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Dist. 41, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 41

Textus Latinus
p. 937

Articulus I. De divisione actionis deliberativae in bonam et in malam et in indifferentem.

Quaestio I. Utrum actio deliberativa dividatur per differentias oppositas.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, cum actio deliberativa dividatur in bonam et malam, utrum dividatur per differentias oppositas. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Prima contrarietas in moribus est inter bonum et malum — unde Philosophus1 dicit, quod « bonum et malum non sunt in genere, sed sunt genera aliorum » — sed prima contraria maxime sunt opposita: ergo bonum et malum circa actionem directam habent oppositionem et repugnantiam.

2. Item, malum dicit privationem boni; sed privatio et habitus directe sunt opposita2: ergo etc.

3. Item, quae habent oppositos effectus directe opponuntur; sed bona actio et mala oppositos habent effectus in anima, quia bona actio ornat et mala deformat, bona ordinat et mala deordinat3: ergo etc.

4. Item, quae habent oppositas retributiones directe habent oppositionem; sed bona actio et mala habent oppositas retributiones, quia uni retribuitur aeternum gaudium, et alii aeternum supplicium4: ergo etc.

5. Item, omnis recta divisio est per opposita5: si ergo actio moralis recte dividitur per bonam et malam, ergo membra huius divisionis sunt per opposita.

Sed contra: 1. « Opposita sunt nata fieri circa idem6 »; sed impossibile est, bonitatem et malitiam, vel e converso, circa eandem actionem succedere: ergo bonum et malum circa actionem non habent oppositionem.

2. Item, omne quod Deus facit, est valde bonum7, item omne quod fit contra Dei prohibitionem, est malum; sed eadem actio fit a Deo et contra Dei prohibitionem: ergo eadem actio est bona et mala. Sed opposita circa idem sunt incompossibilia: ergo bonum et malum circa actionem non sunt opposita.

3. Item, cum dominus praecipit servo dare eleemosynam, et dominus praecipit ex caritate, et servus facit cum murmure; eadem actio est meritoria domino, et demeritoria servo. Sed omne meritorium est bonum, et omne demeritorium est malum; ergo eadem actio est bona et mala: ergo bonum et malum circa actionem non sunt opposita.

4. Item, aliquis incipit aliquam actionem ex caritate et terminat eam ex vanitate, secundum quod dicit Gregorius8: « Saepe quod caritas incipit culpa peragit »: ergo una et eadem actio potest esse meritoria et demeritoria; et si hoc, redit idem quod prius, quod bonum et malum circa actionem non sunt opposita.

5. Item, « bonum et ens convertuntur9 »; sed ens est in plus quam actio, ergo et bonum: ergo si inferius non dividitur per suum superius, actio deliberativa non potest dividi per bonam et malam tanquam per differentias oppositas.

Conclusio

Actio procedens a voluntate deliberativa dividitur per actionem bonam et malam, tanquam per differentias non solum disparatas, sed etiam directe oppositas.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod actio deliberativa nata est habere duplicem bonitatem: et bonitatem naturae, in quantum est actio procedens ab aliqua virtute, et bonitatem moris, in quantum est procedens a libero arbitrio sive a voluntate10. Cum ergo quaeritur, p. 938 utrum bonitas et malitia circa actionem habeant repugnantiam, ita quod ipsam dividant tanquam membra opposita; dicendum, quod hoc non est verum de bono, prout dicitur a bonitate essentiali vel naturali; sic enim bonum non est differentia actionis, immo convertitur cum ente et reperitur in omni actione. — Prout autem bonum dicitur a bonitate moris, sic est divisiva differentia actionis, pro eo quod bonum moris in triplici differentia est. Quoddam enim est bonum in genere, quoddam ex circumstantia, quoddam vero bonum perfectum sive principale sive bonum secundum se. Et quaelibet harum differentiarum habet differentiam mali sibi ex opposito respondentem11.

