.

Respondeo: For the understanding of the foregoing it is to be noted that, as was established in the preceding question, for the perfect and certitudinal cognition of any creature there concurs not only the presence of the eternal light, but also the influence of the eternal light; not only the uncreated Word, but also the word inwardly conceived; not only the eternal wisdom, but also the knowledge impressed upon the soul; not only the truth that causes, but also the truth that informs. Since therefore the soul of Christ, and every soul that knows God, knows according to the measure of the influence4 of the Word and of the knowledge inwardly informing the mind; and since a word and a knowledge of this kind, having created being, and thereby limited being, cannot be made adequate to the divine wisdom, since that wisdom is in every mode infinite: it must be granted that uncreated wisdom cannot be comprehended by the soul united to it, nor by any other creature whatever, according as a thing is said to be comprehended when the one comprehending grasps it whole and totally in every mode within itself, as Augustine says to Paulina, in On Seeing God5: « No one has ever comprehended the fullness of God, not only with the eyes of the body, but not even with the mind itself; for it is one thing to see, another in seeing to comprehend the whole, since that is seen which is somehow felt to be present; but that whole is comprehended which is so seen that nothing of it is hidden from the one seeing, or whose limits can be looked round about ». Now for a vision of this kind it is necessarily required that the one comprehending, according to act, habit, and power, be either made equal to the thing comprehended or exceed it; and this can in no way be in the soul of Christ, or in any creature, in comparison with the eternal wisdom; since that is infinite, and this is finite, therefore that exceeds this disproportionately. And this is what Augustine says in the ninth book on the Trinity, chapter eleven6: « Insofar as we know God, we are like him, but not like him to the point of equality, because we do not know him as much as he knows himself ». And afterward:

« When we know God, although we are made better than we were before we knew him, and most of all when that same knowledge, being found pleasing and worthily loved, is a word; that knowledge does become some likeness of God, yet it is inferior, because it is in an inferior nature; for the mind is a creature, whereas God is the Creator ». Since therefore the soul of Christ cannot, in knowing the eternal Word, beget a word equal to it, it is manifest that it cannot comprehend it, comprehension being taken properly. — Hence the reasons for that side are to be conceded.

But for the understanding of the objections on the contrary side, since they proceed by a threefold way, namely from the immensity of the grace of union, from the simplicity of the Word and of the wisdom of God, and from the capacity and the quieting of the desire of the knowing soul itself; it is to be understood that, although the divine nature and the human are distant by the finite and the infinite, they can nevertheless be united, the property of each nature being preserved, in the unity of the hypostasis. Yet the divine nature itself never becomes finite, nor does the human become infinite. Hence although God is man, and man is God, on account of the unity of person and hypostasis, nevertheless the operations of each nature are preserved and unconfused, although they are predicated of each other on account of the communication of idioms1.

Again, although the divine Word is simple, it is nonetheless infinite, not by quantity of mass, but by quantity of power; because the simpler a thing is, the more united is its power; and « a more united power is more infinite than a multiplied power2 »: and therefore the divine Word, by this very fact that it is most simple, is also most infinite; and therefore, although it is whole wherever it is, it is nevertheless never circumscribed nor comprehended by anything created.

Lastly, although the understanding and the affection of the rational soul never rest except in God and in the infinite good, this is not because it comprehends that good, but because nothing suffices for the soul unless it exceeds its capacity. Hence it is true that both the affection and the understanding of the rational soul itself are borne into the infinite good and true3 and as infinite; but to be borne into it can be in six modes, namely by believing, by arguing, by wondering, by contuiting, by exceeding, and by comprehending. The first mode belongs to imperfection and to the way, the last mode is of the highest perfection and is proper to the eternal and infinite Trinity; the second and third modes pertain to progress along the way; the fourth and fifth to the consummation of the fatherland. For on the way we can contemplate the divine immensity by reasoning and by wondering; but in the fatherland by contuiting, when we shall have been made deiform, and by exceeding, when we shall be altogether inebriated; on account of which inebriation Anselm says at the end of the Proslogion4 that we shall enter more into the divine joy than the divine joy will enter into our heart. — And since that soul united to the Word has both been made more deiform and is more inebriated on account of a grace not only sufficient but even superexcellent; therefore it contuits the divine wisdom and by contuiting exceeds into it, although it does not comprehend it. And for this cause wonder has place not only on the way, but also in the fatherland; not only in the angels, but also in the soul assumed by God, so that it may say: Thy knowledge is become wonderful to me, it is strengthened, and I shall not be able to reach to it5; as the Gloss expounds it of the man assumed by the Word, that « he cannot be made equal to him in wisdom nor in anything else ». — These things being seen, the objections are easily answered.

