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Dist. 42, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 42

Textus Latinus
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Articulus unicus.

De potentia in comparatione ad possibilia, quae potest.

Quaestio II.

Utrum Deus possit omne quod potest agens creatum.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`La.`), then in literal English (`En.`).

Secundo quaeritur, utrum Deus possit in omne aliud, in quod potest omne agens creatum. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Qui enim omne dicit nihil excipit; sed non tantum dicimus et credimus Deum potentem, sed Deum omnipotentem1: ergo etc.

2. Item, quia Deus est omnisciens, ideo scit omnia, quaecumque scit alius sciens; si enim aliquis sciret aliquid, quod non sciret Deus, Deus non diceretur omnisciens: ergo pari ratione non diceretur omnipotens, nisi posset2 omne quod potest omnis alius.

3. Item, Deus non dicitur omnipotens, quia non vult omnia, quae alii volunt: ergo pari ratione, si non posset omnia quae alii possunt3, non esset omnipotens.

4. Item, omne esse est a primo esse, ergo omne posse est a primo posse: ergo omnis potentia potest quidquid potest propter divinam potentiam; sed «propter quod unumquodque, et illud magis»4: ergo etc.

Sed contra:

1. Aliqua creatura potest omnia recipere corporaliter, ut materia; aliqua potest omnia recipere spiritualiter5; sed Deus nihil potest recipere: ergo non potest omne quod potest aliud a se. Si dicas, quod non est potentiae, sed impotentiae; contra: nulla impotentia est a Deo sive a potentia divina: ergo secundum hoc potentia materiae sive animae non esset a Deo.

2. Item, homo potest pati miseriam sive sustinere poenam; Deus non potest pati: ergo etc. Si dicas, quod illud est impotentiae6; contra: nullum opus virtutis est impotentiae; sed sustinere est opus fortitudinis, quae propriissime est virtus7: ergo etc.

3. Item, homo potest peccare, Deus autem non potest: ergo etc. Quodsi potest peccare, potest esse malus; quod est inconveniens. Si dicas, quod hoc posse non est potentiae; contra: Augustinus de Civitate Dei8: «Melior est natura, quae potest peccare, quam quae non potest peccare»: ergo posse peccare spectat ad nobilitatem et perfectionem naturae, ergo non dicit impotentiam.

4. Item, homo potest currere et comedere; Deus hoc non potest: ergo etc. Si dicas, quod hoc est impotentiae; contra: omne illud quod dicit positionem, est a potentia, quae vere est potentia; sed currere et comedere non dicunt actus privativos, sed positivos9: ergo sunt a potentia, in quantum potens est, non in quantum impotens: ergo manifestum est etc.

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Conclusio.

Deus potest omne quod potest agens creatum, dummodo posse non dicat impotentiam, ita tamen, ut per se et in se possit quod est potentiae perfectae, in alio vero, quod est potentiae imperfectae, et nullatenus quod est omnimodae impotentiae.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Philosophus in philosophia prima10: Quaedam sunt, quae dicunt potentiam quantum ad modum dicendi, dicunt tamen impotentiam a parte rei, ut posse mori, posse corrumpi. Propter hoc intelligendum, quod quaedam sunt, quae posse est potentiae simpliciter et perfectae, ut posse intelligere, diligere et operari. Quaedam sunt, quae posse est potentiae, tamen imperfectae, ut currere et ambulare; isti enim actus dicunt simul actionem et passionem sive defectum in agente11. Quaedam, quae posse simpliciter est impotentiae, ut privationes, ut posse peccare, posse deficere, loquendo de his ratione privationis.

Secundum hoc intelligendum, quod cum potentia Dei sit potentia perfectissima, illa potest Deus per se et in se, quae sunt potentiae simpliciter, ut intelligere et operari. Illa vero, quae sunt imperfectae potentiae, potest quidem non in se, sed per se: per se potest ex hoc quod est ibi perfectionis et potentiae; in se non potest propter illud quod est ibi imperfectionis et impotentiae, quae in eo non cadunt. Illa autem, quae sunt simpliciter impotentiae, nec potest in se nec potest per se. In se non potest, quia imperfectio in eo non cadit12; per se non potest, quia nihil est a Deo, quod non sit a Deo per se et immediate; hoc autem quod est defectus, non potest esse in Deo nec a Deo, quia Deus non deficit in essendo nec in agendo.

