Dist. 34, Art. 1, Q. 3
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 34
QUAESTIO III.
Utrum malum sit a bono secundum intentionem, vel praeter intentionem.
Tertio quaeritur, utrum malum sit a bono secundum intentionem, vel praeter. Et quod praeter intentionem, videtur:
1. Primo per Dionysium in quarto de Divinis Nominibus1: « Malum est praeter intentionem, naturam, et causam »; si praeter intentionem, habeo propositum.
2. Item, Dionysius2: « Nemo operatur ad malum aspiciens »; sed qui operatur aliquid per intentionem, ad illud aspicit, quod intendit — nam intentio est quidam mentis intuitus — si ergo nullus operans ad malum aspicit, videtur, quod nullus malum intendit.
3. Item, malum dicit deordinationem ad finem3; sed intentio dicit voluntatem ad finem directam: ergo malum non cadit sub intentione: ergo etc.
4. Item, omne malum, quod est in natura, est praeter intentionem naturae4: ergo pari ratione omne malum, quod est in moribus, est praeter intentionem voluntatis rationalis.
5. Item, « bonum et finis idem »5; sed intentio est respectu finis: ergo respectu boni: ergo non videtur, quod sit respectu mali: ergo nullo modo malum ab operante per voluntatem intenditur; redit igitur idem, quod prius.
Sed contra:
1. Voluntas rationalis est agens per intentionem et deliberationem: ergo si omne malum culpae actualis est voluntarium, omne est per intentionem factum.
2. Item, nullus peccat nisi habens usum rationis; et omnis talis est operans per intentionem: ergo peccatum, ut peccatum est, habet esse per intentionem.
3. Item, quod fit ab agente voluntario praeter intentionem, fit a casu et fortuna6; sed malum culpae non est a casu et fortuna: ergo non est ab agente praeter intentionem.
4. Item, nullus iudicatur malus a facto, sed ab intentione — haec enim est quae « nomen imponit operi »7 — sed ab eo res proprie et principaliter procedit, a quo recipit complementum et denominationem: ergo etc.
5. Item, qui peccat ex malitia peccat ex certa scientia, et nullus agens aliquid ex certa scientia et
malitia agit illud praeter intentionem: ergo si contingit sic malum facere, utpote cum peccatur peccato in Spiritum sanctum; videtur etc.
Conclusio.
Malum, sumtum pro eo quod est malum, potest intendi simpliciter; malum vero sub ratione mali non potest intendi, nisi quis id intendat saltem ut simul bonum sibi.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod de malo est loqui dupliciter: aut de eo quod est malum, aut de malo sub ratione mali. — Cum ergo quaeritur, utrum fiat per intentionem, vel praeter: dicendum, quod si intentio comparetur ad id quod est malum, sic bene contingit malum intendere, et tanquam finem et tanquam id quod est ad finem: tanquam finem, sicut aliquis intendit finaliter luxuriari, vel vane gloriari; tanquam id quod est ad finem, sicut facere furtum intendit, ut inde possit vivere voluptuose, et intendit mentiri, ut possit falso laudari.
Si vero intentio comparetur ad malum sub ratione mali, potest esse dupliciter: aut ita, quod intendat hoc facere tanquam malum simpliciter et malum sibi; et hoc modo nullus intendit, quia nihil appetitur a voluntate nisi sub ratione boni simpliciter vel boni sibi. Aut ita, quod intendat hoc tanquam malum simpliciter, verumtamen ut bonum sibi; et sic malum potest fieri per intentionem et fit aliquando, licet non ab omnibus, sed a malitiosis, quibus propter corruptionem palati interioris, mala sapiunt ut bona. — Quoniam igitur id quod est malum, cadit sub intentione, et aliqua sunt, quae habent malitiam coniunctam inseparabiliter; et qui intendit aliquid, per consequens iudicatur intendere quod est illi unitum inseparabiliter: hinc est, quod malum iudicatur et punitur ut factum per intentionem.
Ex his patet responsio ad quaestionem, ad quam respondendum est non simpliciter, sed distinguendo. Patet etiam responsio ad rationes ad utramque partem adductas. — Nam primae rationes procedunt de malo sub ratione mali. Nam intentio, quidquid principaliter considerat, induit ipsum ratione boni et appetibilis. — Illa tamen ratio de simili in natura non valet, quia natura est agens determinatum, unde « semper intendit quod melius est », operatur autem secundum leges sibi inditas a Deo. Unde si quid fit ibi malum, hoc est praeter intentionem; non sic autem est de voluntate deliberativa; ipsa enim non semper desiderat quod melius est.
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Ad rationes ad oppositum patet responsio. Loquuntur enim de malo secundum id quod est; et sic bene intenditur ab agente per voluntatem, verumtamen vel in quantum consideratur ut habens intentionem boni simpliciter, vel boni ut nunc sive boni ipsi facienti, sicut est in illis, qui laetantur, cum malefecerint. Et sic procedunt omnes illae rationes.
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QUESTION III.
Whether evil is from the good according to intention, or beside intention.
Thirdly it is asked, whether evil is from the good according to intention, or beside it. And that it is beside intention, it seems:
1. First, through Dionysius in the fourth [chapter] On the Divine Names1: « Evil is beside intention, nature, and cause »; if [it is] beside intention, I have my proposition.
2. Likewise, Dionysius2: « No one works while looking toward evil »; but he who works something through intention looks toward that which he intends — for intention is a certain gaze of the mind — if therefore no one working toward evil looks [at it], it seems that no one intends evil.