1. 2. 3. 4. For to that which is objected first from the Gloss, that grace was given to Christ not by measure; and to the authority of Augustine, that that grace is ineffable; and to the authority of Hugh and to that reason which he adduces, that that grace brings it about that a man is God6; to all these it must be answered that all these things are true and are to be understood according to the concurrence of the two natures in one person; from which it comes about that, on account of the immensity of that person, that grace of union too is called immense and ineffable, and that, on account of the unity of the person, God and the things that are God's can be predicated of the man; yet it does not come about from this that the soul itself, or its power and habit, or its act, loses created being, and thereby finite and limited being. And therefore it does not follow that an act comprehensive of the eternal wisdom belongs to it, since that act is infinite and from an infinite power.

5. To that which is objected from the word of Bernard about that threefold union or unity it is to be said that the case is not alike: because in the native and the superdignative unity the extremes are proportional; for each is a connatural unity; but in the dignative unity it is otherwise, because that unity is one of condescension and grace alone; and therefore it is not necessary that on this side there be a mutual comprehension.

6. To that which is objected from Isidore, that the Trinity is known to itself alone, etc.; it is to be said that he says this only on account of the communication of idioms, or on account of the most intimate mode of the revelation of his secrets communicated to that soul united to him, according as it will appear better in the following question7

7. To that which is objected from Cassiodorus, about the inaccessible light, that it is understood by a healthy mind above all brightnesses; it is to be said that this is true, taking health for perfect deiformity. But from this it does not follow that it is comprehended, since the other brightnesses are lesser and comprehensible, whereas that light is greater; and therefore, although it is known by the soul more limpidly than the other brightnesses, it does not follow that it is comprehended.

8. To that which is objected, that the grace of union exceeds every grace of comprehension; it is to be said that this is true; but this is not because the grace of union gives to the soul of Christ an infinite power, since it does not take from it the being of a creature, but because it places it in an infinite hypostasis. Now an operation issuing from a potency is measured according to the greater or lesser power of that potency; and therefore the grace of union and the grace of comprehension are not of the same genus. On account of this, although they are disproportionate, it does not follow on that account that the grace of union elicits from the soul an infinite act; just as it does not follow that a line is actually infinite, although it exceeds a point disproportionately.

9. To that which is objected from Augustine, that the soul, because it is simple, therefore, when it knows itself, knows itself totally, etc.; it is to be said that this is so because the soul has a limited simplicity, upon which there follow finitude and impartibility; and therefore, when it knows itself, it knows itself whole and totally. But the simplicity of the divine wisdom, as was shown before, is joined to infinity; and therefore, although it can be attained and apprehended by a creature, it can nevertheless never be comprehended or circumscribed by a creature.

10. To that which is objected, that this is true of itself, that a simple thing, when it is attained, is attained as a whole; it is to be said that it holds true of a finite simple thing; but of an infinite simple thing it holds true in one way and not in another. If it is understood thus, that the whole is attained, that is, not according to part and part, it holds true; but if it be understood that the whole is attained, that is, according to the whole fullness and perfection of it, so that it does not exceed the one comprehending, it is false. And therefore it has been commonly said, and from of old, that although the whole be attained, it is nevertheless not attained totally; because whole, being a noun, states a disposition on the part of the subject or of the object in itself; whereas totally, being an adverb, states a disposition of the verb1, and thereby posits an entire perfection and equality in the act of the one comprehending with respect to the thing comprehended, which cannot be in the finite with respect to the infinite.

11. 12. To that which is objected: either the whole is hidden, or the whole is open, etc.; the answer is already clear, because the whole is hidden, and the whole is open. For the whole is open to the one apprehending, since he does not apprehend according to part and part; the whole is also hidden as regards comprehension, because nothing of the Word can be comprehended by a created understanding; for the whole is infinite, and that same whole is simple. And therefore that very thing which is apprehended is not comprehended. Just as the eternal Word, the same and whole and according to the same2, is in some creature and is outside it; so it is grasped by some intelligence, and yet is not comprehended by it, because it exceeds it. — And by this the answer is clear to what follows, which is objected, that if anything were hidden, the understanding would not be blessed; for, as has already been said, it is not called incomprehensible on account of the hiddenness of some part, but on account of the immensity of its simplicity.

