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Dist. 44, Art. 2, Q. 1

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 44

Textus Latinus
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Articulus II. De potestate praesidendi.

Consequenter quaeritur de potestate praesidendi. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo.

Primo quaeritur, utrum omnis potentia dominandi sit a Deo.

Quaestio I. Utrum omnis potestas dominandi sit a Deo.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum omnis potestas dominandi sit a Deo. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Ioannis decimo nono1: Non haberes in me potestatem, nisi tibi datum esset desuper, dixit Dominus Pilato: ergo si potestas Pilati super Christum erat a Deo, et tamen minime videbatur, quod super ipsum deberet habere potestatem; ergo videtur, quod multo fortius omnis potestas talis a Deo est.

2. Item, expressius ad Romanos decimo tertio2: Non est potestas nisi a Deo; et constat, quod ibi loquitur de potestate praesidendi: ergo etc. — Et istae duae auctoritates sufficiant, quia plures aliae adducuntur in littera.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione. Potestas praesidendi dicit potentiam in excellentia3, et omne tale dicit positionem aliquam; sed omne quod dicit positionem aliquam, a summa potentia est: ergo omnis potentia praesidendi a Deo est, qualitercumque quis praesit.

4. Item, omnis poena a Deo est, quae habet simpliciter rationem poenae4; sed omnis servitus est poena: ergo a Deo est. Sed ab eodem, a quo est servitus, ab eodem est dominandi potestas: igitur omnis potestas dominandi est a Deo.

Sed contra: 1. Oseae octavo5: Ipsi regnaverunt, et non ex me; principes exstiterunt, et non cognovi: ergo videtur, quod talis praesidentia malorum non sit a Deo.

2. Item, nihil iniustum est a Deo; sed multi iniuste dominantur aliis: ergo videtur, quod non omnis potestas sive dominium, quod est in hominibus, sit a Deo.

3. Item, nihil inordinatum est a Deo; sed cum stultus praeficitur sapienti, et malus bonis, hoc est inordinatum: ergo non videtur esse a Deo.

4. Item, nihil quod est contra ius naturae, est a Deo; sed potestas dominandi in homines est contra ius naturae: ergo non est a Deo. Maior manifesta est. Minor probatur per illud quod dicitur in libro Institutionum6: « Bella exorta sunt, et captivitates secutae et servitus, quae sunt iuri naturali contraria ».

5. Item, nihil auferendum est alicui, quod est ei datum a Deo7: ergo si omnis potestas vel praelatio est a Deo, nulli auferenda est praelatio vel potestas: ergo nullus praelatus vel princeps esset deponendus, quantumcumque malus.

6. Item, nihil quod habet quis per Dei donationem, habet per usurpationem: ergo si omnis potestas est a Deo collata, nulla est usurpata; sed planum est, quod multae potestates usurpantur: ergo non omnis potestas a Deo donatur.

Conclusio

Conclusio. Omnis potestas praesidendi, secundum id quod est, et etiam respectu illius super quem est, iusta est et a Deo est.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod potestas praesidendi dicitur esse illud, per quod quis praesidet et dominatur alteri. Illud autem, per quod praesidet, dupliciter potest dici: uno modo dicitur ipsa virtus, per quam quis praevalet alteri, et haec virtus absque dubio a Deo est; alio modo illud, per quod praesidet, dicitur modus deveniendi vel permanendi8 ad hanc virtutis excellentiam; et sic distinguendum est. Nam quidam praesunt aliis ex iustitia, quidam ex astutia, et quidam ex violentia. Quando autem praeest aliquis aliis per iustitiam, tunc illa potestas dominandi, simpliciter loquendo, a Deo est et respectu praesidentis et respectu subiacentium.