Nam bono in genere opponitur malum in genere, et bono ex circumstantia opponitur malum ex circumstantia, et bono simpliciter sive secundum se opponitur malum secundum se sive demeritorium12. Horum autem omnium exempla sunt manifesta. — Sic igitur actio procedens a voluntate deliberativa dividi habet per actionem bonam et malam, non solum tanquam per differentias disparatas, sed etiam directe oppositas. Unde rationes, quae hoc ostendunt, concedendae sunt.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur, quod opposita nata sunt fieri circa idem; dicendum, quod si intelligatur de eodem numero, non habet veritatem nisi in subiecto, quod est substantia, proprie loquendo. « Ipsius enim substantiae proprium est, cum sit una et eadem numero, quod sit susceptibilis contrariorum13 »; circa actionem autem, cum sit accidens, non oportet illud habere veritatem, quod bonum et malum sint circa eandem actionem numero, sed sufficit quantum ad legem oppositionis, quod habeant fieri circa eandem actionem in specie. — Alia est etiam ratio, quare bonum et malum non possunt sibi succedere in eadem actione secundum eandem partem actionis, propter hoc quod esse actionis consistit in successione. Et hoc melius iam patebit14.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omne quod Deus facit est valde bonum; dicendum, quod illud intelligitur quoad bonum naturae; illi autem bonitati non repugnat malitia moris, immo eam praesupponit; et ideo eadem actio potest a Deo fieri et nihilominus esse prohibita15. Ex hoc tamen non sequitur, quod non sit contrarietas inter bonitatem moris et malitiam. Unde impossibile est, quod eadem actio sit simul et semel in prohibitione et in praecepto.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod eadem actio est meritoria et demeritoria; dicendum, quod bonum et malum meriti et demeriti16 circa actionem non dicunt qualitates absolutas, sed comparationes diversas. Unde actio bona non est aliud quam actio ordinata in finem; refertur autem actio in finem per intentionem. Quoniam igitur una et eadem actio potest esse a duplici intendente et a duplici intentione, ita quod ab uno sicut a principali motore, ab altero vero sicut ab instrumento; et una illarum intentionum potest esse recta, et altera illarum obliqua: hinc est, quod una et eadem actio potest esse bona et mala per comparationem ad diversa principia, loquendo de bonitate et malitia meriti et demeriti. Ex hoc tamen non sequitur, quod bonum et malum non sint opposita circa actionem. Nam etsi compatiantur se circa eandem actionem in comparatione ad diversas intentiones, non tamen compatiuntur se, secundum quod comparantur ad eandem intentionem. Opposita autem respectiva secundum hoc legem habent oppositionis, secundum quod ad idem comparantur17.

Unde nota, quod aliter dicitur bonum de voluntate, aliter de actione exteriori. Nam circa voluntatem dicit qualitatem aliquam superadditam; et ideo impossibile est, quod una et eadem voluntas sit simul et semel bona et mala, nec absolute nec in comparatione ad diversa. Circa actionem vero bonum dicit comparationem ad debitum principium et ad finem. Unde aliquae duae actiones per omnia consimiles tam in genere actionum quam in genere circumstantiarum moralium frequenter differunt in hoc, quod una est meritoria, altera vero non; quia una fit ab habente caritatem, altera a non habente. Et haec dicta sunt de bono et malo, secundum quod tantum valent18, quantum meritorium et demeritorium, quia secundum hoc currebat obiectio.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod actio inchoata ex caritate potest terminari ex19 vanitate; dicendum, quod verum est; sed licet illa actio una sit in genere naturae, non est tamen una in genere moris, pro eo quod, etsi una sit voluntas, quae est principium illius actionis, tamen aliter et aliter est dis-p. 939posita, dispositione, inquam, quae variat in genere moris, sicut est intentio recta et obliqua.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod bonum est in plus; iam patet responsio; obiicit enim de bono naturae, et hoc modo non est differentia divisiva actionis deliberativae.

Scholion

I. Haec quaestio et seq. supponunt saepe repetitum distinctionem bonitatis in genere naturae et in genere moris, et speciatim ea quae dicta sunt supra d. 37. a. 2. q. I.

Quaest. 1. a S. Thoma et Richardo aliisque sic proponitur: utrum eadem actio possit esse bona et mala; et praecipue versatur circa actiones exteriores, de quibus solummodo est difficultas; nam hae possunt esse successivae et divisibiles, dum actio interna est simplex et indivisibilis (cfr. solut. ad 3.). Conveniunt autem magistri in hoc, quod etiam actio externa una, secundum quod est una, non possit esse simul bona et mala, sed tantum, secundum quod est multa.

