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Dist. 34, Art. 2, Q. 1

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 34

Textus Latinus
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ARTICULUS II.

De malo in comparatione ad subiectum, in quo est.

Consequenter quaeritur de secundo principali, scilicet de malo in comparatione ad illud, in quo est. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria.

Primum est, utrum contingat reperire malum sequestratum ab omni bono.

Secundum est, utrum malum habeat esse in bono sibi opposito.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum malum sit in eo, in quo est, tanquam aliquis habitus, aut pura privatio.

QUAESTIO I.

Utrum aliquid sit ita malum, quod nihil habeat de bono.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum aliquod malum sit ab omni bono sequestratum123, et hoc est quaerere, utrum aliquid sit ita malum4, quod nihil habeat de bono5, sed sit malum in summo. Et quod sic, videtur6.

1. « In his quae per se dicuntur, si simpliciter ad simpliciter, et magis ad magis, et maxime ad maxime » per considerationem Philosophi7; sed haec est vera per se: bono opponitur malum: ergo magis bono magis malum, et maxime bono maxime

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malum: si ergo contingit reperire summe bonum, ergo et summe malum. Nam « si unum oppositorum ponitur in natura, per consequens ponitur et reliquum ».

2. Item, magis et minus dicitur per accessum ad terminum: ergo ubi est reperire magis et minus, contingit reperire summum8; sed in malo contingit reperire magis et minus: ergo etc.

3. Item, aut est status in malis, aut non — constat, quod necesse est statum ponere; nam ille ponitur in omni eo quod actu est9 — sed status non est citra summum: ergo necesse est ponere summe malum. Sed hoc est quod nihil habet de bono: ergo etc.

4. Item, « omne per accidens reducitur ad per se10 »: ergo si est ponere malum per accidens, est ponere malum per se; sed illud per se inest alicui, quod habet ortum ex propriis principiis illius: si ergo aliquid est malum per se, videtur, quod eius principia sint mala; et si principia eius sunt mala, totum est malum; et si totum est malum, nihil est ibi de bono: ergo a primo, si est ponere malum per accidens, est ponere aliquid, quod sit simpliciter et totaliter malum. Constat autem, quod primum est ponere: ergo et alterum.

5. Item, omne dictum per participationem reducibile est ad dictum per essentiam: cum ergo dicitur aliquid esse malum, aut dicitur per participationem, aut per essentiam. Si per essentiam; sed bonum per essentiam est summe bonum, quod nihil habet de malo: ergo similiter erit aliquid ita malum, quod nihil habebit de bono. Si dicitur per participationem; et11 omne tale reducitur ad dictum per essentiam: ergo redit necessario, quod aliquid sit malum essentialiter: et ita idem quod prius.

6. Item, « in quolibet genere est reperire unum primum, quo mensurantur omnia, quae sunt illius generis ». Hoc planum est et patet per Philosophum, qui hanc proponit in decimo primae Philosophiae12; hoc etiam patet inducendo. Ergo in genere malorum est reperire aliquod unum, quod sit mensura omnium malorum; sed illud non potest esse nisi summum inter omnia mala: ergo etc.

Contra:

1. Si est ponere summum malum, quod nihil habeat de bono; et esse aliquod bonum est: tunc est ponere, summe malum esse, et tamen non habere esse. Sed haec sunt duo incompossibilia13: ergo etc.

2. Item, « omnis potentia, ut dicit Philosophus, est de genere bonorum », ergo si aliquid est summe malum, illud omnino nihil potest; sed summum in omni genere plus potest, quam illud quod est citra summum: si ergo illud quod non est summe malum, aliquid potest, illud quod est summe malum, multa potest: ergo eo ipso, quod est summum, multa potest et nihil potest. Sed haec duo sunt incompossibilia: ergo etc.

3. Item, « omnis scientia de genere bonorum est », non tantum scientia boni, verum etiam scientia mali; scire enim malum bonum est. Si ergo aliquid est summe malum, caret notitia boni et mali: ergo nec scit facere malum nec laedere; sed hoc ipso, quod malum est, scit laedere bonum: ergo hoc ipso, quod summe malum est, scit et nescit bona et mala. Sed ista sunt incompossibilia: ergo etc.