3. Likewise, evil states a disordering with respect to the end3; but intention states the will directed toward the end: therefore evil does not fall under intention: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, every evil which is in nature is beside the intention of nature4: therefore by parity of reasoning every evil which is in morals is beside the intention of the rational will.
5. Likewise, « the good and the end are the same »5; but intention is with respect to the end: therefore with respect to the good: therefore it does not seem [to be] with respect to evil: therefore in no way is evil intended by the one operating through the will; therefore the same returns as before.
On the contrary:
1. The rational will is an agent through intention and deliberation: therefore if every evil of actual guilt is voluntary, every [such evil] is done through intention.
2. Likewise, no one sins unless having the use of reason; and everyone of this sort is one operating through intention: therefore sin, as it is sin, has being through intention.
3. Likewise, that which is done by a voluntary agent beside intention is done by chance and fortune6; but the evil of guilt is not from chance and fortune: therefore it is not from the agent beside intention.
4. Likewise, no one is judged evil from the deed, but from the intention — for this is what « imposes the name on the work »7 — but a thing properly and principally proceeds from that from which it receives its completion and denomination: therefore etc.
5. Likewise, he who sins from malice sins from certain knowledge, and no one doing something from certain knowledge and
malice does it beside intention: therefore if it happens that evil is so done, as when one sins by the sin against the Holy Spirit; it seems etc.
Conclusion.
Evil, taken for that which is evil, can be intended absolutely; but evil under the character of evil cannot be intended, unless one intend it at least as at the same time a good for oneself.
I respond: It must be said that there are two ways of speaking of evil: either of that which is evil, or of evil under the character of evil. — When therefore it is asked whether it comes about through intention, or beside it: it must be said that if intention is compared to that which is evil, then it can well happen that evil is intended, both as an end and as that which is toward the end: as an end, as someone intends finally to be lustful, or vainly to glory; as that which is toward the end, as he intends to commit theft, so that thereby he may live voluptuously, and he intends to lie, so that he may be falsely praised.
But if intention is compared to evil under the character of evil, it can be in two ways: either so that he intend to do this as evil absolutely and evil for himself; and in this manner no one intends [it], because nothing is desired by the will except under the character of good absolutely or good for oneself. Or so that he intend this as evil absolutely, yet as a good for himself; and thus evil can be done through intention, and is done sometimes, though not by all, but by the malicious, to whom, on account of the corruption of the interior palate, evils taste like goods. — Since therefore that which is evil falls under intention, and there are some [evils] which have malice joined inseparably [to them]; and he who intends something is consequently judged to intend that which is united inseparably to it: hence it is that evil is judged and punished as something done through intention.
From these things the response to the question is plain, to which one must respond not absolutely, but by distinguishing. The response to the reasons adduced on both sides is also plain. — For the first reasons proceed of evil under the character of evil. For intention, whatever it principally considers, clothes it with the character of good and of the appetible. — Yet that reason about the likeness in nature does not hold, because nature is a determinate agent, whence it « always intends what is better », but it operates according to the laws implanted in it by God. Whence if any evil comes about there, this is beside intention; but it is not so with the deliberative will; for it does not always desire what is better.
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. To the reasons to the opposite the response is plain. For they speak of evil according to that which it is; and thus it is well intended by the agent through the will, yet either insofar as it is considered as having the intention of good absolutely, or of good as of now or of good for the one doing it, as is the case in those who rejoice when they have done evil. And thus all those reasons proceed.
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- Paragr. 32. Vide supra pag. 806, nota 1.Paragraph 32. See above p. 806, note 1.
- De Div. Nom. c. 4. § 19. et 31. Cfr. Aristot., II. Magnor. Moral. c. 7. (c. 6.). — Quae quaestione praecedente proferuntur de intentione, accurate exponuntur infra d. 38. a. 2. q. 1. seq.On the Divine Names c. 4. § 19. and 31. Cfr. Aristotle, II. Magna Moralia c. 7. (c. 6.). — The things which are brought forward in the preceding question concerning intention are accurately expounded below d. 38. a. 2. q. 1. seq.
- Cfr. Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 6.Cfr. Aristotle, II. Ethics c. 6.
- Vide Aristot., IV. de Generat. animal. c. 4, ubi dicitur: Monstrosum est enim res praeter naturam. Cfr. II. Phys. text. 49. seqq. (c. 5. seqq.).See Aristotle, IV. On the Generation of Animals c. 4, where it is said: For a monstrous thing is a thing beside nature. Cfr. II. Physics text 49. seqq. (c. 5. seqq.).
- Aristot., II. Phys. text. 31. (c. 3.); III. et V. Metaph. text. 3. (II. et IV. c. 2.); I. Ethic. c. 1; I. Magnor. Moral. c. 2. seq. (c. 1. seq.).Aristotle, II. Physics text 31. (c. 3.); III. and V. Metaphysics text 3. (II. and IV. c. 2.); I. Ethics c. 1; I. Magna Moralia c. 2. seq. (c. 1. seq.).
- Cfr. Aristot., II. Phys. text. 49. seqq. (c. 5. seqq.).Cfr. Aristotle, II. Physics text 49. seqq. (c. 5. seqq.).
- Haec sententia est Ambrosii, I. de Offic. minist. c. 30. n. 147.This opinion is from Ambrose, I. On the Duties of Ministers c. 30. n. 147.