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Dist. 36, Dubia

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 36

Textus Latinus
p. 856

Dubia circa litteram Magistri.

Dub. I. In parte ista sunt quaestiones circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicitur in primo capitulo, quod peccatum est causa peccati. Sed contra: aut peccatum est causa peccati voluntaria, aut necessaria. Non voluntaria, quia nihil voluntarie operatur, nisi quod cognoscit et appetit1; talis autem est rationalis creatura, non culpa: ergo non est voluntaria causa. Item, non est causa necessaria,

p. 857 quia qui peccavit uno peccato, non est necesse, quod peccet altero2: ergo non videtur, quod aliquo modo sit causa. — Item, si peccatum est causa peccati, aut ratione alicuius boni substrati, aut ratione defectus. Non ratione boni substrati, quia tunc magis deberet dici bonum esse causa mali, quam peccatum causa peccati. Non ratione defectus, quia quod nihil est nullius est causa; intentio enim causalitatis in solis entibus reperitur.

Propter quod est quaestio, quod peccatum sit causa peccati, et ratione cuius peccatum sit causa peccati.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum in peccato duo sint, videlicet conversio et aversio, ratione utriusque peccatum habet ad aliud peccatum disponere, et per hoc peccatum aliud dicitur causare. Ratione quidem aversionis, quia in hoc, quod a Deo avertit, elongat a bono, et per hoc homo efficitur impotens ad resistendum malo. Ratione conversionis, sicut actus unius virtutis disponit ad actum alterius3, utpote actus nutritivae ad generativam, sic una culpa habet disponere ad aliam, utpote gula ad luxuriam. Est igitur peccatum causa peccati, id est dispositio trahens sive inclinans ad aliud peccatum, tam ratione aversionis quam ratione conversionis. Sed ratione aversionis, in qua communicant omnia peccata, quodlibet est causa cuiuslibet; ratione vero conversionis, in qua distinguuntur, non quodlibet est causa cuiuslibet, sed peccatum unius generis disponit ad peccatum generis proximi, utpote spirituale ad spirituale, ut superbia ad invidiam, et carnale ad carnale, sicut gula ad luxuriam.

Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod non est causa voluntaria nec necessaria; dicendum, quod peccatum non est sufficiens causa peccati; sed causa dicitur in hoc, quod trahit voluntatem, ut committat aliam4 culpam, et ita reducitur ad causam voluntariam.

Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum sit causa ratione positionis, vel defectus; dico, quod ratione utriusque, sicut visum est5. Conversio enim inordinata disponit ad aliam conversionem inordinatam. Ex conversione enim inordinata augetur in nobis concupiscentia et pronitas ad malum, et dum augetur pronitas et concupiscentia, quasi quoddam pondus ponitur in anima. «Quod enim est pondus in corporibus, hoc est amor in spiritibus6». Et ideo bene dicit Gregorius, quod «peccatum, quod per poenitentiam non diluitur, mox pondere suo ad aliud trahit». Et ita nec defectus per se facit, nec bonum per se, sed unum cum alio. — Illud tamen argumentum non valet: quia defectus non potest esse causa alicuius, ergo non potest esse causa peccati. Causare enim peccatum non est causare aliquid, sed potius deficere. Unde est ibi sophisma secundum quid et simpliciter7.