4. Item, si aliquid est summe malum, est malum per essentiam et necessario14; sed si malum est per essentiam et naturam, naturale est ei facere malum. Sed unumquodque, dum facit quod est sibi naturale, bene facit; et quod bene facit est bonum: ergo si aliquid est summe malum, ipsum est bonum, et dum male facit, bene facit. Sed hoc est impossibile: ergo etc.

5. Item, si aliquid est summe malum, illud est vilissimum; quanto enim aliquid magis malum est, tanto vilius est15; et si vilissimum inter mala, ergo inter illa est infimum. Sed quod est infimum inter mala non est summum caput malorum: ergo quod est summe malum non est summe malum. Si dicas, quod non sequitur: est vilissimum, ergo non est summe malum, quia hoc est esse summe malum, quod infimum est respectu bonorum; obiicitur, quia si aliquid ponitur summe malum, non debet poni super alia, sed infra secundum rectum ordinem: ergo non est deus tenebrarum, sed servus; quod est contra errorem istum16.

6. Item, si est summe malum, ergo illud erit ita omnipotens in malo, sicut summe bonum in bono: ergo omne malum subiacet eius potentiae; sed cuiuscumque boni corruptio est malum: ergo cuiuslibet boni corruptio subiacet potentiae summe mali: ergo si summe malum est, potest corrumpere omne

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bonum. Sed bonum, quod potest corrumpi, non est summum: ergo si est ponere summe malum, nihil est summe bonum; et si non est summe bonum, nihil est bonum17: ergo a primo, si est ponere summe malum, nihil est bonum. Quodsi hoc est omnino falsum et impium, patet etc.

Conclusio.

Et fides et ratio dictat, nihil esse ita malum, quin habeat aliquid de bono.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod ponere, malum aliquod esse, quod nihil habeat de bono, non solum est perversitatis haereticae, sed etiam manifestae caecitatis et stultitiae. Sicut enim in opponendo monstratum est, ipsa positio implicat in se opposita. Implicat enim, quod illud, scilicet summe malum, sit et non sit; quod idem possit et non possit; et quod idem sciat et nesciat. Et dum implicat in se opposita, destruit se ipsam. Nam in ponendo, summe malum esse, quod nihil de bono habeat, ponit, quod illud non sit summum; ponit, quod non sit malum; ponit etiam, quod nullum bonum habeat oppositum. Et haec omnia in opponendo monstrata sunt, quae manifeste convincunt, errorem istum esse fatuum et caecum; et auctorem sive inventorem suum ostendunt fuisse excaecatum et impium. Nunquam enim in tantam tenebrositatem detrusus esset impius Manichaeus, nisi longe ante fuisset servus dei tenebrarum, qui excaecavit mentem eius, ut non fulgeret in eo illuminatio veritatis, quae super omnem irradiat intellectum18. Et usque hodie viget hic error pessimus, quamvis sit irrationabilissimus. Et huius ratio est potissima ipsa mater caecitatis superbia, quae regnat in quibusdam laicis quantum ad ea quae sunt fidei et morum. Cum enim sint idiotae, praesumunt sacram Scripturam exponere, quae est profundissima omnium scripturarum; cum iterum habeant quandam honestatem exteriorem, contemnunt vitam omnium aliorum; et merito huius duplicis superbiae excaecantur, ut incidant in errorem istum pessimum, per quem excaecantur adeo, ut nesciant discernere, quid bonum et quid malum, dum multa genera bonorum ponunt esse a deo malo. Quos Isaias praemonstrat quinto capitulo19: Vae! qui dicitis malum bonum, et bonum malum, ponentes lucem tenebras et tenebras lucem. Et propter nimiam excaecationem, in qua sunt, amisso quasi rationis usu, nullam habent in eis efficaciam argumenta ad persuadendum, nec tormenta ad retrahendum, nec orationum suffragia ad relevandum, nisi hoc fiat de gratia specialissima. — Hanc positionem haereticam, immo stultissimam et blasphemam, repudiando dicamus, sicut dicit fides catholica et ratio recta, nihil esse ita malum, quin habeat aliquid de bono.