13. To that which is objected, that just as it is truly infinite, so it is truly simple; it is to be said that this is true. — As to what is further objected, that as incomprehensibility belongs to the infinite, so comprehensibility belongs to the simple; it is to be said that this is false, because the infinite, by the very fact that it is infinite, states a disproportionate excess with respect to any finite thing; whereas the simple, by the very fact that it is simple, does not state adequation or limitation, neither absolutely in itself nor in comparison with another; because, as was shown before, what is most simple, by the fact that it is most simple, must necessarily be infinite. For since quantity is twofold, namely of mass and of power, in quantity of mass the simple and the infinite are founded upon diverse things, but in quantity of power they are founded upon the same thing, because greatness of simplicity makes for the uniting3 and the magnifying of power; and therefore on account of the highest simplicity comprehensibility is not communicated, but rather incomprehensibility and immense power.

14. To that which is objected about the point, that if in it essence and power were the same, etc.; it is to be said that the eternal Word is not comprehended, neither according to essence nor according to power, by any creature, because both its power and its essence have an immensity infinitely exceeding every created power. And therefore the case of the point is not alike, since the essence of a point is circumscribed.

15. To that which is objected, that nothing less than God can fill the soul; it is to be said that this is true, as has been touched on, because the soul is not content with any good that it grasps and comprehends, since nothing of that kind is the highest; but with a good so great and of such a kind that it grasps and apprehends it by gaze and by affection, and is grasped by it through superexceeding and excess.

16. To that which is objected, that the soul of Christ loves as much as it ought; it is to be said that this is true; but nevertheless it does not follow from this that it loves God as much as God himself loves himself, because

the love by which God loves himself is eternal and immense and coequal to the beloved; whereas the affection, since it issues from the will of Christ, can only be finite. — And as to what is said, that the mode of loving God is to love without mode; this is not because that love lacks finitude and measure, since that love is coequal to every creature, but because the affection in loving ought not to fix for itself a limit and a constricting term, but rather to be borne in an excessive mode, with the whole effort of the mind, into that most infinite goodness1.

17. 18. To that which is objected, that the understanding is invigorated in understanding the greatest intelligible, and that its capacity grows in grasping something greater; it is to be said that this can be understood in two ways: in one way, that the soul, from this, that it understands the highest intelligible and grasps it, is more vigorous and more powerful with respect to those things that are below it; and this holds true2. In another way, so that it be understood that it is capable of still more light and truth than it has grasped; and this is false, because the capacity of the soul is measured according to the quantity of its power, which is rooted upon a finite substance; and therefore the soul is finite in act and sufficiently completable through a finite deiformity, which, by assimilating it to God according to its whole possibility, makes it exceed into the infinite good, and thereby gives it perfection and a settled state.

