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Dist. 36, Art. 3, Q. 2

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 36

Textus Latinus
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QUAESTIO II.

Utrum omnis poena sit a Deo.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum omnis poena sit a Deo. Et quod sic, videtur.

Ad oppositum.

1. Ad Romanos duodecimo1: Mihi vindictam, et ego retribuam: ergo vindicta proprie competit ipsi Deo; sed omnis punitio vindicta quaedam est: ergo omnis poena et punitio est a Deo.

2. Item, Augustinus dicit, et habetur in littera2: « Omnis poena, si peccati poena est, iusta est et supplicium nominatur »; sed omne quod iustum est, a Deo est: ergo omnis poena a Deo est.

3. Item, ad Romanos primo3: Tradidit illos Deus in passiones ignominiae; Glossa paulo ante: « Deserit Deus non apponendo gratiam, vel appositam subtrahendo ». Si igitur nulla poena magis caret ratione boni et pulcri, quam subtractio gratiae et passio ignominiae; et huiusmodi poenae sunt a Deo, sicut patet ex textu et ex Glossa: ergo et omnis poena.

4. Item, nulla poena est acerbior quam poena infernalis, nulla poena habet plus de ratione privationis et defectus quam poena mortis; sed utraque istarum est a Deo: ergo et omnis alia poena.

5. Item, subtractio gratiae directe opponitur collationi gratiae; sed gratiam dare hoc maxime placet divinae bonitati: ergo inter omnes poenas minime est haec poena a Deo auctore. Sed haec est a Deo auctore: ergo et omnis alia. Probatio minoris: In subtractione gratiae est gratiae annihilatio et quaedam Dei de habitaculo cordis expulsio; sed operatio annihilationis soli Deo est possibilis, sicut dicit Hugo4, cum sit infinita distantia inter extrema; et praeterea, nihil potest Deum eiicere: ergo videtur, quod talis subtractio gratiae non possit esse nisi a Deo tanquam ab auctore.

6. Item, omne illud, quod ordinat inordinatum et restituit honorem Deo sublatum, est a summo Ordinatore et honoris proprii Zelatore; sed omnis poena, secundum quod huiusmodi, est ordinativa culpae — in omni etiam punitione honor redditur Deo, cui subtractus est per culpam — ergo omnis poena, secundum id quod est, procedit a divina iustitia5.

Sed contra:

1. Excaecatio est quaedam poena6; sed excaecatio non est a Deo, sed ex propria malitia, sicut dicitur Sapientiae secundo: Excaecavit illos malitia eorum: ergo non omnis poena est a Deo. Quod autem excaecatio non sit a Deo, apparet tam ex textu quam ex verbis Augustini, qui dicit super illud Ioannis primo: Lux in tenebris lucet, ibi dicit, quod « quomodo caeco praesens est lux corporalis, et ipse non est praesens lumini »; sic intelligendum est in luce spirituali, et hoc ipse textus innuit.

2. Item, amissio sive exspoliatio gratuitorum est quaedam poena; sed haec non est a Deo, immo potius a diabolo, secundum quod dicitur, Lucae decimo7, de homine descendente a Ierusalem in Iericho, qui a latronibus fuit vulneratus et spoliatus: ergo non omnis poena est a Deo. Quod autem exspoliatio gratuitorum non sit a Deo, apparet per hoc quod dicit Anselmus, quod « homo non habet gratiam, non quia Deus non dat, sed quia ipse non recipit ».

3. Item, imaginis deformatio est quaedam poena; sed Deus imaginem suam nullo modo deformat, immo indignatur contra deformantem: ergo non omnis poena est a Deo. Quod autem imaginis deformatio non sit a Deo, apparet, quoniam imaginem Dei deformare est contumeliam Deo inferre; sed Deus nunquam facit sibi contumeliam: ergo nunquam deformat imaginem suam.