Ad intelligentiam autem obiectorum notandum, quod summum in aliquo genere dupliciter potest dici. Uno modo dicitur summum, quo nihil potest esse maius; et hoc modo non contingit reperire neque ponere summe malum; nihil enim est adeo malum, quin posset esse peius, pro eo quod aliquid habet de bono, quo posset magis privari, et ita adhuc peius esset. Et pro tanto dicit Dionysius20, quod « malum est infinitum ». Alio modo dicitur summum, quo nihil est maius secundum actum, sed ipsum excedit inter omnia alia; et sic contingit reperire summum in malis. Nam lucifer, qui est rex super omnes filios superbiae21, pessimus est super omnes. — His visis, facile est respondere ad obiecta.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur de oppositione mali, dicendum, quod consideratio intelligitur ita, quod terminus eodem modo accipiatur, cum dicitur simpliciter, et cum dicitur cum excessu; non sic autem est in proposito. Nam cum dicitur, quod bonum opponitur malo, accipitur hic bonum per participationem; cum vero infertur de summo bono, accipitur ibi bonum pro bono per essentiam, quod solum est summe bonum, et illi nihil opponitur22.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod magis et minus accipitur secundum maiorem et minorem accessum ad terminum; dicendum, quod verum est in his quae dicunt positionem; non autem est verum in his quae dicunt privationem, immo accipiuntur per recessum. Unde magis malum dicitur quod magis recedit a bono; et quia nunquam tantum recedit, quin adhuc possit magis; hinc est, quod nunquam est ibi ponere summum23.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de statu, dicendum, quod status est secundum actum; sed non oportet, quod sit status secundum potentiam, ut non possit esse ultra progressus. Nam etsi in rebus creatis non contingat invenire actu infinitum, contingit tamen reperire infinitum in potentia, sicut patet in numero per appositionem et in continuo per divisionem. Sic et in proposito intelligendum; et hoc infra24 manifestabitur, cum agetur de corruptione mali.

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4. 5. 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod per accidens reducitur ad per se, et similiter dictum per participationem ad dictum per essentiam et similiter, quod in quolibet genere est reperire unum primum etc.; dicendum, quod haec habent locum in his quae dicunt positionem et naturam, quae possit causari ex principiis subiecti, et quae possit essentialiter dici, et secundum quam possint alia mensurari secundum eius participationem maiorem et minorem. Malum autem privationem dicit, in quantum malum; et ideo illae tres rationes non habent hic locum. — Et hoc fuit, quod decepit Manichaeum, ut dicit Augustinus25, quia nescivit, quid esset malum. Et quia voluit de malo disputare nesciens, quid hoc esset, ideo se et multos praecipitavit in errorem. Superbia enim sua fecit ipsum ignorare modum addiscendi. In omni enim inquisitione prius oportet intelligere, « quid est quod per nomen dicitur », et hoc tanquam praecognitionem afferre secum ad rei proprietates posterius cognoscendas26.

Scholion

I. Quaestio haec militat contra Manichaeos, qui ponebant, esse summum et purum malum, sicut est summum et purum bonum. — Corollarium quoddam conclusionis, quod respicit quaestionem, utrum peccatum totaliter bona creata corrumpere possit, tractatur infra d. 35. a. 2. q. 3. — De hac re contra Manichaeos disputant: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 1. m. 2. — Scot., Report. II. Sent. d. 37. q. 1. n. 12. — S. Thom., II. Sent. d. 1. q. 1. a. 1. ad 1; S. I. q. 49. a. 3; S. c. Gent. III. c. 15. — B. Albert., II. Sent. d. 1. a. 2; S. p. I. tr. 6. q. 29. m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 4. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Dionys. Carth., II. Sent. d. 1. q. 1. — Biel, hic q. unica.

II. Quoad seq. (2.) quaestionem manifestum est, quod malum, cum sit privatio, debeat esse in aliquo ente ut subiecto, ergo in aliquo bono. Ad solvenda autem argg. 2. et 3. ad opposit. supponit S. Doctor, quod aliud est bonum, quod privatur per malum, aliud, cui inest malum; sive aliud est bonum speciale, cui directe et specialiter malum opponitur, aliud illud bonum, quod malo substernitur, sed eidem non opponitur nisi oppositione generali, quae est inter bonum et malum generaliter sumtum. Dum enim in aliis contrariis non sit nisi oppositio secundum speciem (v. g. album et nigrum), inter bonum et malum potest esse duplex oppositio, scil. in generali, et in speciali, quia « bonum et malum circueunt omne genus » (Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. ad 2.) sive sunt conceptus transcendentes. Ita solutio illius difficultatis secundum communem sententiam habetur.