Si ergo quaeratur, utrum Deus possit omne quod potest aliud agens; respondendum est non simpliciter, sed cum determinatione, quod potest omne quod posse est potentiae; et in se potest omne quod est potentiae simpliciter13; in alio potest quod est potentiae imperfectae; nec in se nec in alio, quod est omnimodae impotentiae: et hoc ipso dicitur omnipotens, quia potentia eius ad omnia sufficit et in nullo deficit.

Ad argumenta in oppositum:

Ad 1. 2. 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non potest recipere res nec rerum similitudines; dicendum ad hoc et ad omnia, de quibus obiicit, quod illa posse non est potentiae perfectae. Secundum hoc intelligendum, quod est potentia omnino sufficiens et activa, ut potentia producendi res; et est potentia pure passiva, ut potentia suscipiendi; et est potentia defectiva, ut potentia peccandi; et est potentia partim activa, partim passiva, ut potentia ambulandi; et est potentia partim activa et partim defectiva, ut potentia suscipiendi poenam14; et potentia partim passiva et partim defectiva, ut potentia moriendi. — Dicendum ergo, quod nihil horum in se potest Deus; quamvis enim sint potentiae alicuius, derogant tamen perfectioni potentiae. Nec est simile de scientia, quia scitum non diminuit de ratione scientiae, sicut possibile de ratione potenp. 750tiae, quia scitum non causatur a scientia, sicut possibile a potentia.

Ad 3. Ad illud tamen quod dicitur de potentia peccandi, intelligendum, quod si peccare dicat effectum cum deformitate sive actum, sic non tantum dicit potentiam defectivam, sed activam ratione actus substrati, et sic dicit nobilitatem; si ratione deformitatis, sic dicit simpliciter defectum. Quocumque tamen modo dicatur, quia semper concernit defectum, nullo modo convenit Deo.

Scholion

I. Descriptio omnipotentiae (in fine corp.): quia potentia eius ad omnia sufficit et in nullo deficit, egregie explicatur in Breviloq. I. c. 7. — Distinctio inter posse per se et in se sumta est ex Alexandro Hal. (S. p. I. q. 21. m. 1. a. 1.). In se superaddit aliquid illi quod Deus potest per se, scilicet, quod ipse Deus ut principium proximum rem efficiat, e. g. creare, dum per se facit etiam quae per alias causas efficit. — Verba subobscura in fine solut. ad 1. 2. 4, quibus solvitur quaestio: quare Deus sciat omnia, et bona et mala, sed non potest malum, explicantur a Richardo a Med. (hic a. 1. q. 2. ad 4.): «Quamvis scire malum culpae sit scire, et velle illud malum sit velle, tamen posse illud malum non est posse. Scire enim respicit rem quantum ad suum esse repraesentatum intellectui... Potentia vero respicit obiectum secundum suum esse reale. Et quia malum sub ratione qua malum non est aliqua res positiva, sed defectus boni debiti, ideo posse malum sub ratione qua malum est posse deficere; posse autem deficere vere est non posse». — Sententia S. Augustini (3. ad opposit.): Melior est natura, quae potest peccare etc., explicatur infra d. 44. dub. 2. Quoad totam solut. ad 3. cfr. II. Sent. d. 34. a. 2. q. 1. 2. 3.

II. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 21. m. 1. a. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1; S. I. q. 25. a. 3. 13. — Albert., hic a. 8. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 2. 3. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 1. — Durand., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.

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English Translation
p. 748

Article unique.

On power (potentia) in comparison to the possibles, [those things] which it can [do].

Question II.

Whether God can [do] everything that a created agent can [do].

Secondly it is asked whether God can [do] everything else, in [respect of] which every created agent can [act]. And that this is so, it appears [thus].

1. For he who says all excepts nothing; but we say and believe God to be not only powerful, but omnipotent1: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, since God is omniscient, therefore he knows all [things] whatsoever any other knower knows; for if anyone knew something which God did not know, God would not be called omniscient: therefore by parity of reason he would not be called omnipotent, unless he could [do] everything which every other can [do]2.