4. Item, nullus purus defectus est a Deo; aliqua poena est purus defectus: ergo aliqua poena non est a Deo. Maior per se manifesta est, quia defectus non habet causam efficientem, sed deficientem;

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sed Deus nullius est causa deficiens8. Minor probatur, quia ignorantia nihil aliud est quam spiritualis tenebra: ergo est privatio pura; et ignorantia est poena: ergo etc.

5. Item, nullum vitium est a Deo; aliqua poena est vitium, utpote malitia et concupiscentia: ergo aliqua poena est, quae non est a Deo. Maior et minor per se manifestae sunt.

6. Item, nullum peccatum est a Deo; sed aliquod peccatum est poena, sicut ostensum est supra9, et manifeste apparet in illa deformitate, quae remanet in anima post culpam perpetratam: ergo aliqua poena est, quae non est a Deo.

Conclusio.

Omnis poena, quatenus tenet rationem poenae, est a Deo, non tamen id quod dicitur poena, a Deo est, si importat defectum simpliciter, vel aliquam positionem cum deordinatione.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod poena de sui generali acceptione dicit nocumentum ordinatum10. Nocumentum autem comparationem habet et ad ipsum nocivum, et ad illud quod patitur nocumentum, et ad illud, secundum cuius privationem nocumentum illud attenditur. Et secundum istam triplicem comparationem nomen poenae habet triplicem acceptionem. Unde dicitur poena aliquando actio rei laedentis, secundum quod adustio ignis infernalis dicitur esse poena reproborum. Dicitur etiam poena passio rei laesae sive punitae, secundum quod dicitur: afflictio reproborum est eorum poena aeterna. Dicitur etiam defectus alicuius boni, in quem incurritur ex illa passione, sicut defectus quietis, salutis et pacis est poena reproborum.

Quocumque autem istorum modorum dicatur poena, sive actio, sive passio, sive defectus, semper nomen poenae, ut sic est, impositum est ab ordine; et quod dicit nominat ut ordinatum. Et quoniam omne ordinatum, ut tale est, procedit a Deo, a quo est omnis ordo; quocumque modo dicatur poena, et quidquid dicitur poena, in quantum poena, a Deo est, quoniam omne ordinatum a Deo est. A Deo enim habet, quod sit ordinatum, et Deo placet omnis ordo, et idem est fieri Deo auctore et Deo volente11.

Si autem loquamur de poena secundum illud quod subest huic ordini, a quo imponitur nomen poenae; tunc dicendum est, quod si poena dicatur defectus sive carentia alicuius boni, sic dicendum est, quod talis defectus a Deo non est; non enim habet causam efficientem, sed deficientem, nec poena, quae talem defectum nominat, est a Deo. — Si autem poena dicatur ipsa passio rei punitae, quae est via ad defectum alicuius boni, tunc distinguendum est: quia quaedam est passio, quae est ordinata simpliciter12; quaedam vero, quae, quamvis sit ordinata secundum quid, est tamen deordinata simpliciter; quaedam vero medio modo se habens. Passio illa, quae est ordinata simpliciter, illa est passio, quae est pure poenalis, sicut passio famis et sitis, et talis passio a Deo est; unde fames et sitis a Deo dicitur esse. — Passio vero, quae est deordinata simpliciter, sed ordinata secundum quid, est illa quae est culpabilis, sicut est deformatio imaginis et corruptio habilitatis ad bonum; et talis non est concedenda esse a Deo. — Passio vero media est illa, quae est passio vitiosa, utpote illa quae est ex rebellione carnis ad spiritum, quae quodam modo ordinata est ad culpam praecedentem, quodam modo deordinata est, quia est inclinativa ad culpam sequentem; et haec non conceditur esse a Deo. Et Magister dixit supra distinctione trigesima secunda13, quod « fomes et concupiscentia non habent Deum auctorem, sed diabolum aut hominem ». — Et sicut distinctum est de poena, prout dicitur passio rei punitae, sic distinguendum est de poena, prout dicitur actio rei punitivae.