III. De hac (2.) quaestione: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. m. 5. a. 1. — S. Thom., hic a. 4.; S. I. q. 48. a. 3; S. c. Gent. III. c. 11; de Malo, q. 1. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 5; S. p. I. tr. 6. q. 27. m. 1. a. 1. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., loc. et art. cit. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 4.

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English Translation

ARTICLE II.

On evil in comparison to the subject in which it is.

Consequently it is asked about the second principal point, namely about evil in comparison to that in which it is. And concerning this three things are asked.

The first is, whether it happens that there is found an evil sequestered from every good.

The second is, whether evil has being in the good opposed to it.

Thirdly it is asked, whether evil is in that in which it is, as a certain habit, or [as] pure privation.

QUESTION I.

Whether anything is so evil that it has nothing of good.

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and it is asked, whether some evil is sequestered from every good123, and this is to ask, whether anything is so evil4 that it has nothing of good5, but is evil in the highest degree. And that it is so, it seems6:

1. « In things which are said per se, if simply [is referred] to simply, and more to more, and most to most », by the consideration of the Philosopher7; but this is true per se: to good evil is opposed: therefore to a greater good a greater evil, and to the greatest good the greatest

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evil: if therefore it happens that there is found a highest good, therefore also a highest evil. For « if one of opposites is posited in nature, consequently the other also is posited ».

2. Likewise, more and less is said by approach to a terminus: therefore where there is found more and less, it happens that there is found a highest8; but in evil there is found more and less: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, either there is a stopping-point among evils, or not — it is agreed that it is necessary to posit a stopping-point; for it is posited in everything that is in act9 — but the stopping-point is not short of the highest: therefore it is necessary to posit a highest evil. But this is what has nothing of good: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, « everything per accidens is reduced to per se10 »: therefore if there is to be posited an evil per accidens, there is to be posited an evil per se; but that per se is present in something which has its origin from the proper principles of it: if therefore something is evil per se, it seems that its principles are evil; and if its principles are evil, the whole is evil; and if the whole is evil, there is nothing there of good: therefore from the first, if there is to be posited an evil per accidens, there is to be posited something which is simply and totally evil. But it is agreed that the first is to be posited: therefore also the other.

5. Likewise, everything said by participation is reducible to what is said by essence: when therefore something is said to be evil, either it is said by participation, or by essence. If by essence; but the good by essence is the highest good, which has nothing of evil: therefore likewise there will be something so evil that it will have nothing of good. If it is said by participation; and11 every such thing is reduced to what is said by essence: therefore it returns necessarily that something is evil essentially: and so the same as before.

6. Likewise, « in any genus there is found one first thing, by which are measured all the things which are of that genus ». This is plain and is manifest through the Philosopher, who proposes this in the tenth [book] of First Philosophy12; this also is manifest by induction. Therefore in the genus of evils there is found some one thing which is the measure of all evils; but that can be nothing except the highest among all evils: therefore etc.

On the contrary:

1. If there is to be posited a highest evil, which has nothing of good; and to be some good is [good]: then there is to be posited, that the highest evil is, and yet has not being. But these are two incompossibles13: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, « every power, as the Philosopher says, is of the genus of goods », therefore if something is the highest evil, it can do nothing at all; but the highest in every genus can do more than that which is short of the highest: if therefore that which is not the highest evil can do something, that which is the highest evil can do many things: therefore by the very fact that it is the highest, it can do many things and can do nothing. But these two are incompossibles: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, « every science is of the genus of goods », not only the science of good, but also the science of evil; for to know evil is good. If therefore something is the highest evil, it lacks the knowledge of good and evil: therefore it neither knows how to do evil nor to harm; but by the very fact that it is evil, it knows how to harm good: therefore by the very fact that it is the highest evil, it knows and does not know good and evil things. But these are incompossibles: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, if something is the highest evil, it is evil by essence and necessarily14; but if it is evil by essence and nature, it is natural to it to do evil. But everything, while it does what is natural to it, does well; and what does well is good: therefore if something is the highest evil, it itself is good, and while it does evil, it does well. But this is impossible: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, if something is the highest evil, it is the vilest; for the more evil something is, the viler it is15; and if it is the vilest among evils, therefore among them it is the lowest. But what is the lowest among evils is not the highest head of evils: therefore what is the highest evil is not the highest evil. If you say that it does not follow: it is the vilest, therefore it is not the highest evil, because this is to be the highest evil, which is the lowest in respect of goods; it is objected, because if something is posited as the highest evil, it ought not to be posited above others, but below, according to the right order: therefore it is not the god of darkness, but the servant; which is against that error16.

