Dist. 36, Art. 3, Q. 1
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 36
ARTICULUS III.
De comparatione poenae ad divinae iustitiae aequitatem.
Consequenter quaeritur de comparatione poenae ad divinae iustitiae aequitatem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo quaeritur, utrum aliqua poena sit a Deo. Secundo, dato quod sic, quaeritur, utrum omnis poena sit ab ipso.
QUAESTIO I.
Utrum aliqua poena sit a Deo.
Quaeritur igitur, utrum aliqua poena sit a Deo. Et quod non, videtur.
Ad oppositum.
1. Sapientiae primo1: Deus mortem non fecit: ergo si mors inter omnes poenas est maxime manifestativa divinae iustitiae, et haec non est a Deo; videtur igitur, quod nulla alia poena sit ab ipso.
2. Item, Augustinus super illum locum Psalmi2: Deduc me, Domine, in iustitia tua: « Cum punit malos Deus, non suum malum eis infert, sed suis malis eos relinquit »: ergo videtur, quod nulla poena secundum id quod est, a Deo sit.
3. Item, poena est malum repugnans naturae; sed « Conditor naturae nihil facit contra naturam », sicut vult Augustinus3: ergo videtur, quod nulla poena sit a Deo.
4. Item, omnis poena inducit privationem alicuius boni, et privatio boni dicit boni defectum; defectus autem non habet causam efficientem, sed deficientem: si ergo Deus nullius est causa deficiens, nullus defectus potest esse ab eo4: ergo nec poena aliqua.
5. Item, sicut malum culpae privat bonam dispositionem voluntatis, sic malum poenae privat bonam dispositionem naturae5; sed ita est a Deo natura, sicut voluntas, et ita conservatio naturae, sicut conservatio voluntatis: si igitur mala dispositio voluntatis a Deo non est, pari ratione nec mala dispositio naturae: ergo sicut non est a Deo culpa, ita non est a Deo poena.
6. Item, sicut in Deo est summa bonitas quantum ad rectitudinem voluntatis, quae est iustitia, sic in Deo est summa bonitas quantum ad completionem et perfectionem naturae; sed Deus, quia summe bonus est et summe iustus, non potest facere aliquod malum sive aliquam iniustitiam sive peccatum: ergo pari ratione, cum sit summe bonus per naturam, non poterit ab eo egredi malum, quod sit in nocumentum naturae: ergo sicut ab ipso non exit malum culpae, sic nec malum poenae.
Sed contra:
1. Isaiae quadragesimo quinto6: Ego Dominus formans lucem et creans tenebras, faciens pacem et creans malum; sed hoc non intelligitur de malo culpae: ergo necesse est, quod habeat veritatem de aliquo malo poenae.
2. Item, expressius in cantico, Deuteronomii tricesimo secundo7: Ego occidam et ego vivere faciam, percutiam et ego sanabo; sed occisio et percussio est poena: ergo etc.
3. Item, adhuc magis expresse Ecclesiastici undecimo8: Bona et mala, vita et mors, paupertas et honestas a Deo sunt; sed huiusmodi sunt poenae: ergo etc.
4. Item, adhuc expressius de novo Testamento, Matthaei vigesimo quinto9: Ite maledicti in ignem aeternum; sed ab illo principaliter est poena, qui dictat sententiam, sed hic est Deus: ergo etc.
5. Item, Augustinus in libro de Libero Arbitrio10: « Deus est auctor mali, quod patimur »; sed hoc est malum poenae, ut ibidem dicit: ergo aliqua poena est a Deo.
6. Item, sicut actus divinae misericordiae est parcere, ita actus divinae iustitiae est punire: ergo sicut peccati remissio et indulgentia est a divina misericordia, ita peccati punitio est a divina iustitia: ergo aliqua poena est a Deo tanquam a causa.
Conclusio.