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Quando autem praeest aliquis per astutiam, vel per violentiam, tunc dicendum est, quod talis potestas et habet comparari ad voluntatem praesidentis, et habet comparari ad meritum subiacentis. In comparatione ad meritum subiacentis talis praesidentia iusta est, quia aut est ad bonorum probationem, aut ad malorum punitionem. Si autem comparetur ad voluntatem praesidentis; sic iniusta est. — Et primo quidem modo dicitur esse a Deo faciente et ordinante, secundum quod dicitur Iob trigesimo quarto9: Facit regnare hypocritam propter peccata populi; et Oseae decimo tertio: Dabo eis regem in furore meo. Secundo autem modo, scilicet in comparatione ad voluntatem praesidentis, sic dicitur esse a Deo permissive, non autem approbatorie, propter quod dicitur10: Ipsi regnaverunt, et non ex me, et principes exstiterunt, et non cognovi.

Concedendum est igitur, quod omnis potestas praesidendi secundum id quod est, et etiam respectu eius super quem est, iusta est et a Deo est; et hoc ostendunt rationes et auctoritates, quae ad primam partem inducuntur, et ideo concedendae sunt. Concedendum est nihilominus, quod modus deveniendi ad hanc praesidentiam in comparatione ad voluntatem praesidentis potest esse iustus et iniustus; et secundum quod iustus est, a Deo est, secundum quod iniustus est, a Deo non est. Quia vero nunquam est ita iniustus ex una parte, quin sit iustus ex altera; ideo de nulla potentia praesidendi dici potest, quod non procedat a Deo.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod Dominus dicit, quod regnaverunt, sed non ex ipso; dicendum, quod non est ibi negatio cuiuscumque voluntatis, sed voluntatis antecedentis et voluntatis approbantis. Dominium enim malorum potius est a Deo vindicante, quam sit a Deo acceptante. Unde in eis verificatur illud quod dicitur Ecclesiastis octavo11: Interdum dominatur homo homini in malum suum.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nihil iniustum est a Deo; dicendum, quod verum est, secundum quod iniustum. Quamvis autem potentia dominandi iniusta sit frequenter in comparatione ad voluntatem praesidentis, semper tamen iusta est in comparatione ad meritum subiacentis, quia est ad vindictam malefactorum, ad laudem vero bonorum, sicut dicitur primae Petri secundo12.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aliqua potestas inordinata est; dicendum, quod etsi aliquo modo aliqua potestas possit ex inordinata voluntate procedere, potestas tamen ipsa semper ordinata est, sicut dicit Gregorius in Moralibus13, quod « tumoris elatio, non potestatis ordo, in crimine est; potentiam Deus dedit, elationem potentiae malitia nostrae mentis invenit ». — Et si obiiciat, quod inordinatum est, quod stulti praesunt sapientibus, et mali bonis, et servi liberis14; dicendum, quod etsi aliqua inordinatio appareat exterius, nihilominus latet pulcra ordinatio interius secundum divinum iudicium, quod frequenter est occultum, nunquam tamen iniustum. Propter quod dicitur Ecclesiastis decimo15: Vidi malum quasi per errorem egrediens a facie principis, stultum positum in dignitate sublimi etc.; quasi dicat: quia, quamvis appareat ibi error, magna tamen est ibi ordinatio, dum ex hoc mali puniuntur, et boni promoventur.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nulla potestas est a Deo, quae est contra ius naturae; dicendum, quod esse contra ius naturae hoc est dupliciter: vel simpliciter, vel secundum aliquem statum. Cum ergo dicitur, quod potestas dominandi est contra ius naturae, hoc non intelligitur quantum ad universale dictamen naturae, sed quantum ad dictamen naturae alicuius status determinati, in quo quidem non esset subiectio servitutis nec praelatio potestatis16.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nihil quod est a Deo datum, est auferendum; dicendum, quod illud verum est, si Deus simpliciter ei dedit; si autem solum ad tempus datum est, sicut Dominus voluit dare, ita etiam voluit per ministerium humanum auferre. Hoc autem cognoscimus, quod Deus velit, quando videmus, ordinem iustitiae sic exigere. Deus enim dedit vitam latroni, et tamen iudex iuste illam aufert ei, exigente hoc mandato iustitiae, quo dicitur17: Maleficum non patieris vivere. Sic etiam intelligendum est se habere in potestate nostra et principum, quia secundum iuris rectitudinem tam dominium quam potestatis privilegium meretur amittere qui concessa sibi abutitur potestate.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nulla potestas a Deo collata est usurpata; dicendum, quod verum est, si totaliter detur a Deo. Sed Deus sic dat potestatem, quod frequenter homo cooperatur in illius potestatis adeptione; et cum recte cooperatur ad illius potestatis adeptionem, tunc dicitur dominari ea ex iustitia; quando vero iniuste, tunc dicitur illa potestas usurpata, in qua non praeest de iure, quamvis praesit de facto; nihilominus tamen, quia talis potestas non caret omnino ordine iustitiae, conceditur esse a Deo. Et simul sunt haec duo vera secundum diversos respectus, videlicet quod eadem potestas sit usurpata et a Deo collata, absque aliqua repugnantia.

