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Dist. 42, Art. 1, Q. 3

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 42

Textus Latinus
p. 750

Articulus unicus.

De potentia in comparatione ad possibilia, quae potest.

Quaestio III.

Utrum Deus possit quaecumque agenti creato impossibilia sunt.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`La.`), then in literal English (`En.`).

Tertio quaeritur, utrum divina potentia se extendat ad omne illud quod alii agenti est impossibile. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Dicitur enim aliquid1 impossibile propter naturae ordinationem, ut de caeco fieri videntem; aliquid propter praeteritionem, ut te non fuisse, ex quo fuisti: tertio propter oppositionem, ut idem esse nigrum et album. Primum est impossibile secundum naturam, secundum secundum tempus sive per accidens, tertium potest dici impossibile secundum disciplinam, quia omnis scientia supponit illud principium, quod opposita non sunt simul vera de eodem2. — Ostenditur ergo quod Deus possit omne tale. Nam scire quodcumque scibile est simpliciter scire; sed Deus omne verbum3; sed omnia contingit hoc verbo dicere: ergo nullum tale est impossibile apud Deum.

2. Item, ad Ephesios tertio4: Ei autem, qui potest facere supra quam possumus intelligere, ergo potest Deus plura facere, quam possit intellectus noster fingere; sed potest fingere omne impossibile, quod potest enuntiare: ergo et Deus potest illud facere.

3. Item, Hilarius5: «Perfectae potestatis est id naturam posse facientis, quod potest significare sermo dicentis».

4. Item, Basilius6: «Plus potest Deus facere, quam tu potes intelligere». — Ergo per auctoritates Canonis et Sanctorum videtur, quod Deus possit omne impossibile. p. 751

5. Item, ratione videtur, quia illud est potentius, cui nihil omnino est impossibile, quam cui aliquid est impossibile; sed Deus est potentissimus in summo: ergo nihil omnino est ei impossibile.

6. Item, si aliquod impossibile non est Deo possibile, aut hoc est propter privationem, aut propter positionem. Si propter privationem; contra: nulla maior privatio quam omnino non-entis; sed Deus de nihilo facit aliquid7: non ergo propter privationem. Si propter positionem: ergo videtur quod aliquid sit, quod non subiaceat divinae potentiae et quod ei non obediat: ergo potentia Dei habet resistens.

7. Item, ostenditur specialiter, quod possit impossibile secundum naturam, ut de trunco facere vitulum8. Quia plus distat non-ens ab ente, quam unum ens ab alio; sed Deus de non-ente facit ens: ergo de uno ente potest facere aliud.

8. Item, quod possit impossibile secundum tempus, videtur, quia illud est impossibile per accidens et9 quod nullam ponit resistentiam, quia non est: ergo si Deus potest impossibile per se et quod etiam habet resistentiam, cum illud sit maius impossibile: ergo potest impossibile per accidens.

9. Item, quod possit impossibile secundum disciplinam, videtur, quia plus distat Creator a creatura quam unum ens creatum ab alio; sed Deus potuit facere, quod creatura Creatori uniretur in eadem hypostasi simplicissima: ergo multo fortius, quod opposita simul sint in eodem, ut quod aliquid sit simul album et nigrum. Et hoc videtur factum esse in Christo, quia unus et idem erat aeternus et temporalis, passibilis et impassibilis, visibilis et invisibilis, et sic de aliis.

10. Item, Deus fecit virginem parere, quod est impossibile10 secundum naturam, quia potentia naturae nullo modo est ad hoc; et est impossibile secundum disciplinam, quia simul sunt opposita vera de eodem; et quod est maius impossibile quam impossibile secundum accidens, scilicet corruptam integrare sive fieri virginem; magis enim videtur partus incompossibilis virginitati quam coitus: ergo etc.

Sed contra:

1. Quod Deus non possit impossibile secundum naturam, videtur Augustinus dicere in libro de Vera Innocentia11: «Deus, inquit, ita est omnipotens, ut nunquam rationis suae instituta evellat». Ergo si aliquid est impossibile secundum institutionem naturae, simpliciter est Deo impossibile.

2. Item, ratione videtur, quia Deus non potest facere contra ordinem rationis rectae, utpote mentiri et consimilia: ergo non potest facere contra institutionem naturae ordinatae: ergo non potest impossibile secundum naturam.

3. Item, quod non possit impossibile per accidens. Hieronymus12: «Cum cetera possit Deus, non potest de corrupta facere virginem»; sed constat quod hoc non dicitur, quod non possit reparare claustra, sed quia eam, quae corrupta est, impossibile est non fuisse corruptam: ergo etc.

4. Item, Augustinus in vigesimo sexto libro contra Faustum13: «Hanc sententiam, qua dicimus, praeteritum fuisse, Deus falsam facere non potest». Et rationem reddit: «Si enim hoc faceret, hoc esset facere, ut ea quae vera sunt, eo ipso quod vera sunt, essent falsa, et ita esset contrarius veritati».

5. Item, quod non possit impossibile secundum disciplinam, scilicet ut duo opposita sint simul in eodem, videtur: quia sicut se habent opposita ad unionem, ita unita ad divisionem; sed Deus non potest facere, quod duo et tria non sint quinque, quia dicit Augustinus14, quod est verum veritate, quae non incipit nec desinit: ergo pari ratione non potest facere, quod opposita sint simul.

6. Item, Deus non potest facere contra veritatem iustitiae. Secundae ad Timotheum secundo15: Fidelis permanet, negare se ipsum non potest, ergo non potest facere contra ordinem sapientiae: sed confundere opposita est facere contra ordinem sapientiae: ergo etc.

Conclusio.

Deus potest omne illud, quod creato agenti iudicatur esse impossibile tum propter limitationem naturalis potentiae, tum propter limitationem nostrae intelligentiae; non autem potest, quod est impossibile in se, sive hoc sit secundum accidens, sive secundum disciplinam seu ordinem divinae sapientiae.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam notandum, quod nos iudicamus aliquid impossibile quatuor causis16.

Uno modo per limitationem naturalis potentiae, ut de trunco fieri vitulum, et virginem parere; mulier enim sine semine non potest concipere naturaliter. Item partus, clausa porta, propter corpulentiam non potest exire; similiter natura statim non potest truncum in vitulum convertere, cum habeat potentiam limitatam.

Secundo modo dicitur impossibile non propter limitationem potentiae, sed propter limitationem nostrae intelligentiae, ut duo corpora esse in eodem loco, vel idem corpus esse in diversis, vel maius corpus in minori loco, quia nullo modo possumus capere, cum nostra imaginatio semper dicat oppositum. Unde etiam, quando Deus sic facit in Sacramento altaris, necesse est, ut ratio contra se elevetur17, ut credat. p. 752

Tertio modo dicitur impossibile propter privationem omnis existentiae secundum omnem comparationem, scilicet principii, medii et ultimi, ut praeteritum non fuisse praeteritum. Omnis enim potentia, quae intelligitur aliquid facere, respicit ens vel in ratione principii, vel termini, vel utroque modo18. Unde de ente potest facere non-ens, et e converso, et de uno aliud; sed de non-ente facere non-ens, nullius omnino potentiae est. Unde quamvis Deus de omni ente creato possit facere quod non sit, sive de oratione sive de re, tamen de eo quod fuit et non est, facere, quod non fuerit, hoc omnino Deo est impossibile, quia hoc facere est nihil facere, sicut iam melius patebit.

Quarto modo dicitur impossibile, secundum illustrationem veritatis aeternae et ordinem divinae sapientiae, ut verbi gratia, quod duo opposita insint eidem et secundum idem, hoc ipsa veritas aeterna, eo ipso quod veritas est, indicat et illustrat, ut iudicet impossibile19, sicut et hoc: duo et tria non esse quinque.

