Bonaventure

Quaestio II. Utrum haec divisio fiat per differentias essentiales, an per accidentales.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum haec divisio fiat per differentias essentiales, an per accidentales. Et quod per essentiales, videtur.

1. Accidentia sunt transmutabilia circa subiectum; sed bonitas et malitia nullo modo transmutantur circa actionem, ut illa actio, quae modo est bona, eadem numero postmodum sit mala, vel e converso¹: ergo bonitas et malitia non sunt differentiae accidentales actionis; et sunt accidentales, vel essentiales: ergo etc.

2. Item, quamvis quaedam accidentia sint inseparabilia secundum rem, tamen omnia sunt separabilia secundum intellectum²; sed quaedam actio est ita mala, quod nunquam potest esse nec intelligi bona, utpote blasphemare et odire Deum: ergo videtur, quod malitia non accidat tali actioni.

3. Item, contingit, aliquem habitum esse essentialiter bonum, utpote caritatem et gratiam, aliquem essentialiter malum, ut iniustitiam et lasciviam: ergo pari ratione, cum actus sint quasi ex habitibus³; videtur, quod aliqui actus sint essentialiter boni, et aliqui essentialiter mali, loquendo de bonitate et malitia moris.

4. Item, generi respondet species: ergo cum sit bonum in genere et malum in genere, utrique respondebit bonum et malum speciale sive per modum speciei se habens; sed genus est essentiale speciei, et species etiam addit super genus differentiam essentialem: ergo necesse est aliquam actionem ponere, quae sit essentialiter et bona in genere et bona ex circumstantia; pari ratione et de actione mala. Videtur ergo, quod divisio praedicta fiat per differentias essentiales et intrinsecas⁴.

Sed contra: 1. Augustinus in quarta Responsione contra Pelagianos⁵: «Peccatum non est natura aliqua, sed actus incidens ex defectu boni»; sed omne quod inest alicui incidenter, inest ei accidentaliter: si ergo omnis malitia est incidens, nulla malitia est essentialis alicui actioni: ergo omnis est accidentalis.

2. Item, differentiae essentiales sunt constitutivae eorum, quorum sunt differentiae, et differentiae constitutivae ex eisdem principiis manant, ex quibus manant ipsa constituta⁶; sed malitia non habet causam effectivam, sed defectivam, actio vero causam effectivam habet; item actio est a Deo, malitia non: ergo impossibile est, quod malitia sit alicuius actionis differentia essentialis.

3. Item, differentiae essentiales non alternantur circa individuum eiusdem speciei⁷; sed actiones, quae sunt eiusdem speciei, differunt per bonitatem et malitiam, quia una est bona et altera mala: ergo bonum et malum non sunt essentiales differentiae actionis.

4. Item, differentia essentialis aliquid addit supra illud quod dividit⁸; sed malum non addit aliquid supra actionem, sed potius privat: ergo malum non est actionis differentia essentialis.

Conclusio

Conclusio. Bonum et malum non sunt differentiae essentiales et intrinsecae actionis, ut est actio vel haec actio, sed tantum, ut est talis actio, quodam modo essentiales dici possunt.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod idem est quaerere, utrum haec divisio actionum, alia bona, alia mala, sit per differentias essentiales, quod quaerere, utrum bonitas et malitia sint proprietates vel conditiones essentiales actioni voluntariae. Et licet istud aliquo modo videatur posse concedi ei qui sustinet illam opinionem, quod non omnis actio a Deo est; tamen secundum illam opinionem, quae communiter sustinetur, quod omnis actio a Deo est, et secundum id quod naturaliter est, bona est; concedi non debet nec potest rationabiliter sustineri, quod malitia essentialis sit actioni, cum potius dicat defectum circumstantiae alicuius, quae accidebat actioni. Si enim non accideret, non posset privari, actione manente⁹.

Attendendum est tamen, quod malitiam contingit tripliciter comparare ad actionem: aut secundum quod est actio, aut secundum quod est haec actio, aut secundum quod est talis actio. — Si comparetur malitia ad actionem, secundum quod actio, sic tenet rationem accidentis separabilis et communis¹⁰. Rationem accidentis separabilis tenet in hoc, quod actio, quae consuevit fieri cum culpa, potest, causa aliqua interveniente, fieri absque culpa. Rationem vero accidentis communis tenet, quia circa actionem eiusdem speciei contingit malitiam in aliquibus inveniri, in aliquibus vero non; sicut aliquis praedicando fidem Christi ex vana gloria peccat, alius vero meretur¹¹. Licet autem malitia respectu actionis, consideratae in genere, habeat aliquo modo conformitatem ad accidens separabile et commune; non tamen proprie est accidens tale, quia non dicit ens, sed defectum entis.