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Scholion

I. Ut haec et sequentes quaestiones solvantur, tria secundum communem doctrinam distinguenda sunt, scilicet essentia potestatis, modus eam acquirendi et modus ea utendi. Primum, scilicet ordo superioris ad inferiorem, semper et bonum est et a Deo. Sed modus acquirendi et utendi potest esse malus et non a Deo nisi secundum permissionem. Haec principia valent respectu potestatis tum spiritualis tum saecularis. De hac (I.) quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 48. m. 1. a. 1-3. (ubi plura habet de duplici potestate, regali et sacerdotali, nec non de comparatione utriusque inter se) et q. 40. m. 1-5. (ubi de praeeminentia spiritualis potestatis loquitur). — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2; Opusc. 16. (alias 20.) de Regimine principum, III. c. 1-3. — B. Albert., hic a. 4; S. p. II. tr. 24. q. 141. m. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

II. Quod attinet sequentem quaest., Alex. Hal., Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med. eodem quo S. Bonav. modo distinguunt triplicem potestatem dominandi. Omnes autem concedunt, quod tertia species, scilicet potestas coercendi vi subditos, non conveniat statui innocentiae, et a fortiori nec servitus proprie dicta. De hac (2.) quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 93. m. 1. — Scot., in utroque Scripto, IV. Sent. d. 36. q. 1, et Oxon. IV. Sent. d. 15. q. 2. n. 7. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3; S. I. q. 96. a. 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.

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English Translation

Article II. On the power of presiding.

Next there is inquiry concerning the power of presiding. And concerning this two questions are asked.

First it is asked whether all power of ruling is from God.

Question I. Whether all power of ruling is from God.

Concerning the first the matter proceeds thus, and it is asked whether all power of ruling is from God. And that it is, seems [so]:

1. John nineteen1: Thou wouldst have no power over me, unless it were given thee from above, the Lord said to Pilate: therefore if Pilate's power over Christ was from God — and yet it by no means appeared that he ought to have power over him — therefore it seems that much more is all such power from God.

2. Likewise, more expressly to the Romans thirteen2: There is no power but from God; and it is agreed that there he speaks of the power of presiding: therefore etc. — And let these two authorities suffice, since several others are adduced in the text.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems [so] by reason. The power of presiding bespeaks a potency in eminence3, and everything of this sort bespeaks some positing; but everything that bespeaks some positing is from the highest power: therefore all power of presiding is from God, in whatever way one presides.

4. Likewise, all punishment is from God which has simply the character of punishment4; but all servitude is a punishment: therefore it is from God. But from the same source from which servitude is, from the same is the power of ruling: therefore all power of ruling is from God.

On the contrary: 1. Hosea eight5: They have reigned, but not by me; they have been princes, and I knew not: therefore it seems that such presiding of the wicked is not from God.

2. Likewise, nothing unjust is from God; but many rule over others unjustly: therefore it seems that not all power or dominion that is among men is from God.

3. Likewise, nothing disordered is from God; but when a fool is set over a wise man, and an evil man over the good, this is disordered: therefore it does not seem to be from God.

