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Quaestiones disputatae de scientia Christi · Quaestio VII: Utrum anima Christi comprehendat omnia, quae comprehendit sapientia increata

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Quaestio VII. Utrum anima Christi comprehendat omnia, quae comprehendit sapientia increata.

Quaeritur, utrum anima Christi comprehendat omnia, quae comprehendit sapientia increata. Et videtur, quod sic.

1. Ad Romanos undecimo4: O altitudo divitiarum sapientiae et scientiae Dei! quam incomprehensibilia sunt iudicia eius, et investigabiles viae eius! Ex quo colligitur, quod illa quae pertinent ad divinam sapientiam magis comprehensibilia sunt quam divina iudicia; sed Ioannis quinto dicitur, quod Pater omne iudicium dedit Filio, quia Filius hominis est; ex quo colligitur, quod anima Christi comprehendit divina iudicia: ergo si illa sunt minus comprehensibilia quam alia, multo fortius comprehendit omnia alia.

2. Item, Apocalypsis quinto5: Dignus est Agnus, qui occisus est, accipere sapientiam; Glossa: « Cognitionem omnium, sicut Verbum sibi unitum »; sed Verbum unitum comprehendit quaecumque cognoscit: ergo et anima Christi.

3. Item, Damascenus, in tertio libro6: « Aimus, Christum hominem omnia scientem; in Christo enim sunt omnes thesauri sapientiae ». — Si dicas, quod intelligitur secundum divinam naturam; contra: nihil scit aliquis, quod anima eius ignorat: ergo si Christus omnia comprehendit, necesse est, quod et illud comprehendat eius anima.

4. Item, Gregorius, in Dialogis7: « Animae videnti Creatorem angusta est omnis creatura »: ergo si anima Christi perfecte videt Verbum sibi unitum, angusta est ergo sibi omnis creatura; sed ultra omnem creaturam nihil restat nisi immensitas eorum quae sunt Deo possibilia: ergo anima Christi comprehendit illa omnia.

5. Item, anima Christi perfectissime est unita Verbo, et secundum quod est Verbum et secundum quod est exemplar; sed si aliquid esset in Verbo vel in exemplari aeterno, quod animam Christi lateret, posset cogitari adhuc perfectius unita: si ergo unita

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est unione perfectissima, necesse est, quod comprehendat omnia.

6. Item, anima Christi cognoscit in Verbo; et quia uno cognoscit multa, ideo simul multa cognoscit, licet de naturali cognitione non habeat intelligere nisi unum1: ergo cum illud unum non tantum se extendat ad multa, verum etiam ad infinita; qua ratione simul multa cognoscit, eadem ratione infinita cognoscit.

7. Item, Verbum aeternum aeternaliter repraesentat quaecumque repraesentat, cum sit unum et uniforme: ergo non alia ratione2 ducit in unum, et in quodlibet: ergo anima Christi aut nulla in Verbo videt, aut si aliqua videt, infinita videt.

8. Item, potentior est anima Christi ad cognoscendum per Verbum sibi unitum, quam aliqua anima per habitum sibi datum; sed anima habens habitum sapientiae comprehendit omnia, ad quae se extendit habitus ille3: ergo pari ratione anima Christi per Verbum aeternum comprehendit omnia, ad quae se extendit ipsum Verbum.

9. Item, anima Christi cognoscit ipsum Verbum totum, cum totum habeat sibi unitum; sed in Verbo idem sunt potentia et essentia: ergo comprehendit totam potentiam Verbi. Sed potentia Verbi se extendit ad infinita: ergo anima Christi comprehendit infinita.

10. Item, propinquior est anima Christi ipsis rebus, ut sunt in Verbo, quam secundum quod sunt in proprio genere; sed nulla res habet esse in proprio genere, quin cognoscatur ab anima Christi; scit enim omnia, quaecumque fiunt: ergo multo fortius scit omnia, quaecumque sciuntur a Verbo aeterno.

11. Item, aeque impossibile est contingentia certitudinaliter scire4, sicut comprehendere infinita; sed anima Christi propter unionem sui ad Verbum certitudinaliter habet scientiam futurorum contingentium: ergo pari ratione et infinitorum.

12. Item, aeque difficile est cognoscere secreta, sicut cognoscere multa; sed anima Christi propter unionem sui ad Verbum scit secretissima cordium, quantumcumque sint intima: ergo pari ratione cognoscit quantumcumque multa: ergo infinita.

13. Item, anima Christi comprehendit omne comprehensibile a creatura; sed quaelibet species numeri est comprehensibilis a creatura: ergo comprehendit omnes species numeri. Sed species numeri, ut dicit Augustinus duodecimo de Civitate5, sunt infinitae: ergo anima Christi comprehendit infinita.

14. Item, anima Christi comprehendit totum universum, ergo ens et omnes entis differentias: ergo non solum cognoscit differentias generales, verum etiam individuales, non solum ens actu, verum etiam ens in potentia; sed quaelibet species, quantum est de se, habet individua infinita in potentia6: ergo anima Christi comprehendit infinita.

15. Item, anima Christi comprehendit aliquod finitum, utpote lineam, ergo cognoscit principium lineae; sed principium lineae est punctus: ergo comprehendit punctum. Sed qui comprehendit aliquid novit illud secundum totum posse suum: ergo cum potentia puncti se extendat ad infinitas lineas, et anima Christi comprehendat totam puncti potentiam; necesse est, quod comprehendat infinita.

16. Item, anima Christi amat omne amabile, ergo pari ratione scit omne scibile; sed omne, quod scitur a Deo, est scibile: ergo anima Christi scit omne, quod scitur a Deo.

17. Item, anima Christi est omnino perfecta; sed in eo quod est omnino perfectum omne, quod est in potentia, est reductum ad actum; intellectus autem animae Christi est in potentia ad infinita, quia nunquam intelligit tot, quin plura possit intelligere: ergo cum intelligibilia in intelligente non se coangustent7, ergo si tota ipsius potentia est ad actum reducta, necesse est, quod cognoscat infinita.

18. Item, si intellectus agens esset in plena actualitate respectu omnium, ad quae est possibilis in potentia; quilibet intelligeret infinita8: ergo cum in anima Christi Verbum sibi unitum sit in plena actualitate respectu omnium, respectu quorum est

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intellectus animae Christi in potentia: ergo anima Christi intelligit infinita.

19. Item, anima Christi aut potest aliquid addiscere, aut nihil. Si aliquid potest addiscere: ergo non est plene perfecta in scientia, pari ratione nec in gratia; si nihil potest addiscere: ergo tot scit, quod non potest plura scire: ergo necesse est, quod cognoscat infinita.

20. Item, anima Christi aut cognoscit aliqua eorum quae Deus potest facere et non faciet, aut nihil. Si nihil cognoscit eorum; quaero, quid impediat; aut enim hoc est, quia ipsa non potest ad illa se extendere, et illud est manifeste falsum; aut quia Deus non vult sibi revelare, et hoc est manifestum inconveniens, quia aufert illi animae summam familiaritatem ad Verbum sibi unitum. Si cognoscit aliqua eorum quae potest facere et non faciet; sed non est maior ratio, quare magis cognoscat hoc quam illud: ergo videtur, quod cognoscat omnia, quae sunt Deo possibilia: ergo infinita.

21. Item, anima Christi aut cognoscit finita, aut infinita. Si finita cognoscit; cum omnibus finitis possint cogitari plura: ergo poterit aliqua anima plura cogitare, quam cognoscat anima Christi; sed hoc est inconveniens, quod aliqua anima in aliquo illam excedat: ergo necesse est ponere, quod cognoscat infinita.

Contra: 1. Psalmus1: Mirabilis facta est scientia tua etc.; Glossa: « Homo assumtus divinae substantiae non potest aequari in substantia nec in aliquo alio »: ergo anima Christi non comprehendit omnia, quae comprehenduntur a sapientia aeterna.

2. Item, Augustinus, duodecimo de Civitate Dei2: « Infinitas numerorum scientiae Dei, quae comprehendit, non potest esse infinita »: ergo si anima Christi comprehendit infinita, infinita sunt ei finita; sed si infinita sunt ei finita, cum ipsa sit finita, non sunt infinita: ergo si comprehendit finita, non comprehendit infinita.