Ex praedictis igitur patet, quod etsi omnis poena sit a Deo, in quantum tenet rationem poenae, non omne tamen, quod dicitur poena, a Deo est; immo quaedam est a Deo, quaedam non. Illa est a Deo, quae dicit positionem aliquam, ita quod non nominat deordinationem; et haec est simpliciter poena. Illa vero non est concedenda esse a Deo, quae nominat simpliciter defectum, vel quae nominat positionem aliquam cum deordinatione. Unde nec conceditur a Deo esse excaecatio nec obduratio nec imaginis deformatio nec gratiae subtractio sive exspoliatio nec error nec ignorantia nec concupiscentia nec his consimilia; omnia enim haec vel dicunt defectum, vel deordinationem aliquam. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, quod non omnis poena est a Deo.

1. 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnis vindicta est a Deo, et similiter ad sequens, quo dicitur, quod omnis poena iusta est; dicendum, quod illae

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duae rationes non concludunt, nisi quod poena sit a Deo sub ratione poenae; sic enim aliquid dicit, quod respicit ordinem, qui attenditur secundum ultionem divinae iustitiae. De eo autem, quod subest, non oportet illud intelligi, quod sit a Deo; nam « crimina criminibus vindicantur », secundum quod Sancti dicunt, et supra14 ostensum fuit.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod passio ignominiae et subtractio gratiae est a Deo; dicendum, quod proprie loquendo, neutrum a Deo esse conceditur nisi permissive, secundum quod Deus dicitur obdurare, quia, ipso gratiam non apponente, homo obduratur; sicut etiam Deus dicitur tradere in desideria cordis. Unde Glossa dicit ibidem15: « Tradere est permittere, et non incitare, sed dimittere; praecedentibus quippe culparum causis, iure et merito deseruntur a Deo »; et per hoc, quod deseruntur, desideriis traduntur. Similiter, quod dicitur Deus gratiam subtrahere, hoc non est, quod auferat datam, sed quia, homine se avertente, Deus eam non continuat.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de poena mortis et aeternae damnationis, dicendum, quod utraque a Deo est; utraque enim positionem aliquam vel dispositionem16 nominat sine deordinatione aliqua. — Et si obiiciat, quod poena infernalis est acerbissima; dicendum, quod acerbitas non impedit, quin poena sit a Deo, sed potius deordinatio et defectus. — Et si obiiciat, quod mors dicit defectum; dico, quod mors non tantum dicit defectum, immo dicit passionem et progressum ab esse in non-esse, qui quidem est per animae et corporis separationem, ubi est ergo dolor et afflictio. Et licet defectus consequatur ad illam passionem, mors tamen non nominat purum defectum, sed potius passionem et transitum illum; et ideo conceditur mors esse a Deo, quamvis non concedatur de aliis poenis, quarum nomina imponuntur ab ipso defectu.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod subtractio gratiae est a Deo; dicendum, quod falsum est, proprie loquendo, nisi dicatur permissive, ut dictum est. — Quod vero obiicitur17, quod ibi est annihilatio et Dei expulsio; dicendum, quod Deum expelli non est aliud quam gratiam Dei repelli. Gratiam autem Dei repelli non est aliud quam gratiam corrumpi, pro eo quod ipsa, cum sit accidens, non habet salvari, nisi in substantia rationali. Gratia autem corrumpitur et annihilatur non per actionem contrarii agentis, sed propter defectum in se ipsa. Deficit autem in se ipsa propter hoc, quod subiectum deficit sibi. Anima enim non est nata esse subiectum gratiae nisi per conversionem sui ad Deum; et ideo, cum se a Deo avertit, iam gratia gratum faciens in ea non potest salvari, et ideo in se ipsa deficit. — Quod ergo obiicitur, quod nihil potest gratiam annihilare et Deum de habitaculo suo eiicere; dicendum, quod illa ratio procedit, ac si talis annihilatio vel eiectio fieret per virtutem alicuius agentis. Hoc autem non fit, immo fit propter ineptitudinem suscipientis, sicut visum est18.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omne ordinatum, et quod reddit honorem Deo, est a Deo; dicendum, quod verum est in quantum tale. Sed cum assumit19, quod omnis poena est huiusmodi; verum est in quantum poena; et tunc conclusio vera est, videlicet, quod omnis poena, in quantum poena, a Deo est. Sed si ex hoc arguatur ulterius, quod omne illud, quod dicitur poena, est a Deo, utpote culpa vel vitium vel defectus, fiet sophisma secundum accidens20, quia quaedam sunt, quae Deo attribuere potius sonat in contumeliam quam in gloriam. — Et propterea si alicubi unquam inveniatur, quod concupiscentia vel ignorantia vel cetera similia a Deo sint, exponenda sunt verba, vel quod21 dicta sunt esse a Deo, quia sunt permissive, vel quia dicuntur esse a Deo, in quantum sunt poenae, vel dicuntur esse a Deo, secundum quod concernunt aliquod ens, non secundum illud, a quo primo et principaliter imponuntur22.