De I. quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 96. m. 1. a. 2. — Scot., Quodl. q. 18. n. 12. seqq. — S. Thom., II. Sent. d. 40. a. 4; S. I. II. q. 20. a. 6. — B. Albert., de hac et seq. q. S. p. II. tr. 22. q. 137. m. I. — Petr. a Tar., II. Sent. d. 40. q. 2. a. I. — Richard. a Med., II. Sent. d. 40. a. 2. q. 2. — Aegid. R., II. Sent. d. 40. q. 1. a. 3. — Durand., II. Sent. d. 40. q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., II. Sent. d. 40. q. 4.

II. Quoad sequentem (2.) quaest. conveniunt magistri antiqui in hoc, quod loquendo de actione voluntaria et libera, bonum et malum non sunt differentiae essentiales, quatenus actio est in genere naturae, cum accidant actioni; item quod « malum, prout dicit privationem tantum, non potest proprie dici essentialis differentia » (S. Thom., II. Sent. d. 40. a. 1. ad 2.). Sub hoc autem respectu S. Bonav. negat, hanc divisionem esse per differentias essentiales et intrinsecas. — Si autem actio consideratur in genere moris sive secundum ordinem ad finem; tunc alii communiter docent, quod bonum et malum dividunt actiones essentialiter et secundum speciem. « Per hoc enim actio in genere moris constituitur, quia est bona vel mala. Quia vero primum esse [scilicet naturae] est esse simpliciter, aliud secundum quid; ideo bonum et malum non sunt differentiae essentiales actionis simpliciter, sed secundum quid, prout scilicet est in genere moris » (Petr. a Tar., II. Sent. d. 40. q. 2. a. 2.). Licet autem S. Bonav. aliis verbis et distinctionibus utatur, tamen in doctrina convenit cum ceteris magistris. Addit autem S. Thom. (art. cit.), quod actus interiores voluntatis simpliciter sic specie dividuntur; actus vero imperati a voluntate et eliciti ab aliis potentiis tantum per accidens, secundum quod ad genus moris pertinent.

Praeter laudatos: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. quaest. inter. — B. Albert., II. Sent. d. 40. a. I. — Richard. a Med., loc. cit. q. I. — Aegid. R., loc. cit. q. 2. a. I. — Biel, hic q. unica.

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English Translation

Article I. On the division of deliberative action into good, evil, and indifferent.

Question I. Whether deliberative action is divided by opposite differences.

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and asks, since deliberative action is divided into good and evil, whether it is divided by opposite differences. And that it is so, it seems.

1. The first contrariety in morals is between good and evil — whence the Philosopher1 says that « good and evil are not in a genus, but are genera of other things » — but the first contraries are opposites in the highest degree: therefore good and evil with respect to a direct action have opposition and incompatibility.

2. Likewise, evil states the privation of good; but privation and possession are directly opposed2: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, those things which have opposite effects are directly opposed; but a good action and an evil one have opposite effects in the soul, because a good action adorns and an evil one deforms, a good one orders and an evil one disorders3: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, those things which have opposite retributions are directly opposed; but a good action and an evil one have opposite retributions, because to the one is rendered eternal joy, and to the other eternal punishment4: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, every correct division is by opposites5: if therefore moral action is correctly divided into good and evil, then the members of this division are by opposites.

On the contrary: 1. « Opposites are of a nature to come to be about the same thing6 »; but it is impossible that goodness and malice, or conversely, should succeed one another about the same action: therefore good and evil with respect to action do not have opposition.

2. Likewise, everything that God makes is very good7, likewise everything that is done against God's prohibition is evil; but the same action is done by God and against God's prohibition: therefore the same action is good and evil. But opposites about the same thing are incompatible: therefore good and evil with respect to action are not opposites.

3. Likewise, when a master commands a servant to give alms, and the master commands out of charity, and the servant does it with murmuring; the same action is meritorious for the master, and demeritorious for the servant. But everything meritorious is good, and everything demeritorious is evil; therefore the same action is good and evil: therefore good and evil with respect to action are not opposites.

4. Likewise, someone begins some action out of charity and ends it out of vanity, according to what Gregory says8: « Often what charity begins, fault carries through »: therefore one and the same action can be meritorious and demeritorious; and if this is so, the same thing returns as before, that good and evil with respect to action are not opposites.

5. Likewise, « good and being are convertible9 »; but being is wider than action, therefore so too good: therefore if the inferior is not divided by its superior, deliberative action cannot be divided into good and evil as by opposite differences.