19. 20. To that which is objected, that the soul of Christ attains to the uncreated and most simple, although it is created and composite, and therefore by parity of reasoning attains to the infinite, according as it is infinite, although the soul itself is finite; it is to be said that the conclusion can be conceded, that it attains to the infinite as it does to the uncreated and most simple. For just as it does not attain to the infinite3 by comprehending, but by apprehending and by exceeding, so neither does it so attain to the uncreated and most simple. — It could nevertheless be said that the case is not alike on the one side and the other: because to know a simple thing as simple and the uncreated as uncreated includes only an assimilation of the knower to the thing known; but to know the infinite as infinite states not only an assimilation, but also a certain adequation — for the infinite as infinite names a how much — and therefore the aforesaid reasoning does not follow; just as it does not follow, if a creature can be assimilated to God, that on that account it can be made equal to God. — We confess, however, that the soul of Christ is deiform, yet not equal to God; and therefore we concede and hold that, although it apprehends clearly and plainly the very wisdom united to it, it nevertheless does not comprehend it totally.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. 2
    Vers. 34. — Glossa est ordinaria apud Strabum et Lyranum; cfr. August., in Ioan. Evang. tr. 14. n. 10. seq., ex quo quaedam attulimus tom. III. pag. 278, nota 1. — Eadem quaestio solvitur III. Sent. d. 14. a. 1. q. 2.
    Verse 34. — The Gloss is the ordinary one in Strabo and Lyra; compare Augustine, On the Gospel of John, tr. 14, n. 10 and following, from which we adduced some things in tom. III, p. 278, note 1. — The same question is solved in III Sentences, d. 14, a. 1, q. 2.
  2. 3
    Num. 24: In Verbo... et utrumque simul in unam personam Dei et hominis ineffabili gratiae largitate coniunctum.
    N. 24: In the Word... and both together joined in one person of God and man by the bounty of an ineffable grace.
  3. 4
    Completius: de Sapientia animae Christi, ubi circa finem haec verba etiam Ambrosio attribuuntur (cfr. tom. III. pag. 52. nota 2.). Ibid. insuper seq. arg. insinuatur. — In minori post sapientiae F addit quae est infinita.
    More fully: On the Wisdom of the Soul of Christ, where near the end these words are attributed also to Ambrose (compare tom. III, p. 52, note 2). In the same place, moreover, the following argument is intimated. — In the minor premiss, after sapientiae F adds quae est infinita.
  4. 5
    Sive Libr. V. de Considerat. c. 8. et 9. n. 18-21, ubi inter novem modos unitatis (cfr. III. Sent. d. 6. a. 2. q. 2.) recenset unitatem nativam, i. e. qua anima et caro unus nascitur homo; unitatem dignativam, i. e. qua limus noster a Dei Verbo in unam assumtus est personam; et unitatem Trinitatis (superdignativam), i. e. qua tres personae una substantia sunt, et quae arcem tenet inter omnes unitates. De unitate dignativa subinde ostendit (n. 20.): quod « haec unitas duarum [scil. Trinitatis et nativae], consistens media unitatum, alteri succumbere, alteri praeeminere cognoscitur; quantum superiore inferior, tantum inferiore superior ».
    That is, book V On Consideration, c. 8 and 9, nn. 18–21, where among nine modes of unity (compare III Sentences, d. 6, a. 2, q. 2) he lists the native unity, i.e. that by which soul and flesh are born one man; the dignative unity, i.e. that by which our clay was assumed into one person by the Word of God; and the unity of the Trinity (the superdignative), i.e. that by which three persons are one substance, and which holds the citadel among all the unities. Of the dignative unity he then shows (n. 20) that « this unity of the two [namely of the Trinity and the native], standing as the middle of the unities, is known to succumb to the one and to be preeminent over the other; the lower being as far below the higher as the higher is above the lower ».
  5. 6
    Libr. I. Sent. c. 3. n. 1. Cfr. tom. III. pag. 299, nota 2. — Inferius pro quacumque A B E G quantacumque.
    Book I of the Sentences, c. 3, n. 1. Compare tom. III, p. 299, note 2. — Below, for quacumque A B E G read quantacumque.
  6. 7
    Libr. de Anima, c. 3, ubi ostendit, nos immortales et lumen dici posse propter imaginem Dei: Ipse enim Deus omnipotens solus habet immortalitatem et lumen habitat inaccessibile (I. Tim. 6, 16.), quod supra omnes claritates vel admirationes sanitas mentis intelligit, sed imago aliquam habet similitudinem. Ceterum haec lumen habere non potest quod veritas etc.
    The book On the Soul, c. 3, where he shows that we can be called immortal and lumen on account of the image of God: For God almighty himself alone has immortality and dwells in inaccessible lumen (I Tim. 6:16), which the health of the mind understands above all brightnesses or wonderings, but the image has some likeness of it. For the rest, this image cannot have the lumen that truth has, etc.
  7. 8
    Aristot., I. de Caelo et mundo, text. 52. et 64. (c. 6. et 7.): Ratio autem nulla est infiniti ad finitum.
    Aristotle, I On the Heaven and the World, texts 52 and 64 (c. 6 and 7): But there is no ratio of the infinite to the finite.
  8. 9
    Cap. 4. n. 7; clarius ibid. X. c. 3. n. 6; cfr. VII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 21. n. 28.
    C. 4, n. 7; more clearly in the same work X, c. 3, n. 6; compare VII On Genesis according to the Letter, c. 21, n. 28.
  9. 1
    Vide tom. III. pag. 299, nota 3. verba Aristot.
    See the words of Aristotle in tom. III, p. 299, note 3.
  10. 2
    F quia tunc non esset summae simplicitatis.
    F reads quia tunc non esset summae simplicitatis.
  11. 3
    B non esset. Mox plures codd. a quo pro ex quo, G ad quod.
    B reads non esset. Presently several codices read a quo for ex quo, G ad quod.
  12. 4
    F addit sed non nihil. Superius post virtus sua D F H legunt quia quidquid est essentiale in ipso est omnino idem et simplicissimum.
    F adds sed non nihil. Above, after virtus sua, D F H read quia quidquid est essentiale in ipso est omnino idem et simplicissimum.