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English Translation

QUESTION II.

Whether every punishment is from God.

Secondly it is asked, whether every punishment is from God. And that it is, it seems.

To the opposite.

1. Romans, twelfth [chapter]1: Vengeance is mine, and I will repay: therefore vengeance properly belongs to God himself; but every punishing is a certain vengeance: therefore every penalty and punishment is from God.

2. Likewise, Augustine says, and it is found in the [Master's] text2: « Every punishment, if it is the punishment of sin, is just and is called a chastisement »; but everything that is just is from God: therefore every punishment is from God.

3. Likewise, Romans, first [chapter]3: God delivered them up to passions of ignominy; the Gloss a little before: « God deserts [them] by not bestowing grace, or by withdrawing grace once bestowed ». If therefore no punishment lacks the character of the good and the beautiful more than the withdrawal of grace and the passion of ignominy; and punishments of this kind are from God, as is clear from the text and from the Gloss: therefore [so is] every punishment.

4. Likewise, no punishment is more bitter than the punishment of hell, no punishment has more of the character of privation and defect than the punishment of death; but each of these is from God: therefore [so is] every other punishment.

5. Likewise, the withdrawal of grace is directly opposed to the bestowal of grace; but to give grace pleases the divine goodness most of all: therefore among all punishments this punishment is least from God as author. But this is from God as author: therefore [so is] every other. Proof of the minor: In the withdrawal of grace there is the annihilation of grace and a certain expulsion of God from the dwelling of the heart; but the operation of annihilation is possible to God alone, as Hugh says4, since there is an infinite distance between the extremes; and besides, nothing can cast out God: therefore it seems that such a withdrawal of grace cannot be except from God as from author.

6. Likewise, everything which orders the disordered and restores to God the honor taken away, is from the supreme Orderer and Zealot of his own honor; but every punishment, insofar as it is of this kind, is ordering of guilt — in every punishment too honor is rendered to God, of whom [it] was withdrawn through guilt — therefore every punishment, according to that which it is, proceeds from divine justice5.

On the contrary:

1. Blinding is a certain punishment6; but blinding is not from God, but from one's own malice, as is said in Wisdom, second [chapter]: Their own malice blinded them: therefore not every punishment is from God. But that blinding is not from God is apparent both from the text and from the words of Augustine, who says, upon that place of John, first [chapter]: The light shines in the darkness, there he says, that « as bodily light is present to a blind man, and he himself is not present to the light »; so it is to be understood in regard to spiritual light, and the text itself suggests this.