3. Likewise, God is not called omnipotent because he does not will all [the things] which others will: therefore by parity of reason, if he could not [do] all [the things] which others can [do]3, he would not be omnipotent.

4. Likewise, every being (esse) is from the first being, therefore every being-able (posse) is from the first being-able: therefore every power can whatever it can on account of the divine power; but «on account of which each thing [is such], that [thing itself is] also more so»4: therefore etc.

On the contrary:

1. Some creature can receive all [things] corporeally, as matter [does]; some [creature] can receive all [things] spiritually5; but God cannot receive anything: therefore he cannot [do] everything which something other than himself can [do]. If you say that this [belongs] not to power but to impotence; on the contrary: no impotence is from God or from the divine power: therefore on this account the power of matter or of soul would not be from God.

2. Likewise, a man can suffer misery or endure punishment; God cannot suffer: therefore etc. If you say that that [belongs] to impotence6; on the contrary: no work of virtue is of impotence; but to endure is a work of fortitude, which is most properly a virtue7: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, a man can sin, but God cannot: therefore etc. But if [God] can sin, he can be evil; which is unfitting. If you say that this being-able does not [belong] to power; on the contrary: Augustine, On the City of God8: «Better is the nature which can sin than [the nature] which cannot sin»: therefore being-able-to-sin pertains to the nobility and perfection of nature, therefore it does not bespeak impotence.

4. Likewise, a man can run and eat; God cannot [do] this: therefore etc. If you say that this [belongs] to impotence; on the contrary: every [thing] which bespeaks position [a positive state] is from power, which is truly a power; but to run and to eat do not bespeak privative acts, but positive [ones]9: therefore they are from power, insofar as it is powerful, not insofar as it is impotent: therefore it is manifest etc.

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Conclusion.

God can [do] everything that a created agent can [do], provided that the being-able does not bespeak impotence, in such a way, however, that through himself and in himself he can [do] that which [belongs] to perfect power, but in another [he can do] that which [belongs] to imperfect power, and in no wise that which [belongs] to total impotence.

I respond: It must be said that, as the Philosopher says in first philosophy10: There are certain [things] which bespeak power with respect to the mode of speaking, yet bespeak impotence on the side of the thing, as to-be-able-to-die, to-be-able-to-be-corrupted. On account of this it must be understood that there are certain [things] whose being-able belongs to power simply and perfectly, as to-be-able-to-understand, to-love and to-operate. There are certain [things] whose being-able belongs to power, yet imperfectly, as to-run and to-walk; for these acts bespeak together action and passion or a defect in the agent11. There are certain [things] whose being-able simply [belongs] to impotence, as privations, as to-be-able-to-sin, to-be-able-to-fail, speaking of these by reason of privation.

According to this it must be understood that, since the power of God is the most perfect power, God can [do] through himself and in himself those [things] which [belong] to power simply, as to-understand and to-operate. But those [things] which [belong] to imperfect power, [God] can [do] indeed not in himself, but through himself: he can through himself on account of that which is there of perfection and power; in himself he cannot, on account of that which is there of imperfection and impotence, which do not fall in him. But those [things] which [belong] simply to impotence, he can neither in himself nor can he through himself. In himself he cannot, because imperfection does not fall in him12; through himself he cannot, because nothing is from God which is not from God through himself and immediately; but this [thing] which is a defect, cannot be in God nor from God, since God does not fail in being or in acting.

If therefore it be asked whether God can [do] everything that another agent can [do]; the answer is, not simply, but with determination, [namely] that he can [do] everything whose being-able belongs to power; and in himself he can [do] everything which [belongs] to power simply13; in another he can [do] that which [belongs] to imperfect power; neither in himself nor in another [can he do] that which [belongs] to total impotence: and by this very thing he is called omnipotent, since his power suffices for all [things] and fails in none.