Quando ergo argumentatur20, utrum Deo sit possibile omne impossibile; dicendum de impossibili, quod est impossibile propter limitationem potentiae, vel21 propter limitationem intelligentiae, quod Deo est possibile, propter hoc quod eius potentia non est limitata, sed infinita; et ideo supra naturam et intelligentiam potest, quarum utraque est arctata. Illud autem impossibile, quod est impossibile propter privationem omnis existentiae, et quod propter illustrationem veritatis aeternae, non potest omnino. Primum quidem non potest, quia illud posse est nihil posse. Secundum non potest, quia illud est posse inordinate et contra ordinem sapientiae posse. Et quoniam Deus sic est omnipotens, ut nihil possit, nisi quod decet suam potentiam et non deordinat sapientiam: ideo haec impossibilia non potest.

Sed obiiciet aliquis, quod illud est falsum, scilicet quod impossibile per accidens sit impossibile propter privationem omnis existentiae. Nam propositio de praeterito est vera, et veritas illa non fundatur super nihil nec super ens increatum, cum incipiat esse vera, ergo super ens creatum; et illud est praeteritum: ergo praeteritum dicit aliquo modo ens; sed omne creatum, quantumcumque habeat parum de ente, Deus potest illud amittere, si velit: ergo Deus potest facere, quod illud quod fuit, non fuerit. — Et iterum, cum dico, hoc esse praeteritum, aut dico aliquid, aut nihil. Si aliquid: ergo responsio nulla; si autem nihil dico: ergo potest dici22, quod chimaera sit praeterita, et quod non praeteritum, quod nihil est, sit praeteritum, quod manifeste falsum est: non igitur dicit privationem omnis existentiae. — Praeterea, illud23 non videtur subtrahere, quin subiaceat potentiae divinae. Nam futurum non dicit ens, et tamen Deus potest facere, quod futurum secundum veritatem nunquam sit futurum. — Similiter, non praesens nihil dicit entitatis; et Deus potest facere, quod illud quod nunquam est praesens, unquam24 sit praesens. — Nec adhuc videtur posse evadi: quaeri enim potest, utrum Deus possit facere de praeterito praesens; et constat, quod in altero extremo ponitur ens: si ergo potest facere, quod praeteritum sit praesens — et quod est praesens non est praeteritum — potest facere de praeterito, quod non sit praeteritum.

Propter haec et his similia fuit opinio Gilberti Porretani25, quod Deus potest super impossibile per accidens; potest enim facere, quod praeteritum nunquam fuerit. Et illud beati Hieronymi exponunt qui sequuntur eum, quod non potest facere de corrupta virginem, id est, non ostendit se posse, cum nunquam fecerit. Et similiter illud de Augustino, quod Deus sententiam de praeterito non potest facere falsam, hoc intelligitur, salva re26. p. 753

Sed certe huiusmodi expositiones valde sunt extraneae. Si enim Hieronymus dicit, quod non potest de corrupta facere virginem, id est non ostendit, similiter non potest de trunco vitulum facere, cum non ostendat; non recte igitur dicit27: «cum cetera possit Deus» etc. — Et iterum, si sermo Augustini intelligitur, quod non potest facere Deus illam sententiam falsam, supposito praeterito, similiter nec sententiam de futuro, salva futuritione.

Et propter hoc, cum auctoritates hoc dicant magnorum doctorum, quod Deus de eo quod fuit, non potest facere, quod non fuerit; et intellectus in nullo dicat contrarium; nec fides ad hoc nos moveat vel compellat: tanquam rationabilius et securius dicendum est cum Sanctis, quod Deus de eo quod fuit, non potest facere, quod non fuerit. — Et huius rationem ad praesens aliam nescio, nisi quae praedicta est28; nisi forte dicatur, hoc esse propter omnimodam indivisionem29, ut, sicut opposita, manentia opposita, non potest unire, sic nec idem a se dividere; et ideo quod fuit pro tempore, quo fuit, omnimode est unitum, et similiter praesens in tempore, in quo est, sive in instanti. Unde hoc esset idem a se dividere, facere scilicet, quod praeteritum non fuerit praeteritum: et hoc repugnat ordini divinae sapientiae, sicut facere, quod sit triangulus et non sit figura; et hoc claudit in se duo contradictorie opposita.

Ratio tamen praedicta satis est conveniens, si quis recte intelligat. Cum enim dicitur, praeteritum carere existentia, non dico propter hoc, quod cum dicitur aliquid fuisse, dicatur omnino nihil, sed propter hoc, quod aliquid est verum fuisse, quod habuit aliquando esse, etiam si de eius esse nihil omnino remanserit. Unde si totus Caesar cesserit in nihil, verum est, Caesarem fuisse. Et hoc dicit Anselmus30, quod si omnia creata omnino cedant in nihil, verum est, mundum fuisse. p. 754

Ob aliam etiam rationem dicitur carere existentia, quia nec est nec est ordinatum ad praesens. Unde veritas propositionis de praeterito non dicit a parte rei nihil omnino nec vere ens in actu31, sed illud quod fuit et non est; et hoc quidem non dicit quid neutrum, quod sit, sed quod fuit. Si ergo Deus dicatur posse aliquid super hoc, quod non fuerit, aut quiescendo32 sive nihil operando, aut faciendo aliquid, aut destruendo. Si quiescit et nihil facit, propter hoc nihilominus hoc praeteriit nec fuisse desinit: quia, cum non sit nec actu nec potentia, nec indiget conservante nec indiget producente. Non sic est de futuro, quia futurum33 est ordinatum ad esse, ideo indiget producente: et ideo, si Deus non velit facere futurum, non fit, et illi non erit futurum34. — Si ergo potest aliquid, ut faciat, hoc quod fuit non fuisse; aut hoc erit faciendo, aut destruendo. Sed facere, quod non fuisset35, est nihil facere, cum non fuisse non dicat ens: ergo Deus faciendo nihil facit, quod est imperfectio et contradictionis implicatio36. — Similiter non est aliquid destruere, cum fuisse non dicat aliquid esse: ergo si destruendo hoc facit, destruendo nihil destrueret, quod est simile inconveniens. Non ergo potest nihil agendo, nec faciendo, nec destruendo: ergo de praeterito quod non fuerit praeteritum, non potest facere.

Patent etiam instantiae. Nam veritas propositionis de praeterito non necessario fundatur supra aliquid creatum, quod sit, sed quod fuerit; et ideo manet, illo creato interempto. — Patet etiam, quod praeteritio non dicit omnino nihil, sed dicit aliquid quod fuerit et non est, nisi forte praeteritum dicat successionem temporalem, quam utique potest Deus destruere; sed largius accipitur hic fuisse37. — Patet etiam instantia in ipso futuro, quia non est simile. — Patet instantia, quod praeteritum potest fieri praesens. Esto quod hoc intelligatur38, adhuc nihilominus intelligitur fuisse. — Patet etiam, quod Deus potest destruere omnem propositionem et omne dictum; sed salva propositione et eius significatione non potest ipsam falsificare, quoniam hoc non potest esse, nisi rem significatam mutaret; alioquin faceret, orationem, eo ipso quo vera est, esse falsam, et hoc esset contra suam veritatem39; rem autem mutare non potest, et ita nec orationem falsificare.

Ex his quae dicta sunt, satis potest praehabita responsio roborari.