2. Likewise, the loss or despoiling of the gratuitous [gifts] is a certain punishment; but this is not from God, but rather from the devil, according to what is said, in Luke, tenth [chapter]7, of the man going down from Jerusalem to Jericho, who by robbers was wounded and despoiled: therefore not every punishment is from God. But that the despoiling of the gratuitous [gifts] is not from God is apparent through what Anselm says, that « the human does not have grace, not because God does not give [it], but because he himself does not receive [it] ».

3. Likewise, the deformation of the image is a certain punishment; but God in no way deforms his image, but rather is indignant against the one deforming [it]: therefore not every punishment is from God. But that the deformation of the image is not from God is apparent, because to deform the image of God is to inflict an affront upon God; but God never does an affront to himself: therefore he never deforms his image.

4. Likewise, no pure defect is from God; some punishment is a pure defect: therefore some punishment is not from God. The major is manifest of itself, because a defect does not have an efficient cause, but a deficient one;

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but God is the deficient cause of nothing8. The minor is proven, because ignorance is nothing other than spiritual darkness: therefore it is pure privation; and ignorance is a punishment: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, no vice is from God; some punishment is a vice, such as malice and concupiscence: therefore there is some punishment which is not from God. The major and minor are manifest of themselves.

6. Likewise, no sin is from God; but some sin is a punishment, as has been shown above9, and it is manifestly apparent in that deformity which remains in the soul after guilt has been perpetrated: therefore there is some punishment which is not from God.

Conclusion.

Every punishment, insofar as it holds the character of punishment, is from God; yet that which is called punishment is not from God, if it imports a defect simply, or some position with disorder.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that punishment, in its general acceptation, states an ordered harm10. But harm has a relation both to the harmful thing itself, and to that which suffers the harm, and to that according to whose privation that harm is regarded. And according to this threefold relation the name of punishment has a threefold acceptation. Whence punishment is sometimes called the action of the thing inflicting harm, according to which the burning of the infernal fire is said to be the punishment of the reprobate. Punishment is also called the passion of the thing harmed or punished, according to which it is said: the affliction of the reprobate is their eternal punishment. It is also called the defect of some good, into which one falls from that passion, as the defect of rest, of health, and of peace is the punishment of the reprobate.

But in whichever of these modes punishment is called, whether action, or passion, or defect, the name of punishment, as it is so, is always imposed from order; and what it states it names as ordered. And since everything ordered, as such, proceeds from God, from whom is all order; in whatever mode punishment is called, and whatever is called punishment, insofar as it is punishment, is from God, because everything ordered is from God. For from God it has, that it is ordered, and to God all order is pleasing, and it is the same to come about with God as author and with God willing [it]11.

But if we speak of punishment according to that which underlies this order, from which the name of punishment is imposed; then it must be said that if punishment is called the defect or lack of some good, thus it must be said that such a defect is not from God; for it does not have an efficient cause, but a deficient one, nor is the punishment, which names such a defect, from God. — But if punishment is called the very passion of the thing punished, which is the way to the defect of some good, then it must be distinguished: because there is a certain passion which is ordered simply12; another, indeed, which, although it be ordered in a certain respect, is nevertheless disordered simply; and another holding in a middle mode. That passion which is ordered simply, that is the passion which is purely penal, such as the passion of hunger and thirst, and such a passion is from God; whence hunger and thirst are said to be from God. — But the passion which is disordered simply, but ordered in a certain respect, is that which is culpable, such as is the deformation of the image and the corruption of the aptitude for the good; and such is not to be granted to be from God. — But the middle passion is that which is the vicious passion, such as that which is from the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit, which in a certain mode is ordered to a preceding guilt, in a certain mode is disordered, because it is inclining toward a following guilt; and this is not granted to be from God. And the Master said above, in the thirty-second distinction13, that « the tinder [of sin] and concupiscence do not have God as author, but the devil or the human ». — And just as it has been distinguished concerning punishment, insofar as it is called the passion of the thing punished, so it must be distinguished concerning punishment, insofar as it is called the action of the punishing thing.