Aliquae poenae sunt a Deo vindicante.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod poena plus dicit quam malum. Malum enim importat11 absentiam sive defectum boni, ubi debet esse; poena vero importat ordinem ad ipsum meritum poenae, et simul cum hoc dispositionem aliquam significat circa ipsum punibile. — Quoniam igitur tam ordo quam dispositio rei dicitur esse a Deo sicut a principio; hinc est, quod rationabiliter conceditur, quod poena sit a Deo, de12 illa potissime, quae importat ordinem fundatum super realem dispositionem. Et quoniam dicit aliquo modo ordinem ad culpam praecedentem, et culpa praecedens non est ex constitutione naturae, sed potius ex voluntatis inordinatione; hinc est, quod etsi poena dicatur a Deo, non tamen dicitur a Deo faciente, sed a Deo vindicante. — Concedendum est igitur, aliquas poenas a Deo esse, sicut ostendunt rationes ad hoc inductae, pro eo quod aliquae poenae sunt dispositiones ipsius punibilis, et dispositiones non qualescumque, sed ordinatae secundum rigorem divinae iustitiae.
1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod Deus mortem non fecit; iam patet responsio, quia non negatur, quod mors non sit a Deo vindicante, sed quia non fuit a Deo naturam instituente. Ideo enim13 Deus eam inflixit, quia homo eam meruit merito culpae.
2. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod Deus, cum punit malos, non infert eis malum; dicendum, quod Augustinus non vult ibi negare, poenam inferri a Deo, sed hoc vult negare, quod defectus ille, qui clauditur in intellectu poenae, non causatur a Deo. Unde non dicit: non infert poenam, sed: non infert malum; malum enim dicit ipsum defectum, sicut dictum est; poena autem non tantum dicit boni defectionem, sed etiam dicit punibilis dispositionem.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Conditor naturae nihil facit contra naturam; dicendum, quod si natura dicatur naturalis creaturae obedientia, vel naturale iudicatorium, secundum quod homo est habilis ad iustitiam — quia utrumque horum dicit immediatam ordinationem ad Deum — sic Deus non facit contra naturam, sicut nec facit contra se ipsum14. Alio modo natura dicitur vis operans secundum solitum cursum et quodcumque bonum, quod inest creaturae ex sua origine; et hoc modo Deus facit contra naturam, sive per miracula potentiae, sive per supplicia vindicantis iustitiae. Et sic non facit simpliciter contra naturam, immo potius secundum naturam, cuius operatio subiacet divinae potentiae, et ordinatio subiacet divinae iustitiae. Et cum Deus utitur creatura, sive ad manifestationem divinae potentiae, sive ad manifestationem iustitiae, utitur ea, prout debet.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod poena dicit privationem et defectum; dicendum, quod generaliter loquendo, poena non dicit solum defectum, immo quaedam poena est, quae dicit veram passionem circa ipsum punibile. Unde sicut actio ignis aeterni, qua agit in animam, aliquid est; sic et passio, quam patitur anima ab igne, aliquid est15. Et iterum, aliquid ordinatum est, et ita a Deo est, a quo est omnis essentia et omnis ordo. Et propter hoc deficit illa ratio, quia non omnis poena dicit defectum purum.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod malum poenae privat bonam dispositionem naturae, sicut malum culpae dispositionem voluntatis; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia malum culpae privat inordinate et vituperabiliter; malum vero poenae, secundum quod huiusmodi, privat ordinate et laudabiliter. Et quia quod laudabile est, est attribuendum Deo; quod vero vituperabile, non; hinc est, quod recte aliquod malum poenae Deo attribuitur, malum vero culpae non, sicut infra16 melius videbitur.
5. Et per hoc patet responsio ad ultimum, quod obiicitur de perfectione bonitatis quantum ad voluntatem et naturam Dei. Concedo enim bene, quod utriusque est summa perfectio, quia una et eadem; idem enim est in eo natura et voluntas. Comparatio tamen divinae voluntatis ad culpam et poenam, sive e converso poenae et culpae ad divinam voluntatem, differens est, quia culpa propter sui deordinationem deordinationem ponit circa peccantem; poena vero non deordinationem connotat circa punientem et ordinantem.