Dub. II. Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Illico, ut peccat homo, fit in homine corruptio, quae tamen fit Deo auctore. Sed contra hoc est, quia illa boni corruptio, sive active dicatur sive passive, est imaginis Dei deformatio. Deformatio autem imaginis Deo displicet; et nihil quod Deo displicet, est a Deo — «idem enim est fieri Deo auctore et Deo volente8» — ergo talis corruptio non est a Deo. — Item, eadem sunt principia actionis et passionis: ergo si corruptio-actio non est a Deo, videtur similiter, quod nec corruptio-passio.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod illud verbum non est dictum secundum opinionem Magistri, sed secundum opinionem aliorum, sicut patet ex ipsa serie litterae9. Sed quia tamen illud idem videtur Magister dixisse in ultimo capitulo praecedentis distinctionis; aliter respondendum est, quod in illa corruptione et est considerare defectum et deordinationem; est nihilominus ibi considerare passionem et ordinem ad praecedentem actionem; et quantum ad haec duo ultima, corruptio ista tenet rationem poenae, et quantum ad hoc dicitur esse a Deo, videlicet in quantum poena. Simpliciter autem loquendo, ut dicatur corruptio modi, speciei et ordinis esse a Deo sive deformatio imaginis, non admittitur; sicut rationes ostendunt, propter hoc quod talis corruptio et defectum dicit et etiam deordinationem, quae est culpa, sicut supra10 est ostensum. Et est talis corruptio poena non inflicta nec contracta, sed acta; et ideo quodam modo tenet rationem culpae, sicut ostensum fuit in praecedenti distinctione11. Et quantum ad hoc non intelligitur illud quod in littera dicitur. — Et per hoc patent ea quae in littera obiiciuntur.

Dub. III. Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Si quis dicat, ea quae peccata sunt, essentialiter poenas esse, in nullo praeiudicium fit veritati. Et postea subiungit,

p. 858 quod huiusmodi punitiones iustae sunt et a Deo sunt, nec tamen12 peccata a Deo sunt. Videtur enim esse implicatio contradictionis. Primo enim dicit, unum et idem, essentialiter loquendo, est poena et culpa; et post dicit, quod idem ipsum et est a Deo et non est a Deo.

Respondeo: Dicendum est ad hoc, quod illud et consimilia intelligenda sunt cum reduplicatione, ut quando dicitur, quod aliquod peccatum est poena peccati, et quod poena illa est a Deo; hoc intelligitur, secundum quod poena, hoc est secundum rationem ordinationis. Et hoc innuit Magister in littera13, cum dicit, quod non in quantum peccata sunt, poenae sunt, nec in quantum peccata sunt, a Deo sunt, quasi dicat: cum in idem concurrant ratio deordinationis et ordinationis per relationem14 ad diversa, ordinatio est a Deo, deordinatio vero minime.

Dub. IV. Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod sunt quaedam necessitate facta improbanda. Contrarium huius videtur dicere Augustinus in libro de Duabus Animabus15. Dicit enim, quod illud solum est peccatum, a quo «liberum est abstinere».

Et dicendum est ad hoc, quod, sicut Magister determinat infra16, quaedam necessitas est ad venialia peccata, saltem in universali. Illa autem ratio et verbum, quod ibidem sequitur, intelligitur de peccato actuali mortali. Qualiter autem necessitas sit ad venialia, hoc habebit quaestionem infra suo loco, ubi Magister inquirit, distinctione quadragesima prima.

Dub. V. Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Addunt quoque, quosdam actus non tantum essentia, sed etiam genere esse bonos, ut reficere esurientem. Quaeritur enim: pro quanto dicitur17 bonum in genere? Si quia dicit bonum absque circumstantia aliqua superaddita, tunc videtur, quod reficere indigentem non sit bonum in genere, quia est ibi circumstantia debita in eo qui reficitur. Si tu dicas, quod bonum in genere dicitur, quia commune est et universale: tunc videtur, quod similiter deberet dici bonum in specie, cum generale dicatur respectu speciei.

Est igitur quaestio, pro quanto dicatur aliquid esse bonum in genere. Quaestio est etiam de sufficientia ipsius divisionis per tria membra; videtur enim esse insufficiens, quia non tantum est bonum in genere et bonum ex intentione et causa, sed etiam bonum gratiae et bonum gloriae.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Magister dividit hic bonum non quocumque modo, sed bonum, prout est in actu. Bonum autem huiusmodi habet considerari in se sive secundum se; et sic est bonum naturae. Habet iterum considerari secundum comparationem ad materiam debitam; et sic dicitur bonum in genere. Habet iterum considerari secundum alia tria genera causarum, videlicet in comparatione ad efficiens et formam et finem; et sic est bonum perfectum.