Conclusion

Action proceeding from the deliberative will is divided into good and evil action, as by differences not only disparate, but also directly opposite.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that deliberative action is of a nature to have a twofold goodness: both the goodness of nature, inasmuch as it is an action proceeding from some power, and the goodness of morals, inasmuch as it proceeds from free choice or from the will10. When therefore it is asked p. 938 whether goodness and malice have incompatibility with respect to action, such that they divide it as opposite members; it must be said that this is not true of good, as it is said from essential or natural goodness; for thus good is not a difference of action, but rather is convertible with being and is found in every action. — But as good is said from the goodness of morals, thus it is a dividing difference of action, for the reason that the good of morals exists in a threefold difference. For one kind is good in genus, another from circumstance, and another a perfect good, or principal, or good in itself. And each of these differences has the difference of evil corresponding to it from the opposite side11.

For to good in genus is opposed evil in genus, and to good from circumstance is opposed evil from circumstance, and to good simply or in itself is opposed evil in itself or demeritorious evil12. And the examples of all these are manifest. — Thus therefore action proceeding from the deliberative will has to be divided into good and evil action, not only as by disparate differences, but also directly opposite ones. Whence the reasons which show this are to be conceded.

1. To that, therefore, which is objected first, that opposites are of a nature to come to be about the same thing; it must be said that, if it is understood of the same in number, it does not hold true except in a subject, which is a substance, properly speaking. « For it is proper to substance that, being one and the same in number, it is receptive of contraries13 »; but with respect to action, since it is an accident, it is not necessary that that hold true, namely that good and evil be about the same action in number, but it suffices, as regards the law of opposition, that they have to come to be about the same action in species. — There is also another reason why good and evil cannot succeed one another in the same action according to the same part of the action, on account of this, that the being of an action consists in succession. And this will be made clearer presently14.

2. To that which is objected, that everything which God makes is very good; it must be said that this is understood as to the good of nature; but to that goodness the malice of morals is not repugnant, but rather presupposes it; and therefore the same action can be done by God and nonetheless be prohibited15. From this, however, it does not follow that there is no contrariety between the goodness of morals and malice. Whence it is impossible that the same action be at one and the same time under prohibition and under precept.

3. To that which is objected, that the same action is meritorious and demeritorious; it must be said that the good and evil of merit and demerit16 with respect to action do not state absolute qualities, but diverse comparisons. Whence a good action is nothing other than an action ordered to an end; but an action is referred to an end through intention. Since therefore one and the same action can be from a twofold one intending and from a twofold intention, such that from the one as from a principal mover, but from the other as from an instrument; and one of these intentions can be right, and the other of them oblique: hence it is that one and the same action can be good and evil by comparison to diverse principles, speaking of the goodness and malice of merit and demerit. From this, however, it does not follow that good and evil are not opposites with respect to action. For although they are compatible about the same action in comparison to diverse intentions, they are nevertheless not compatible insofar as they are compared to the same intention. But relative opposites have the law of opposition in this respect, insofar as they are compared to the same thing17.

Whence note that good is said in one way of the will, in another of the exterior action. For with respect to the will it states some superadded quality; and therefore it is impossible that one and the same will be at one and the same time good and evil, neither absolutely nor in comparison to diverse things. But with respect to action good states a comparison to the due principle and to the end. Whence two actions altogether alike, both in the genus of actions and in the genus of moral circumstances, frequently differ in this, that one is meritorious, the other not; because one is done by one having charity, the other by one not having it. And these things have been said of good and evil, insofar as they are worth18 as much as the meritorious and the demeritorious, because in this respect the objection ran.

4. To that which is objected, that an action begun out of charity can be ended out of19 vanity; it must be said that it is true; but although that action is one in the genus of nature, it is nevertheless not one in the genus of morals, for the reason that, even though the will, which is the principle of that action, is one, nevertheless it is dis-p. 939posed in different ways, by a disposition, I say, which varies in the genus of morals, as is right and oblique intention.

5. To that which is objected, that good is wider; the response is already clear; for the objection deals with the good of nature, and in this mode it is not a dividing difference of deliberative action.

Scholion

I. This question and the following one presuppose the often-repeated distinction of goodness in the genus of nature and in the genus of morals, and especially the things said above in d. 37, a. 2, q. I.

Question 1 is proposed by St. Thomas and Richard and others thus: whether the same action can be good and evil; and it is concerned chiefly with exterior actions, about which alone there is difficulty; for these can be successive and divisible, whereas the internal action is simple and indivisible (cf. solution to obj. 3). The masters agree, however, in this, that even one external action, insofar as it is one, cannot be at once good and evil, but only insofar as it is many.