Si autem comparetur malitia ad actionem, secundum quod est haec actio, sic tenet rationem accidentis inseparabilis et proprii. Rationem tenet accidentis inseparabilis in hoc, quod illa actio eadem numero, quae est mala, non potest esse ulterius bona, propter hoc quod eadem numero resumi¹² non potest. Rationem vero accidentis proprii tenet aliquando, licet non semper, in hoc, quod illa malitia ortum habet ex proprietatibus agentis et patientis, ex quarum comparatione necessario surgit inordinatio; sicut patet, cum filius co-

gnoscit matrem, vel cum homo blasphemat Deum. Unde sicut inseparabiliter adhaeret propria passio subiecto, sic inseparabiliter adhaeret malitia huic actioni. Non est autem malitia propria passio huius actionis, tum quia non dicitur de ea convertibiliter¹³, tum quia non dicit positionem, sed privationem.

Si vero comparetur malitia ad actionem, secundum quod talis actio est, sic potest habere rationem differentiae essentialis. Sicut enim albedo est essentialis homini albo, secundum quod est albus, quamvis non sit essentialis, secundum quod¹⁴ homo; sic malitia est essentialis actioni malae, secundum quod mala. — Quamvis autem aliquo modo dicatur essentialis, non tamen dicitur essentialis, quia dicat veram essentiam, sed quantum ad modum se habendi. Et quoniam quaedam sunt nomina, quae imponuntur actionibus, non secundum quod sunt actiones tantum, sed secundum quod sunt deformes; hinc est, quod talia «mox nominata coniuncta sunt malo¹⁵»; et sicut castitas ponitur in genere boni essentialiter, sic adulterium et mendacium ponitur in genere mali essentialiter. In hoc enim non significatur, quod defectus sit essentialis actioni, sed quod defectus essentialis est actioni, secundum quod defectiva. Quod autem dictum est de malitia moris, hoc ipsum intelligendum est et de bonitate. — His visis, plana est responsio ad quaestionem et etiam ad obiecta. Concedo enim, quod haec divisio actionis non est per differentias essentiales et intrinsecas. Et rationes, quae hoc ostendunt, concedendae sunt.

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod accidens potest transmutari circa subiectum; dicendum, quod istud non habet veritatem in omni accidente nec respectu cuiuscumque subiecti, sed respectu subiecti permanentis et fixi. Quando enim accidens comparatur ad aliquod successivum, hoc ipso, quod adhaeret ei, inseparabiliter adhaeret; quia illud statim transit in praeteritum et efficitur intransmutabile, et amplius idem numero resumi non potest¹⁶. Actus enim numeratur subiecto et tempore et specie sive termino; et ideo, sicut est alius actus, cuius est aliud principium et alius terminus; sic est alius actus, cuius est mensura aliud et aliud tempus, intercisione et renovatione facta in ipso actu: et ideo quamvis motui accidat velox et tardum, tamen motus, qui est velox, secundum eam partem, secundum quam est velox, nunquam potest esse tardus. Sic et in proposito est intelligendum.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod accidentia sunt saltem separabilia intellectu¹⁷; dicendum, quod nunquam malitia sic adhaeret alicui actioni, quin essentia illius actionis possit praeter malitiam considerari. Cum enim dico actionem malam, et dico actionem, et dico defectum; et utrumque per se divisim possum considerare. Similiter, cum dico actionem huiusmodi, et actionem hanc, duo dico, quia et monstro ipsam substantiam et etiam accidentia, sub quibus substantia ipsa oculis carnis vel mentis habet esse conspicua; et unum potest praeter alterum considerari et intelligi. Malitia autem non adhaeret inseparabiliter actioni huius substantiae vel illius ratione substantiae substratae, sed potius ratione proprietatis vel qualitatis superadditae; et sicut substantia illa poterat intelligi sine illa proprietate, sic et actio sine malitia.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aliquis habitus est essentialiter bonus, et aliquis¹⁸ est essentialiter malus; dicendum, quod etsi concedi possit, aliquem habitum essentialiter esse bonum; non tamen concedi debet, aliquem habitum essentialiter esse malum, secundum quod est habitus. Nam habitus, secundum quod habitus, dicit ens et bonum. Quod ergo ipse obiicit de avaritia et lascivia, non valet, quia huiusmodi non sunt nomina habituum animae, secundum quod sunt habitus, sed secundum quod sunt deformes et defectivi. Licet autem malitia non sit essentialis habitui, secundum quod est habitus, potest tamen ei esse essentialis, secundum quod defectivus. Ita etiam contingit reperire circa actum.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod bono in genere respondet bonum in specie, et malo in genere similiter; dicendum, quod malum in genere sive bonum non dicitur proprie, quod sit genus, sed propter quandam conformitatem, quam habet cum genere in hoc, quod dicit quandam potentiam indifferentem ad hoc, quod fiat meritorie vel demeritorie; et dum per circumstantias superadditas determinatur, quodam modo specificatur¹⁹. Non tamen malum, secundum quod malum, habet species proprias, pro eo quod privationes non sunt in genere nisi per quandam reductionem. Unde specificatio et distinctio malorum aut attenditur ratione boni, quod privatur per malum, aut ratione boni, ad quod quis convertitur in actu peccati. Et huius signum est, quod peccata non distinguuntur penes aversionem, sed penes conversionem²⁰.