From the foregoing therefore it is clear that, although every punishment is from God insofar as it holds the character of punishment, yet not everything which is called punishment is from God; rather a certain [punishment] is from God, a certain [punishment] not. That is from God which states some position, in such a way that it does not name disorder; and this is simply punishment. But that is not to be granted to be from God which names simply a defect, or which names some position with disorder. Whence neither is it granted to be from God that there be blinding, nor hardening, nor deformation of the image, nor withdrawal of grace or despoiling, nor error, nor ignorance, nor concupiscence, nor things like these; for all these either state a defect, or some disorder. — The reasons showing that not every punishment is from God are therefore to be granted.

1. 2. To that which is objected, that every vengeance is from God, and likewise to the following, by which it is said that every punishment is just; it must be said that those

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two reasons conclude only that punishment is from God under the character of punishment; for thus it states something which regards the order which is regarded according to the avenging of divine justice. But concerning that which underlies [it], it is not necessary to understand it to be from God; for « crimes are avenged by crimes », according to what the Saints say, and as was shown above14.

3. To that which is objected, that the passion of ignominy and the withdrawal of grace is from God; it must be said that, properly speaking, neither is granted to be from God except permissively, according to which God is said to harden, because, with him not bestowing grace, the human is hardened; just as also God is said to deliver up into the desires of the heart. Whence the Gloss says in the same place15: « To deliver up is to permit, and not to incite, but to let go; for, with the causes of guilt going before, they are by right and merit deserted by God »; and through this, that they are deserted, they are delivered up to [their] desires. Likewise, that God is said to withdraw grace, this is not that he takes away what was given, but because, with the human turning himself away, God does not continue it.

4. To that which is objected concerning the punishment of death and of eternal damnation, it must be said that each is from God; for each names some position or disposition16 without any disorder. — And if one object, that the punishment of hell is most bitter; it must be said that bitterness does not prevent the punishment from being from God, but rather disorder and defect do. — And if one object, that death states a defect; I say that death does not only state a defect, but rather states a passion and a passage from being into non-being, which indeed is through the separation of soul and body, where therefore there is pain and affliction. And although a defect follows upon that passion, death nevertheless does not name a pure defect, but rather that passion and passage; and therefore death is granted to be from God, although it not be granted concerning the other punishments, whose names are imposed from the defect itself.

5. To that which is objected, that the withdrawal of grace is from God; it must be said that it is false, properly speaking, unless it be called [so] permissively, as has been said. — But to that which is objected17, that there is in it annihilation and the expulsion of God; it must be said that for God to be expelled is nothing other than for the grace of God to be repelled. But for the grace of God to be repelled is nothing other than for grace to be corrupted, for the reason that it, since it is an accident, cannot be preserved except in a rational substance. But grace is corrupted and annihilated not through the action of a contrary agent, but on account of a defect in itself. And it fails in itself for this reason, that the subject fails it. For the soul is not born to be the subject of grace except through its conversion to God; and therefore, when it turns itself away from God, now sanctifying grace cannot be preserved in it, and so it fails in itself. — To that therefore which is objected, that nothing can annihilate grace and cast God out of his dwelling; it must be said that that argument proceeds as if such annihilation or ejection were brought about through the power of some agent. But this does not come about; rather it comes about on account of the unfitness of the recipient, as has been seen18.