6. Likewise, if there is a highest evil, then it will be as omnipotent in evil as the highest good is in good: therefore every evil is subject to its power; but the corruption of any good whatever is evil: therefore the corruption of any good whatever is subject to the power of the highest evil: therefore if there is a highest evil, it can corrupt every

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good. But a good which can be corrupted is not the highest: therefore if there is to be posited a highest evil, there is no highest good; and if there is no highest good, there is no good17: therefore from the first, if there is to be posited a highest evil, there is no good. But if this is altogether false and impious, it is manifest etc.

Conclusion.

Both faith and reason dictate that nothing is so evil that it does not have something of good.

I respond: It must be said that to posit that there is some evil which has nothing of good is not only [a mark] of heretical perversity, but also of manifest blindness and stupidity. For as was shown in objecting, the very position implies opposites within itself. For it implies that that thing, namely the highest evil, is and is not; that the same thing can and cannot; and that the same thing knows and does not know. And while it implies opposites within itself, it destroys itself. For in positing that the highest evil is, which has nothing of good, it posits that that thing is not the highest; it posits that it is not evil; it posits also that it has no good opposed [to it]. And all these things were shown in objecting, which manifestly convince that this error is foolish and blind; and they show its author or inventor to have been blinded and impious. For never would the impious Manichee have been thrust into such great darkness, had he not long before been a servant of the god of darkness, who blinded his mind, so that the illumination of truth which irradiates over every intellect18 did not shine in him. And to this day this worst error flourishes, although it is most irrational. And the chief cause of this is pride itself, the mother of blindness, which reigns in certain laymen as to the things which are of faith and morals. For since they are uneducated, they presume to expound sacred Scripture, which is the most profound of all writings; since again they have a certain exterior respectability, they despise the life of all others; and by the merit of this twofold pride they are blinded, so as to fall into that worst error, by which they are so blinded that they do not know how to discern what is good and what is evil, while they posit that many kinds of goods are from an evil god. These Isaiah foreshows in the fifth chapter19: Woe! you who call evil good, and good evil, putting light [for] darkness and darkness [for] light. And on account of the excessive blindness in which they are, having as it were lost the use of reason, arguments have no efficacy in them for persuading, nor torments for drawing them back, nor the suffrages of prayers for relieving them, unless this be done by a most special grace. — Repudiating this heretical, nay most foolish and blasphemous position, let us say, as the catholic faith and right reason say, that nothing is so evil that it does not have something of good.

But for the understanding of the objections it is to be noted that highest in some genus can be said in two ways. In one way is said highest, than which nothing can be greater; and in this way it does not happen that there is found nor posited a highest evil; for nothing is so evil that it could not be worse, for the reason that it has something of good, of which it could be more deprived, and so it would be still worse. And for this reason Dionysius says20 that « evil is infinite ». In another way is said highest, than which nothing is greater according to act, but it itself exceeds among all others; and in this way it happens that there is found a highest among evils. For Lucifer, who is king over all the sons of pride21, is the worst over all. — These things having been seen, it is easy to respond to the objections.

1. To that therefore which is first objected concerning the opposition of evil, it must be said that the consideration is understood thus, that the term be taken in the same way, when it is said simply, and when it is said with excess; but it is not so in the matter at hand. For when it is said that good is opposed to evil, here good is taken by participation; but when it is inferred concerning the highest good, there good is taken for the good by essence, which alone is the highest good, and to it nothing is opposed22.