Ad argumenta in oppositum:

Ad 1, 2, 3, 4. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod potest omne dicibile et cogitabile; dicendum, quod hoc intelligitur de his solum, quae dicuntur et cogitantur secundum rationem recte intelligentem et recte pronuntiantem. Nihil enim rationabile potest dici vel cogitari, quod Deus facere non possit, et etiam plus potest.

Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod potentius est illud, cui omnia sunt possibilia; dicendum, quod verum est de his quae posse est potentiae nobilis: nam si posset aliquid, quod non sit de nobilitate potentiae, quanto magis illud posset, tanto magis adversitas et perversitas possent in illum40, et ita tanto minus esset potens.

Ad 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur: aut propter privationem etc.; dicendum, quod propter privationem omnis existentiae in utroque extremo, et propter privationem distinguimus, et propter positionem ex parte Dei; quia potentia Dei respicit aliquid p. 755ut obiectum effectum, et sapientia respicit ordinatum.

Ad 7. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod possit impossibile secundum naturam; dicendum, quod illud verum est.

Ad 8. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod possit impossibile per accidens, quia nullam dicit resistentiam; dicendum, quod hoc non est propter resistentiam, sed propter omnimodam non-existentiam, ob quam posse illud est nihil posse.

Ad 9. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Creatore et creatura, dicendum, quod omnis creatura est materialis et possibilis respectu Dei, et Deus est in omni creatura per intimitatem substantiae; non sic oppositum respectu oppositi41. — Quod ergo obiicitur, quod magis distant; verum est quantum ad naturarum differentiam, quia in nullo communicant, sed non est verum quantum ad simultatis existentiam.

Ad 10. Ad illud quod obiicitur de hoc, quod est virginem parere; dicendum, quod est impossibile secundum naturam, sed non impossibile secundum oppositionem, quia esse virginem et parere non sunt opposita42, similiter nec esse virginem et concipere; sed iudicantur opposita propter naturae impotentiam. Sed ista sunt opposita corrumpi et esse virginem; et ideo patet illud.

Ad 1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non potest impossibile secundum naturam propter ordinem; dicendum, quod est ordo naturae specialis et generalis. Ordo naturae specialis transmutari potest et destrui, quia potest in alteram differentiam res referri, sed generalis non. Sic dicendum, quod specialis ordo attenditur secundum potentiam naturae specialis, generalis ordo secundum potentiam obedientiae, quae est generalis43: contra hunc ordinem non facit, sed contra alium.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non potest contra dictamen rationis rectae; dicendum, quod verum est, prout recta ratio dicit, malum non esse faciendum, quia hoc facere est deficere; non sic autem deficit faciendo contra naturam; et ratio huius patebit infra44.

Scholion

I. In praecedenti quaest. dictum est, quo sensu Deus possit facere omne quod causis creatis est possibile; hic inquiritur utrum possit omne quod agenti creato est impossibile. Cum autem in corp. recenseantur quatuor species eorum quae a nobis impossibilia iudicantur, omnino manifestum est quod quaestio affirmative sit decidenda quoad primam et secundam impossibilium speciem. Sed reliqua est quaestio circa speciem tertiam et quartam, et praecipue circa tertiam, sive circa impossibile secundum tempus. Unde quaeritur, utrum Deus possit facere, quod res praeterita non sit praeterita. Multi enim, praesertim Nominales, hoc multis sophisticis rationibus probare conabantur. Ad rem dicit Brulifer (hic); Gilbertus Porretanus et Gulielmus Antissiodorensis tenent partem affirmativam... et doctores Universitatis Anglicanae, scil. Oxonienses, tenent contra Parisienses illorum opinionem; unde Gregorius de Arimino ponit utramque opinionem et rationes eorum. Ipse tamen finaliter cum principalioribus Scholasticis hanc opinionem bene refellit. Praecipua argumenta Porretani in corp. responsionis recensentur.

Praescindendo ab ista subtili quaestione de impossibili per accidens, plura principia utilia ad stabiliendam sanam doctrinam de possibilitate miraculorum et ad alias quaestiones solvendas invenies in responsione et solutione argumentorum pro parte negativa.

II. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 21. m. 5. a. 2. 3. 4. — Scot. Report. hic q. 2. — Thom., S. hic q. 2. a. 2; S. I. q. 25. a. 3. 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 6. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 4. 5. 6. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. 2.

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English Translation
p. 750

Article unique.

On power (potentia) in comparison to the possibles, [those things] which it can [do].

Question III.

Whether God can [do] all those things which are impossible for a created agent.

Thirdly it is asked, whether the divine power extends to everything which is impossible for any other agent. And that it does so [extend], appears thus.

1. For something is called impossible1 on account of nature's ordination, as that the blind should be made seeing; something else on account of pre-occurrence (praeteritio), as that you should not have been, since you have been; thirdly on account of opposition, as that the same [thing] should be black and white. The first is impossible according to nature, the second according to time or per accidens, the third may be called impossible according to discipline [i.e. according to the rules of demonstrative science], since every science supposes that principle, that opposites are not at the same time true of the same thing2. — It is shown therefore that God can [do] every such [thing]. For to know any knowable [thing] is simpliciter to know; but God [knows] every word3; but it is possible to say all things by means of this word: therefore no such [thing] is impossible with God.

2. Likewise, to the Ephesians, chapter three4: To him who is able to do above what we can understand, therefore God can do more things than our intellect can imagine; but it can imagine every impossible [thing] which it can enunciate: therefore God too can do that [thing].

3. Likewise, Hilary5: "It belongs to perfect power, the [power] of him acting can make [be the case] that which the speech of the speaker can signify."

4. Likewise, Basil6: "God can do more than you can understand." — Therefore by the authorities of the Canon [of Scripture] and of the Saints it appears that God can [do] every impossible [thing]. p. 751

5. Likewise, by reason it appears, since that is more powerful to which nothing whatever is impossible, than [that] to which something is impossible; but God is most powerful in the highest [degree]: therefore nothing at all is impossible to him.

6. Likewise, if any impossible [thing] is not possible to God, this is either on account of privation, or on account of position [i.e. some positive determination]. If on account of privation; on the contrary: no privation is greater than [that] of utter non-being; but God makes something from nothing7: therefore not on account of privation. If on account of position: therefore it appears that there is something which does not lie under the divine power and does not obey it: therefore the power of God has something resisting [it].

7. Likewise, it is shown specifically that he can [do] the impossible according to nature, as to make a calf from a tree-stump8. For non-being differs more from being than one being from another; but God makes a being out of non-being: therefore out of one being he can make another.

8. Likewise, that he can [do] the impossible according to time appears [thus], since that is impossible per accidens which posits no resistance9, since it is not [in being]: therefore if God can [do] the impossible per se and that which also has resistance, since that is a greater impossible: therefore he can [do] the impossible per accidens.

9. Likewise, that he can [do] the impossible according to discipline appears [thus], since the Creator differs more from the creature than one created being from another; but God could make [it the case] that a creature should be united to the Creator in the same most-simple hypostasis: therefore much more strongly, that opposites should be at the same time in the same [thing], as that something should be at the same time white and black. And this seems to have been done in Christ, since one and the same [person] was eternal and temporal, passible and impassible, visible and invisible, and so on with other things.

10. Likewise, God made a virgin to bear, which is impossible10 according to nature, since the power of nature is in no way [directed] to this; and it is impossible according to discipline, since opposites are at the same time true of the same; and what is a greater impossible than the impossible per accidens, namely to make whole again [a thing] corrupted, or to become a virgin [again]; for birth seems more incompossible with virginity than intercourse: therefore etc.