  13. 5
    Expos. in Act. 5, 3. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 209, nota 3. et pag. 226, nota 5.
    Exposition on Acts 5:3. Compare tom. II, p. 209, note 3, and p. 226, note 5.
  14. 6
    Bernard., de Diligendo Deo, c. 1. n. 1: Causa diligendi Deum Deus est; modus, sine modo diligere.
    Bernard, On Loving God, c. 1, n. 1: The cause of loving God is God; the mode, to love without mode.
  15. 7
    Cfr. I. Sent. d. 1. a. 3. q. 1. ad 2.
    Compare I Sentences, d. 1, a. 3, q. 1, ad 2.
  16. 8
    F talis, et nihil remanet ex aliqua sui parte vacuum; ergo. Idem F superius cum D verbis aliquid ampliaretur interserit unitum; subinde ante infinitum addit in.
    F reads talis, et nihil remanet ex aliqua sui parte vacuum; ergo. The same F above, with D, inserts unitum into the words aliquid ampliaretur; then before infinitum it adds in.
  17. 9
    Ita D, alii omittunt similiter.
    So D; the others omit similiter.
  18. 10
    Scil. de Fide orthod. Recentior versio (ed. Migne): Infinitus igitur est Deus et incomprehensibilis, atque hoc unum est, quod de eo percipi possit et comprehendi (καὶ τοῦτο μόνον αὐτοῦ καταληπτόν, ἡ ἀπειρία καὶ ἀκαταληψία). — Subinde pro dicatur incomprehensibile A substituit dicatur incomprehensibilis Deus.
    That is, On the Orthodox Faith. The more recent version (Migne's edition): God therefore is infinite and incomprehensible, and this alone is what can be perceived and comprehended of him (καὶ τοῦτο μόνον αὐτοῦ καταληπτόν, ἡ ἀπειρία καὶ ἀκαταληψία). — Then for dicatur incomprehensibile A substitutes dicatur incomprehensibilis Deus.
  19. 11
    Cap. 18.
    C. 18.
  20. 12
    Secundum Boeth., V. de Consolat., prosa 4; verba vide tom. III. pag. 296, nota 4. et 5.
    According to Boethius, V On Consolation, prose 4; for the words see tom. III, p. 296, notes 4 and 5.
  21. 1
    F prosequitur oporteret illam infinitam esse quoad substantiam etc.
    F continues oporteret illam infinitam esse quoad substantiam, etc.
  22. 2
    Secundum August., vide supra pag. 10, nota 4.
    According to Augustine; see above, p. 10, note 4.
  23. 3
    Cfr. II. Sent. d. 2. p. 1. a. 1. q. 1.
    Compare II Sentences, d. 2, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1.
  24. 4
    A influentis.
    A reads influentis.
  25. 5
    Sive Epist. 147. (alias 112.) c. 9. n. 21: Non quia Dei plenitudinem quisquam non solum oculis corporis, sed vel ipsa mente aliquando comprehendit etc. — A B E: De plenitudine Dei nullus non solum etc., H: Plenitudinem Divinitatis nullus non solum etc.
    That is, Letter 147 (otherwise 112), c. 9, n. 21: Not that anyone has ever comprehended the fullness of God, not only with the eyes of the body, but even with the mind itself, etc. — A B E: De plenitudine Dei nullus non solum, etc.; H: Plenitudinem Divinitatis nullus non solum, etc.
  26. 6
    Num. 16. In secundo loco pro fit aliqua Dei similitudo aliqui codd. fit aliqua Dei similitudine, quam lectionem etiam tom. I. pag. 70, nota 2. notavimus.
    N. 16. In the second place, for fit aliqua Dei similitudo some codices read fit aliqua Dei similitudine, a reading which we noted also in tom. I, p. 70, note 2.
  27. 1
    Vide tom. III. pag. 14, nota 3.
    See tom. III, p. 14, note 3.
  28. 2
    Lib. de Causis, propos. 17. — De quantitate molis et virtutis cfr. August., de Quantitate animae, c. 3. n. 4.
    The book On Causes, proposition 17. — On quantity of mass and of power compare Augustine, On the Quantity of the Soul, c. 3, n. 4.
  29. 3
    Cfr. IV. Sent. d. 49. p. 1. q. 1. seq.
    Compare IV Sentences, d. 49, p. 1, q. 1 and following.
  30. 4
    Cap. 26: Non ergo totum illud gaudium intrabit in gaudentes, sed toti gaudentes intrabunt in gaudium (cfr. Matth. 25, 21. et 23.). — Superius pro ratiocinando F arguendo. Inferius pro anima illa D F H anima illi, et pro in ipsam A B in ipsa.
    C. 26: That whole joy, therefore, will not enter into those who rejoice, but those who rejoice will enter whole into the joy (compare Matt. 25:21 and 23). — Above, for ratiocinando F reads arguendo. Below, for anima illa D F H read anima illi, and for in ipsam A B read in ipsa.
  31. 5
    Psalm. 138, 6. — Glossa est secundum Cassiodor., in hunc loc., relata a Magistro, III. Sent. d. XIV. c. 1. — Mox pro homine assumto F anima assumta.
    Psalm 138:6. — The Gloss is according to Cassiodorus on this passage, reported by the Master, III Sentences, d. XIV, c. 1. — Presently, for homine assumto F reads anima assumta.
  32. 6
    F facit, creaturam esse Deum etc. Inferius pro ut propter B et propter, qui deinde cum aliis habet ut illa. Subinde pro dicat... possit F diceretur.... posset.
    F reads facit, creaturam esse Deum, etc. Below, for ut propter B reads et propter, and then with the others has ut illa. Thereafter, for dicat... possit F reads diceretur.... posset.
  33. 7
    Cfr. etiam III. Sent. d. 14. a. 1. q. 2. ad 3.
    Compare also III Sentences, d. 14, a. 1, q. 2, ad 3.
  34. 1
    Priscian., XI. Grammat. c. 2: Adverbium [dicitur], quod verbo adiungitur (cfr. ibid. XV. c. 1.). — De ipsa solut. vide III. Sent. d. 14. a. 1. q. 2. ad 4; ibid. ad 5. seq. solut. insinuatur.
    Priscian, XI Grammar, c. 2: An adverb [is so called] because it is joined to a verb (compare the same work XV, c. 1). — On this solution itself see III Sentences, d. 14, a. 1, q. 2, ad 4; in the same place, ad 5, the following solution is intimated.
  35. 2
    A secundum totum.
    A reads secundum totum.
  36. 3
    F H unionem. Subinde pro communicatur A concomitatur.
    F H read unionem. Thereafter, for communicatur A reads concomitatur.
  37. 1
    Cfr. III. Sent. d. 27. a. 2. q. 5. ad 1.
    Compare III Sentences, d. 27, a. 2, q. 5, ad 1.
  38. 2
    Idem docet Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 7. (c. 4.); verba ipsius vide tom. I. pag. 39, nota 5.
    Aristotle teaches the same, III On the Soul, text 7 (c. 4); for his words see tom. I, p. 39, note 5.
  39. 3
    Ita F, alii attingitur. Aliquanto inferius voci adaequationem ex A B E G praemisimus quandam.
    So F; the others read attingitur. Somewhat below we have prefixed quandam to the word adaequationem from A B E G. ---
Cited by