4. Likewise, nothing that is against the law of nature is from God; but the power of ruling over men is against the law of nature: therefore it is not from God. The major is manifest. The minor is proved by what is said in the book of the Institutes6: « Wars have arisen, and captivities have followed, and servitude, which are contrary to the law of nature ».

5. Likewise, nothing is to be taken away from anyone which is given to him by God7: therefore if all power or prelacy is from God, prelacy or power is to be taken from no one: therefore no prelate or prince should be deposed, however evil he be.

6. Likewise, nothing that one has by God's donation does one have by usurpation: therefore if all power is conferred by God, none is usurped; but it is plain that many powers are usurped: therefore not all power is bestowed by God.

Conclusion

Conclusion. All power of presiding, according to what it is, and also in respect of him over whom it is, is just and is from God.

I respond: It must be said that the power of presiding is said to be that by which one presides over and rules another. But that by which one presides can be spoken of in two ways: in one way the virtue itself is meant, by which one prevails over another, and this virtue is without doubt from God; in another way that by which one presides is meant as the mode of arriving at or of remaining8 in this excellence of virtue; and so a distinction must be made. For some preside over others out of justice, some out of cunning, and some out of violence. But when anyone presides over others through justice, then that power of ruling, speaking simply, is from God both in respect of the one presiding and in respect of the subjects.

But when anyone presides through cunning or through violence, then it must be said that such power both has to be compared to the will of the one presiding, and has to be compared to the merit of the subject. In comparison to the merit of the subject such presiding is just, since it is either for the proving of the good or for the punishment of the wicked. But if it be compared to the will of the one presiding, thus it is unjust. — And in the first way indeed it is said to be from God as doing and ordaining, according to what is said in Job thirty-four9: He maketh a hypocrite to reign for the sins of the people; and Hosea thirteen: I will give thee a king in my wrath. But in the second way, namely in comparison to the will of the one presiding, it is thus said to be from God permissively, but not approvingly, on account of which it is said10: They have reigned, but not by me, and they have been princes, and I knew not.

It must therefore be granted that all power of presiding according to what it is, and also in respect of him over whom it is, is just and is from God; and this the reasons and authorities that are adduced for the first part show, and therefore they are to be granted. It must nonetheless be granted that the mode of arriving at this presiding, in comparison to the will of the one presiding, can be just and unjust; and insofar as it is just, it is from God, insofar as it is unjust, it is not from God. But because it is never so unjust on the one side but that it is just on the other, therefore of no power of presiding can it be said that it does not proceed from God.

1. To that, then, which is first objected to the contrary, that the Lord says that they have reigned but not by him; it must be said that there is not there a negation of any and every will, but of the antecedent will and of the approving will. For the dominion of the wicked is rather from God avenging than from God accepting. Hence in them is verified what is said in Ecclesiastes eight11: Sometimes one man ruleth over another to his own hurt.

2. To that which is objected, that nothing unjust is from God; it must be said that it is true, insofar as it is unjust. But although the potency of ruling is often unjust in comparison to the will of the one presiding, nevertheless it is always just in comparison to the merit of the subject, since it is for the punishment of evildoers, but for the praise of the good, as is said in the first [epistle] of Peter, two12.

3. To that which is objected, that some power is disordered; it must be said that although in some way some power can proceed from a disordered will, the power itself is nevertheless always ordered, as Gregory says in the Morals13, that « the swelling of pride, not the order of power, is in the crime; God gave the potency, the malice of our mind devised the puffing-up of the potency ». — And if it be objected that it is disordered that fools preside over the wise, and the evil over the good, and slaves over the free14; it must be said that although some disorder may appear exteriorly, nonetheless a fair ordering lies hidden interiorly according to the divine judgment, which is frequently hidden, yet never unjust. On account of which it is said in Ecclesiastes ten15: I have seen an evil, as it were by an error, proceeding from the face of the prince: a fool set in high dignity etc.; as if to say: that, although an error may appear there, yet there is great ordering there, since by it the wicked are punished and the good are advanced.