3. Item, Hugo, de Sapientia animae Christi3: « Hoc unum indubitanter affirmo, quod alia sapientia praeter divinam in anima Christi non fuit, aut si aliqua fuit, aequalis illi non fuit »; sed constans est, quod alia fuit, sicut ex praemissis apparet: ergo cum sapientia informativa et perfectiva animae et habilitativa non possit esse nisi creata, sapientia illa in Christo non se extendet ad comprehendenda omnia, quae comprehendit sapientia increata.

4. Item, omne creatum dispositum est in certo pondere, numero et mensura4: ergo anima Christi et eius sapientia habet certum numerum et mensuram; ergo non se extendit ad infinita.

5. Item, comprehendere infinita est actus pertransiens totaliter super immensitatem cognoscibilium; omnis autem talis actus est infinitus; actus autem infinitus non est nisi a virtute infinita, neque virtus infinita nisi in substantia infinita5: si ergo anima Christi finita est et limitata, cum sit creatura, impossibile est, quod infinita comprehendat.

6. Item, quanto substantia simplicior, tanto plurium est cognoscitiva6; sed anima Christi nec per naturam nec per gratiam sublimatur usque ad divinam simplicitatem: ergo non elevatur ad tot cognoscenda, quot cognoscit divina sapientia.

7. Item, sapientia Verbi est immensa limpiditate et numerositate; sed anima Christi nunquam pervenit ad comprehendendum immensitatem lucis aeternae secundum omnimodam limpiditatem: ergo nunquam pervenit ad cognoscendam omnimodam numerositatem.

8. Item, licet anima Christi uniatur essentiae Verbi, nunquam tamen in tot existit rebus, in quot est ipsum Verbum; sed sicut se habet essentia ad essentiam, ita scientia ad scientiam: ergo nunquam cognoscit omnia, quae cognoscit ipsum Verbum.

9. Item, scientia includit potentiam, quia posse scire posse aliquid est7; sed anima Christi non est capax potentiae infinitae, sicut potentiae creandi: ergo pari ratione nec scientiae se extendentis ad infinita.

10. Item, infinitas in creaturis attestatur imperfectionem8: si ergo sapientia animae Christi est perfectissima, ergo non admittit infinitatem nec ex parte cognoscentis nec ex parte cogniti nec ex parte modi cognoscendi.

11. Item, nullum creatum excedit aliud creatum in infinitum; sed si anima Christi cognosceret infinita; cum aliae animae non cognoscant nisi finita, excederet illas in infinitum: ergo exiret extra genus creatum. Sed hoc est manifeste falsum: ergo et illud, ex quo sequitur, scilicet quod anima Christi sit comprehensiva infinitorum.

12. Item, omne cognitum est in cognoscente9: ergo si anima Christi actu comprehenderet infinita, infinita actu essent in anima Christi; sed impossibile est ponere infinitum actu circa ens creatum: ergo impossibile est, quod anima Christi sit comprehensiva infinitorum.

Conclusio. Anima Christi in Verbo non comprehendit proprie infinita; quatenus tamen Verbum est exemplar factivum, fertur in illud comprehendendo; sed quatenus est exemplar expressivum, in idem fertur non comprehendendo, sed excedendo.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod dupliciter contingit loqui de sapientia increata: aut secundum quod est exemplar factivum et dispositivum, aut secundum quod est exemplar expressivum sive repraesentativum. Primo

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modo relucent in arte divinae sapientiae ea quae sunt, fuerunt et erunt; et haec sunt finita. Secundo modo relucent omnia, quae Deus potest facere et intelligere; et haec quidem sunt infinita, sicut in praecedentibus1 monstratum fuit, et Augustinus expresse dicit duodecimo de Civitate Dei. — Anima igitur Christi utroque modo per cognitionem fertur in divinam sapientiam, sed differenter. In ipsam enim, secundum quod est exemplar factivum, fertur comprehendendo, quia illa quae in exemplari ut factivo et dispositivo continentur et repraesentantur finita sunt, ac per hoc et comprehensibilia. In exemplar vero, secundum quod est exemplar expressivum seu repraesentativum, fertur non comprehendendo, sed excedendo; quia, cum in ipso repraesententur infinita, incomprehensibilia sunt, scilicet a substantia finita. Et ideo anima Christi, cum sit creatura ac per hoc finita, quantumcumque sit unita Verbo, infinita non comprehendit, quia nec illis aequatur nec illa excedit; et ideo illa non omnimode capit, sed potius capitur, ac per hoc in illa non fertur per modum comprehensionis, sed potius per modum excessus. Excessivum autem modum cognoscendi dico, non quo cognoscens excedat cognitum, sed quo cognoscens fertur in obiectum excedens excessivo quodam modo, erigendo se supra se ipsum. De quo cognoscendi modo Dionysius loquitur in libro de Mystica Theologia, et septimo capitulo de Divinis Nominibus2 dicit sic: « Oportet agnoscere, nostrum intellectum quandam habere potentiam ad intelligendum, per quam videt intelligibilia, unionem vero excedentem intellectus naturam, per quam coniungitur ad ea quae sunt ultra se. Secundum hanc igitur divina intelligendo, non secundum nos, sed nos totos a nobis totis extra factos et totos deificatos; melius est enim Dei esse et non esse sui; sic enim erunt omnia credibilia iis qui sunt cum Deo ». — Hic autem modus cognoscendi per excessum est in via et in patria; sed in via ex parte, in patria vero est perfecte in Christo et in aliis comprehensoribus; sed in aliis est coarctate tum ex parte mensurae propriae gratiae, tum ex parte voluntatis divinae, quae non se cuilibet offert in omnimoda familiaritate; sed in anima Christi est liberalissime, tum quia ab ipsa habet gratiam implentem omnimode capacitatem suam, tum quia speculum aeternum praebet se ei manifestabile3 secundum familiaritatem omnimodam.

Differt autem in Christo modus comprehensionis et excessus multipliciter: primo, quia in comprehensivo cognoscens capit cognitum, in excessivo vero cognitum capit cognoscentem. — Secundo, quia in comprehensivo terminatur intelligentiae4 aspectus, in excessivo vero intelligentiae appetitus. — Tertio, quia in comprehensivo fit actu considerans omnia praeterita, praesentia et futura; in excessu vero fit ad considerandum prompta. — Quarto, quia ex comprehensione percepta fit, ut nihil de novo addiscat; propter vero excessum fit, ut nihil addiscere possit5; et ideo, licet cognitio animae Christi per modum excessus quodam modo dici possit respectu infinitorum, cognitio tamen comprehensiva non est nisi respectu finitorum. Unde si secundum illam dicatur anima Christi cognoscere quaecumque Verbum cognoscit, hoc intelligitur de praeteritis, praesentibus et futuris, quae aliquo modo faciunt ad integritatem ipsius universi, quod plene et totaliter fuit ab instanti conceptionis descriptum in anima Christi Iesu. Et pro tanto dicitur anima illa habuisse omnem scientiam, non quia comprehendit omnia, quae cognoscit divina sapientia, cum illa sit infinita et comprehendi non possit a potentia finita, secundum quod ostensum est supra6. — Unde rationes, quae hoc ostendunt, sunt concedendae, quia irrefragabiliter verum concludunt.

1. 2. 3. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod anima Christi comprehendit omnia divina iudicia, et quod habet omnem scientiam, sicut habet Verbum sibi unitum; dici potest, quod illa dicuntur de homine assumto propter communicationem idiomatum; vel certe dicuntur de iis quae sunt, fuerunt et erunt, quae quidem ab anima Christi comprehendi possunt; non autem est verum respectu omnium, quae intelligit divina sapientia, cum infinita cognoscat, sicut patet ex iis quae sunt praedeterminata. — Illud tamen quod obiicitur, quod nullus potest aliquid scire, quod anima eius ignorat; veritatem habet, cum aliquis nihil cognoscat nisi per animam, sicut est purus homo. In Christo autem, qui non tantum cognoscit per animam, sed etiam per divinam naturam, locum non habet propositio illa. Et per hoc patet responsio ad tria primo obiecta.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod animae videnti Deum angusta est omnis creatura; dicendum, quod illud est verum de creatura secundum esse, quod habet in proprio genere, non tamen secundum esse, quod habet in arte, quia ars illa nobilissima et perfectissima est, non angustiam habens, sed potius perfectionem. Unde si anima cognosceret totum universum secundum esse, quod habet in proprio genere; non tamen adhuc esset in perfecta cognitione et comprehensione, nisi et artem illam cognosceret, per

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quam universa fiunt. Et quia anima Christi omnia facta perfectissime comprehendit in illa arte, ideo in illa et per illam dicitur habere comprehensionem perfectam.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima Christi perfectissime est unita Verbo; dicendum, quod verum est, salva tamen limitatione naturae creatae, quam anima Christi non perdit, quia non desinit esse creatura; et quia infinita comprehendere repugnat limitationi creaturae: hinc est, quod non potest inferri ex unione illa, quantumcumque intelligatur perfecta.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima Christi simul cognoscit multa, quia cognoscit uno, quod pari ratione debeat cognoscere infinita; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia multitudo cum simultate non repugnat limitationi creaturae, infinitas autem cum actualitate et simultate omnimode repugnat; et ideo non est argumentum a simili, sed a valde dissimili.

7. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Verbum aeternum aequaliter repraesentat; dici potest, quod illud habet falsitatem, quia repraesentare dicit actum ad alterum; Deus autem, etsi in se uniformis sit, tamen multiformiter illustrat et manifestat; et cum infinita cognoscat, quaedam ex eis approbat et quaedam reprobat, quaedam disponit facere, quaedam vero minime, quaedam voluntarie ostendit, quaedam occulte. — Praeterea, esto quod quantum est de se, uniformiter omnia cognoscat, adhuc ratio non concludit, quia « omne receptum est in recipiente per modum recipientis et non per modum recepti1 »; et ideo, cum virtus illa capiens finita sit, impossibile est, etsi totum sibi ultro offeratur, quod totum capiat et comprehendat, sed secundum quod competit sibi; sicut exemplo apparet, si totus Sequana2 offert se afferenti amphoram, non tamen totus comprehenditur, sed quantum et quomodo capacitas amphorae se extendit.

8. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod potentior est anima Christi ad cognoscendum per Verbum sibi unitum, quam aliqua alia3 anima per habitum sibi datum; dicendum, quod verum est, sed ex hoc non sequitur, quodsi anima comprehendit omnia, ad quae se extendit habitus, quod propter hoc cognoscat anima Christi omnia, quae cognoscit per ipsum Verbum: quia anima comprehendit ipsum habitum tanquam sibi proportionalem et in nullo excedentem ipsius capacitatem; non sic anima Christi comprehendit Verbum sibi unitum, cum eius capacitatem excedat in infinitum.

9. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod totum cognoscit, ergo totam potentiam; dicendum, quod ratio illa non valet, quia totum, dictum de Verbo, dicit privationem partis et partis vel positionem omnimodae perfectionis; dictum autem de potentia, quia potentia dicit comparationem ad possibilia, dicit distributionem respectu omnium possibilium; et sic variatur eius acceptio, et ideo non procedit ratio illa.

10. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod propinquior est anima Christi ipsis rebus, prout sunt in Verbo, quam prout sunt in proprio genere; dicendum, quod licet sit propinquior, non tamen est proportionalior. Comprehensio autem aliquo modo claudit in se rationem proportionalitatis, et quod finitum sit cognitum cognoscenti; et ideo, quia in proprio genere finitae sunt et proportionales illi animae, ideo comprehensibiles sunt, non autem prout sunt in illius artis immensitate, nisi forte intelligatur, secundum quod sunt in ipsa tanquam in exemplari factivo. Et hoc modo concedi potest, ipsas comprehendi ab anima Christi, alio vero modo non, propter immensitatem et improportionalitatem.

11. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aeque impossibile est contingentia certitudinaliter scire, sicut et infinita comprehendere; dicendum, quod illud non habet veritatem: quia, licet contingentia certitudinaliter cognoscere sit impossibile secundum cognitionem naturae; fit tamen possibile secundum illustrationem supra naturam, quae elevat animam ad cognoscendum res in arte aeterna, in qua incommutabiliter sunt tam contingentia quam necessaria; sed comprehendere actu infinita non tantum est impossibile cognitione naturali, verum etiam cognitione gratuita, pro eo quod utraque est creata et limitata, ac per hoc non se extendit ad actu infinita.

12. Ad illud quod obiicitur de comparatione secretorum et infinitorum, dicendum, quod non est simile, sicut ex dictis patet: quia perceptio secreti quantumcumque occulti non dicit aliquid incompossibile naturae ipsius intellectus creati. Non sic est de comprehensione infiniti, quae implicat infinitatem in actu, et per hoc in substantia et virtute; quod nullo modo admittit aliqua creatura, nec per gratiam nec per gloriam.

13. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quodlibet comprehensum est comprehensibile a creatura; dicendum, quod licet singillatim de qualibet re possit concedi, quod sit comprehensibilis a creatura, quia quaelibet est finita; omnes tamen insimul sunt infinitae, et ideo incomprehensibiles. Et ideo ratio illa non procedit, pro eo quod proceditur a partibus divisim sumtis ad easdem, ut colliguntur in unum. Unde sicut non valet illud argumentum: domus ista potest capere quemlibet hominem per se, ergo potest capere omnes homines; sic nec illud valet.

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14. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima Christi comprehendit omnes entis differentias, et quod potentia cuiuslibet speciei se extendit ad infinita individua; dicendum, quod dupliciter est intelligere potentiam ad infinita, scilicet potentiam activam et potentiam passivam. Potentia activa ad infinita non est nisi in creatrice essentia, quae est actu infinita. Si autem ponatur in creatura potentia respectu infinitorum, est potentia passiva tantum, quae radicatur super finitum, habet tamen respectum ad infinitum principium activum, secundum illud quod dicitur in Libro de Causis1: « Omnes virtutes infinitae pendentes sunt per unum infinitum principium, quod est virtus virtutum ». Secundum hoc dupliciter potest intelligi, cognosci sive comprehendi potentia infinita in creatura: vel quantum ad id, supra quod radicatur in creatura; et quia illud est actu finitum, ideo est comprehensibile; vel quantum ad principium activum extra, quod est actu infinitum. Primo modo anima Christi comprehendit omnes entis differentias, tam in generibus respectu specierum, quam in speciebus respectu individuorum; secundo modo, prout refertur ad activam potentiam infinitam, cognoscit utique, non tamen per modum cognitionis comprehensivae, sed excessivae, sicut supra monstratum est. Et per hoc patet responsio.

15. 16. Ad illud quod obiicitur de puncto et de amabili et scibili, dicendum, quod2 verum est, quod comprehendit omne amabile et scibile secundum esse, quod habet in propria natura; secundum autem esse, quod habet in causa prima infinita, sic dicitur scibile et comprehensibile soli potentiae infinitae; quia, licet secundum modum videatur aliquid creatum dicere, tamen secundum rem nihil dicit nisi potentiam efficientis, quae, cum sit infinita, a nullo finito potest comprehendi.

17. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima Christi est omnino perfecta, et quod nihil remansit in potentia, quod non sit reductum ad actum; dicendum, quod verum est de potentia, quae est reducibilis ad actum omnino; potentia autem ad infinita nunquam ad actum reduci potest secundum totum3 nisi secundum partem. Unde impossibile est, quod Deus faciat, quod continuum sit omnino divisum in omnia, in quae potest dividi; hoc enim repugnat perfectioni potentiae ipsius agentis et completioni creaturae, quae nata est esse in finitate4; et talis est potentia intellectus possibilis.

18. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quodsi intellectus agens esset in actu respectu omnium, ad quae possibilis est in potentia, quod tunc anima intelligeret infinita etc.; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia, si intellectus agens esset actu respectu infinitorum, secundum quod est potentia animae; tunc anima propria sua virtute se extenderet ad infinita. Non sic autem est in anima unita sapientiae aeternae: quia sapientia illa, etsi se extendat ad infinita, non est aliquid ipsius animae, sed supra animam; et ideo non oportet propter hoc, quod competat ipsi animae scire infinita. Praeterea, possibilis intellectus est proportionalis agenti, non sic sapientia increata ipsi animae intelligenti.