Et sic patet sufficientia, quia omnis actus aut comparatur ad suum principium efficiens solum; aut comparatur ad suum principium efficiens, prout respicit debitum obiectum; aut comparatur ad suum principium efficiens, prout respicit debitum obiectum et finem congruum. Bonum autem, secundum quod respicit materiam debitam, dicitur esse bonum in genere, pro eo quod, sicut genus dicit esse in potentia ad esse completum, quae completur per adventum differentiarum18, sic in actu transeunte super materiam debitam quodam modo inchoatur bonum moris; illud autem bonum moris specificatur et completur per adventum circumstantiarum, unde potest fieri et bene et male. Similiter intelligendum est de malo in genere. — Quamvis autem bonum et malum possint differenter fieri et bene et male; nihilominus tamen bonum, quantum est de se, dicit inchoationem boni, et malum similiter mali; et ideo nomen boni tenet, quia in ipso salvatur ratio generis. Unde bonum naturae respectu boni moris est quasi in potentia materiali, quae est potentia passiva; bonum autem in genere aliquo modo est bonum moris ex hoc, quod transit supra materiam debitam: et ideo assimilatur potentiae generis, quae est aliquo modo activa. Genus enim est forma, ut dicit Philosophus19, licet per comparationem ad differentias in definitione, sit sicut materia.

Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. Nam bonum ex circumstantia contineri potest sub bono perfecto, vel sub bono in genere. Si enim est indutum omnibus bonis circumstantiis, continetur sub bono perfecto. Si autem deficit in aliqua circumstantia,

p. 859 reducitur ad bonum in genere. Sub bono autem perfecto comprehenditur actus gratuitus et gloriosus.

Possent autem plura quaeri de hac materia, sed alibi magis habent locum quam hic20.

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English Translation

Doubts concerning the text of the Master.

Doubt I. In this part there are questions concerning the text, and first it is asked about that which is said in the first chapter, that sin is the cause of sin. But on the contrary: sin is the cause of sin either as a voluntary cause, or as a necessary one. Not as voluntary, because nothing acts voluntarily except what it knows and desires1; but such is the rational creature, not fault: therefore it is not a voluntary cause. Likewise, it is not a necessary cause,

p. 857 because he who has sinned by one sin, it is not necessary that he sin by another2: therefore it does not seem that in any way it is a cause. — Likewise, if sin is the cause of sin, [it is so] either by reason of some underlying good, or by reason of defect. Not by reason of an underlying good, because then good ought rather to be called the cause of evil, than sin the cause of sin. Not by reason of defect, because what is nothing is the cause of nothing; for the intention of causality is found only in beings.

On account of which there is the question, whether sin be the cause of sin, and by reason of what sin is the cause of sin.

I respond: It must be said that, since in sin there are two things, namely conversion and aversion, by reason of each sin has it to dispose toward another sin, and through this one sin is said to cause another. By reason of aversion, indeed, because in this, that it turns away from God, it withdraws from good, and through this man is rendered powerless to resist evil. By reason of conversion, just as the act of one virtue disposes toward the act of another3, as the act of the nutritive [power disposes] toward the generative, so one fault has it to dispose toward another, as gluttony toward lust. Sin is therefore the cause of sin, that is, a disposition drawing or inclining toward another sin, both by reason of aversion and by reason of conversion. But by reason of aversion, in which all sins communicate, any is the cause of any; whereas by reason of conversion, in which they are distinguished, not any is the cause of any, but a sin of one genus disposes toward a sin of the nearest genus, as the spiritual toward the spiritual, as pride toward envy, and the carnal toward the carnal, as gluttony toward lust.

To that, then, which is objected, that it is neither a voluntary nor a necessary cause; it must be said that sin is not the sufficient cause of sin; but it is called a cause in this, that it draws the will to commit another4 fault, and thus it is reduced to a voluntary cause.