I. Poenas non esse a Deo, asserere non dubitabant multi et antiqui et recentiores, praesertim illi qui providentiam Dei circa res humanas negabant, inter quos fuit etiam Cicero, III. de Officiis, c. 29. — In utraque huius articuli quaestione adhibentur plures distinctiones magni momenti; notanda est in primis in q. 2. distinctio triplicis poenae, et alia, quae est de poena, secundum quod ordinata est, et secundum id quod subest huic ordini. Sub primo respectu constat poenam omnem ratione ordinis esse a Deo; item sub secundo respectu patet, non esse a Deo id quod dicit defectum, privationem vel malum.
Primum principium ita intelligitur, ut ordinatio illa sit a Deo secundum voluntatem consequentem, non antecedentem (cfr. infra d. 37. dub. 5, et I. Sent. d. 46. q. 1.). In applicatione secundi principii est quaedam differentia opinionum, sed exigui momenti, ut notat Richard. a Med. — Plura ad hanc quaestionem spectantia vide hic dub. 3. Utramque quaestionem alii magistri plerumque una sola absolvunt.
II. De utraque quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 94. m. 6. 7. (quoad principia solutionis). — S. Thom., II. Sent. d. 37; S. 1. II. q. 87. a. 7. q. 3. a. 1. — B. Albert., II. Sent. d. 37. a. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 1. 2. — Aegid. R., II. Sent. d. 37. q. 2. a. 1. 2. — Durand., II. Sent. d. 37. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.
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ARTICLE III.
On the comparison of punishment to the equity of divine justice.
Next there is inquiry concerning the comparison of punishment to the equity of divine justice. And concerning this two things are asked. First it is asked, whether any punishment is from God. Second, granted that it is, it is asked, whether every punishment is from him.
QUESTION I.
Whether any punishment is from God.
It is asked, therefore, whether any punishment is from God. And that it is not, it seems.
To the opposite.
1. Wisdom, first [chapter]1: God did not make death: therefore if death, among all punishments, is most manifestative of divine justice, and this is not from God; it seems therefore that no other punishment is from him.
2. Likewise, Augustine on that place of the Psalm2: Lead me, Lord, in your justice: « When God punishes the wicked, he does not inflict his own evil upon them, but leaves them to their own evils »: therefore it seems that no punishment, according to that which it is, is from God.
3. Likewise, punishment is an evil repugnant to nature; but « the Author of nature does nothing against nature », as Augustine holds3: therefore it seems that no punishment is from God.
4. Likewise, every punishment induces the privation of some good, and the privation of good states a defect of the good; but a defect does not have an efficient cause, but a deficient one: if therefore God is the deficient cause of nothing, no defect can be from him4: therefore neither any punishment.
5. Likewise, just as the evil of guilt deprives [one] of the good disposition of the will, so the evil of punishment deprives [one] of the good disposition of nature5; but nature is from God just as the will is, and the conservation of nature just as the conservation of the will: if therefore the bad disposition of the will is not from God, by like reasoning neither [is] the bad disposition of nature: therefore just as guilt is not from God, so punishment is not from God.
6. Likewise, just as in God there is the highest goodness as regards the rectitude of the will, which is justice, so in God there is the highest goodness as regards the completion and perfection of nature; but God, because he is supremely good and supremely just, cannot do any evil or any injustice or sin: therefore by like reasoning, since he is supremely good by nature, no evil could go forth from him which would be to the harm of nature: therefore just as the evil of guilt does not go out from him, so neither [does] the evil of punishment.
On the contrary:
1. Isaiah, forty-fifth [chapter]6: I am the Lord forming light and creating darkness, making peace and creating evil; but this is not understood of the evil of guilt: therefore it is necessary that it hold true of some evil of punishment.
2. Likewise, more expressly in the canticle, Deuteronomy, thirty-second [chapter]7: I will kill and I will make to live, I will strike and I will heal; but killing and striking are punishment: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, still more expressly, Ecclesiasticus, eleventh [chapter]8: Good things and evil, life and death, poverty and honor are from God; but such things are punishments: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, still more expressly from the new Testament, Matthew, twenty-fifth [chapter]9: Go, you cursed, into eternal fire; but punishment is principally from him who pronounces the sentence, but this is God: therefore etc.