19. 20. 21. Ad illud quod obiicitur de anima Christi, utrum possit aliquid addiscere, et utrum cognoscat aliqua eorum quae Deus facturus non est et facere potest, et utrum cognoscat finita tantum, vel etiam infinita; patet responsio per distinctionem superius habitam: quia, cum anima Christi cognitionem comprehensivam habeat respectu omnium, quaecumque in universo fiunt, et excessivam respectu omnium, quae in divina arte continentur, et excessus ille sit in totalitate virtutis cognoscentis, et in summa familiaritate respectu speculi repraesentantis; oportet5, quod anima Christi etsi non omnia comprehendat, quae divina sapientia comprehendit, quia tamen in omnia illa excedit, ideo totus eius appetitus est terminatus; ut, sicut nihil ultra adiici possit eius gratiae, sic nihil ultra adiici possit eius sapientiae, quia tantum datum est ei, quantum concedi potest alicui creaturae.

Ex his igitur quae dicta sunt et praedeterminata de sapientia Christi et quantum ad divinam naturam et quantum ad humanam, apparere potest modus cognoscendi tam in cognitione Creatoris quam in cognitione creaturae, non solum in statu patriae, verum etiam in statu viae. Ut enim sit ad unum dicere, fatendum est, Deum scire infinita, scire, inquam, se ipso, non similitudine; et similitudine non accepta, sed ipsa veritate exprimente et exemplativa rerum universarum, respectu quarum multae dicuntur similitudines et expressiones, non propter multitudinem et distinctionem secundum se6, sed secundum intelligendi rationem; hae autem similitudines sive rationes aeternae sunt, a quibus manat omnis certitudo cognitionis creatae, tam in anima Christi quam in aliis spiritibus creatis; nec ipsae solae sunt rationes cognoscendi, sed cum his etiam similitudines acceptae ab extra; secundum statum viae et secundum statum patriae non solum requiritur lucis aeternae praesentia, sed etiam lucis aeternae influentia, non tantum Verbum increatum, sed etiam verbum interius conceptum; quod cum sit finitum, nec anima Christi nec aliqua alia anima potest esse comprehensiva Verbi aeterni nec scibilium infinitorum,

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licet in ea ferri habeat per excessum; qui quidem excessus est ultimus modus cognoscendi et nobilissimus, quem in omnibus libris suis laudat Dionysius, et maxime in libro de Mystica Theologia. De quo etiam mystice quasi est tota Scriptura divina, et de quo Apocalypsis secundo1: Dabo ei calculum, et in calculo nomen novum scriptum, quod nemo scit, nisi qui accipit; quia istum cognoscendi modum vix aut nunquam intelligit nisi expertus, nec expertus, nisi qui est in caritate radicatus et fundatus, ut possit comprehendere cum omnibus Sanctis, quae sit longitudo, latitudo etc.; in quo etiam experimentalis et vera consistit sapientia, quae inchoatur in via et consummatur in patria; ad cuius circumlocutionem magis sunt idoneae negationes quam affirmationes, et superpositiones quam positivae praedicationes; ad cuius experientiam plus valet internum silentium quam exterius verbum. Et ideo hic finis verbi habendus est, et orandus Dominus, ut experiri2 donet quod loquimur3.

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English Translation

Question VII. Whether the soul of Christ comprehends all that uncreated wisdom comprehends.

It is asked whether the soul of Christ comprehends all that uncreated wisdom comprehends. And it seems that it does.

1. Romans eleven4: O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God! how incomprehensible are his judgments, and how unsearchable his ways! From which it is gathered that those things which pertain to the divine wisdom are more comprehensible than the divine judgments; but in John five it is said that the Father hath given all judgment to the Son, because he is the Son of man; from which it is gathered that the soul of Christ comprehends the divine judgments: therefore if those are less comprehensible than the others, much more strongly does it comprehend all the others.

2. Again, Apocalypse five5: The Lamb that was slain is worthy to receive wisdom; the Gloss: « The cognition of all things, as the Word united to him has it »; but the united Word comprehends whatever it knows: therefore so also does the soul of Christ.

3. Again, the Damascene, in the third book6: « We affirm that the man Christ knows all things; for in Christ are all the treasures of wisdom ». — If you say that this is understood according to the divine nature; on the contrary: no one knows anything of which his soul is ignorant: therefore if Christ comprehends all things, it is necessary that his soul too should comprehend that.

4. Again, Gregory, in the Dialogues7: « To a soul that sees the Creator every creature is narrow »: therefore if the soul of Christ perfectly sees the Word united to it, then every creature is narrow to it; but beyond every creature nothing remains except the immensity of those things which are possible to God: therefore the soul of Christ comprehends all those things.

5. Again, the soul of Christ is most perfectly united to the Word, both according as it is the Word and according as it is the exemplar; but if there were anything in the Word or in the eternal exemplar that lay hidden from the soul of Christ, it could be thought still more perfectly united: if therefore it is united

by a most perfect union, it is necessary that it should comprehend all things.

6. Again, the soul of Christ knows in the Word; and because it knows many things by one, therefore it knows many things at once, although as regards natural cognition it has no understanding except of one1: therefore since that one extends itself not only to many things but even to infinite things; by the same account by which it knows many things at once, by that same account it knows infinite things.

7. Again, the eternal Word eternally represents whatever it represents, since it is one and uniform: therefore it is not by another account2 that it leads into one thing and into any other whatever: therefore the soul of Christ either sees nothing in the Word, or, if it sees anything, sees infinite things.

8. Again, the soul of Christ is more powerful for knowing through the Word united to it than any soul is through a habit given to it; but a soul having the habit of wisdom comprehends all things to which that habit extends itself3: therefore by parity of reasoning the soul of Christ through the eternal Word comprehends all things to which that same Word extends itself.

9. Again, the soul of Christ knows the whole Word itself, since it has the whole united to itself; but in the Word power and essence are the same: therefore it comprehends the whole power of the Word. But the power of the Word extends itself to infinite things: therefore the soul of Christ comprehends infinite things.

10. Again, the soul of Christ is nearer to things themselves as they are in the Word than according as they are in their own kind; but no thing has being in its own kind without being known by the soul of Christ; for it knows all things whatsoever that come to be: therefore much more strongly does it know all things whatsoever that are known by the eternal Word.

11. Again, it is equally impossible to know contingent things with certitude4 as to comprehend infinite things; but the soul of Christ, on account of its union to the Word, has with certitude the knowledge of future contingents: therefore by parity of reasoning it has also the knowledge of infinite things.

12. Again, it is equally difficult to know secrets as to know many things; but the soul of Christ, on account of its union to the Word, knows the most secret things of hearts, however inward they may be: therefore by parity of reasoning it knows however many things there may be: therefore infinite things.

13. Again, the soul of Christ comprehends everything comprehensible by a creature; but any species of number whatever is comprehensible by a creature: therefore it comprehends all the species of number. But the species of number, as Augustine says in the twelfth book On the City5, are infinite: therefore the soul of Christ comprehends infinite things.

14. Again, the soul of Christ comprehends the whole universe, therefore being and all the differences of being: therefore it knows not only the generic differences but also the individual ones, not only being in act but also being in potency; but any species whatever, so far as lies in itself, has infinite individuals in potency6: therefore the soul of Christ comprehends infinite things.

15. Again, the soul of Christ comprehends some finite thing, for instance a line, therefore it knows the beginning of the line; but the beginning of a line is a point: therefore it comprehends the point. But whoever comprehends a thing knows it according to the whole of its power: therefore since the power of a point extends itself to infinite lines, and the soul of Christ comprehends the whole power of the point, it is necessary that it should comprehend infinite things.

16. Again, the soul of Christ loves everything lovable, therefore by parity of reasoning it knows everything knowable; but everything that is known by God is knowable: therefore the soul of Christ knows everything that is known by God.

17. Again, the soul of Christ is altogether perfect; but in that which is altogether perfect everything that is in potency has been reduced to act; but the understanding of the soul of Christ is in potency to infinite things, because it never understands so many things that it could not understand more: therefore since intelligibles do not crowd one another in the one who understands7, therefore if the whole of its potency has been reduced to act, it is necessary that it should know infinite things.

18. Again, if the agent intellect were in full actuality with respect to all the things to which it is possible in potency, anyone whatever would understand infinite things8: therefore since in the soul of Christ the Word united to it is in full actuality with respect to all those things with respect to which

the understanding of the soul of Christ is in potency: therefore the soul of Christ understands infinite things.