2. To that which is objected, that more and less is taken according to the greater and lesser approach to a terminus; it must be said that it is true in those things which state a position; but it is not true in those things which state a privation, rather they are taken by recession. Whence a greater evil is said [to be] that which recedes more from good; and because it never recedes so much that it cannot still [recede] more; hence it is that there is never a highest to be posited there23.

3. To that which is objected concerning the stopping-point, it must be said that the stopping-point is according to act; but it is not necessary that there be a stopping-point according to potency, so that there could not be progress further. For although in created things it does not happen that one finds an actual infinite, it does happen that one finds an infinite in potency, as is plain in number by addition and in the continuum by division. So also it is to be understood in the matter at hand; and this will be manifested below24, when corruption of evil is treated.

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4. 5. 6. To that which is objected, that per accidens is reduced to per se, and likewise what is said by participation to what is said by essence, and likewise that in any genus there is found one first thing etc.; it must be said that these have a place in those things which state a position and a nature, which can be caused from the principles of the subject, and which can be said essentially, and according to which other things can be measured according to their greater and lesser participation of it. But evil states a privation, insofar as it is evil; and therefore those three reasons have no place here. — And this is what deceived the Manichee, as Augustine says25, because he did not know what evil was. And because he wished to dispute about evil, not knowing what this was, therefore he cast himself and many into error. For his pride made him ignorant of the manner of learning. For in every inquiry it is necessary first to understand « what it is that is said by the name », and to bring this as it were as a foreknowledge with oneself to the properties of the thing to be known afterward26.

Scholion

I. This question contends against the Manichees, who posited that there is a highest and pure evil, just as there is a highest and pure good. — A certain corollary of the conclusion, which regards the question whether sin can totally corrupt created goods, is treated below d. 35. a. 2. q. 3. — On this matter against the Manichees there dispute: Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II. q. 1. m. 2. — Scotus, Reportata II. Sent. d. 37. q. 1. n. 12. — St. Thomas, II. Sent. d. 1. q. 1. a. 1. ad 1; Summa I. q. 49. a. 3; Summa contra Gentiles III. c. 15. — B. Albert, II. Sent. d. 1. a. 2; Summa p. I. tr. 6. q. 29. m. 2. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 3. a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 2. q. 4. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 2. a. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, II. Sent. d. 1. q. 1. — Biel, here q. unica.

II. As to the following (2nd) question it is manifest that evil, since it is a privation, ought to be in some being as in a subject, therefore in some good. But for solving arguments 2 and 3 to the opposite, the holy Doctor supposes that one is the good which is deprived by evil, another that in which the evil is present; or one is a special good, to which evil is directly and specially opposed, another that good which is laid under the evil, but is not opposed to it except by a general opposition, which is between good and evil taken generally. For while in other contraries there is only an opposition according to species (e.g. white and black), between good and evil there can be a twofold opposition, namely in general, and in special, because « good and evil go around every genus » (Richard of Middleton, here a. 1. q. 2. ad 2.) or are transcendent concepts. Thus the solution of that difficulty is had according to the common opinion.