6 places in the Opera Omnia citethis question. Derived from Quaracchi’s own apparatus, never tagged by hand.

On the second vision: the fifth treatment, which is the third on the comeliness of faith and treats of God as the exemplar of all things
Collationes in Hexaëmeron · Collatio XII: De visione secunda tractatio quinta, quae est tertia de speciositate fidei et agit de Deo, ut est exemplar omnium rerum
pag. 35, nota 2
On the speculation of God in his vestiges in this sensible world
Itinerarium mentis in Deum · Cap. II: De speculatione Dei in vestigiis suis in hoc sensibili mundo
pag. 33, nota 5
Whether trinity and the highest simplicity can stand together
Quaestiones disputatae de mysterio Trinitatis · Quaestio III: Utrum simul stent trinitas et summa simplicitas
supra pag. 34, nota 6
Whether the divine being is most infinite
Quaestiones disputatae de mysterio Trinitatis · Quaestio IV: Utrum trinitas stet cum summa infinitate · 2×
supra pag. 33, nota 10
Whether trinity and infinity can stand together
Quaestiones disputatae de mysterio Trinitatis · Quaestio IV: Utrum trinitas stet cum summa infinitate
supra pag. 35, nota 2
Whether the soul of Christ comprehends all that uncreated wisdom comprehends
Quaestiones disputatae de scientia Christi · Quaestio VII: Utrum anima Christi comprehendat omnia, quae comprehendit sapientia increata
supra pag. 35, nota 5

2 further references address the article or printed page this question belongs to, rather than the question itself.