Dist. 17, Part 3, Art. 2, Q. 3
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 17
Quaestio III. Utrum teneamur confiteri omnem peccati circumstantiam.
Tertio quaeritur, utrum teneamur confiteri omnem peccati circumstantiam. Et quod sic, videtur.
1. Quia Augustinus dicit sic in libro de Poenitentia1, enarrans multiplicia genera circumstantiarum: « Omnis, inquit, ista varietas confitenda est et deflenda ».
2. Item, ratione videtur: quia confessio maxime fit ad sciendam peccati quantitatem, quia imponenda est poenitentia secundum mensuram et aestimationem peccati, sicut dicitur Levitici quinto2; sed penes circumstantias consistit peccati quantitas: ergo necesse est eas confiteri. Prima manifesta est; secunda probatur per hoc quod dicit Bernardus, quod « nugae in ore sacerdotis blasphemiae sunt ». Hoc autem non dicit nisi propter aggravationem peccati: ergo etc.
3. Item, in confessione necesse est genus peccati aperiri; sed genus peccati variatur per circumstantias, sicut patet; cognoscere enim non suam, quae soluta est, fornicatio est; cognoscere non suam, quae habet virum, est adulterium: ergo necesse est confiteri circumstantias.
4. Item, confessio potissime fit ad erubescentiam; sed maior est erubescentia in confessione circumstantiarum adiacentium quam etiam in enarratione actus: ergo videtur, quod potissime circa circumstantias in confessione insistendum est.
5. Item, confessio principaliter fit ad accusationem peccantis; sed accusatio actionis est ex circumstantiis. Unde Tullius in primo Rhetoricae: « Circumstantiae sunt, a quibus trahuntur argumenta accusationis, vel defensionis ». Et Boethius in quarto3: « Circumstantiae sunt, quae quaestionem rhetoricam faciunt de laude et vituperio personae ».
6. Item, strictius est divinum iudicium quam humanum; sed in humano iudicio modo4 fit inquisitio et responsio de circumstantiis, unde non est sufficiens quaerere de actu: ergo multo fortius in iudicio divino. Sed hoc est iudicium poenitentiae: ergo etc.
7. Item, diligentius curandus est morbus spiritualis quam corporalis, sicut magna diligentia est habenda circa spiritum et maior quam circa corpus; sed morbus corporalis non detegitur sufficienter, nisi etiam circumstantiae detegantur: ergo etc.
Contra:
1. Translato principali, necesse est, quod transferatur annexum, sicut Apostolus dicit ad Hebraeos septimo5: Translato sacerdotio, necesse est, ut Legis translatio fiat; sed peccatum est principale: ergo si per confessionem Dominus transfert peccatum, pari ratione et circumstantiam.
2. Item, circumstantiae sunt infinitae nobis; et nullus tenetur ad illud quod sibi est impossibile6: ergo non tenetur circumstantias peccati recolligere et referre.
3. Item, non est necesse, quod peccatori imponat sacerdos ita gravem poenam, sicut exigit culpa, immo tota die imponuntur multo minores: ergo pari ratione non est necesse, quod peccator confiteatur, se ita graviter peccasse, sicut peccavit.
4. Item, si tenetur confiteri circumstantias ad sciendam quantitatem peccati; sed quantitas peccati non scitur, nisi sciantur circumstantiae alleviantes sicut aggravantes, et circumstantiae defendentes sicut accusantes: ergo homo tenetur in confessione se ipsum excusare, sed hoc est falsum: ergo etc.
5. Item, videtur, quod circumstantia non augeat quantitatem, quia in bonis quantitas meriti non causatur ex circumstantiis, sed ex quantitate amoris, quo convertitur homo ad Deum7: ergo pari ratione, cum peccatum sit aversio, quantitas peccati consistit in libidine sive contemptu cordis: non ergo in circumstantia exteriori.
6. Item, videtur, quod non det speciem peccato, quia omne illud, quod dat speciem et formam, debet esse essentiale et intrinsecum et unicum8; sed circumstantiae sunt extrinsecae et accidentales et variabiles: ergo nulla circumstantia trahit in genus peccati novum: non ergo videtur, quod oporteat circumstantias confiteri.
Est igitur quaestio, quas oporteat confiteri, et quas non.