4. To that which is objected, that no power is from God which is against the law of nature; it must be said that to be against the law of nature is twofold: either simply, or according to some state. When therefore it is said that the power of ruling is against the law of nature, this is not understood with regard to the universal dictate of nature, but with regard to the dictate of the nature of some determinate state, in which indeed there would be no subjection of servitude nor prelacy of power16.

5. To that which is objected, that nothing which is given by God is to be taken away; it must be said that this is true if God gave it to him simply; but if it was given only for a time, as the Lord willed to give, so also he willed to take it away through human ministry. And this we know that God wills, when we see the order of justice so to require. For God gave life to the robber, and yet the judge justly takes it away from him, this command of justice requiring it, by which it is said17: Thou shalt not suffer a wrongdoer to live. So too it is to be understood to hold in our power and in that of princes, since according to the rectitude of right both dominion and the privilege of power he deserves to lose who abuses the power granted to him.

6. To that which is objected, that no power conferred by God is usurped; it must be said that it is true, if it be given wholly by God. But God so gives power that frequently man cooperates in the obtaining of that power; and when he rightly cooperates toward the obtaining of that power, then he is said to rule it out of justice; but when [he does so] unjustly, then that power is said to be usurped, in which he does not preside by right, although he presides in fact; nevertheless, because such power is not altogether without the order of justice, it is granted to be from God. And these two are at once true according to different respects, namely that the same power is usurped and conferred by God, without any contradiction.

Scholion

I. That this and the following questions may be solved, three things according to common doctrine must be distinguished, namely the essence of power, the mode of acquiring it, and the mode of using it. The first, namely the order of the superior to the inferior, is always both good and from God. But the mode of acquiring and of using can be evil and not from God except by permission. These principles hold with respect to power, both spiritual and secular. On this (1st) question: Alex. of Hales, S. p. III. q. 48. m. 1. a. 1-3. (where he treats much of the twofold power, royal and sacerdotal, as also of the comparison of the two to each other) and q. 40. m. 1-5. (where he speaks of the pre-eminence of spiritual power). — St. Thomas, here q. 1. a. 2; Opusc. 16. (alias 20.) On the Governance of Princes, III. c. 1-3. — B. Albert, here a. 4; S. p. II. tr. 24. q. 141. m. 3. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 2. a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2. q. 1. — Giles of Rome, here q. 1. a. 2. — Durandus, here q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2.