On the contrary:

1. That God cannot [do] the impossible according to nature, Augustine seems to say in his book De Vera Innocentia11: "God," he says, "is so omnipotent that he never tears up the institutes of his reason." Therefore if anything is impossible according to the institution of nature, it is simpliciter impossible for God.

2. Likewise, by reason it appears, since God cannot act against the order of right reason, such as to lie and the like: therefore he cannot act against the institution of ordered nature: therefore he cannot [do] the impossible according to nature.

3. Likewise, that he cannot [do] the impossible per accidens. Jerome12: "Although God can [do] the rest, he cannot make a virgin out of one corrupted"; but it is established that this is not said because he cannot repair the [bodily] enclosures, but because, for her who is corrupted, it is impossible not to have been corrupted: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, Augustine in the twenty-sixth book contra Faustum13: "This judgment, by which we say [that] a past [thing] has been, God cannot make false." And he gives the reason: "For if he did this, this would be to make [it the case] that those [things] which are true should, by the very fact that they are true, be false, and so he would be contrary to truth."

5. Likewise, that he cannot [do] the impossible according to discipline, namely that two opposites be at the same time in the same [thing], appears [thus]: since as opposites stand toward union, so [things] united [stand] toward division; but God cannot make [it the case] that two and three are not five, since Augustine says14 that this is true with the truth which does not begin and does not cease: therefore by parity of reasoning he cannot make [it the case] that opposites be at the same time [in the same].

6. Likewise, God cannot act against the truth of justice. Second to Timothy, chapter two15: He [Christ] remains faithful, he cannot deny himself, therefore he cannot act against the order of wisdom: but to confound opposites is to act against the order of wisdom: therefore etc.

Conclusion.

God can [do] everything which is judged to be impossible for a created agent, both on account of the limitation of natural power and on account of the limitation of our understanding; but he cannot [do] what is impossible in itself, whether this be according to accident or according to discipline, that is, the order of the divine wisdom.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing, it must be noted that we judge something to be impossible for four causes16.

In one mode, through the limitation of natural power, as that from a stump a calf should come to be, or that a virgin should bear; for a woman cannot conceive naturally without seed. Likewise birth, with the door closed, cannot come out through corporeality; similarly nature cannot at once convert a stump into a calf, since it has a limited power.

In a second mode something is called impossible not on account of the limitation of [created] power, but on account of the limitation of our understanding, as that two bodies should be in the same place, or the same body in different [places], or a larger body in a smaller place, since we can in no way grasp [this], as our imagination always says the opposite. Hence also, when God thus acts in the Sacrament of the altar, it is necessary that reason raise itself against itself17 in order to believe. p. 752

In a third mode something is called impossible on account of the privation of all existence according to every comparison, namely [comparison] to a beginning, to a middle, and to an ultimate [term], as that a past thing should not have been past. For every power which is understood to make something regards being either in the account of beginning, or of term, or in both modes18. Hence from a being it can make a non-being, and conversely, and from one [thing] another; but to make non-being from non-being belongs to no power whatever. Hence although God can make [it the case] that any created being should not be, whether [a being] of speech or of [the] thing [itself], nevertheless concerning that which has been and is not, to make [it the case] that it should not have been, this is utterly impossible to God, since to do this is to do nothing, as will become better clear presently.

In a fourth mode something is called impossible according to the illumination of the eternal truth and the order of the divine wisdom, as for example, that two opposites be in the same and according to the same — this the eternal truth itself, by the very fact that it is truth, indicates and illuminates as judging [it] to be impossible19, as also this: that two and three are not five.

When therefore it is argued20 whether every impossible is possible for God; it must be said concerning the impossible which is impossible on account of the limitation of [created] power, or21 on account of the limitation of [created] understanding, that this is possible for God, because his power is not limited, but infinite; and therefore he can [reach] above nature and above [created] understanding, both of which are restricted. But that impossible which is impossible on account of the privation of all existence, and that [which is so] on account of the illumination of the eternal truth, he cannot [do] at all. The first he cannot, since to be able to do that is to be able to do nothing. The second he cannot, since that is to be able [to act] disorderedly and to be able [to act] against the order of wisdom. And since God is so omnipotent that he can do nothing except what is fitting to his power and does not derange his wisdom: therefore he cannot [do] these impossibles.

But someone will object that this is false, namely that the impossible per accidens is impossible on account of the privation of all existence. For a proposition about a past [thing] is true, and that truth is not founded upon nothing nor upon an uncreated being, since it begins to be true, therefore upon a created being; and this [created being] is the past [thing]: therefore the past [thing] says in some way being; but every created [thing], however little of being it has, God can make perish, if he wills: therefore God can make [it the case] that that which has been should not have been. — And again, when I say "this is past," either I say something or nothing. If something: therefore the [foregoing] response is null; if I say nothing: therefore it can be said22 that a chimera is past, and that a not-past, which is nothing, is past, which is manifestly false: therefore [past] does not denote the privation of all existence. — Moreover, that [namely, that the past should not have been]23 does not seem to be withdrawn from being subject to the divine power. For "future" does not say being, and yet God can make [it the case] that what is future according to truth should never be future. — Similarly, "not-present" says no entity at all; and God can make [it the case] that what is never present should ever24 be present. — Nor yet does it seem possible to escape [thus]: for one can ask whether God can make [the] present out of [the] past; and it is established that in one extreme [of the comparison] a being is posited: if therefore he can make [it the case] that the past should be present — and [since] what is present is not past — he can make [it the case] concerning a past [thing] that it should not be past.

On account of these and similar [arguments] there was the opinion of Gilbert of Poitiers25, that God can [act] upon the impossible per accidens; for he can make [it the case] that a past [thing] should never have been. And the [saying] of blessed Jerome those who follow him expound, that he cannot make a virgin out of one corrupted, that is, he does not show himself able [to do this], since he has never done it. And similarly that [saying] from Augustine, that God cannot make false a judgment about the past — this is understood, the thing being kept [unchanged]26. p. 753

But certainly such expositions are exceedingly foreign [to the truth]. For if Jerome says that he cannot make a virgin out of one corrupted, that is, he does not show [it], similarly he cannot make a calf out of a stump, since he does not show [it]; therefore he is not speaking rightly27 [when he says]: "although God can [do] the rest" etc. — And again, if the saying of Augustine is understood [to mean] that God cannot make false that judgment, the past [event] being granted [as past], similarly he cannot [do this] with the judgment about the future, the futurition being kept [unchanged].

And on account of this, since the authorities of the great doctors do say this, that God cannot make [it the case] concerning that which has been, that it should not have been; and the intellect in nothing says the contrary; and faith neither moves nor compels us to this: as more reasonable and more safe it must be said with the Saints that God cannot make [it the case] concerning that which has been, that it should not have been. — And of this reason at present I know no other than that which has been said28; unless perhaps it be said [that] this is on account of utter indivision29, so that, just as he cannot unite opposites, [the opposites] remaining opposites, so neither can he divide the same from itself; and therefore what has been for the time at which it was, is utterly united [with itself], and similarly the present [is utterly united with itself] in the time in which it is, that is, in [its] instant. Hence this would be to divide the same from itself, namely to make [it the case] that the past not have been past: and this is repugnant to the order of the divine wisdom, as [it would be to make it the case] that there should be a triangle and not a figure; and this encloses in itself two contradictorily opposed [things].