To the arguments to the contrary:

To 1, 2, 4. To that which is objected, that he cannot receive things nor the likenesses of things; it must be said to this and to all [the things] of which [the opponent] objects, that that being-able does not [belong] to perfect power. According to this it must be understood that there is power wholly sufficient and active, as the power of producing things; and there is purely passive power, as the power of receiving; and there is defective power, as the power of sinning; and there is power partly active, partly passive, as the power of walking; and there is power partly active and partly defective, as the power of undergoing punishment14; and power partly passive and partly defective, as the power of dying. — It must therefore be said that none of these can God [do] in himself; for although they are powers of some [thing], yet they derogate from the perfection of power. Nor is the case similar with knowledge, since the known does not diminish from the account (ratio) of knowledge, as the possible [does] from the account of powp. 750er, because the known is not caused by knowledge, as the possible [is] by power.

To 3. To that, however, which is said of the power of sinning, it must be understood that if to sin bespeaks an effect with deformity, or an act, then it bespeaks not only a defective power but [a power] active by reason of the substrate act, and thus it bespeaks nobility; if [it bespeaks the act] by reason of the deformity, then it bespeaks simply a defect. In whatever mode, however, it be said, since it always involves a defect, it in no way befits God.

Scholion

I. The description of omnipotence (at the end of the body): because his power suffices for all and fails in none, is excellently explained in Breviloquium I, c. 7. — The distinction between to-be-able-through-self and in-self is taken from Alexander of Hales (S. p. I, q. 21, m. 1, a. 1). In se adds something to that which God can per se, namely, that God himself as a proximate principle effects the thing, e.g. to create, while per se he also does [those things] which he effects through other causes. — The somewhat obscure words at the end of the solution to [arguments] 1, 2, 4, by which the question is resolved: why God knows all [things], both good and bad, but cannot [do] evil, are explained by Richard of Middleton (here a. 1, q. 2, ad 4): «Although to know the evil of fault is to know, and to will that evil is to will, yet to-be-able-[to-do] that evil is not to-be-able. For to know regards the thing with respect to its being represented to the intellect... But power regards its object according to its real being. And since evil under the formality (ratio) by which it is evil is not some positive thing, but a defect of a due good, therefore to-be-able-[to-do]-evil under the formality by which it is evil is to-be-able-to-fail; but to-be-able-to-fail is truly not to-be-able». — The sentence of St. Augustine (3rd argument to the contrary): Better is the nature which can sin etc., is explained below at d. 44, dub. 2. As to the whole solution to [argument] 3, cf. II Sent., d. 34, a. 2, q. 1. 2. 3.