5. Likewise, Augustine in the book On Free Choice10: « God is the author of the evil which we suffer »; but this is the evil of punishment, as he says in the same place: therefore some punishment is from God.
6. Likewise, just as the act of divine mercy is to spare, so the act of divine justice is to punish: therefore just as the remission and indulgence of sin is from divine mercy, so the punishment of sin is from divine justice: therefore some punishment is from God as from a cause.
Conclusion.
Some punishments are from God as the avenger.
I respond: It must be said that punishment states more than evil. For evil imports11 the absence or defect of a good where it ought to be; but punishment imports an order to the very merit of punishment, and together with this it signifies some disposition concerning the punishable [thing] itself. — Since therefore both the order and the disposition of a thing is said to be from God as from a principle; hence it is that it is reasonably granted that punishment is from God, most of all that [punishment]12 which imports an order founded upon a real disposition. And since it states in some way an order to a preceding guilt, and the preceding guilt is not from the constitution of nature, but rather from the disorder of the will; hence it is that, even if punishment is said to be from God, yet it is not said to be from God doing [it], but from God avenging [it]. — It must therefore be granted that some punishments are from God, as the reasons adduced for this show, for the reason that some punishments are dispositions of the punishable [thing] itself, and dispositions not of any kind whatever, but ordered according to the rigor of divine justice.
1. To that therefore which is objected to the contrary, that God did not make death; the response is now clear, because it is not denied that death is from God as the avenger, but [it is denied] that it was from God as the institutor of nature. For God inflicted it13 for this reason, because the human deserved it by the merit of guilt.
2. To that indeed which is objected, that God, when he punishes the wicked, does not inflict evil upon them; it must be said that Augustine does not there wish to deny that punishment is inflicted by God, but he wishes to deny this, that that defect which is enclosed in the notion of punishment is caused by God. Whence he does not say: he does not inflict punishment, but: he does not inflict evil; for evil states the defect itself, as has been said; but punishment does not only state the defection of the good, but also states the disposition of the punishable [thing].
3. To that which is objected, that the Author of nature does nothing against nature; it must be said that if nature is called the natural obedience of the creature, or the natural faculty of judgment, according to which the human is apt for justice — because each of these states an immediate ordering to God — thus God does not act against nature, just as neither does he act against himself14. In another way nature is called the power operating according to its accustomed course and whatever good is in the creature from its origin; and in this way God does act against nature, whether through the miracles of [his] power, or through the punishments of avenging justice. And thus he does not act simply against nature, but rather according to nature, whose operation is subject to divine power, and whose ordination is subject to divine justice. And when God uses a creature, whether for the manifestation of divine power or for the manifestation of justice, he uses it as he ought.
4. To that which is objected, that punishment states privation and defect; it must be said that, generally speaking, punishment does not state only defect, but rather there is a certain punishment which states a true passion concerning the punishable [thing] itself. Whence just as the action of the eternal fire, by which it acts upon the soul, is something; so also the passion which the soul suffers from the fire is something15. And again, it is something ordered, and so it is from God, from whom is all essence and all order. And on account of this that argument fails, because not every punishment states pure defect.
3. To that which is objected, that the evil of punishment deprives [one] of the good disposition of nature, just as the evil of guilt [deprives one] of the disposition of the will; it must be said that it is not alike, because the evil of guilt deprives inordinately and blameworthily; but the evil of punishment, insofar as it is of this kind, deprives in an ordered way and praiseworthily. And because that which is praiseworthy is to be attributed to God, but that which is blameworthy is not; hence it is that rightly some evil of punishment is attributed to God, but the evil of guilt is not, as will be seen better below16.
5. And through this the response to the last [objection] is clear, which is objected concerning the perfection of goodness as regards the will and nature of God. For I grant well that of each there is the highest perfection, because [it is] one and the same; for in him nature and will are the same. Yet the comparison of the divine will to guilt and punishment, or conversely of punishment and guilt to the divine will, is different, because guilt, on account of its own disorder, places disorder concerning the one sinning; but punishment does not connote disorder concerning the one punishing and ordering.