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Question II. Whether this division is made through essential or through accidental differences.

Secondly it is asked whether this division is made through essential differences or through accidental ones. And that it is through essential ones seems to be the case.

1. Accidents are changeable about their subject; but goodness and malice are in no way changed about an action, so that the action which is now good, the same in number, might afterward be evil, or conversely¹: therefore goodness and malice are not accidental differences of an action; and they are either accidental or essential: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, although certain accidents are inseparable in reality, nonetheless all are separable according to the understanding²; but a certain action is so evil that it can never be nor be understood to be good, such as to blaspheme and to hate God: therefore it seems that malice does not happen accidentally to such an action.

3. Likewise, it happens that some habit is essentially good, such as charity and grace, and some essentially evil, such as injustice and lasciviousness: therefore by parity of reasoning, since acts are as it were from habits³; it seems that some acts are essentially good, and some essentially evil, speaking of the goodness and malice of morals.

4. Likewise, to a genus there corresponds a species: therefore since there is good in genus and evil in genus, to each there will correspond a special good and evil, or one having itself after the manner of a species; but the genus is essential to the species, and the species also adds upon the genus an essential difference: therefore it is necessary to posit some action which is essentially both good in genus and good from circumstance; and by parity of reasoning, also concerning an evil action. It seems therefore that the aforesaid division is made through essential and intrinsic differences⁴.

On the contrary: 1. Augustine, in the fourth Reply against the Pelagians⁵: «Sin is not any nature, but an act befalling from a defect of good»; but everything that is in something incidentally is in it accidentally: if therefore all malice is incidental, no malice is essential to any action: therefore all is accidental.

2. Likewise, essential differences are constitutive of those things whose differences they are, and constitutive differences flow from the same principles from which the things constituted themselves flow⁶; but malice does not have an effective cause, but a defective one, whereas an action does have an effective cause; likewise an action is from God, malice is not: therefore it is impossible that malice be an essential difference of any action.

3. Likewise, essential differences do not alternate about an individual of the same species⁷; but actions which are of the same species differ through goodness and malice, since one is good and the other evil: therefore good and evil are not essential differences of an action.

4. Likewise, an essential difference adds something over that which it divides⁸; but evil adds nothing over the action, but rather takes away: therefore evil is not an essential difference of an action.

Conclusion

Conclusion. Good and evil are not essential and intrinsic differences of an action, insofar as it is an action or this action, but only insofar as it is such an action can they in a certain way be called essential.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that it is the same to ask whether this division of actions, one good and another evil, is through essential differences, as to ask whether goodness and malice are essential properties or conditions of a voluntary action. And although this might in some way seem able to be conceded to one who holds that opinion which says that not every action is from God; nonetheless according to that opinion which is commonly held, that every action is from God, and according to that which it is naturally, it is good; it ought not to be conceded, nor can it reasonably be maintained, that malice be essential to an action, since rather it bespeaks a defect of some circumstance which befell the action. For if it had not befallen it, it could not be deprived, the action remaining⁹.

It must nonetheless be attended to that malice happens to be compared to an action in three ways: either according to what it is as an action, or according to what it is as this action, or according to what it is as such an action. — If malice is compared to an action according as it is an action, then it holds the character of a separable and common accident¹⁰. It holds the character of a separable accident in this, that an action which is wont to be done with fault can, some cause intervening, be done without fault. But it holds the character of a common accident, because about an action of the same species it happens that malice is found in some instances, but not in others; just as one preaching the faith of Christ out of vainglory sins, but another merits¹¹. Although, however, malice with respect to an action considered in its genus has in some way a conformity to a separable and common accident; nonetheless it is not properly such an accident, because it does not bespeak being, but a defect of being.