On Question 1: Alex. of Hales, S. p. II, q. 96, m. 1, a. 2. — Scotus, Quodl. q. 18, n. 12 ff. — St. Thomas, II Sent. d. 40, a. 4; S. I-II, q. 20, a. 6. — B. Albert, on this and the following question, S. p. II, tr. 22, q. 137, m. I. — Petr. a Tar., II Sent. d. 40, q. 2, a. I. — Richard of Middleton, II Sent. d. 40, a. 2, q. 2. — Giles of Rome, II Sent. d. 40, q. 1, a. 3. — Durandus, II Sent. d. 40, q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, II Sent. d. 40, q. 4.

II. As to the following (2nd) question, the ancient masters agree in this, that, speaking of voluntary and free action, good and evil are not essential differences, insofar as the action is in the genus of nature, since they are accidental to the action; likewise that « evil, as it states privation only, cannot properly be called an essential difference » (St. Thomas, II Sent. d. 40, a. 1, ad 2). Under this respect St. Bonaventure denies that this division is by essential and intrinsic differences. — But if the action is considered in the genus of morals or according to its order to an end; then others commonly teach that good and evil divide actions essentially and according to species. « For by this an action is constituted in the genus of morals, namely that it is good or evil. But because the first being [namely of nature] is being simply, the other [being] in a certain respect; therefore good and evil are not essential differences of action simply, but in a certain respect, namely insofar as it is in the genus of morals » (Petr. a Tar., II Sent. d. 40, q. 2, a. 2). But although St. Bonaventure uses other words and distinctions, nevertheless in doctrine he agrees with the other masters. St. Thomas adds, however (art. cit.), that the interior acts of the will are divided according to species simply; but the acts commanded by the will and elicited by other powers only accidentally, insofar as they pertain to the genus of morals.