Yet the aforesaid reason is sufficiently fitting, if one understands [it] rightly. For when it is said [that] the past lacks existence, I do not mean on account of this, that when it is said that something "has been," [we mean] that [it is] utterly nothing, but on account of this, that something is true to have been, which once had being, even if of its being nothing at all has remained. Hence if Caesar in his entirety should pass into nothing, it is [still] true that Caesar has been. And this Anselm says30, that if all created [things] should utterly pass into nothing, it is [still] true that the world has been. p. 754

For another reason also is the past said to lack existence, since it neither is nor is ordered to [the] present. Hence the truth of a proposition about a past [thing] does not denote, on the side of the thing, sheer nothing nor a being truly in act31, but that which has been and is not; and this indeed does not denote some neuter thing which is, but [something] which has been. If then God be said able [to do] something concerning this — that it should not have been — either [this will be] by his being-quiet32, that is, by his doing nothing, or by his doing something, or by his destroying. If he is quiet and does nothing, on account of this nonetheless this thing has gone-by [as past] and does not cease to have been: since, as it is neither in act nor in potency, it neither needs anything conserving [it] nor anything producing [it]. It is not so with the future, since the future33 is ordered to being, [and] therefore needs something producing [it]: and therefore, if God does not will to make a future [thing], it does not come to be, and it will not be future [to itself]34. — If therefore he can [do] something, in order that he may make [it the case] that what was should not have been; either this will be by [his] doing or by [his] destroying. But to make [it the case] that it should not have been35 is to do nothing, since "not-to-have-been" does not say being: therefore God by doing does nothing, which is an imperfection and an implication of contradiction36. — Similarly to destroy is not [to destroy] something, since "has-been" does not say something to be: therefore if he does this by destroying, by destroying he would destroy nothing, which is a similar incongruity. Therefore he cannot [do this] by no acting, nor by doing, nor by destroying: therefore concerning the past, [namely] that it not have been past, he cannot do [it].

The [counter-]instances [raised above] are also plain [in their answer]. For the truth of a proposition about a past [thing] is not necessarily founded upon some created [thing] which is, but which has been; and therefore it remains, even though that created [thing] be done away with. — It is plain also that "past-ness" (praeteritio) does not denote sheer nothing, but denotes something which has been and is not, unless perhaps "past" denote a temporal succession, which assuredly God can destroy; but here fuisse ("to have been") is taken in a broader sense37. — It is plain also that the [counter-]instance drawn from the future itself [fails], since it is not similar. — It is plain [also] [as to the objection] that a past [thing] can become present. Even granted that this be understood [as you wish]38, nonetheless it is still understood to have been. — It is plain also that God can destroy every proposition and every utterance; but, the proposition being kept and its signification [being kept], he cannot falsify it, since this cannot be unless he should change the thing signified; otherwise he would make speech, by the very fact that it is true, to be false, and this would be against his truth39; but he cannot change the thing, and so neither can he falsify the speech.

From these things that have been said the preceding response can be sufficiently corroborated.

To the arguments to the contrary:

To 1, 2, 3, 4. To that, then, which is objected, that he can [do] every utterable and thinkable [thing]; it must be said that this is understood only of those [things] which are said and thought according to a reason rightly understanding and rightly pronouncing. For nothing rational can be said or thought, which God cannot do, and he can do even more.

To 5. To that which is objected, that more powerful is that to which all things are possible; it must be said that this is true of those things to be able [which] belongs to a noble power: for if it were able [to do] something which is not of the nobility of power, the more it were able [to do that], the more would adversity and perversity be able [to act] against it40, and so the less powerful would it be.

To 6. To that which is objected: either on account of privation etc.; it must be said that we distinguish on account of the privation of all existence in both extremes, and on account of privation, and on account of position on the part of God; since the power of God regards something p. 755as object of [its] effect, and wisdom regards what is ordered.

To 7. To that which is objected, that he can [do] the impossible according to nature; it must be said that this is true.

To 8. To that which is objected, that he can [do] the impossible per accidens, since it says no resistance; it must be said that this [his not being able to do it] is not on account of resistance, but on account of utter non-existence, on account of which to be able to do that is to be able to do nothing.

To 9. To that which is objected concerning the Creator and the creature, it must be said that every creature is material and possible with respect to God, and God is in every creature through the inwardness of [his] substance; not so with the opposite with respect to its opposite41. — As to what is objected, that they differ more; this is true as to the difference of [their] natures, since they share in nothing, but it is not true as to a simultaneity of existence.

To 10. To that which is objected concerning the fact that a virgin gives birth; it must be said that this is impossible according to nature, but not impossible according to opposition, since "to be a virgin" and "to give birth" are not opposites42, similarly nor "to be a virgin" and "to conceive"; but they are judged opposites on account of nature's impotence. But these are opposites: "to be corrupted" and "to be a virgin"; and therefore that [point] is clear.

To 1 [of the contra]. To that which is objected, that he cannot [do] the impossible according to nature, on account of order; it must be said that there is an order of nature, special and general. The order of special nature can be changed and destroyed, since a thing can be brought back to another differentia, but the general [order] cannot. Thus it must be said that the special order is attended to according to the power of special nature, the general order according to the power of obedience, which is general43: against this [general] order he does not act, but against another.

To 2. To that which is objected, that he cannot [act] against the dictate of right reason; it must be said that this is true, insofar as right reason says that evil is not to be done, since to do this is to fall short; but he does not so fall short by acting against [particular] nature; and the reason for this will be plain below44.

Scholion

I. In the preceding question it was said in what sense God can do everything that is possible to created causes; here it is asked whether he can [do] everything that is impossible for a created agent. Now since in the body [of the article] four species of those [things] which are judged by us impossible are enumerated, it is utterly manifest that the question is to be decided affirmatively as to the first and second species of impossibles. But the question remains regarding the third and fourth species, and especially regarding the third, that is, regarding the impossible according to time. Hence it is asked whether God can make [it the case] that a past thing should not be past. For many, especially the Nominales, attempted to prove this by many sophistical reasons. To the matter Brulifer says (here); Gilbert of Poitiers and William of Auxerre hold the affirmative side... and the doctors of the English University, namely the Oxonians, hold against the Parisians [the contrary of] their opinion; hence Gregory of Rimini sets out both opinions and their reasons. He himself, however, finally with the more principal Scholastics well refutes this [affirmative] opinion. The chief arguments of [Gilbert] of Poitiers are recounted in the body of the response.

Setting aside this subtle question concerning the impossible per accidens, you will find many useful principles for establishing sound doctrine on the possibility of miracles and for solving other questions in the response and in the solution of the arguments for the negative side.