Conclusio. Confessio circumstantiarum speciem mutantium necessaria est, aggravantium est congrua, alleviantium vero potius incongrua.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod circumstantiae, quae attingunt peccatum, quaedam sunt alleviantes, quaedam in aliud genus trahentes, quaedam aliquo modo aggravantes. Circumstantias in aliud genus trahentes confiteri est necessarium, quoniam genus peccati confiteri oportet. — Circumstantias vero alleviantes confiteri non est bonum, nisi propter hoc, ut satisfiat alienae inquisitioni, vel ut provideatur eius scandalo et perturbationi, utpote si timeret9, confessorem ex hoc accipere occasionem ad malum vel si etiam tantum diminuat, ut sit in genere venialis, sicut comedere carnes in Quadragesima propter infirmitatem, ita tamen, quod a latere non sit gulositas aliqua. Et ratio huius est, quia in confessione non debet peccator se excusare, sed accusare. — De circumstantiis autem, quae aggravant, si genus peccati non mutatum est, est inter doctores opinio diversa.
Quidam enim dicunt, quod poenitentes tenentur confiteri; sed praeceptum affirmativum est et obligat non ad semper, sed pro loco et tempore, scilicet quando eas cognoscit, sive per se, sive per inquisitionem alienam. Unde sapiens et intelligens tenetur eas confiteri absque inquisitione, simplex tenetur, si ab eo inquiratur.
Alii dicunt, quod non tenemur ad confessionem harum circumstantiarum tentione necessitatis, sed de bono et aequo; et quanto magis sapientes et perfecti, tanto magis debent distinctius eas explicare; sed non tenentur ad hoc, nisi forte ex propria conscientia obligentur. — Hanc positionem credo probabiliorem.
Unde dicendum, quod confessio circumstantiarum in aliud genus trahentium spectat ad confessionem quantum ad necessitatem; confessio vero aggravantium quantum ad congruitatem; confessio vero alleviantium potius facit incongruitatem; et hoc intelligatur, exceptis casibus praedictis.
Omnes igitur rationes probantes, circumstantias esse confitendas, sunt congruitatis quantum ad aggravantes; aliter, si velint probare necessitatem, ab insufficienti procedunt, illa excepta, quae est de circumstantia trahente in aliud genus.
Ad argumenta:
Ad 1. 2. 4. 5. 7. Unde verbum Augustini consilium est. — Et quod obiicitur de quantitate et erubescentia et accusatione et diligentia habenda, non concludunt10, nisi quod competentius fiat, si exprimatur cuiuslibet peccati circumstantia.
Quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod non oportet eas confiteri, concedendum11 est.
4. Tamen illud quod obiicit, quod circumstantiae alleviantes sunt confitendae etc.; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia aggravantes non tantum oportet confiteri propter quantitatem peccati, verum etiam propter erubescentiam et accusationem.
5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non augent quantitatem; dicendum, quod non augent principaliter, sed quia augent contemptum, vel libidinem. Nec est simile de bono; quia enim boni sumus, bona facimus12; unde quantitas bonitatis venit ab habitu intrinseco, sed quantitas malitiae ab actu; quia enim mala facimus, mali sumus.
6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non mutat speciem; dicendum, quod est esse naturae et est esse moris. Et aliquid est alicui accidentale secundum esse naturae, quod tamen est essentiale secundum esse moris; et quamvis circumstantiae sint accidentales actui secundum esse naturae, tamen essentiales sunt secundum laudem et vituperium, quae laus venit ex parte moris, vel eius contrarium. Et si tu obiicias, quod non debent dici circumstantiae; dicendum, quod aliqua est circumstantia respectu esse naturalis, quae non est circumstantia respectu peccati, sed forma, utpote furti accipere rem non suam, invito Domino13. Aliquando circumstantia est accidentalis respectu actus quantum ad esse naturae et in quantum peccatum, quia sine ea nihilominus est peccatum, sicut accipere rem alienam et sacram de loco sacro, et ita est circumstantia et forma; sed circumstantia respectu peccati furti, quia sine ea poterat esse furtum, sed forma respectu sacrilegii14.
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Question III. Whether we are bound to confess every circumstance of sin.
Thirdly it is asked whether we are bound to confess every circumstance of sin. And that we are, seems to be the case.
1. Because Augustine speaks thus in his book On Penance1, setting forth the manifold kinds of circumstances: "All this variety," he says, "is to be confessed and bewailed."
2. Likewise, it seems so by reason: for confession is made chiefly to know the magnitude of sin, because the penance is to be imposed according to the measure and estimation of sin, as is said in Leviticus 52; but the magnitude of sin lies in the circumstances: therefore it is necessary to confess them. The first is manifest; the second is proved by what Bernard says, that "trifles in the mouth of a priest are blasphemies." But he says this only on account of the aggravation of sin: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, in confession it is necessary that the kind of sin be disclosed; but the kind of sin is varied by circumstances, as is plain; for to know a woman not one's own, who is unmarried, is fornication; to know one not one's own, who has a husband, is adultery: therefore it is necessary to confess the circumstances.
4. Likewise, confession is made especially for shame; but there is greater shame in confessing the adjacent circumstances than even in the narration of the act: therefore it seems that in confession one ought to dwell especially upon the circumstances.