6. To that which is objected, that everything ordered, and what renders honor to God, is from God; it must be said that it is true insofar as [it is] such. But when it assumes19 that every punishment is of this kind; it is true insofar as [it is] punishment; and then the conclusion is true, namely, that every punishment, insofar as [it is] punishment, is from God. But if from this it be argued further, that everything which is called punishment is from God, such as guilt or vice or defect, there will be a fallacy of accident20, because there are certain things which to attribute to God sounds rather to [his] reproach than to [his] glory. — And therefore if anywhere it ever be found that concupiscence or ignorance or the rest of such things are from God, the words are to be expounded, either [in the sense] that21 they are said to be from God because they are [so] permissively, or because they are said to be from God insofar as they are punishments, or [because] they are said to be from God according as they concern some being, not according to that from which they are first and principally imposed22.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 19. Vulgata: Mihi vindicta, ego.
    Verse 19. The Vulgate: Mihi vindicta, ego ("Vengeance is mine, I [will repay]").
  2. Hic c. 2. et 5.
    Here c. 2 and 5.
  3. Vers. 26. — Glossa allegata pertinet ad v. 24. et habetur apud Petr. Lombardum. Cfr. etiam hic lit. Magistri, c. 3.
    Verse 26. — The Gloss adduced pertains to v. 24 and is found in Peter Lombard. Cfr. also here the text of the Master, c. 3.
  4. Libr. 1. de Sacram. p. VI. c. 37. Vide supra pag. 729, nota 6.
    Book 1. On the Sacraments, p. VI. c. 37. See above p. 729, note 6.
  5. Cfr. Anselm., I. Cur Deus homo, c. 13-15.
    Cfr. Anselm, I. Why God [Became] Man, c. 13-15.
  6. Vers. 21. — Seq. textus est loc. cit. v. 5. Verba Augustini vide supra pag. 123, nota 6. — Aliquanto inferius post Lux in tenebris lucet Vat. omittit ibi dicit, quae verba re vera superflua sunt, nisi forte verba qui dicit, quae immediate habentur post Augustini, aut expunguntur, quod in cod. W factum est, aut potius commutantur in quae dicit.
    Verse 21. — The following text is at the place cited, v. 5. For the words of Augustine see above p. 123, note 6. — A little below, after Lux in tenebris lucet ("The light shines in the darkness"), the Vatican [edition] omits ibi dicit, which words are in truth superfluous, unless perhaps the words qui dicit, which are had immediately after Augustini, are either expunged, which was done in cod. W, or rather changed into quae dicit.
  7. Vers. 30. Cfr. supra pag. 506, nota 3. et pag. 700, nota 1. — Dictum Anselmi habetur in Dialog. de Casu diaboli, c. 2. seq. Cfr. supra pag. 247, nota 1. et tom. I. pag. 720, nota 6. — Vat. hic textum valde mutilavit. Omissis enim ultima huius arg. parte inde a verbis Quod autem exspoliatus, nec non prima parte arg. sequentis usque ad verba Quod autem imaginis, haec duo argg. in unum perperam confudit.
    Verse 30. Cfr. above p. 506, note 3, and p. 700, note 1. — The saying of Anselm is found in the Dialogue on the Fall of the Devil, c. 2 seq. Cfr. above p. 247, note 1, and tom. I. p. 720, note 6. — The Vatican [edition] here greatly mutilated the text. For, omitting the last part of this argument from the words Quod autem exspoliatus ("But that the despoiling..."), as well as the first part of the following argument up to the words Quod autem imaginis ("But that... of the image"), it wrongly confused these two arguments into one.
  8. Cfr. August., XII. de Civ. Dei, c. 8. Idem in Enarrat. in Ps. 34. serm. I. n. 9. ignorantiam vocat tenebram. — In initio arg. post Item Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 interserit si, et deinde sola post defectus est a Deo interiicit et.