II. Alex. Hal., S. p. I, q. 21, m. 5, a. 2. 3. 4. — Scot. Report. here q. 2. — Thomas, S. here q. 2, a. 2; S. I, q. 25, a. 3. 4. — B. Albert, here a. 6. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 2, a. 3. — Richard of Middleton, here q. 4. 5. 6. — Aegid. R., here 2, princ. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., here q. 1. 2.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Nam scire quodcumque scibile est simpliciter scire; sed posse aliqua possibilia vel est simpliciter impotentia, vel potentia imperfecta, ut dictum est.
    For to know any knowable [thing] is simpliciter to know; but to be able [to do] some possibles either is simpliciter an impotence, or an imperfect power, as has been said.
  2. Cod. bb subiicit esse.
    Codex bb adds [the verb] esse ("to be").
  3. Cfr. Aristot., IV. Metaph. text. 4. seqq. (III. c. 3.). — Cod. V addit subiecto.
    Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, text 4 ff. (III, c. 3). — Codex V adds subiecto ("of the subject").
  4. Vers. 37. — Mox Vat. voculam hoc ante verbo omittit; ed. I ergo si omnia haec verbo contingit dicere.
    [Ephesians 3,] verse 37 [recte 20]. — Soon afterward the Vatican [edition] omits the little word hoc before verbo; edition I [reads] ergo si omnia haec verbo contingit dicere ("therefore if all these [things] it is possible to say with this word").
  5. Vers. 20, ubi Vulgata: Ei autem, qui potens est omnia facere superabundanter, quam petimus aut intelligimus.
    [Ephesians 3,] verse 20, where the Vulgate [reads]: "But to him who is able to do all things more abundantly than we ask or understand." [Note: the Quaracchi cross-references between notes 4 and 5 are tangled; the Hilary citation is to Libr. V. de Trin. n. 8.]
  6. Libr. V. de Trin. n. 8.
    [Hilary,] book V On the Trinity, n. 8.
  7. Unde haec Basilii citatio desumpta sit, indagare non potuimus. Fr. Guliel. de Murra in suo aneedoto Compendio (cfr. supra pag. 604, Scholion) delegat lectorem ad Basil. Hexaemeron, Homil. 6. n. 3, ubi tamen loco verborum citatorum haec habentur: «Nec mihi dixeris, fieri non posse, ut haec a se invicem separentur. Neque enim aio, lucis a solari corpore separationem mihi et tibi esse possibilem, sed quae nostra cogitatione dividi possunt, ea dico a naturae Conditore etiam re ipsa seiungi posse». Sententia similis invenitur etiam in Homil. I. in Hex.: «Quique (Deus) omnem prae potentiae suae multitudine cogitationem exsuperat», nec non in Homil. 2. et 10, et apud Hilarium, III. de Trin. n. 18: Ut crederes Deum efficere posse, quorum intelligere efficientiam non possis.
    Whence this citation of Basil has been taken, we have not been able to track down. Friar Wm. of Murra in his anecdotal Compendium (cf. above p. 604, Scholion) directs the reader to Basil, Hexaemeron, Homily 6, n. 3, where however in place of the quoted words [these] are found: "Do not say to me that it cannot come to pass that these things be separated one from the other. For I do not say that the separation of light from the solar body is possible for me or for you, but those [things] which can be divided in our thought, these I say can be divided in actual fact by the Founder of nature." A similar judgment is found also in Homily I on Hex.: "[God] surpasses by the very abundance of his power every thought," and also in Homilies 2 and 10, and in Hilary, On the Trinity III, n. 18: "That you may believe God to be able to effect things the efficiency of which you cannot understand."
  8. Pro aliquid cod. K ens.
    In place of aliquid ("something") codex K [reads] ens ("being").
  9. Hoc exemplum, in libris Scholast. frequentissimum, Anselmo auctori adscribitur (cfr. infra q. 4. in corp.), et secundum B. Albert., S. p. I. tr. 19. q. 76, in Anselmi libro de Conceptu virginali occurrere deberet. Sed in isto libro non invenitur, attamen aliud exemplum ibi (c. 11. edit. recent.) exhibetur de costa Adae, ex qua formata est Eva, et de formatione Adae de limo. Exemplum de trunco occurrit iam in Alani de Insulis Theol. Regul. reg. 88.
    This example, very frequent in Scholastic books, is ascribed to Anselm as its author (cf. below q. 4 in the body), and according to B. Albert, S. p. I, tr. 19, q. 76, it ought to be found in Anselm's book On Virginal Conception. But it is not found in that book; another example is, however, presented there (c. 11 of the recent edition) about the rib of Adam from which Eve was formed, and about the formation of Adam from clay. The example of the stump occurs already in Alan of Lille, Theological Rules, rule 88.
  10. In cod. T et nonnullis aliis nec non in Vat. deest et. Paulo inferius pro maius Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. magis.
    In codex T and some others, and also in the Vatican [edition], et is missing. A little below, in place of maius ("greater") the Vatican [edition] with one or another codex [reads] magis ("more").
  11. Auctoritate cod. F (T a secunda manu) substituimus impossibile, quod etiam contextus postulat, pro Vat. lectione ibi impotentia.
    On the authority of codex F (and T at the second hand) we have substituted impossibile ("impossible"), which the context also demands, for the Vatican reading there of impotentia ("impotence").
  12. Sententia citata invenitur in libro sententiarum Prosperi Aquitani ex operibus Augustini excerptarum, sub n. 285. Cfr. VI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 18. n. 29.
    The quoted judgment is found in the book of Sentences of Prosper of Aquitaine, excerpted from the works of Augustine, under n. 285. Cf. On Genesis according to the Letter VI, c. 18, n. 29.
  13. Epist. 22. ad Eustoch. n. 3: Cum omnia possit Deus suscitare virginem non potest post ruinam. — Pro Item sola Vat. Sed contra.
    [Jerome,] Letter 22 to Eustochium, n. 3: "Although God can do all things, he cannot raise up a virgin after [her] fall." — In place of Item ("likewise") the Vatican [edition] alone [reads] Sed contra ("but on the contrary").
  14. Cap. 4. seq.: Unde tam non possunt futura non fieri, quam non fuisse facta praeterita; quoniam non est in Dei voluntate, quae non incipit nec desinit ... [continued in body text]
    [Augustine, contra Faustum XXVI,] c. 4 ff.: "Hence future things can no more not come to pass than past things [can] not have been made; since [this] is not in the will of God, which neither begins nor ceases..." [The Quaracchi note continues at length with quotation from Augustine, de Libero Arbitrio II, c. 8, n. 21, on the sentence "seven and three are ten."]
  15. Libr. II. de Lib. Arb. c. 8. n. 21: «Et quidquid sensu corporis tango, veluti est hoc caelum et haec terra et quaecumque in eis alia corpora sentio, quamdiu futura sint, nescio; septem autem et tria decem sunt, et non solum nunc, sed etiam semper; neque ullo modo aliquando septem et tria non fuerunt decem, aut aliquando septem et tria non erunt decem». Idem dicit August. de veritate ipsa, in libr. I. Soliloq. c. 13. n. 28. seqq., et II. c. 2. et 15. — In fine argumenti post simul Vat. cum cod. cc adiicit vera.
    [Augustine,] book II On Free Choice, c. 8, n. 21: "And whatever I touch with bodily sense — such as this sky and this earth and whatever other bodies I sense in them — how long they shall be, I do not know; but seven and three are ten, and not only now, but also always; nor in any way ever were seven and three not ten, nor at any time will seven and three not be ten." The same Augustine says on truth itself, in book I of the Soliloquies, c. 13, n. 28 ff., and II, c. 2 and 15. — At the end of the argument, after simul ("at the same time") the Vatican [edition] with codex cc adds vera ("true").
  16. [II Tim. 2,] vers. 13. — Mox post ergo Vat. perperam omittit non.
    [II Timothy 2,] verse 13. — Soon afterward, after ergo, the Vatican [edition] wrongly omits non.
  17. Cod. Y et ed. 1 clarius quatuor de causis; cod. K quatuor modis. Subinde pro per limitationem ed. I propter limitationem.
    Codex Y and edition 1 more clearly [read] quatuor de causis ("by four causes"); codex K [reads] quatuor modis ("in four modes"). And shortly afterward, in place of per limitationem ("through limitation") edition I [reads] propter limitationem ("on account of limitation").