I. That punishments are not from God, many both ancient and more recent [thinkers] did not hesitate to assert, especially those who denied the providence of God concerning human affairs, among whom was also Cicero, III. On Duties, c. 29. — In both questions of this article several distinctions of great moment are employed; to be noted first of all is the distinction in q. 2 of the threefold punishment, and another which concerns punishment according to that which it is ordered and according to that which underlies this order. Under the first respect it is established that all punishment is from God by reason of order; likewise under the second respect it is clear that what states defect, privation, or evil is not from God.
The first principle is so understood that that ordination is from God according to the consequent will, not the antecedent [will] (cfr. below d. 37. dub. 5, and I. Sent. d. 46. q. 1.). In the application of the second principle there is a certain difference of opinions, but of little moment, as Richard of Middleton notes. — Many things pertaining to this question see here in dub. 3. The other masters most often resolve both questions in one alone.
II. On both questions: Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II. q. 94. m. 6. 7. (as to the principles of the solution). — St. Thomas, II. Sent. d. 37; Summa 1. II. q. 87. a. 7. q. 3. a. 1. — B. Albert, II. Sent. d. 37. a. 3. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 2. a. 2. 3. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 3. q. 1. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, II. Sent. d. 37. q. 2. a. 1. 2. — Durandus, II. Sent. d. 37. q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 3.
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- Vers. 13.Verse 13.
- Psalm. 5, 9. — August. super hunc locum n. 10. proprie dicit: Cum punit Deus peccatores, non malum suum eis infert, sed malis eorum eos dimittit.Psalm 5, 9. — Augustine on this place, n. 10, properly says: When God punishes sinners, he does not inflict his own evil upon them, but dismisses them to their own evils.
- Libr. XXVI. contra Faustum, c. 3. Vide supra pag. 435, nota 1.Book XXVI. Against Faustus, c. 3. See above p. 435, note 1.
- Cfr. August., XII. de Civ. Dei, c. 8.Cfr. Augustine, XII. On the City of God, c. 8.
- Vide supra d. 35. a. 1. q. 1. et a. 2. q. 1.See above d. 35. a. 1. q. 1. and a. 2. q. 1.
- Vers. 6. seq.: Ego Dominus et non est alter formans etc. Vers. 39.Verse 6 seq.: I am the Lord and there is no other, forming etc. Verse 39.
- Vers. 39.Verse 39.
- Vers. 14.Verse 14.
- Vers. 41.Verse 41.
- Libr. I. c. 1. n. 1.Book I. c. 1. n. 1.
- Vat. cum paucis codd. verbo importat praemittit plus et mox pro meritum poenae (i. e. culpam) substituit meritum culpae.The Vatican [edition], with a few codices, prefixes plus to the word importat, and presently for meritum poenae ("the merit of punishment," i. e. guilt) substitutes meritum culpae ("the merit of guilt").
- Vat. et edd. 3, 4 omittunt de, quod pertinet ad conceditur. Paulo inferius post ordinem in multis codd., ut C F K O R S T V etc., et in primis edd. desideratur ad culpam.The Vatican [edition] and edd. 3, 4 omit de, which pertains to conceditur. A little below, after ordinem, in many codices, such as C F K O R S T V etc., and in the first editions, ad culpam is lacking.
- in Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4 nec non in aliquibus codd., inter quos est cod. ee, deest enim.In the Vatican [edition] and edd. 2, 3, 4, as also in some codices, among which is cod. ee, enim is absent.
- Cfr. verba Augustini, ex VI. de Gen. ad lit. supra pag. 435, nota 1. et pag. 437, nota 3. allata. — Mox pro et quodcumque non pauci codd., inter quos F H V W Y bb, cum primis edd. etiam quodcumque.Cfr. the words of Augustine, from VI. On Genesis according to the Letter, adduced above p. 435, note 1, and p. 437, note 3. — Presently for et quodcumque not a few codices, among which are F H V W Y bb, with the first editions, [read] also quodcumque.
- Vide August., de Natura boni, c. 38.See Augustine, On the Nature of the Good, c. 38.
- Quaest. seq. et d. 37. a. 2. q. 1.The following question and d. 37. a. 2. q. 1.