Besides those cited: Alex. of Hales, loc. cit. interior question. — B. Albert, II Sent. d. 40, a. I. — Richard of Middleton, loc. cit. q. I. — Giles of Rome, loc. cit. q. 2, a. I. — Biel, here, single question.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Libr. de Praedicam. c. de Oppositis, in fine, et IV. Topic. c. 3. — De minori cfr. Aristot., X. Metaph. text. 13. seq. et 22. seqq. (IX. c. 4. et 7.), in quo ultimo loco (text. 23.) ait: Priora invicem contraria sunt. — Paulo ante Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 verbis per differentias praefigit tanquam.
    Book On the Categories, c. On Opposites, at the end, and IV Topics c. 3. — On the minor cf. Aristotle, X Metaphysics text 13 f. and 22 ff. (IX c. 4 and 7), in which last place (text 23) he says: Prior things are contrary to one another. — Shortly before, the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 prefixes tanquam to the words per differentias.
  2. Vide Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Oppositis et X. Metaph. text. 9. et 15. (IX. c. 3. seq.). — Explicatio maioris habetur supra d. 34. a. 2. q. 3.
    See Aristotle, On the Categories c. On Opposites and X Metaphysics text 9 and 15 (IX c. 3 f.). — An explanation of the major is found above in d. 34, a. 2, q. 3.
  3. Cfr. supra d. 35. a. 1. q. 1.
    Cf. above d. 35, a. 1, q. 1.
  4. Matth. 25, 46: Et ibunt hi in supplicium aeternum, iusti autem in vitam aeternam. Cfr. Ioan. 5, 29.
    Matt. 25:46: And these shall go into everlasting punishment, but the just into life everlasting. Cf. John 5:29.
  5. Aristot., X. Metaph. text. 24. (IX. c. 8.): Cuncta namque oppositis dividuntur. Cfr. supra pag. 653, nota 2. — In fine arg. Vat. cum cod. ee omittit per ante opposita.
    Aristotle, X Metaphysics text 24 (IX c. 8): For all things are divided by opposites. Cf. above p. 653, note 2. — At the end of the argument the Vatican edition with codex ee omits per before opposita.
  6. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Oppositis et II. Topic. c. 3. (c. 7.). — Sententiam, quae in minori proponitur, Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Substantia, sic exprimit: Neque eadem actio et una numero [dicitur] prava et studiosa. — Pro vel Vat. sibi.
    Aristotle, On the Categories c. On Opposites and II Topics c. 3 (c. 7). — The judgment proposed in the minor, Aristotle, On the Categories c. On Substance, expresses thus: Nor is the same action, one in number, [said to be] base and virtuous. — For vel the Vatican edition reads sibi.
  7. Gen. 1, 31: Viditque Deus cuncta quae fecerat, et erant valde bona. — De minori vide supra d. 37. a. 1. q. 1. et de minori subsumta, quae est secundum Aristot., vide supra pag. 100, nota 1. — Mox edd. et pro item. Paulo inferius pro sed eadem codd. Iv V W X Z bb ee et alii igitur eadem.
    Gen. 1:31: And God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good. — On the minor see above d. 37, a. 1, q. 1, and on the subsumed minor, which is according to Aristotle, see above p. 100, note 1. — Presently the editions read et for item. A little further down, for sed eadem codices Iv V W X Z bb ee and others read igitur eadem.
  8. Libr. IX. Moral. c. 23. n. 37: Horrendo modo unum idemque opus culpa peragit, quod virtus inchoavit.
    Book IX Morals c. 23, n. 37: In a horrible way fault carries through one and the same work which virtue began.
  9. Vide supra pag. 805, nota 4. Quod inferius non dividatur per suum superius, insinuat Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Specie et c. de Differentia. Primo loc. cit. ait: Divisivum enim semper est quod singulare [inferius] est, collectivum autem et adunativum quod commune [superius] est.
    See above p. 805, note 4. That the inferior is not divided by its superior, Porphyry intimates, On the Predicables c. On Species and c. On Difference. In the first place cited he says: For divisive is always what is singular [the inferior], but collective and unitive is what is common [the superior].
  10. Cfr. supra d. 35. a. 2. q. 1. in corp. et d. 37. a. 1. q. 1.
    Cf. above d. 35, a. 2, q. 1, in the body, and d. 37, a. 1, q. 1.
  11. Cod. T habet differentiam secundum se mali oppositam.
    Codex T has differentiam secundum se mali oppositam.
  12. Vide supra d. 36. dub. 5.
    See above d. 36, dub. 5.
  13. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Substantia. De propos. seq. cfr. ibid. c. de Oppositis, ubi dicitur, eundem non posse simul esse sanum et languidum, et deinde pergit: Palam vero est, quod circa idem aut specie aut genere nata sunt fieri contraria. Languor namque et sanitas in corpore animalis nata sunt fieri... iustitia vero et iniustitia in anima hominis.
    Aristotle, On the Categories c. On Substance. On the following proposition cf. ibid. c. On Opposites, where it is said that the same thing cannot be at once healthy and sick, and then he continues: But it is manifest that contraries are of a nature to come to be about the same thing in species or in genus. For sickness and health are of a nature to come to be in the body of an animal... but justice and injustice in the soul of a man.
  14. Quaest. seq.
    The following question.
  15. Vide supra d. 37. a. 1. q. 1. ad 1. — Paulo inferius pro eadem edd., excepta 1, una et eadem.
    See above d. 37, a. 1, q. 1, ad 1. — A little further down, for eadem the editions, except 1, read una et eadem.
  16. Cod. K meritum et demeritum. Idem cod. cum codd. bb ee et nonnullis aliis nec non ed. 1 mox pro dicunt substituit habent.
    Codex K reads meritum et demeritum. The same codex, with codices bb ee and several others as well as edition 1, presently substitutes habent for dicunt.
  17. Generatim enim secundum Boeth., IV. in Categor. (Praedicam.) Aristot. c. de Oppositis, sunt opposita « quae in eodem, secundum idem, in eodem tempore circa unam eandemque rem simul esse non possunt ». — Pro Opposita autem ed. 1 (cod. W a secunda manu) Opposita enim. Post pauca pro dicit cod. Iv substituit habet.
    For generally, according to Boethius, IV on the Categories (Predicaments) of Aristotle c. On Opposites, those are opposites « which cannot be at once in the same thing, according to the same, at the same time, about one and the same thing ». — For Opposita autem edition 1 (codex W by a second hand) reads Opposita enim. After a little, for dicit codex Iv substitutes habet.
  18. Non pauci codd., inter quos F H T Y bb ee, cum edd. 1, 2 valet.
    Not a few codices, among them F H T Y bb ee, with editions 1, 2 read valet.
  19. Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 et pauci codd. in.
    The Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 and a few codices read in. ---
← Dist. 41, Divisio TextusDist. 41, Art. 1, Q. 2→