III. On this (2nd) question: Alexander of Hales, in the cited place m. 5. a. 1. — St. Thomas, here a. 4.; Summa I. q. 48. a. 3; Summa contra Gentiles III. c. 11; de Malo, q. 1. a. 2. — B. Albert, here a. 5; Summa p. I. tr. 6. q. 27. m. 1. a. 1. 2. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 3. a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, in the cited place and article. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 1. a. 4.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vide infra d. 43. per totam. — Edd., excepta 1, omittunt peccato.
    See below d. 43, throughout. — The editions, except 1, omit peccato.
  2. Supple cum cod. bb (in marg.) aliquis.
    Supply with cod. bb (in the margin) aliquis.
  3. Codd. F aa bb et alii hic interserunt hoc. — Paulo inferius post et hoc modo nullus cod. aa interiicit malum.
    Codd. F aa bb and others here insert hoc. — A little below, after et hoc modo nullus cod. aa inserts malum.
  4. Vide Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 4. et VIII. c. 2.
    See Aristotle, III. Ethics c. 4. and VIII. c. 2.
  5. Secundum Aristot., cuius sententiam de hoc vide supra pag. 183, nota 5. De testimonio seq. cfr. supra pag. 341, nota 1. — Paulo superius pro et appetibilis edd., excepta 1, cum pluribus codd. ut appetibilis, cod. O appetibilis tantum. Paulo inferius pro si quid fit bene multi codd., ut F T aa bb ee etc., cum edd. 1, 2 si quid sit, cod. K si quid fuerit.
    According to Aristotle, whose opinion on this see above p. 183, note 5. On the following testimony cfr. above p. 341, note 1. — A little above, for et appetibilis the editions, except 1, with several codices [read] ut appetibilis, cod. O appetibilis only. A little below, for si quid fit bene many codices, such as F T aa bb ee etc., with edd. 1, 2 [read] si quid sit, cod. K si quid fuerit.
  6. Prov. 2, 14. — Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    Proverbs 2, 14. — See the scholion to the preceding question.
  7. Libr. V. Topic. c. 5. (c. 8.), ubi haec regula explicatur, in quantum respicit proprium. Cfr. II. c. 4. (c. 10.). Quod ad propos. seq. attinet, ait Aristot. de Praedicam. c. de Oppositis: Contrarium autem bono quidem ex necessitate malum est. — De testimonio in fine arg. allato cfr. supra pag. 42, nota 2. — Circa finem arg. pro ergo et summe malum codd. K (T a secunda manu) X contingit reperire et summe malum.
    Book V. Topics c. 5. (c. 8.), where this rule is explained, insofar as it regards the proper. Cfr. II. c. 4. (c. 10.). As to what pertains to the following proposition, Aristotle says in On the Categories, the chapter On Opposites: But the contrary of a good is of necessity an evil. — On the testimony adduced at the end of the argument cfr. above p. 42, note 2. — Near the end of the argument, for ergo et summe malum codd. K (T by a second hand) X [read] contingit reperire et summe malum.
  8. Arislot., IV. Metaph. text. 18. (III. c. 4.) ait: Si igitur quod magis est propinquius est, profecto erit aliquid verum, cui propinquius est quod magis verum est. Cfr. Anselm., Monolog. c. 1. et 4. — Vocabulo summum cod. F praemittit et.
    Aristotle, IV. Metaphysics text 18. (III. c. 4.) says: If therefore what is more is nearer, surely there will be something true, to which is nearer that which is more true. Cfr. Anselm, Monologion c. 1. and 4. — Before the word summum cod. F prefixes et.
  9. Sicut exponit Aristot., II. Metaph. text. 5. seqq. (I. brev. c. 2.).
    As Aristotle expounds, II. Metaphysics text 5. seqq. (I. brev. c. 2.).
  10. Secundum Aristot., II. Phys. text. 66. (c. 6.).
    According to Aristotle, II. Physics text 66. (c. 6.).
  11. Ed. 1 sed. In fine arg. cod. A addit ergo similiter erit aliquid ita malum, quod nihil habebit de bono.
    Ed. 1 [reads] sed. At the end of the argument cod. A adds therefore likewise there will be something so evil that it will have nothing of good.
  12. Cfr. supra pag. 94, nota 4.
    Cfr. above p. 94, note 4.
  13. Vide Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 4. § 19 seq., et Damasc., Dialog. contra Manichaeos, ubi fere eadem argg. occurrunt.
    See Dionysius, On the Divine Names c. 4. § 19 seq., and Damascene, Dialogue against the Manichees, where nearly the same arguments occur.