To that which is asked, whether it be a cause by reason of position or of defect; I say that [it is so] by reason of each, as has been seen5. For inordinate conversion disposes toward another inordinate conversion. For from inordinate conversion concupiscence and the proneness to evil are increased in us, and while proneness and concupiscence are increased, a kind of weight is, as it were, placed in the soul. «For what weight is in bodies, this is love in spirits6». And therefore Gregory well says that «the sin which is not washed away by penance soon by its own weight draws toward another». And thus neither does defect of itself effect [it], nor good of itself, but the one together with the other. — Yet that argument is not valid: namely, defect cannot be the cause of anything, therefore it cannot be the cause of sin. For to cause sin is not to cause something, but rather to be deficient. Hence there is here a sophism in a certain respect and simply7.

Doubt II. Likewise it is asked about that which he says: As soon as man sins, there arises in man a corruption, which nonetheless arises with God as author. But against this is that this corruption of good, whether it be called active or passive, is a deformation of the image of God. But the deformation of the image displeases God; and nothing which displeases God is from God — «for it is the same to come to be with God as author and with God willing it8» — therefore such a corruption is not from God. — Likewise, the principles of action and of passion are the same: therefore if the corruption-action is not from God, it seems likewise that neither [is] the corruption-passion.

I respond: It must be said that that word is not said according to the opinion of the Master, but according to the opinion of others, as is plain from the very course of the text9. But because nevertheless the Master seems to have said the same thing in the last chapter of the preceding distinction; it must be answered otherwise, that in that corruption there is both to consider a defect and a deordination; there is nonetheless there to consider a passion and an order to the preceding action; and as to these two last, that corruption holds the formal character of punishment, and as to this it is said to be from God, namely insofar as it is punishment. But simply speaking, so that the corruption of measure, species, and order be said to be from God, or the deformation of the image, it is not admitted; as the reasons show, on account of this, that such a corruption both bespeaks a defect and also a deordination, which is fault, as was shown above10. And such a corruption is a punishment not inflicted nor contracted, but enacted; and therefore in a certain manner it holds the formal character of fault, as was shown in the preceding distinction11. And as to this, that which is said in the text is not understood [thus]. — And by this are made plain those things which are objected in the text.

Doubt III. Likewise it is asked about that which he says: If anyone should say that those things which are sins are essentially punishments, in no way is prejudice done to the truth. And afterward he subjoins,

p. 858 that such chastisements are just and are from God, nor nevertheless12 are sins from God. For it seems to be an implication of contradiction. For first he says that one and the same thing, speaking essentially, is punishment and fault; and afterward he says that the same very thing both is from God and is not from God.

I respond: It must be said to this, that this and like statements are to be understood with reduplication, as when it is said that some sin is the punishment of sin, and that that punishment is from God; this is understood according as it is punishment, that is, according to the formal character of ordination. And the Master intimates this in the text13, when he says that not insofar as they are sins are they punishments, nor insofar as they are sins are they from God, as if to say: since in the same thing there concur the account of deordination and of ordination through a relation14 to diverse things, the ordination is from God, but the deordination by no means.

Doubt IV. Likewise it is asked about that which he says, that there are certain things to be reproved which are done by necessity. The contrary of this Augustine seems to say in the book On the Two Souls15. For he says that that alone is sin from which «it is free to abstain».

And it must be said to this, that, as the Master determines below16, there is a certain necessity for venial sins, at least in general. But that account and word which there follows is understood of actual mortal sin. But in what manner there is necessity for venial sins, this will have its question below in its own place, where the Master inquires, in the forty-first distinction.

Doubt V. Likewise it is asked about that which he says: They add also that certain acts are good not only in essence, but also in genus, as to refresh one who is hungry. For it is asked: for how much is a thing called17 good in genus? If because he calls it good without any added circumstance, then it seems that to refresh one in need is not good in genus, because there is there a due circumstance in him who is refreshed. If you say that it is called good in genus because it is common and universal: then it seems that likewise it ought to be called good in species, since the general is said with respect to the species.