II. As regards the following question, Alex. of Hales, Petrus a Tarantasia, and Richard of Mediavilla distinguish the threefold power of ruling in the same way as St. Bonaventure. But all concede that the third species, namely the power of coercing subjects by force, does not befit the state of innocence, and a fortiori neither does servitude properly so called. On this (2nd) question: Alex. of Hales, S. p. II. q. 93. m. 1. — Scotus, in both Commentaries, IV. Sent. d. 36. q. 1, and Oxon. IV. Sent. d. 15. q. 2. n. 7. — St. Thomas, here q. 1. a. 3; S. I. q. 96. a. 4. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 2. a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2. q. 2. — Giles of Rome, here q. 1. a. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 3.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 11. Vulgata: Non haberes adversum me etc.
    Verse 11. The Vulgate: Thou wouldst have no [power] against me etc.
  2. Vers. 1. — Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1.
    Verse 1. — Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 1.
  3. Cfr. Aristot., III. Polit. c. 4. et 12. (c. 11. seq.).
    Cf. Aristotle, III. Politics c. 4 and 12 (c. 11 ff.).
  4. Cfr. supra d. 36. a. 3. q. 1. seq. — De minori cfr. verba Ambrosii, quae supra pag. 168, nota 3. exhibentur; cfr. etiam infra quaest. seq.
    Cf. above d. 36. a. 3. q. 1. ff. — On the minor cf. the words of Ambrose, which are given above on page 168, note 3; cf. also below in the following question.
  5. Vers. 4.
    Verse 4.
  6. Libr. 1. c. 2. § Ius autem gentium. In sententia allata, quae ex Hermogeniani Responso delibata est, textus originalis pro servitus et dein pro contraria habet servitutes et contrariae.
    Book 1, c. 2, § Ius autem gentium [But the law of nations]. In the cited passage, which is excerpted from the Response of Hermogenianus, the original text, for servitus and then for contraria, has servitutes and contrariae.
  7. S. Thom. (hic q. 1. a. 2. arg. 4.) addit: Sicut quod Deus coniunxit, homo non separet. (Matth. 19, 6.).
    St. Thomas (here q. 1. a. 2. arg. 4) adds: As what God hath joined together, let not man put asunder. (Matt. 19:6).
  8. Cod. O pertingendi. In Vat. et edd. 3, 4 legitur dicitur modus perveniendi vel promovendi. Mox pro distinguendum est codd. B C D E H K L P R S T ee et ed. 2 intelligendum est. Vat. post distinguendum est subiicit tripliciter.
    Codex O: pertingendi [of attaining]. In the Vatican and edd. 3, 4 is read it is said [to be] the mode of arriving or of advancing. Soon, for distinguendum est [a distinction must be made], codd. B C D E H K L P R S T ee and ed. 2 read intelligendum est [it must be understood]. The Vatican, after distinguendum est, adds threefoldly.
  9. Vers. 30. — Seq. Script. loc. est ibid. v. 11. — Hos locos explicat Gregor., XXV. Moral. c. 16. n. 34. seqq.
    Verse 30. — The following passage of Scripture is in the same place, v. 11. — Gregory explains these passages, XXV. Morals c. 16. n. 34. ff.
  10. Oseae 8, 4. — Paulo ante pro approbatorie edd. substituunt approbative.
    Hosea 8:4. — A little before, for approbatorie [approvingly] the editions substitute approbative.
  11. Vers. 9. — Haec solutio est secundum Gregor., XXV. Moral. c. 16. n. 41. — De voluntate Dei antecedente et approbante vide I. Sent. d. 48. a. 3. q. 2. et d. 46. q. 1. in corp. — Pro antecedentis cod. Y habet acceptantis.
    Verse 9. — This solution is according to Gregory, XXV. Morals c. 16. n. 41. — On the antecedent and approving will of God see I. Sent. d. 48. a. 3. q. 2. and d. 46. q. 1. in the body. — For antecedentis codex Y has acceptantis.
  12. Vers. 14, in quo textu codd. H K W Y ce et ed. 1 malefactorum mutarunt in maleficiorum.
    Verse 14, in which text codd. H K W Y ce and ed. 1 changed malefactorum [of evildoers] into maleficiorum [of misdeeds].
  13. Libr. XXVI. c. 26. n. 48. In testimonio allato textus originalis pro dedit exhibet tribuit.
    Book XXVI. c. 26. n. 48. In the cited testimony the original text, for dedit [gave], shows tribuit [bestowed].
  14. Primae edd. dominis, Vat. dominis vel liberis.
    The first editions: dominis [over masters]; the Vatican: dominis vel liberis [over masters or the free].
  15. Vers. 5. seq. — Paulo inferius pro ibi error, magna [ed. 1 magis] tamen Vat. et edd. 3, 4 ibi error magnus, tamen.
    Verse 5 ff. — A little below, for ibi error, magna [there an error, great] (ed. 1: magis) tamen, the Vatican and edd. 3, 4 have ibi error magnus, tamen [there a great error, yet].
  16. Vide infra quaest. seq.
    See below in the following question.
  17. Exod. 22. 18. — Mox codd. D F H M V bb omittunt nostra et ante principum, cod. T ibi omittit solummodo et. Post principum cod. D addit quando perverse et contra iustitiae ordinem abutuntur ea.
    Exod. 22:18. — Soon codd. D F H M V bb omit nostra and before principum, cod. T there omits only et. After principum cod. D adds when they abuse it perversely and against the order of justice.
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