5. Likewise, confession is made principally for the accusation of the one sinning; but the accusation of the action is from the circumstances. Whence Tully in the first book of the Rhetoric: "Circumstances are those from which the arguments of accusation or of defense are drawn." And Boethius in the fourth3: "Circumstances are those which make the rhetorical question concerning the praise and blame of a person."
6. Likewise, the divine judgment is stricter than the human; but in human judgment inquiry and response concerning circumstances is now4 made, whence it is not sufficient to ask about the act: therefore much more so in the divine judgment. But this is the judgment of penance: therefore etc.
7. Likewise, the spiritual sickness is to be tended more diligently than the bodily, just as great diligence is to be had concerning the spirit and greater than concerning the body; but bodily sickness is not sufficiently detected unless the circumstances also be detected: therefore etc.
On the contrary:
1. The principal being transferred, it is necessary that what is annexed be transferred, as the Apostle says to the Hebrews in the seventh chapter5: The priesthood being transferred, it is necessary that a transfer of the Law also be made; but sin is the principal: therefore if through confession the Lord transfers sin, by equal reasoning the circumstance also.
2. Likewise, the circumstances are infinite to us; and no one is bound to that which is impossible to him6: therefore he is not bound to gather up and report the circumstances of sin.
3. Likewise, it is not necessary that the priest impose on the sinner so grave a penalty as the fault demands, but rather much lesser ones are imposed every day: therefore by equal reasoning it is not necessary that the sinner confess that he has sinned as gravely as he did sin.
4. Likewise, if he is bound to confess the circumstances in order to know the magnitude of sin; but the magnitude of sin is not known unless the alleviating circumstances be known as well as the aggravating, and the defending circumstances as well as the accusing: therefore a man is bound in confession to excuse himself, but this is false: therefore etc.
5. Likewise, it seems that the circumstance does not increase the magnitude, because in good deeds the magnitude of merit is not caused by the circumstances, but by the magnitude of the love by which a man is turned toward God7: therefore by equal reasoning, since sin is an aversion, the magnitude of sin lies in the lust or contempt of the heart: not, therefore, in the exterior circumstance.
6. Likewise, it seems that it does not give species to the sin, because all that gives species and form ought to be essential and intrinsic and single8; but circumstances are extrinsic and accidental and variable: therefore no circumstance draws sin into a new kind: it does not, therefore, seem that one must confess the circumstances.
There is, then, the question, which ones it is necessary to confess, and which not.
Conclusion. The confession of circumstances changing the species is necessary, that of aggravating ones is fitting, but that of alleviating ones is rather unfitting.
I respond: It must be said that the circumstances which touch upon sin are some alleviating, some drawing it into another kind, and some in some way aggravating. To confess the circumstances drawing it into another kind is necessary, since the kind of sin must be confessed. — But to confess the alleviating circumstances is not good, except for this: that satisfaction be made to another's inquiry, or that provision be made against his scandal and disturbance, as for example if he should fear9 that the confessor might from this take occasion for evil; or also if it so diminishes the sin that it falls within the kind of the venial, as to eat meat in Lent on account of infirmity, yet in such a way that there be no gluttony on the side. And the reason for this is that in confession the sinner ought not to excuse himself, but to accuse himself. — But concerning the circumstances which aggravate, if the kind of sin is not changed, there is a diverse opinion among the doctors.
For some say that penitents are bound to confess them; but it is an affirmative precept and obliges not always, but for the place and the time, namely when he knows them, whether of himself or through another's inquiry. Whence one wise and intelligent is bound to confess them without inquiry; the simple is bound if he be questioned about it.
Others say that we are not bound to the confession of these circumstances by the bond of necessity, but out of what is good and fitting; and the more wise and perfect one is, the more distinctly ought he to explain them; but they are not bound to this, unless perhaps they be obliged out of their own conscience. — This position I believe to be the more probable.
Whence it must be said that the confession of circumstances drawing into another kind pertains to confession as regards necessity; but the confession of aggravating ones as regards fittingness; whereas the confession of alleviating ones rather produces unfittingness; and let this be understood with the aforesaid cases excepted.
All the reasons, therefore, proving that the circumstances are to be confessed, are reasons of fittingness as regards the aggravating ones; otherwise, if they wish to prove necessity, they proceed from an insufficient ground, that one excepted which concerns the circumstance drawing into another kind.
Replies to the arguments:
To 1, 2, 4, 5, 7. Whence the word of Augustine is a counsel. — And as to what is objected concerning the magnitude and the shame and the accusation and the diligence to be had, they do not conclude10 anything except that it be done more becomingly if the circumstance of each sin be expressed.
What is objected on the contrary, that it is not necessary to confess them, is to be conceded11.