There is therefore a question, for how much something is said to be good in genus. There is also a question concerning the sufficiency of that division itself by three members; for it seems to be insufficient, because there is not only good in genus and good from intention and cause, but also good of grace and good of glory.

I respond: It must be said that the Master here divides good not in any way whatever, but good insofar as it is in act. But good of this kind has to be considered in itself or according to itself; and thus it is the good of nature. It has again to be considered according to comparison to a due matter; and thus it is called good in genus. It has again to be considered according to the other three genera of causes, namely in comparison to the efficient and the form and the end; and thus it is perfect good.

And thus the sufficiency is plain, because every act either is compared to its efficient principle alone; or is compared to its efficient principle, insofar as it regards a due object; or is compared to its efficient principle, insofar as it regards a due object and a fitting end. But good, according as it regards a due matter, is said to be good in genus, for the reason that, just as genus bespeaks being in potency to a complete being, which is completed by the advent of differences18, so in an act passing over upon a due matter the good of conduct is in a certain manner begun; but that good of conduct is specified and completed by the advent of circumstances, whence it can be done both well and ill. Likewise is it to be understood of evil in genus. — But although good and evil can be done differently both well and ill; nevertheless good, as regards itself, bespeaks the inchoation of good, and evil likewise of evil; and therefore it holds the name of good, because in it the account of genus is preserved. Hence the good of nature with respect to the good of conduct is as it were in material potency, which is passive potency; but good in genus is in some manner the good of conduct, from this, that it passes over upon a due matter: and therefore it is likened to the potency of genus, which is in some manner active. For genus is form, as the Philosopher says19, although by comparison to the differences in the definition it is as matter.

And by this the answer to the objections is plain. For good from circumstance can be contained under perfect good, or under good in genus. For if it is clothed in all good circumstances, it is contained under perfect good. But if it is deficient in some circumstance,

p. 859 it is reduced to good in genus. But under perfect good is comprehended the gratuitous and glorious act.