19. Again, the soul of Christ either can learn something or nothing. If it can learn something: therefore it is not fully perfect in knowledge, and by parity of reasoning neither in grace; if it can learn nothing: therefore it knows so much that it cannot know more: therefore it is necessary that it should know infinite things.

20. Again, the soul of Christ either knows some of those things which God can do and will not do, or nothing. If it knows nothing of them, I ask what hinders it; for either this is because it cannot extend itself to them, and that is manifestly false; or because God does not will to reveal them to it, and this is a manifest incongruity, because it takes away from that soul the highest familiarity with the Word united to it. If it knows some of those things which he can do and will not do; but there is no greater reason why it should know this rather than that: therefore it seems that it knows all things that are possible to God: therefore infinite things.

21. Again, the soul of Christ knows either finite things or infinite things. If it knows finite things; since more can be thought than any finite things whatever: therefore some soul will be able to think more things than the soul of Christ knows; but it is incongruous that any soul should exceed it in anything: therefore it is necessary to hold that it knows infinite things.

Contra: 1. The Psalm1: Thy knowledge is become wonderful etc.; the Gloss: « The man assumed cannot be equalled to the divine substance either in substance or in anything else »: therefore the soul of Christ does not comprehend all that is comprehended by eternal wisdom.

2. Again, Augustine, in the twelfth book On the City of God2: « The infinity of numbers cannot be infinite to the knowledge of God, which comprehends it »: therefore if the soul of Christ comprehends infinite things, infinite things are finite to it; but if infinite things are finite to it, since it is itself finite, they are not infinite: therefore if it comprehends finite things, it does not comprehend infinite things.

3. Again, Hugh, On the Wisdom of the Soul of Christ3: « This one thing I affirm without doubt, that there was in the soul of Christ no other wisdom besides the divine, or, if there was any, it was not equal to it »; but it is settled that there was another, as appears from the premises: therefore since a wisdom that informs and perfects and enables the soul cannot be other than created, that wisdom in Christ will not extend itself to comprehending all that uncreated wisdom comprehends.

4. Again, everything created is disposed in a fixed weight, number and measure4: therefore the soul of Christ and its wisdom has a fixed number and measure; therefore it does not extend itself to infinite things.

5. Again, to comprehend infinite things is an act passing wholly over the immensity of the knowable; but every such act is infinite; and an infinite act is only from an infinite power, nor is there an infinite power except in an infinite substance5: if therefore the soul of Christ is finite and limited, since it is a creature, it is impossible that it should comprehend infinite things.

6. Again, the simpler a substance is, the more things it is capable of knowing6; but the soul of Christ is raised neither by nature nor by grace as far as the divine simplicity: therefore it is not elevated to knowing as many things as the divine wisdom knows.

7. Again, the wisdom of the Word is immense in clarity and in numerousness; but the soul of Christ never arrives at comprehending the immensity of the eternal light according to its every mode of clarity: therefore it never arrives at knowing its every mode of numerousness.

8. Again, although the soul of Christ is united to the essence of the Word, it nevertheless never exists in as many things as the Word itself is in; but as essence stands to essence, so knowledge to knowledge: therefore it never knows all that the Word itself knows.

9. Again, knowledge includes power, because to be able to know is to be able to do something7; but the soul of Christ is not capable of infinite power, as of the power of creating: therefore by parity of reasoning neither of a knowledge extending itself to infinite things.

10. Again, infinity in creatures testifies to imperfection8: if therefore the wisdom of the soul of Christ is most perfect, therefore it does not admit infinity, neither on the side of the knower nor on the side of the known nor on the side of the mode of knowing.

11. Again, no created thing exceeds another created thing infinitely; but if the soul of Christ were to know infinite things, then, since other souls know only finite things, it would exceed them infinitely: therefore it would pass outside the created genus. But this is manifestly false: therefore so also is that from which it follows, namely that the soul of Christ is comprehensive of infinite things.

12. Again, everything known is in the knower9: therefore if the soul of Christ were actually to comprehend infinite things, infinite things would actually be in the soul of Christ; but it is impossible to posit an actual infinite about created being: therefore it is impossible that the soul of Christ should be comprehensive of infinite things.

Conclusio. The soul of Christ does not properly comprehend infinite things in the Word; yet in so far as the Word is a productive exemplar, it is borne into it by comprehending; but in so far as it is an expressive exemplar, it is borne into the same not by comprehending but by exceeding.

I answer: For the understanding of the foregoing it is to be noted that there are two ways of speaking of uncreated wisdom: either according as it is a productive and dispositive exemplar, or according as it is an expressive or representative exemplar. In the first

way there shine back in the art of the divine wisdom those things which are, have been, and will be; and these are finite. In the second way there shine back all the things which God can make and understand; and these indeed are infinite, as was shown in what precedes1, and as Augustine expressly says in the twelfth book On the City of God. — The soul of Christ therefore is borne by cognition into the divine wisdom in both ways, but differently. For into it, according as it is a productive exemplar, it is borne by comprehending, because those things which are contained and represented in the exemplar as productive and dispositive are finite, and by this very fact also comprehensible. But into the exemplar according as it is an expressive or representative exemplar it is borne not by comprehending, but by exceeding; because, since infinite things are represented in it, they are incomprehensible, namely by a finite substance. And therefore the soul of Christ, since it is a creature and by this very fact finite, however much it may be united to the Word, does not comprehend infinite things, because it is neither equalled to them nor does it exceed them; and therefore it does not in every mode grasp them, but is rather grasped by them, and by this very fact it is not borne into them by way of comprehension, but rather by way of excess. And by an excessive mode of knowing I mean, not one by which the knower exceeds the known, but one by which the knower is borne into an object that exceeds it in a certain excessive manner, raising itself above itself. Of which mode of knowing Dionysius speaks in the book On Mystical Theology, and in the seventh chapter On the Divine Names2 he says thus: « It must be acknowledged that our understanding has a certain power for understanding, through which it sees intelligibles, but also a union exceeding the nature of the understanding, through which it is joined to those things which are beyond it. According to this, therefore, divine things are to be understood, not according to ourselves, but with ourselves wholly put outside ourselves wholly and wholly deified; for it is better to be God's and not one's own; for so will all things be believable to those who are with God ». — But this mode of knowing by excess is in the way and in the fatherland; but in the way partially, whereas in the fatherland it is perfectly so in Christ and in the other comprehensors; but in the others it is constrictedly, both on the side of the measure of their own grace and on the side of the divine will, which does not offer itself to just anyone in every mode of familiarity; but in the soul of Christ it is most freely, both because from it that soul has a grace filling its capacity in every mode, and because the eternal mirror offers itself to it as manifestable3 according to a familiarity of every mode.

But in Christ the mode of comprehension and of excess differ in many ways: first, because in the comprehensive mode the knower grasps the known, whereas in the excessive mode the known grasps the knower. — Secondly, because in the comprehensive mode the gaze of intelligence4 is terminated, whereas in the excessive mode the appetite of intelligence is. — Thirdly, because in the comprehensive mode it becomes actually considering all things past, present and future; whereas in excess it becomes ready for considering. — Fourthly, because from a comprehension that has been received it comes about that it learns nothing anew; but on account of excess it comes about that it can learn nothing5; and therefore, although the cognition of the soul of Christ can in a certain manner be spoken of with respect to infinite things by way of excess, nevertheless comprehensive cognition is only with respect to finite things. Hence if according to that cognition the soul of Christ is said to know whatever the Word knows, this is understood of past, present and future things, which in some way make for the integrity of the universe itself, which was fully and totally described in the soul of Christ Jesus from the instant of his conception. And to this extent that soul is said to have had all knowledge, not because it comprehends all that the divine wisdom knows, since that wisdom is infinite and cannot be comprehended by a finite power, according to what was shown above6. — Hence the arguments which show this are to be conceded, because they conclude the truth irrefragably.

1. 2. 3. To that which is objected first on the contrary side, that the soul of Christ comprehends all the divine judgments, and that it has all knowledge, as the Word united to it has; it can be said that those things are said of the assumed man on account of the communication of idioms; or else certainly they are said of those things which are, have been and will be, which indeed can be comprehended by the soul of Christ; but it is not true with respect to all the things which the divine wisdom understands, since it knows infinite things, as is clear from the things that have been predetermined. — Yet as to what is objected, that no one can know anything of which his soul is ignorant; it holds true when someone knows nothing except through a soul, as is a mere man. But in Christ, who knows not only through his soul but also through the divine nature, that proposition has no place. And by this the response to the three first objections is clear.