II. Alex. Hal., S. p. I, q. 21, m. 1, a. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 1; S. I, q. 25, a. 3. 13. — Albert, here a. 8. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 2, a. 1. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here q. 2. 3. — Aegid. R., here 2, princ. q. 1. — Durand., on this and the following question, here q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., here q. 1.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Symbol. Apostolorum: «Credo in Deum Patrem omnipotentem.» — Pro sed Deum omnipotentem cod. M sed etiam omnipotentem.
    Apostles' Creed: «I believe in God the Father almighty.» — In place of sed Deum omnipotentem ("but God almighty") codex M [reads] sed etiam omnipotentem ("but also almighty").
  2. Plurimi codd. et ed. I possit.
    Most codices and edition I [read] possit (subjunctive: "could").
  3. Cod. T cum pluribus aliis minus congrue possent.
    Codex T with several others, less fittingly, [reads] possent ("they were able").
  4. Aristot., I. Poster. c. 2.
    Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I, c. 2.
  5. Quare et Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 37. (c. 8.) dicit, animam cognoscentem esse quodammodo omnia. Quid sibi velit haec sententia, vide supra d. 3. p. I. q. I. ad 1. De potentia materiae recipiendi formas vide ibid. p. II. a. I. q. 3. ad 4. — In hac propositione post secundum aliqua Vat. cum multis codd. interiicit potentia, simulque cum codd. P Q K (K a secunda manu) addit ut spiritus rationalis creatus, et cod. ut anima. Nonnulli codd. cum Vat. post aliqua ponunt potentia, sed omittunt deinde potest. Nostrae lectioni suffragantur codd. M V X et ed. 1. Paulo inferius post Si dicas, quod supple cum cod. K hoc.
    Hence also Aristotle, On the Soul III, text 37 (c. 8), says that the knowing soul is in some manner all things. On what this saying means, see above d. 3, p. I, q. I, ad 1. On the power of matter to receive forms, see ibid. p. II, a. I, q. 3, ad 4. — In this proposition, after secundum aliqua the Vatican [edition] with many codices inserts potentia, and together with codices P, Q, K (K from a second hand) adds ut spiritus rationalis creatus ("as a created rational spirit"), and [one] codex [reads] ut anima ("as a soul"). Some codices with the Vatican [edition] place potentia after aliqua, but then omit potest. Our reading is supported by codices M, V, X and edition I. A little below, after Si dicas, quod supply with codex K hoc ("this").
  6. Pro impotentiae Vat. hic et immediate post atque etiam in seq. argumento impossibile, et similiter in tertio argumento possibile pro potentiae, quam immutationem vocum contextus et codd. cum ed. 1 prorsus reprobant.
    In place of impotentiae the Vatican [edition], here and immediately after, and also in the following argument [reads] impossibile, and similarly in the third argument possibile in place of potentiae; which change of words the context and the codices, together with edition I, wholly reject.
  7. De fortitudine eiusque actibus vide Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 6. seqq.
    On fortitude and its acts, see Aristotle, Ethics III, c. 6 ff.
  8. Libr. XII. c. 1. n. 3, sed non eisdem verbis. Verbis de Civitate Dei codd. aa bb adiungunt vel de Libero arbitrio, in quo libro nimirum simile testimonium exhibetur. Loquens enim S. August., ibi libr. III. c. 5. n. 16, de animabus peccatricibus ait: cum et tales adhuc meliores sint eis, quae, quoniam nullum habent rationale ac liberum voluntatis arbitrium, peccare non possunt. — Mox pro nobilitatem, quam vocem ex potioribus codd. ut K L N P Q V Y ff et ed. 1 revocavimus, Vat. minus bene bonitatem, et non pauci codd. cum edd. 2, 3 perperam voluntatem.
    Book XII, c. 1, n. 3, but not in the same words. To the words de Civitate Dei codices aa, bb add vel de Libero arbitrio, in which book a similar testimony is exhibited. For St. Augustine, speaking there [in] book III, c. 5, n. 16, of sinning souls, says: since even such are still better than those which, because they have no rational and free choice of will, cannot sin. — Soon after, in place of nobilitatem ("nobility"), which word we have restored from the better codices such as K, L, N, P, Q, V, Y, ff and edition I, the Vatican [edition] [reads] less well bonitatem ("goodness"), and not a few codices with editions 2, 3 wrongly voluntatem ("will").
  9. Vat. cum aliis edd. et pluribus codd. actus privationis, sed positionis.
    The Vatican [edition] with the other editions and several codices [read] actus privationis, sed positionis ("acts of privation, but of position").
  10. Libr. V. Metaph. text. 17. (IV. c. 12.), ubi Philosophus, agens de potentia et impotentia, duplicem distinguit potentiam, scil. activam et passivam, cui duplici potentiae respondent duo modi possibilis (potentis), nempe potens agere et potens pati sive mutari. De hoc secundo modo ait: Alio vero [modo possibile est], si quid ad quodcumque transmutetur, sive in peius sive in melius potentiam habeat; etenim quod corrumpitur videtur possibile esse corrumpi, aliter non corrumperetur, si impossibile esset; nunc autem habet quandam dispositionem, causam et principium huiuscemodi passionis; quandoque enim propterea quod habet, quandoque propterea quod privatur, tale esse videtur... Aequivoce autem dicimus ipsum ens; quare propterea quod habet habitum quendam et principium possibile est, et propterea quod habet huius privationem, si possibile est privationem habere. Cfr. etiam IX. Metaph. text. 2. seqq. (VIII. c. 1.).