4. Yet as to that which objects that the alleviating circumstances are to be confessed etc.; it must be said that it is not the same: because the aggravating ones must be confessed not only on account of the magnitude of sin, but also on account of shame and accusation.
5. To that which is objected, that they do not increase the magnitude; it must be said that they do not increase it principally, but because they increase the contempt or the lust. Nor is it the same with the good; for because we are good, we do good12; whence the magnitude of goodness comes from the intrinsic habit, but the magnitude of malice from the act; for because we do evil, we are evil.
6. To that which is objected, that it does not change the species; it must be said that there is the being of nature and the being of morals. And something is accidental to a thing according to the being of nature, which nevertheless is essential according to the being of morals; and although the circumstances are accidental to the act according to the being of nature, yet they are essential according to praise and blame, which praise comes from the side of morals, or its contrary. And if you object that they ought not to be called circumstances; it must be said that some thing is a circumstance with respect to natural being, which is not a circumstance with respect to sin, but a form, as in theft to take a thing not one's own, against the will of the owner13. Sometimes a circumstance is accidental with respect to the act as regards the being of nature and inasmuch as it is sin, because without it there is nonetheless sin, as to take a thing belonging to another and sacred from a sacred place, and thus it is both a circumstance and a form; but it is a circumstance with respect to the sin of theft, because without it there could be theft, but a form with respect to sacrilege14.
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- 1Sive de Vera et falsa Poenitentia (inter opera August.), c. 14. n. 29. Vide supra lit. Magistri, d. XVI. c. 2, ubi integra verba habentur.Or On True and False Penance (among the works of Augustine), c. 14, n. 29. See above the text of the Master, d. XVI, c. 2, where the words are had in full.
- 2Vers. 18. — Verba Bernardi inveniuntur in II. de Considerat. c. 13. n. 22. Vide etiam supra d. 16. p. I. dub. 7. et 9.V. 18. — The words of Bernard are found in the second book On Consideration, c. 13, n. 22. See also above, d. 16, pars I, dubia 7 and 9.
- 3Formata est haec definitio ex doctrina Ciceronis, I. Rhetor. c. 5. et 23. seqq. Vide supra pag. 400, nota 1, ubi etiam mentio fit ipsius Boethii, qui in IV. de Differentiis topic. definitionem seq. insinuat.This definition is formed from the teaching of Cicero, Rhetoric I, c. 5 and 23 ff. See above, p. 400, note 1, where mention is also made of Boethius himself, who in the fourth book On Topical Differences suggests the following definition.
- 4Plures codd., ut AFGHK 1, omittunt modo.Several codices, such as AFGHK 1, omit modo.
- 5Vers. 12, ubi Vulgata post ut addit et. — In fine arg. voci pari cod. R praemittit necesse est, quod.V. 12, where the Vulgate after ut adds et. — At the end of the argument, before the word pari codex R prefixes necesse est, quod.
- 6Vide supra pag. 234, nota 6.See above, p. 234, note 6.
- 7Cfr. supra pag. 353, nota 6. et pag. 378, nota 3.Cf. above, p. 353, note 6, and p. 378, note 3.
- 8Cfr. tom. II. pag. 225, nota 6. — Plures codd. unitum.Cf. tom. II, p. 225, note 6. — Several codices read unitum.
- 9Codd. R S X timor est, cod. F timerem. Superius pro satisfiat codd. A W et ed. 1 satisfaciat. Aliquanto inferius pro mutatum est cod. G mutant.Codices R, S, X read timor est, codex F timerem. Above, for satisfiat codices A, W and edition 1 read satisfaciat. Somewhat below, for mutatum est codex G reads mutant.
- 10Codd. A 1 K et ed. 1 concludit.Codices A 1 K and edition 1 read concludit.
- 11Vat. Ad illud quod obiicitur in contrarium, dicendum, quod non oportet eas confiteri, congruum est tamen. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod circumstantiae alleviantes etc.The Vatican edition reads: To that which is objected on the contrary, it must be said that it is not necessary to confess them, yet it is fitting. To that which is objected, that the alleviating circumstances etc.
- 12Vide supra pag. 352, nota 10.See above, p. 352, note 10.
- 13Respicitur definitio furti tom. III. pag. 835, nota 3, allata. — Superius pro quae non codd. F G quae tamen non. Iidem codd. mox Aliqua pro Aliquando, et ista est pro ita est.Reference is made to the definition of theft adduced in tom. III, p. 835, note 3. — Above, for quae non codices F and G read quae tamen non. The same codices shortly read Aliqua for Aliquando, and ista est for ita est.
- 14Vide II. Sent. d. 36. dub. 5. — Vide scholion ad I. huius articuli quaest.See the second book of the Sentences, d. 36, dubium 5. — See the scholion to question I of this article. ---