    Cfr. Augustine, XII. On the City of God, c. 8. The same, in Enarration on Ps. 34, serm. I. n. 9, calls ignorance tenebram ("darkness"). — At the beginning of the argument, after Item, the Vatican [edition] with edd. 3, 4 inserts si, and then alone, after defectus est a Deo, interjects et.
  9. Art. I. q. 1. et d. 33. a. I. q. 2.
    Art. I. q. 1, and d. 33. a. I. q. 2.
  10. Isidor., V. Etymolog. c. 27. n. 2: Poena dicta, quod puniat. — Mox pro nocivum codd. K M T V bb ee etc. nocumentum.
    Isidore, V. Etymologies, c. 27. n. 2: Poena ("punishment") is so called, because it punishes (puniat). — Presently for nocivum codd. K M T V bb ee etc. [read] nocumentum.
  11. August., 83 Qq. q. 3: Illo autem auctore cum dicitur, illo volente dicitur. — Paulo superius post poena, a Deo est Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 incongrue addit et; at mox sola et ante Deo placet et ante idem est hanc particulam omittit; deinde post idem est subiicit enim.
    Augustine, 83 Questions, q. 3: But when it is said [to be] with him as author, it is said [to be] with him willing [it]. — A little above, after poena, a Deo est, the Vatican [edition] with edd. 3, 4 incongruously adds et; but presently it alone omits this particle et before Deo placet and before idem est; then after idem est it adds enim.
  12. In multis codd., ut B C E F H K O R S T W Y etc., et in edd. 3, 4 deest simpliciter.
    In many codices, such as B C E F H K O R S T W Y etc., and in edd. 3, 4, simpliciter is lacking.
  13. Cap. 3. — In Vat., edd. 3, 4 et in aliquibus codd. desiderantur verba, quae mox sequuntur: sicut distinctum est... usque ad rei punitae inclusive.
    Cap. 3. — In the Vatican [edition], edd. 3, 4, and in some codices, the words which follow presently are lacking: sicut distinctum est... ("just as it has been distinguished...") up to rei punitae inclusively.
  14. Art. I. q. 1. Verbum August. vide hic lit. Magist. c. 3.
    Art. I. q. 1. For the word of Augustine see here the text of the Master, c. 3.
  15. Super Rom. 1, 24; vide Petr. Lombard. in hunc locum. — Versus finem solutionis ante datam Vat. repetit gratiam.
    On Rom. 1, 24; see Peter Lombard on this place. — Toward the end of the solution, before datam, the Vatican [edition] repeats gratiam.
  16. Codd. K (a secunda manu) T ee et alii cum ed. 1 in positionem. Particula vel, quae voci dispositionem praecedit, deest in codd. K (a secunda manu) T ee; codd. H Y bb pro ea substituerunt et.
    Codd. K (by a second hand) T ee and others, with ed. 1, [read] in positionem. The particle vel, which precedes the word dispositionem, is lacking in codd. K (by a second hand) T ee; codd. H Y bb substituted et for it.
  17. Cod. V et ed. 1 Ad illud vero quod obiicitur.
    Cod. V and ed. 1 [read] Ad illud vero quod obiicitur ("But to that which is objected").
  18. Cfr. supra d. 26. q. 5. praesertim ad 5. — Paulo superius pro eiectio edd. praeter 1 cum pluribus codd. abiectio.
    Cfr. above d. 26. q. 5, especially ad 5. — A little above, for eiectio the editions except 1, with several codices, [read] abiectio.
  19. Sive aliis verbis: cum in minori dicit. — Paulo ante post dicendum, quod Vat. et edd. 3, 4 addunt hoc.
    Or in other words: when it says it in the minor. — A little before, after dicendum, quod, the Vatican [edition] and edd. 3, 4 add hoc.
  20. Vide tom. I. pag. 58, nota 5, et infra d. 37. a. 2. q. 1. in fine. — Mox pro attribuere Vat. attributa, edd. 3, 4 attribuere possunt, cod. ee attribui possunt. Subinde pro sonat Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 et plures codd. sonant.
    See tom. I. p. 58, note 5, and below d. 37. a. 2. q. 1. at the end. — Presently for attribuere the Vatican [edition reads] attributa, edd. 3, 4 attribuere possunt, cod. ee attribui possunt. Thereupon for sonat the Vatican [edition] with edd. 3, 4 and several codices [read] sonant.
  21. Cod. F quia.
    Cod. F [reads] quia.
  22. Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    See the scholion to the preceding question.
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