4. To that which is objected, that to a soul that sees God every creature is narrow; it is to be said that this is true of a creature according to the being which it has in its own kind, but not according to the being which it has in the art, because that art is most noble and most perfect, having no narrowness but rather perfection. Hence if a soul were to know the whole universe according to the being which it has in its own kind, it would still not yet be in perfect cognition and comprehension, unless it also knew that art through

which all things come to be. And because the soul of Christ most perfectly comprehends all made things in that art, therefore in it and through it it is said to have perfect comprehension.

5. To that which is objected, that the soul of Christ is most perfectly united to the Word; it is to be said that this is true, saving nevertheless the limitation of created nature, which the soul of Christ does not lose, because it does not cease to be a creature; and because to comprehend infinite things is repugnant to the limitation of a creature: hence it is that it cannot be inferred from that union, however perfect it be understood to be.

6. To that which is objected, that the soul of Christ knows many things at once because it knows by one, and that by parity of reasoning it ought to know infinite things; it is to be said that the case is not alike: because multitude together with simultaneity is not repugnant to the limitation of a creature, whereas infinity together with actuality and simultaneity is repugnant in every mode; and therefore it is not an argument from the like, but from what is very unlike.

7. To that which is objected, that the eternal Word represents equally; it can be said that this is false, because to represent states an act toward another; but God, although in himself uniform, nevertheless illumines and manifests in manifold ways; and since he knows infinite things, some of them he approves and some he reproves, some he disposes to make and some by no means, some he shows willingly, some in a hidden way. — Moreover, granted that so far as lies in himself he knows all things uniformly, still the argument does not conclude, because « everything received is in the recipient after the mode of the recipient and not after the mode of the received1 »; and therefore, since that receiving power is finite, it is impossible, even if the whole should offer itself to it unasked, that it should grasp and comprehend the whole, but only according to what befits it; as appears by an example, if the whole Seine2 offers itself to one who brings a jar, it is nevertheless not wholly comprehended, but only so far and in such manner as the capacity of the jar extends.

8. To that which is objected, that the soul of Christ is more powerful for knowing through the Word united to it than any other3 soul is through a habit given to it; it is to be said that this is true, but from this it does not follow that, if a soul comprehends all the things to which the habit extends itself, therefore on that account the soul of Christ knows all that it knows through the Word itself: because a soul comprehends the habit itself as proportional to itself and in no way exceeding its own capacity; the soul of Christ does not in this way comprehend the Word united to it, since it exceeds its capacity infinitely.

9. To that which is objected, that it knows the whole, therefore the whole power; it is to be said that that argument is not valid, because whole, said of the Word, states the privation of part and part, or the positing of perfection in every mode; but said of power, since power states a comparison to possible things, it states a distribution with respect to all possible things; and thus its acceptation is varied, and therefore that argument does not proceed.

10. To that which is objected, that the soul of Christ is nearer to things themselves as they are in the Word than as they are in their own kind; it is to be said that although it is nearer, it is nevertheless not more proportional. But comprehension in some way encloses in itself an account of proportionality, and that the known should be finite to the knower; and therefore, because in their own kind they are finite and proportional to that soul, therefore they are comprehensible, but not as they are in the immensity of that art, unless perhaps it be understood according as they are in it as in a productive exemplar. And in this way it can be conceded that they are comprehended by the soul of Christ, but in the other way not, on account of immensity and improportionality.

11. To that which is objected, that it is equally impossible to know contingent things with certitude as to comprehend infinite things; it is to be said that this is not true: because, although to know contingent things with certitude is impossible according to the cognition of nature, it nevertheless becomes possible according to an illumination above nature, which elevates the soul to knowing things in the eternal art, in which contingent things no less than necessary ones are unchangeably; but to comprehend infinite things in act is impossible not only by natural cognition but also by gratuitous cognition, for the reason that each is created and limited, and by this very fact does not extend itself to things actually infinite.

12. To that which is objected concerning the comparison of secret things and infinite things, it is to be said that the case is not alike, as is clear from what has been said: because the perception of a secret, however hidden, does not state anything incompossible with the nature of the created understanding itself. It is not so with the comprehension of the infinite, which implies infinity in act, and by this in substance and in power; which no creature whatever admits, neither through grace nor through glory.

13. To that which is objected, that whatever is comprehended is comprehensible by a creature; it is to be said that, although it can be conceded singly of any thing whatever that it is comprehensible by a creature, because each is finite, nevertheless all together are infinite, and therefore incomprehensible. And therefore that argument does not proceed, for the reason that it proceeds from the parts taken separately to the same parts as they are gathered into one. Hence just as that argument is not valid: this house can hold any man whatever by himself, therefore it can hold all men; so neither is that one valid.

14. To that which is objected, that the soul of Christ comprehends all the differences of being, and that the potency of any species whatever extends itself to infinite individuals; it is to be said that there are two ways of understanding a potency to infinite things, namely an active potency and a passive potency. An active potency to infinite things is only in the creating essence, which is actually infinite. But if a potency with respect to infinite things be posited in a creature, it is a passive potency only, which is rooted upon something finite, yet has a relation to an infinite active principle, according to what is said in the Book of Causes1: « All infinite powers are dependent through one infinite principle, which is the power of powers ». According to this, an infinite potency in a creature can be understood, known or comprehended in two ways: either as regards that upon which it is rooted in the creature — and because that is actually finite, therefore it is comprehensible; or as regards the active principle outside, which is actually infinite. In the first way the soul of Christ comprehends all the differences of being, both in the genera with respect to species and in the species with respect to individuals; in the second way, as it is referred to the infinite active potency, it certainly knows them, yet not by way of comprehensive cognition but of excessive cognition, as was shown above. And by this the response is clear.

15. 16. To that which is objected concerning the point and concerning the lovable and the knowable, it is to be said that2 it is true that it comprehends everything lovable and knowable according to the being which it has in its own proper nature; but according to the being which it has in the infinite first cause, it is thus said to be knowable and comprehensible to an infinite power alone; because, although according to the mode it may seem to state something created, nevertheless according to the thing it states nothing but the power of the efficient cause, which, since it is infinite, can be comprehended by nothing finite.

17. To that which is objected, that the soul of Christ is altogether perfect, and that nothing remained in potency which has not been reduced to act; it is to be said that this is true of a potency which is reducible to act altogether; but a potency to infinite things can never be reduced to act according to the whole3 but only according to a part. Hence it is impossible that God should bring it about that a continuum be altogether divided into all the things into which it can be divided; for this is repugnant to the perfection of the power of the agent itself and to the completion of the creature, which is born to be in finitude4; and such is the potency of the possible intellect.

18. But to that which is objected, that if the agent intellect were in act with respect to all the things to which it is possible in potency, then the soul would understand infinite things, etc.; it is to be said that the case is not alike: because, if the agent intellect were in act with respect to infinite things, according as it is a potency of the soul, then the soul by its own power would extend itself to infinite things. But it is not so in a soul united to eternal wisdom: because that wisdom, although it extends itself to infinite things, is not something of the soul itself, but above the soul; and therefore it is not necessary on this account that it should belong to that soul to know infinite things. Moreover, the possible intellect is proportional to the agent intellect, whereas uncreated wisdom is not so to the soul that understands.

19. 20. 21. To that which is objected concerning the soul of Christ, whether it can learn anything, and whether it knows any of those things which God is not going to make and can make, and whether it knows finite things only or infinite things also; the response is clear from the distinction made above: because, since the soul of Christ has comprehensive cognition with respect to all things whatsoever that come to be in the universe, and excessive cognition with respect to all things which are contained in the divine art, and that excess lies in the totality of the knowing power and in the highest familiarity with respect to the representing mirror, it must be5 that the soul of Christ, even if it does not comprehend all that the divine wisdom comprehends, yet because it exceeds into all those things, therefore its whole appetite is terminated; so that, just as nothing further can be added to its grace, so nothing further can be added to its wisdom, because as much has been given to it as can be granted to any creature.