  18. Libr. III. Sent. d. 23. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4. S. Doctor distinguit rationem sursum elevatam, illustratam a lumine veritatis aeternae, et rationem conversam ad inferiora et ad cognitionem sensibilem; et hanc posteriorem docet frequenter iudicare, vera esse quae falsa sunt, et e converso; et rationem illuminatam contra istam se elevare credendo mysteria fidei. Cfr. etiam supra d. 19. p. I. dub. 8. — Pro contra se codd. KPQ cc supra se.
    Book III of the Sentences-Commentary, d. 23, a. 1, q. 1, ad 4. The Holy Doctor distinguishes the reason elevated upward, illumined by the light of the eternal truth, and the reason turned to lower things and to sensible knowledge; and he teaches that the latter frequently judges as true those [things] which are false, and conversely; and that the illumined reason raises itself against the [latter] by believing the mysteries of the faith. Cf. also above d. 19, p. I, dub. 8. — In place of contra se ("against itself") codices KPQ, cc [read] supra se ("above itself").
  19. Vel aliis verbis utamur: Est triplex actio, cui aliquis respondet effectus, scil. simpliciter productiva, cuius terminus simpliciter est ens et qua aliquid de nihilo producitur; simpliciter destructiva, quae in principio respicit ens et terminatur ad non-ens, sive qua ens existens annihilatur; et actio, quae mediat inter utramque, in quantum supponit primam ut exercitam, secundam ut possibilem, et respicit haec actio ens in principio et terminatur ad ens, quia per ipsam unum ens immutatur in aliud. Prima et tertia actio dicit in se quid positivum, secunda autem quid negativum, scil. subtractionem actionis positivae. Quarta actio, quae poni posset, scil. quae et in principio et in termino et in medio non-ens respicit, nec impossibilis est, cum nullus effectus ei respondeat, neque non esset actio. Talis autem actio supponenda esset, si Deus praeteritum facere posset, non fuisse praeteritum.
    Or let us use other words: there is a triple action, to which some effect corresponds, namely [first] simply productive, whose term is simpliciter a being and by which something is produced from nothing; [second] simply destructive, which at the beginning regards being and is terminated at non-being, or by which an existing being is annihilated; and [third] an action which mediates between the two, inasmuch as it presupposes the first as exercised, the second as possible, and this action regards being at the beginning and is terminated at being, since by it one being is changed into another. The first and the third actions assert in themselves something positive, but the second something negative, namely the subtraction of a positive action. A fourth action, which might be posited, namely one which both at the beginning and at the term and in the middle regards non-being, would be neither impossible — since no effect corresponds to it — nor would it even be an action. But such an action would have to be supposed, if God could make a past [thing] not to have been past.
  20. In sermone de Dono intellectus (Supplem. Bonelli, tom. III. col. 478, n. 83.) S. Doctor ait: Est enim (substantia spiritualis) in Deo speculum et lumen: speculum, in quantum repraesentat, et lumen, in quantum indicat (manifestat). — Pro indicat Vat. cum pluribus mss. et ed. I iudicat, et subinde pro iudicet eadem Vat. cum nonnullis mss. iudiretur, cod. V iudicemus.
    In the sermon On the Gift of Understanding (Supplem. Bonelli, vol. III, col. 478, n. 83) the Holy Doctor says: "For (the spiritual substance) is in God mirror and light: mirror, insofar as it represents; and light, insofar as it indicates (manifests)." — In place of indicat ("indicates"), the Vatican [edition] with several mss. and edition I [reads] iudicat ("judges"); and shortly afterward in place of iudicet, the same Vatican [edition] with some mss. [reads] iudiretur, codex V iudicemus ("let us judge").
  21. Codd. BD et ed. I vel etiam. Paulo ante pro argumentatur codd. PQ arguitur, Vat. quaeretur.
    Codices BD and edition I [read] vel etiam ("or also"). A little before, in place of argumentatur ("is argued") codices PQ [read] arguitur, the Vatican [edition] quaeretur ("will be asked").
  22. Vat. omittit quod; cod. R non quod adhuc quod est impossibile.[?]
    The Vatican [edition] omits quod; codex R [reads] non quod adhuc quod est impossibile ("not that, while yet, which is impossible").[?]
  23. Vat. cum cod. cc, mutata interpunctione, sic: si autem nihil: dico, quod ita iam potest dici.
    The Vatican [edition] with codex cc, with the punctuation changed, [reads] thus: "but if [I say] nothing: I say, that it can already be said thus."
  24. Scilicet quod praeteritum non sit ens. — Pro Praeterea, quod ex cod. Z restituimus, plurimi codd. cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Et, ed. I Et ideo, Vat. cum cod. cc Et ita, sed perperam. Nam propositio sequens non continet conclusionem ex argumentis praecedentibus. Paulo post cod. X sic: Nam futurum non dicit praesens ens vel existens, et tamen Deus etc.
    Namely [the proposition] that the past should not be a being. — In place of Praeterea ("moreover"), which we have restored from codex Z, most codices with editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 [read] Et; edition I Et ideo ("and therefore"); the Vatican [edition] with codex cc Et ita ("and so") — but wrongly. For the following proposition does not contain a conclusion drawn from the foregoing arguments. A little afterward codex X [reads] thus: "For the future does not say present being or existent, and yet God etc."
  25. Vat. omittit unquam, quod ex cod. T supplevimus. Pro unquam ceteri codd. et edd. 1, 3, 6 perperam nunquam.
    The Vatican [edition] omits unquam ("ever"), which we have supplied from codex T. In place of unquam, the other codices and editions 1, 3, 6 wrongly [read] nunquam ("never").
  26. Qui in expositione cap. 4. Boeth. de Trin. sic ait: Aeque etenim universa subiecta eius potestati sunt, ut scilicet, sicut quaecumque non fuerunt, possunt fuisse, et quaecumque non sunt vel non erunt, possunt esse, ita etiam quaecumque fuerunt, possunt non fuisse, et quaecumque sunt vel erunt, possunt non esse.
    [Gilbert,] who in his exposition on c. 4 of Boethius De Trinitate, speaks thus: "For equally all things are subject to his power, so that, namely, just as whatever things have not been can have been, and whatever things are not or will not be can be, so also whatever things have been can not-have-been, and whatever things are or will be can not-be."
  27. Vel, ut in cod. Q habetur, salva praeterito. Sicut enim impossibile est, aliquid simul praeteritum esse et non praeteritum, ita etiam impossibile est, Deum posse facere praeteritum, manente praeterito, non fuisse praeteritum. Attamen fautores huius opinionis putabant, cessare hanc impossibilitatem, si praeteritum Dei omnipotentia destruatur. — Paulo ante pro de Augustino cod. Y Augustini.
    Or, as codex Q has it, salva praeterito. For just as it is impossible that something be at the same time past and not past, so also it is impossible that God be able to make a past [thing], the past [thing] remaining [as past], not to have been past. Yet the supporters of this opinion thought that this impossibility ceased, if the past [thing] were destroyed by God's omnipotence. — A little before, in place of de Augustino codex Y [reads] Augustini.
  28. Scilicet Hieronymus, cuius verba invenies supra, arg. 3, pro negat. — Paulo ante pro ostendat codd. PQ ostenderit.
    Namely Jerome, whose words you will find above, [contra] argument 3 [recte arg. 3 on the negative side]. — A little before, in place of ostendat codices PQ [read] ostenderit ("had shown").
  29. Supra in corp. huius art., ubi tertia causa exponitur, ex qua aliquid impossibile iudicamus (Tertio modo dicitur impossibile etc.).
    Above in the body of this article, where the third cause is set out, from which we judge something to be impossible ("In a third mode something is called impossible" etc.).
  30. Id est propter omnimodam identitatem praeteriti, quod scilicet pro illo instanti temporis praeteriti ita fuit unitum, ut non possit dividi. — Mox pro potest unire aliqui codd., inter quos et cod. T (a prima manu), minus congrue possunt uniri, et paulo inferius pro unitum ed. I unicum.