  14. Libr. VI. Topic. c. 3. (c. 3.), de quo vide supra pag. 372, nota 5. Idem dicit Aristot., I. Rhetor. c. de Bono et utili, et I. Magnor. Moral. c. 2. (c. 1.), idemque supponit III. Topic. c. 4. (c. 6.). Quibus locis etiam sententia habetur, quae format maiorem arg. seq., de quo cfr. etiam II. Magnor. Moral. c. 8. (c. 7.). — In testimonio allato textus Graecus pro potentia habet δύναμις, quae vox ab aliis Latine redditur voce potestatis, ab aliis voce facultatis.
    Book VI. Topics c. 3. (c. 3.), on which see above p. 372, note 5. Aristotle says the same, I. Rhetoric, the chapter On the Good and the Useful, and I. Magna Moralia c. 2. (c. 1.), and he supposes the same III. Topics c. 4. (c. 6.). In which places also is found the opinion which forms the major of the following argument, on which cfr. also II. Magna Moralia c. 8. (c. 7.). — In the testimony adduced the Greek text for potentia has δύναμις, which word is rendered into Latin by some by the word potestatis, by others by the word facultatis.
  15. Cod. F naturam.
    Cod. F [reads] naturam.
  16. Cfr. Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 4. § 27, ubi malum dicitur vile propter defectum formae et privationem ordinis.
    Cfr. Dionysius, On the Divine Names c. 4. § 27, where evil is called vile on account of the defect of form and the privation of order.
  17. Vide supra pag. 25, nota 1.
    See above p. 25, note 1.
  18. Cfr. Boeth., de Hebdomad. sive Quomodo substantiae in eo quod sint, bonae sint etc. — Subinde post a primo Vat. adiungit ad ultimum.
    Cfr. Boethius, On the Hebdomads or How substances in that they are, are good etc. — Then after a primo the Vatican [edition] adds ad ultimum.
  19. Cfr. supra pag. 690, nota 1. et 2, et II. Cor. 4, 4.
    Cfr. above p. 690, notes 1 and 2, and II. Corinthians 4, 4.
  20. Vers. 20. — Aliquanto inferius Vat. omittit quasi, pro qua vocula codd. BP VZ etc. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 exhibent suae.
    Verse 20. — Somewhat below the Vatican [edition] omits quasi, for which little word codd. BP VZ etc. with edd. 2, 3, 4 exhibit suae.
  21. De Div. Nom. c. 4. § 32. Idem iam docebant Pythagorici, teste Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 6. Cfr. supra pag. 655, nota 3.
    On the Divine Names c. 4. § 32. The Pythagoreans already taught the same, on the testimony of Aristotle, II. Ethics c. 6. Cfr. above p. 655, note 3.
  22. Paulo superius verbis summe malum edd., excepta 1, praefigunt aliquid.
    A little above, to the words summe malum the editions, except 1, prefix aliquid.
  23. Iob. 41, 25. — Cfr. supra d. 21. a. 3. q. 3. in corp.
    Job 41, 25. — Cfr. above d. 21. a. 3. q. 3. in the body.
  24. Cfr. infra d. 35. a. 1. q. 3. — Cod. F quia hoc pro quod.
    Cfr. below d. 35. a. 1. q. 3. — Cod. F [reads] quia hoc for quod.
  25. Cfr. infra d. 35. a. 2. q. 3. — De duplici infinito cfr. Aristot., III. Phys. text. 56. seqq. (c. 6.). — Paulo superius pro actu infinitum edd., excepta 1, cum pluribus codd. actum infinitum.
    Cfr. below d. 35. a. 2. q. 3. — On the twofold infinite cfr. Aristotle, III. Physics text 56. seqq. (c. 6.). — A little above, for actu infinitum the editions, except 1, with several codices [read] actum infinitum.
  26. Libr. II. de Morib. Manich. c. 2. n. 2. seqq.; de Duabus Animabus, c. 8. n. 10; Contra epist. Manichaei, c. 31. seqq.; de Natura boni, c. 4. — Paulo inferius voci multos cod. K addit alios. Aristot., I. Poster. c. 1, exponens, quod omnis doctrina disciplinaque intellectualis fit ex praeexistente cognitione, ait: Dupliciter autem est necessarium praecognoscere: alia namque quia sunt praeopinari necesse est, alia vero quid est quod dicitur intelligere oportet, quaedam autem utraque. Cfr. ibid. c. 10. (c. 9.).
    Book II. On the Morals of the Manichees c. 2. n. 2. seqq.; On the Two Souls, c. 8. n. 10; Against the Letter of Mani, c. 31. seqq.; On the Nature of the Good, c. 4. — A little below, to the word multos cod. K adds alios. Aristotle, I. Posterior [Analytics] c. 1, expounding that all intellectual teaching and learning comes from preexisting knowledge, says: But it is necessary to have foreknowledge in two ways: for of some things it is necessary to presuppose that they are, but of others what it is that is said must be understood, and of certain things both. Cfr. ibid. c. 10. (c. 9.).
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