From these things, therefore, which have been said and predetermined concerning the wisdom of Christ, both as regards the divine nature and as regards the human, there can appear the mode of knowing both in the cognition of the Creator and in the cognition of the creature, not only in the state of the fatherland but also in the state of the way. For, to say it in one word, it must be confessed that God knows infinite things — knows them, I say, by himself, not by a likeness; and by a likeness not received, but by the very truth which expresses and exemplifies all things whatsoever, with respect to which many likenesses and expressions are spoken of, not on account of multitude and distinction in themselves6, but according to an account of understanding; and these likenesses or eternal accounts are those from which flows all the certitude of created cognition, both in the soul of Christ and in the other created spirits; nor are they alone the accounts of knowing, but together with them also the likenesses received from without; according to the state of the way and according to the state of the fatherland there is required not only the presence of the eternal light, but also the influence of the eternal light, not only the uncreated Word, but also the word inwardly conceived; and since this is finite, neither the soul of Christ nor any other soul can be comprehensive of the eternal Word nor of infinite knowables,

although it has to be borne into it by excess; and this excess is the last and noblest mode of knowing, which Dionysius praises in all his books, and most of all in the book On Mystical Theology. Of which also the whole of divine Scripture is, as it were, mystically; and of which the Apocalypse says in the second chapter1: I will give him a white counter, and in the counter a new name written, which no man knoweth but he that receiveth it; because scarcely anyone, or no one, understands that mode of knowing except one who has experienced it, nor has anyone experienced it except one who is rooted and founded in charity, that he may be able to comprehend, with all the saints, what is the length, the breadth, etc.; in which also experimental and true wisdom consists, which is begun in the way and consummated in the fatherland; for the circumlocution of which negations are more fitting than affirmations, and superpositions than positive predications; for the experience of which inward silence avails more than outward speech. And therefore here an end of speaking is to be made, and the Lord is to be prayed that he grant us to experience2 what we speak3.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. 4
    Vers. 33. Deinde citatur Ioan. 5, 22. et 27. — Codd. magis incomprehensibilia; sed in hac lectione deficit argumentum. — Eadem quaestio solvitur III. Sent. d. 14. a. 2. q. 3.
    Verse 33. Then John 5:22 and 27 are cited. — The codices read magis incomprehensibilia; but on that reading the argument fails. — The same question is solved in III Sentences, d. 14, a. 2, q. 3.
  2. 5
    Vers. 12: Dignus... accipere virtutem et divinitatem et sapientiam. — Glossa Haymonis est ordinaria apud Strabum et Lyranum: Cognitionem omnium rerum, sicut habet Verbum etc.
    Verse 12: Worthy... to receive power and divinity and wisdom. — The Gloss of Haymo is the ordinary one in Strabo and Lyra: The cognition of all things, as the Word has it, etc.
  3. 6
    De Fide orthod. c. 21. Locus Script. est Col. 2, 3: In quo etc.
    On the Orthodox Faith, c. 21. The scriptural place is Col. 2:3: In whom etc.
  4. 7
    Libr. II. c. 35. Pro angusta D F agnita (idem recurrit inferius), pro qua lectione afferri possunt verba Gregor., IV. Dialog. c. 33: Quid est quod ibi nesciant, ubi scientem omnia sciunt? Cfr. tom. IV. pag. 953, nota 8.
    Book II, c. 35. For angusta D F read agnita (the same recurs below), in favour of which reading the words of Gregory, IV Dialogues c. 33, can be adduced: What is there that they do not know there, where they know him who knows all things? Compare tom. IV, p. 953, note 8.
  5. 1
    Aristot., II. Topic. c. 4. (c. 10.): Contingit enim plura scire, intelligere autem non. Cfr. tom. III. pag. 114, nota 5.
    Aristotle, II Topics c. 4 (c. 10): For it happens that one knows many things, but does not understand them. Compare tom. III, p. 114, note 5.
  6. 2
    G ergo ratione una.
    G reads ergo ratione una.
  7. 3
    Cfr. supra pag. 3, nota 4.
    Compare above, p. 3, note 4.
  8. 4
    Vide Aristot., I. Periherm. c. 7. (c. 9.) et I. Poster. c. 24. (c. 30.).
    See Aristotle, I On Interpretation c. 7 (c. 9) and I Posterior Analytics c. 24 (c. 30).
  9. 5
    Cap. 18. Vide supra q. 1. in corp.
    Chapter 18. See above, q. 1, in the body.
  10. 6
    Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Specie: Individua, quae sunt post specialissima [i. e. ultimam speciem], infinita sunt.
    Porphyry, On the Predicables, the chapter On Species: The individuals which come after the most special things [i.e. the lowest species] are infinite.
  11. 7
    Cfr. tom. III. pag. 313, nota 3.
    Compare tom. III, p. 313, note 3.
  12. 8
    Vide II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 4. — F prosequitur ergo cum anima Christi per Verbum etc.
    See II Sentences, d. 24, p. I, a. 2, q. 4. — F continues ergo cum anima Christi per Verbum etc.
  13. 1
    Psalm. 138, 6. — Glossa est secundum Cassiod. in hunc loc. Cfr. supra pag. 35, nota 5.
    Psalm 138:6. — The Gloss is according to Cassiodorus on this place. Compare above, p. 35, note 5.
  14. 2
    Cap. 18, ubi textus originalis qua comprehenditur pro quae comprehendit.
    Chapter 18, where the original text has qua comprehenditur for quae comprehendit.
  15. 3
    In fine. Textus originalis: Hoc... quod aut alia [codd. illa] sapientia..., aut si alia fuit, qualis illi non fuit. Cfr. tom. III. pag. 297, nota 4. — Minor ostensa est supra q. 5. — Inferius post animae F addit Christi.
    At the end. The original text: This... that either another [the codices: that] wisdom..., or, if there was another, it was not such as that one. Compare tom. III, p. 297, note 4. — The minor premiss was shown above in q. 5. — Below, after animae F adds Christi.
  16. 4
    Sap. 11, 21: Omnia in mensura et numero et pondere disposuisti.
    Wisdom 11:21: Thou hast ordered all things in measure and number and weight.
  17. 5
    Nam, ut communiter dicitur, operari sequitur esse; cfr. tom. I. pag. 84, nota 7.
    For, as is commonly said, acting follows being; compare tom. I, p. 84, note 7.
  18. 6
    Cfr. Liber de Causis, propos. 10. et 17, nec non Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 3. seqq. (c. 4.).
    Compare the Book of Causes, propositions 10 and 17, and also Aristotle, III On the Soul, text 3 and following (c. 4).
  19. 7
    Richard. a S. Vict., VI. de Trin. c. 15: Potest esse multiplex potentia, ubi [v. g. in insensatis et brutis] nulla potest esse sapientia; econtra autem ubi nulla potentia est, nulla sapientia inesse potest. Nam posse sapere absque dubio est aliquid posse; dat igitur esse posse non sapientia potentiae, sed potentia sapientiae.
    Richard of St Victor, VI On the Trinity c. 15: There can be manifold power where [e.g. in things without sense and in brutes] there can be no wisdom; but conversely, where there is no power, no wisdom can be present. For to be able to be wise is without doubt to be able to do something; it is therefore not wisdom that gives power its being able, but power that gives wisdom its being able.
  20. 8
    Ut in materia secundum Aristot., III. Phys. text. 59-72. (c. 6. et 7.). Cfr. tom. I. pag. 360, nota 5. et pag. 765, nota 6.
    As in matter, according to Aristotle, III Physics, texts 59–72 (c. 6 and 7). Compare tom. I, p. 360, note 5, and p. 765, note 6.
  21. 9
    Cfr. tom. I. pag. 68, nota 2. — Inferius fide E F G elegimus lectionem circa ens, in aliis esse ens.
    Compare tom. I, p. 68, note 2. — Below, on the faith of E F G we have chosen the reading circa ens; in the others, esse ens.
  22. 1
    Quaest. 1, in cuius 4. fundam. atque in corp. allegatur etiam August., XII. de Civ. Dei, c. 18, et in 2. fundam. citatur XI. c. 10. n. 3.
    Question 1, in whose fundamentum 4 and in the body Augustine, XII On the City of God c. 18, is also adduced, and in fundamentum 2, XI, c. 10, n. 3 is cited.