    That is, on account of the utter identity of the past [thing], which, namely, for that instant of past time was so united [with itself], that it cannot be divided. — Soon after, in place of potest unire ("he can unite") some codices, among them codex T (at the first hand), [read], less congruously, possunt uniri ("can be united"); and a little below, in place of unitum edition I [reads] unicum.
  31. Libr. II. Cur Deus homo, c. 18: Et sicut cum Deus facit aliquid, postquam factum est, iam non potest non esse factum, sed semper verum est factum esse etc. In Dialog. de Veritate, c. 10. de praeterito idem Doctor ait: Idcirco namque vere dicitur, praeteritum esse aliquid, quia ita est in re; et ideo est aliquid praeteritum, quia sic est in veritate summa. Cfr. et August., II. Soliloq. c. 2. et 15; et infra d. 46. q. 4. ad 3.
    [Anselm,] book II of Cur Deus homo, c. 18: "And just as, when God makes something, after it is made, it cannot now not have been made, but it is always true that it has been made etc." In the Dialogue On Truth, c. 10, on the past the same Doctor says: "For it is for this reason truly said that a past [thing] is something, because it is so in the [thing] itself; and therefore [it] is a past thing, because it is so in the highest truth." Cf. also Augustine, Soliloquies II, c. 2 and 15; and below d. 46, q. 4, ad 3.
  32. Verba quae sequuntur usque praesens in edd. 3, 4, 5 desiderantur necnon p. al. m. his verbis adiicitur praesens. Mox pro illud sola multi codd. ut CFGIKLMOSVW etc., cod. T fortassis[?]. Forsan legendum erit vere ens et actu, vel vere ens in potentia et actu, quae lectio insinuetur lectione cod. B: vere ens in actu vel in potentia. Proxime post pro illud sola Vat. aliud.
    The words which follow up to praesens are missing in editions 3, 4, 5, and (with a different hand) the word praesens is added. Soon afterward, in place of illud sola, many codices such as CFGIKLMOSVW etc., codex T [read] fortassis[?]. Perhaps one should read vere ens et actu ("truly a being and in act"), or vere ens in potentia et actu ("truly a being in potency and in act"), which reading is suggested by the reading of codex B: vere ens in actu vel in potentia ("truly a being in act or in potency"). Right afterward, in place of illud sola, the Vatican [edition] [reads] aliud.
  33. Verbis aut quiescendo Vat. bene praemittit hoc est.
    Before the words aut quiescendo ("or by being-quiet") the Vatican [edition] rightly prefaces hoc est ("that is").
  34. Futurum namque ab antiquis Scholasticis definitur: quod est ordinatum sive determinatum in suis causis ad recipiendam existentiam in tempore sequenti. Cum hac definitione parum convenit illa, quae ab aliis proponitur his verbis: futurum est id quod modo non est, sed in duratione sequenti erit, ita ut essentia futuri nihil aliud importet quam negationem existentiae pro nunc, et existentiam pro tunc.
    Futurum ("future") is defined by the early Scholastics: "that which is ordered or determined in its causes for receiving existence at a following time." With this definition little agrees that which is proposed by others in these words: "the future is that which now is not, but in a following duration will be," so that the essence of future imports nothing other than the negation of existence "for now," and existence "for then."
  35. Supple non codd. R V praeteritum. — Paulo inferius pro imperfectio codd. M X imperfectionis.
    Supply non; codices R V [read] praeteritum. — A little below, in place of imperfectio codices M X [read] imperfectionis.
  36. Ed. I faceret.
    Edition I [reads] faceret.
  37. Eiusdem sententiae Aristot. fuisse videtur; nam VI. Ethic. c. 2. laudans Agathonem sic ait: «Idcirco recte Agatho [negat]: Hoc namque solo ipse privatur Deus: Ut facta minime infecta possit reddere». Quae verba Averroes sic commentatur: Illud quod iam fuit, necessarium est, idem quod non est possibile, nisi ut sit. Et propterea videbatur quibusdam antiquorum, vel Deum privari potentia potest, sed impotentia; addit: quia quod prius adipiscitur et indistinguitur[?].
    Aristotle seems to have been of the same judgment; for in book VI of the Ethics c. 2, praising Agathon, he speaks thus: "Hence Agathon rightly [denies]: 'For of this alone is God himself deprived — that what has been done could be rendered undone.'" Which words Averroes thus comments: "That which has already been is necessary — i.e. it is not possible [for it] to be other than that it [should] be." And on this account it seemed to certain of the ancients either [that God is deprived... — the OCR is corrupt here; the closing thought appears to be: that God can be deprived not by power but by impotence, since what one previously attains is also indistinguishable from him.][?]
  38. Potentia obedientialis est aptitudo ad actum supra vires naturae per divinam virtutem eliciendum, sive aptitudo creaturae ad actum vires naturae excedentem a Deo recipiendum. Vocatur generalis, quia respicit infinitam potentiam et voluntatem Dei, quae quidquid possibile est ex creatura elicere potest. Cfr. August., IX. de Gen. ad lit. c. 16. n. 20. seqq., et XXVI. contra Faustum, c. 3, et Bonav. in quaest. seq.
    Obediential potency is the aptitude to an act above the powers of nature [that is] to be elicited through divine power, or the aptitude of a creature to receiving from God an act exceeding the powers of nature. It is called general, because it regards the infinite power and will of God, which can elicit from a creature whatever is possible. Cf. Augustine, On Genesis according to the Letter IX, c. 16, n. 20 ff., and contra Faustum XXVI, c. 3, and Bonaventure in the following question.
  39. Quaest. seq. — Paulo ante pro ratio dicit codd. KMPQVZ et ed. I ratio dictat.
    [In] the following question. — A little before, in place of ratio dicit ("reason says") codices KMPQVZ and edition I [read] ratio dictat ("reason dictates").
  40. In cod. solutio huius obiectionis sic incipit: Ad nonam [dicendum], quod Deus non coniunxit humanam naturam divinae, ita quod esset eadem natura, vel quod una persona secundum idem esset Deus et homo, sed secundum aliud et aliud. Et sic non est dubium, quin contraria coniungere possit et etiam natura hoc facit. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Creatore etc.
    In [one] codex the solution to this objection begins thus: "To the ninth [it must be said], that God did not conjoin human nature to divine [nature] in such a way that it should be the same nature, or [that] one person should be God and man according to the same [respect], but according to one [respect] and another. And so there is no doubt that he can conjoin contraries, and nature too does this. To that which is objected concerning the Creator etc."
  41. In cod. Y hic additur, quod et in cod. B in marg. habetur: sed defloratam esse sive corruptam opponitur ad esse virginem. Paulo superius post dicendum quod cod. T inserit hoc.
    In codex Y there is added here — and it is also found in the margin of codex B — "but to-be-deflowered or to-be-corrupted is opposed to being a virgin." A little higher, after dicendum quod, codex T inserts hoc.
  42. Scilicet potentia obedientialis: vide notam supra ad textum, ubi haec definitur.
    Namely [the power of] obediential [potency]: see the note above to the text 38, where this is defined. [Cross-reference reconstructed; the Quaracchi text places the gloss on generalis at this site rather than re-printing it.][?]
  43. Quaest. seq. — In quaestione IV. infra rationem reddit S. Doctor, cur natura potest in malum, Deus autem non.
    [See] the following question. — In question IV below, the Holy Doctor gives the reason why nature can [tend] to evil, but God cannot.[?]
  44. [Apparatus item for the scholion citation list; the Quaracchi footers on p. 755 do not number this separately. The scholion enumerates Alex. Hal., Scotus, Thomas, B. Albert, Petr. a Tar., Richard, Aegid., and Dionys. Carth. cross-references.]
    [Scholion bibliographic enumeration — see the body above. No discrete footer entry corresponds.]
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