But more could be asked concerning this matter, but elsewhere they have place more than here20.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vide supra pag. 592, nota 3. — Subinde post talis autem est cod. V subiicit sola.
    See above, p. 592, note 3. — Soon after, following talis autem est codex V subjoins sola.
  2. Edd. cum aliquot codd., ut F bb, omittunt ergo.
    The editions with several codices, such as F, bb, omit ergo.
  3. Cod. T hic repetit virtutis.
    Codex T here repeats virtutis.
  4. Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4, paulo superius post sed omissa voce causa, hic loco aliam exhibent aliquando.
    The Vatican edition and editions 2, 3, 4, a little above, the word causa being omitted after sed, here in place of aliam present aliquando.
  5. Cfr. etiam supra d. 35. a. 1. q. 1, praesertim ad 2.
    Cf. also above, d. 35, a. 1, q. 1, especially ad 2.
  6. Secundum Augustinum. Vide supra pag. 76, nota 6. — Verbum Gregorii exhibetur XXV. Moral. c. 9. n. 22. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. et 3. — Pro spiritibus Vat. spiritualibus.
    According to Augustine. See above, p. 76, note 6. — The word of Gregory is given in the Morals, Bk. XXV, c. 9, n. 22. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 1 and 3. — For spiritibus the Vatican edition [reads] spiritualibus.
  7. De quo vide Aristot., I. Elench. c. 4. (c. 5.). — De hoc dubio tractant Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 94. m. 9; S. Thom., hic a. 1; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1; Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 1.
    Concerning which see Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, Bk. I, c. 4 (c. 5). — On this doubt treat Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. II, q. 94, m. 9; St. Thomas, here, a. 1; Peter of Tarentaise, here, q. 1, a. 1; Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text; Giles of Rome, here, q. 2, a. 1.
  8. August., 83 Qq. q. 3. Vide supra pag. 855, nota 4.
    Augustine, Eighty-three Questions, q. 3. See above, p. 855, note 4.
  9. Hic c. 2.
    Here, c. 2.
  10. Art. 3. q. 2.
    Article 3, q. 2.
  11. Art. 1. q. 2, praecipue in solut. ad 4. — Cfr. Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.
    Article 1, q. 2, especially in the solution ad 4. — Cf. Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text.
  12. In littera Magistri additur in quantum.
    In the text of the Master is added in quantum.
  13. Hic c. 4.
    Here, c. 4.
  14. Codd. C F H I O R S T V W Z ce et edd. 2, 3, 4 assertionem, codd. X Y bb comparationem, ed. 1 assumptionem; in cod. T legitur: per assertionem, per assertionem ad diversa. — Huius dubii solutio habetur etiam apud S. Thom. et Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic dub. lit. 3.
    Codices C, F, H, I, O, R, S, T, V, W, Z, ce, and editions 2, 3, 4 [read] assertionem; codices X, Y, bb comparationem; edition 1 assumptionem; in codex T is read: per assertionem, per assertionem ad diversa. — The solution of this doubt is also had in St. Thomas and Peter of Tarentaise, here on the text; Giles of Rome, here, doubt on the text, 3.
  15. Cap. 11. n. 15.
    Chapter 11, n. 15.
  16. Dist. XLI. in fine. Vide ibid. Comment. a. 2. q. 1. De eadem re Magister iam locutus est in praecedente d. c. 6. — Mox edd. praeter 1 cum codd. O R ee et aliis: ad peccata venialia, peccata saltem in universali.
    Distinction XLI, at the end. See there the Commentary, a. 2, q. 1. The Master has already spoken of the same matter in the preceding distinction, c. 6. — Soon after, the editions except 1, with codices O, R, ee, and others: ad peccata venialia, peccata saltem in universali.
  17. Edd., excepta 1, adiiciunt esse. Subinde pro Si quia dicit Vat. Si dicitur quia.
    The editions, except 1, add esse. Soon after, for Si quia dicit the Vatican edition [reads] Si dicitur quia.
  18. Cfr. Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 43. (VI. c. 12.). — Paulo ante pro genus dicit Vat. genus dicitur. Subinde pro in potentia plures codd. in potentiam, alii impotentiam.
    Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. VII, text 43 (VI, c. 12). — A little before, for genus dicit the Vatican edition [reads] genus dicitur. Soon after, for in potentia several codices [read] in potentiam, others impotentiam.
  19. Libr. II. Phys. text. ult.; VII. Metaph. text. 43. et VIII. text. 6. (VI. c. 12. et VII. c. 2.). Averroes hos locos exponens docet, definitiones continere genera et differentias; genera esse formas universales, differentias autem formas proprias, genera determinantes.
    Physics, Bk. II, last text; Metaphysics, Bk. VII, text 43, and Bk. VIII, text 6 (VI, c. 12, and VII, c. 2). Averroes, expounding these places, teaches that definitions contain genera and differences; that the genera are universal forms, but the differences proper forms, determining the genera.
  20. Cfr. infra d. 41. a. 1. q. 1. — Pro habent locum cod. cc et ed. 1 habet locum. In praecedentibus multi codd., ut F K T V Y bb ce etc., ter sub bono perfecte pro sub bono perfecto, sed contra contextum. — De hoc dubio scripserunt Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 96. per totam; B. Albert., hic a. 6. seq.; Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 3.
    Cf. below, d. 41, a. 1, q. 1. — For habent locum codex cc and edition 1 [read] habet locum. In the preceding [text] many codices, such as F, K, T, V, Y, bb, ce, etc., three times [read] sub bono perfecte for sub bono perfecto, but against the context. — On this doubt have written Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. II, q. 96, throughout; B. Albert, here, a. 6 ff.; Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text; Giles of Rome, here, q. 2, a. 3.
← Dist. 36, Art. 3, Q. 2