  23. 2
    Paragr. 1, ex quo seqq. verba. De Mystica Theolog. cfr. c. 1. § 1. — Pro intelligendo versio Scoti Erig. intelligendum (νοητέον), pro deificatos, quod habet A, E F deifactos, B deificos (Θεοῦ γιγνομένους). Finem verborum versio Scoti Erig. sic exhibet: Sic enim erunt divina data cum Deo futuris (τὰ θεῖα δοτὰ τοῖς μετὰ Θεοῦ γιγνομένοις).
    Paragraph 1, from which the following words come. For the Mystical Theology compare c. 1, § 1. — For intelligendo the version of Scotus Eriugena has intelligendum (νοητέον); for deificatos, which A has, E F have deifactos, B deificos (Θεοῦ γιγνομένους). The end of the words the version of Scotus Eriugena gives thus: For so will divine things be given to those who are to be with God (τὰ θεῖα δοτὰ τοῖς μετὰ Θεοῦ γιγνομένοις).
  24. 3
    F minus bene manifestissime.
    F less well reads manifestissime.
  25. 4
    Codd. bis intelligentia, sed videtur esse error.
    The codices read intelligentia twice, but this seems to be an error.
  26. 5
    Cfr. infra solut. ad 19, 20, 21.
    Compare below, the solution to 19, 20, 21.
  27. 6
    Quaest. praeced. — Superius pro omnem scientiam A B divinam scientiam. Mox pro illa sit... possit F illa sint... possint.
    The preceding question. — Above, for omnem scientiam A B read divinam scientiam. Shortly after, for illa sit... possit F reads illa sint... possint.
  28. 1
    Hoc communissimum Scholasticorum axioma ex Aristotele, II. de anima text. 24. (c. 2.), formavit Boethius, sed verbis aliquatenus diversis; de quo cfr. tom. II. pag. 364, nota 3.
    This most common axiom of the Scholastics Boethius formed out of Aristotle, II On the Soul, text 24 (c. 2), but in somewhat different words; on which compare tom. II, p. 364, note 3.
  29. 2
    Fluvius Galliae, qui vulgo dicitur la Seine; codd. scribunt secane, vel secana, vel feceva.
    A river of Gaul, commonly called la Seine; the codices write secane, or secana, or feceva.
  30. 3
    Ex F adiecimus alia.
    From F we have added alia.
  31. 1
    Propos. 16: Omnes virtutes, quibus non est finis, pendentes sunt per infinitum primum, quod est etc.
    Proposition 16: All powers to which there is no end are dependent through the first infinite, which is etc.
  32. 2
    Posuimus cum F dicendum, quod, pro quo alii tantum quia, et inferius cum eodem prima infinita pro potentia infinita.
    With F we have put dicendum, quod, for which the others have only quia; and below, with the same manuscript, prima infinita for potentia infinita.
  33. 3
    Videtur excidisse sed non post totum.
    Sed non seems to have dropped out after totum.
  34. 4
    Vide I. Sent. d. 43. q. 3. ad 6.
    See I Sentences, d. 43, q. 3, ad 6.
  35. 5
    Ita F, in aliis omittitur oportet.
    So F; in the others oportet is omitted.
  36. 6
    D F secundum rem.
    D F read secundum rem.
  37. 1
    Vers. 17: Vincenti dabo manna absconditum et dabo illi calculum candidum et in calculo etc. — Alter textus est Eph. 3, 17: In caritate radicati et fundati, ut possitis comprehendere etc. — Inferius pro experimentalis, quod habet A, alii experibilis; deinde pro et A B E G est, alii in, denique substituimus quae pro aut.
    Verse 17: To him that overcometh I will give the hidden manna, and I will give him a white counter, and in the counter etc. — The other text is Eph. 3:17: Rooted and founded in charity, that you may be able to comprehend etc. — Below, for experimentalis, which A has, the others read experibilis; then for et A B E G read est, the others in; finally we have substituted quae for aut.
  38. 2
    A B E addunt nos. — Cfr. Dionys., de Mystica Theolog. c. 1. seqq.
    A B E add nos. — Compare Dionysius, On Mystical Theology, c. 1 and following.
  39. 3
    In hac quaestione solvenda S. Doctor aliquatenus recedit a via (vel saltem a modo loquendi), quam secutus est in III. Sent., d. 14. a. 2. q. 2. 3, ut ibi (in scholio ad q. 3.) iam observavimus, ubi simul recensuimus diversas de hac re opiniones antiquorum magistrorum, praesertim S. Thomae, qui diffuse de hoc disputat (de Veritate q. 20. a. 4. 5.). Attamen S. Bonaventura in utroque loco firmiter tenet, quod anima Christi, cum sit finita, non possit actu cognoscere sive considerare infinita, et quod hoc sensu nequeat omnia cognoscere, quae aeterno actu cognoscit ipsum Verbum. Nihilominus idem in utroque loco « propter auctoritates Sanctorum... et pro reverentia Christi » (loc. cit. q. 3. in fine) nititur animae Christi hanc dignitatem vindicare, quod aliquo alio sensu et modo cognoscat omnia, quae cognoscit Verbum ipsi unitum. Hinc in Commentario suo utitur distinctione inter cognitionem actualem et habitualem, atque huic habituali, quae quoad obiectum primarium semper est in actu, simul attribuit infinitatem respectuum ad obiecta secundaria, ita ut eodem habitu et vi eiusdem actus obiectum principale respicientis facile et pro libitu etiam secundaria possint considerari. Unde illa « habitualis cognitio non ponit infinitatem actualem in ipso habitu, vel in potentia cognoscente, sed solum in ratione cognoscendi, vel in comparatione habitus cognoscendi ad ipsa cognoscibilia » (ibid.). Nulla autem ibidem fit mentio distinctionis inter cognitionem per modum comprehensionis et per modum excessivum, qua S. Doctor hic utitur ad eundem finem obtinendum. Ceterum neque hoc loco meminit illius distinctionis, quam ponit in Commentario. — Consideratis omnibus, nobis nunc videtur, tum quod hi duo modi rem explicandi non se excludant, sed potius invicem magis declarent, tum quod incertum sit, quae via tempore prius a S. Doctore sit excogitata.
    In solving this question the holy Doctor departs somewhat from the way (or at least from the manner of speaking) which he followed in III Sentences, d. 14, a. 2, qq. 2 and 3, as we have already observed there (in the scholion to q. 3), where we at the same time reviewed the various opinions of the older masters on this matter, especially that of St Thomas, who disputes about it at length (On Truth, q. 20, a. 4 and 5). Nevertheless St Bonaventure in both places firmly holds that the soul of Christ, since it is finite, cannot actually know or consider infinite things, and that in this sense it cannot know all that the Word itself knows by its eternal act. None the less in both places, « on account of the authorities of the saints... and out of reverence for Christ » (loc. cit., q. 3, at the end), he strives to vindicate for the soul of Christ this dignity, that in some other sense and manner it knows all that the Word united to it knows. Hence in his Commentary he employs the distinction between actual and habitual cognition, and to this habitual cognition, which as regards its primary object is always in act, he at the same time attributes an infinity of relations to secondary objects, so that by the same habit and by force of the same act of one regarding the principal object the secondary objects too can easily and at will be considered. Hence that « habitual cognition does not posit an actual infinity in the habit itself, or in the knowing power, but only in the account of knowing, or in the comparison of the habit of knowing to the knowables themselves » (ibid.). But no mention is made there of the distinction between cognition by way of comprehension and by an excessive way, which the holy Doctor here employs to obtain the same end. Nor, for that matter, does he in this place recall that distinction which he lays down in the Commentary. — All things considered, it now seems to us both that these two ways of explaining the matter do not exclude one another but rather declare one another the more, and that it is uncertain which way was thought out earlier in time by the holy Doctor. ---
Cited by

2 places in the Opera Omnia citethis question. Derived from Quaracchi’s own apparatus, never tagged by hand.

On the unity of the divine nature amid the multiplicity of appropriations
Breviloquium · Pars I: De Trinitate Dei
supra pag. 39, nota 7
Whether the divine being is most infinite
Quaestiones disputatae de mysterio Trinitatis · Quaestio IV: Utrum trinitas stet cum summa infinitate
supra pag. 41, nota 2

1 further reference addresses the article or printed page this question belongs to, rather than the question itself.