But if malice is compared to an action according as it is this action, then it holds the character of an inseparable and proper accident. It holds the character of an inseparable accident in this, that that action, the same in number, which is evil cannot further be good, on account of the fact that the same in number cannot be taken up again¹². But it holds the character of a proper accident sometimes, though not always, in this, that that malice has its origin from the properties of the agent and the patient, from whose comparison disorder necessarily arises; as is clear when a son knows his mother, or when a man blasphemes God. Hence just as a proper passion inseparably adheres to its subject, so does malice inseparably adhere to this action. But malice is not a proper passion of this action, both because it is not predicated of it convertibly¹³, and because it does not bespeak a positing, but a privation.

But if malice is compared to an action according as it is such an action, then it can have the character of an essential difference. For just as whiteness is essential to a white man insofar as he is white, although it is not essential insofar as¹⁴ he is a man; so malice is essential to an evil action insofar as it is evil. — Although, however, it is in some way said to be essential, nonetheless it is not said to be essential because it bespeaks a true essence, but as to the mode of having itself. And since there are certain names which are imposed on actions, not according as they are actions only, but according as they are deformed; hence it is that such things «once named are joined to evil¹⁵»; and just as chastity is placed in the genus of good essentially, so adultery and lying are placed in the genus of evil essentially. For in this it is not signified that the defect is essential to the action, but that the essential defect belongs to the action insofar as it is defective. And what has been said of the malice of morals, this same must be understood also of goodness. — These things seen, the response to the question and also to the objections is plain. For I concede that this division of action is not through essential and intrinsic differences. And the reasons which show this are to be conceded.

1. To that which is objected, that an accident can be changed about its subject; it must be said that this does not hold true in every accident nor with respect to any subject whatever, but with respect to a permanent and fixed subject. For when an accident is compared to something successive, by this very fact that it adheres to it, it adheres inseparably; because that thing at once passes into the past and becomes unchangeable, and further the same in number cannot be taken up again¹⁶. For an act is numbered by subject and time and species or term; and therefore, just as there is one act whose principle is one and whose term is another; so there is another act whose measure is one time and another, an interruption and renewal having been made in the act itself: and therefore although swiftness and slowness happen to a motion, nonetheless the motion which is swift, according to that part according to which it is swift, can never be slow. So too must it be understood in the matter proposed.

2. To that which is objected, that accidents are at least separable by the understanding¹⁷; it must be said that malice never so adheres to any action that the essence of that action cannot be considered apart from malice. For when I say an evil action, I say both an action and a defect; and each I can consider separately by itself. Likewise, when I say an action of this kind, and this action, I say two things, because I both point out the substance itself and also the accidents, under which the substance itself comes to be conspicuous to the eyes of the flesh or of the mind; and the one can be considered and understood apart from the other. But malice does not inseparably adhere to the action of this substance or of that by reason of the underlying substance, but rather by reason of a property or quality superadded; and just as that substance could be understood without that property, so too the action without malice.

3. To that which is objected, that some habit is essentially good, and some¹⁸ essentially evil; it must be said that even if it can be conceded that some habit is essentially good; nonetheless it ought not to be conceded that some habit is essentially evil, insofar as it is a habit. For a habit, insofar as it is a habit, bespeaks being and good. Therefore what he objects concerning avarice and lasciviousness is not valid, because such are not names of habits of the soul insofar as they are habits, but insofar as they are deformed and defective. Although, however, malice is not essential to a habit insofar as it is a habit, it can nonetheless be essential to it insofar as it is defective. So too it happens to be found concerning an act.

4. To that which is objected, that to a good in genus there corresponds a good in species, and likewise to an evil in genus; it must be said that an evil in genus, or a good, is not properly called a genus, but on account of a certain conformity which it has with a genus in this, that it bespeaks a certain potency indifferent to its being done meritoriously or demeritoriously; and while it is determined through superadded circumstances, it is in a certain way specified¹⁹. Yet evil, insofar as it is evil, does not have proper species, for the reason that privations are not in a genus except by a certain reduction. Hence the specification and distinction of evils is regarded either by reason of the good which is taken away by the evil, or by reason of the good to which one turns in the act of sin. And a sign of this is that sins are not distinguished according to aversion, but according to conversion²⁰.

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