    Book V, Metaphysics text 17 (IV, c. 12), where the Philosopher, treating of power and impotence, distinguishes power as twofold, namely active and passive, to which twofold power correspond two modes of possible (i.e., capable), namely able-to-act and able-to-undergo or to-be-changed. Of this second mode he says: But in another [mode it is possible], if anything be transmuted into anything, whether it has the power for the worse or for the better; for that which is corrupted appears possible to be corrupted, otherwise it would not be corrupted, were it impossible; but now it has a certain disposition, cause, and principle of such passion; for sometimes on account of what it has, sometimes on account of what it is deprived of, it seems to be such... But we say being itself equivocally; wherefore on account of having a certain habit and principle it is possible, and on account of having the privation of this, if it is possible to have the privation. Cf. also Metaphysics IX, text 2 ff. (VIII, c. 1).
  11. Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 28. (c. 7.), assignans differentiam inter actum physici motus et sentientis, ait: «Motus enim actus erat imperfecti; simpliciter autem actus, qui perfecti est, alius est». Quae verba Averroes exponit sic: Et causa, propter quam isti motui (physico) contingit transmutatio et alteratio, illi (sentire, cognoscere) autem non, est, quia iste motus, cui accidit transmutatio, est actio non perfecta et via ad complementum, ille autem est actio perfecta, immo complementum. — Quod ad sequentem propositionem attinet, illud Aristot., IX. Metaph. text. 19. (VIII. c. 9.) auferre iuvat: Necesse autem est, etiam in malis finem et actum deteriorem potentia esse; etenim potens est idem ambo contraria... Non igitur quidquam in his quae a principio et quae perpetua sunt, malum est neque corruptum; etenim corruptis de malis est.
    Aristotle, On the Soul III, text 28 (c. 7), assigning the difference between the act of physical motion and [that] of the sentient [soul], says: «For motion was the act of the imperfect; but the act simply [speaking], which is of the perfect, is another [kind]». Which words Averroes expounds thus: And the cause on account of which to this (physical) motion there happens transmutation and alteration, but not to that (sensing, knowing), is that this motion, to which transmutation happens, is an action not perfect and a way to completion, but the other is a perfect action, indeed [the] completion. — As to the following proposition, it helps to bring forward this [text] of Aristotle, Metaphysics IX, text 19 (VIII, c. 9): It must be also that in evil [things] the end and the act be worse than the power; for the powerful [thing] is the same [in regard to] both contraries... Therefore there is no evil nor corrupted [thing] in those which are from a principle and which are perpetual; for the corrupted is [taken] from evil [things].
  12. Hic in codd. nec non in Vat. est erratum, quod saepe in mss. occurrit et homoioteleuton vocatur. Deest enim probatio primae partis propositionis disiunctivae, quae praecedit, quam probationem supplevimus adiungendo ex ed. 1: In se non potest, quia imperfectio non cadit. Propter consonantiam cum praecedentibus haec verba a festinantibus aut oscitantibus librariis omissa sunt.
    Here in the codices and in the Vatican [edition] there is an error which often occurs in manuscripts and is called homoioteleuton. For there is missing the proof of the first part of the preceding disjunctive proposition, which proof we have supplied by adding from edition I: In se non potest, quia imperfectio non cadit ("In itself he cannot, since imperfection does not fall [in him]"). On account of the consonance with the preceding, these words were omitted by hurried or careless scribes.
  13. Vat. cum aliquibus codd. addit et perfectae. — Idem docet Magister, hic in lit. c. 2.
    The Vatican [edition] with some codices adds et perfectae ("and perfect"). — The Master teaches the same here in the littera, c. 2.
  14. Sicut apparet in eo qui ipse sibi infligit poenam, nam agendo laeditur. «Poena enim, ut S. Doctor ait II. Sent. d. 11. a. 2. q. 3, ratione poenae duo nominat, videlicet nocumentum naturae et instrumentum divinae iustitiae, unum tanquam materiale, reliquum tanquam formale. Unde poena est et ultio, et est etiam passio... non quaecumque passio... sed passio laedens, passio affligens, passio displicens.»
    As is apparent in him who inflicts punishment upon himself, for in acting he is injured. «For punishment, as the Holy Doctor says in II Sent., d. 11, a. 2, q. 3, names two [things] by reason of punishment, namely harm to nature and instrument of divine justice, the one as material, the other as formal. Whence punishment is both a vengeance and is also a passion... not just any passion... but a passion that injures, a passion that afflicts, a passion that displeases.»
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