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Dist. 44, Art. 2, Q. 2

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 44

Textus Latinus
p. 1007

Quaestio II. Utrum potestas praesidendi sit in homine secundum institutionem naturae, vel secundum punitionem culpae.

Secundo quaeritur circa hoc, utrum potestas praesidendi sit in homine secundum institutionem naturae, vel secundum punitionem culpae. Et quod primo modo, videtur:

1. Genesis primo1: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram, et praesit etc. Si tu dicas, quod habuit praelationem respectu bestiarum, sed non respectu hominum; per hoc non evadetur, quia primae ad Corinthios undecimo2: Caput mulieris vir: si ergo caput praesidet corpori et debet regere corpus, ergo videtur, quod secundum institutionem naturae sit potestas dominandi in humano genere.

2. Item, in Angelis, qui sunt perfecti in natura et in gloria, non tantummodo est ordo et gradus secundum excellentiam naturalium, sed etiam secundum praesidentiam officiorum3: ergo videtur, quod dominium non repugnet, sed consonet institutioni naturae humanae, sicut et angelicae.

3. Item, potestas dominandi est proprietas dignitatis et nobilitatis4; sed si aliquid dignitatis competit naturae lapsae, multo magis competit naturae institutae: ergo videtur, quod magis pertinebat ad statum naturae institutae potestas dominandi quam ad statum naturae lapsae.

4. Item, omne illud, quod est ad conservationem ordinis naturalis, pertinet ad institutionem naturae; sed potestas praesidendi pertinet ad conservationem ordinis naturalis: ergo potestas praesidendi inest homini a Deo secundum institutionem naturae. Maior manifesta est. Minor probatur per illud quod dicit Augustinus decimo nono de Civitate Dei5: «Poenalis servitus ea lege ordinatur, quae naturalem ordinem conservari iubet et perturbari vetat»; sed ad idem ordinatur potestas dominandi et poenalis servitus: ergo etc.

Sed contra: 1. Gregorius6: «Omnes homines natura aequales fecit, sed pro variis meritis alios aliis occulta Dei dispensatio, sed iusta praeponit»: ergo videtur, quod subiectio et praelatio non sit in homine secundum institutionem naturae.

2. Item, Augustinus, decimo nono de Civitate Dei7: «Rationalem hominem, ad imaginem Dei factum, dominari noluit Deus nisi irrationalibus»: ergo si potestas praesidendi et dominandi est in uno homine respectu alterius, videtur etc.

3. Item, ratione hoc ipsum videtur. Libertas homini inest a natura; sed potestas dominandi est libertatis impeditiva: ergo non videtur, quod sit a natura. Quod autem libertas et a natura sit et a po p. 1008 testate praesidendi habeat impediri, manifestatur, quia libertas sic habet definiri8: «Libertas est naturalis potestas, qua licet homini facere quod vult».

4. Item, homo secundum suam primam conditionem factus est ad Dei imaginem9; sed in quantum est imago Dei, natus est immediate ferri in Deum: ergo si solus Deus eo maior est, ergo secundum naturam nihil est supra hominem nisi Deus: ergo nullum dominium in homine est secundum naturae institutionem nisi solum dominium divinum.

5. Item, non est dominus sine servo, ergo nec dominium sine servitute; sed «servitus est introducta propter peccatum», sicut in pluribus locis10 dicit Augustinus: ergo videtur, quod potestas dominandi in homine sit secundum conditionem culpae, non secundum institutionem naturae.

6. Item, in glorificatione hominum «vitia detrahentur, et natura servabitur», secundum quod in libro de Civitate Dei11 vult Augustinus; sed in statu gloriae non manebit dominium praelationis et subiectio servitutis: ergo non videntur haec esse in natura humana, secundum quod instituta, sed solum secundum quod lapsa et vitiata.

Conclusio

Conclusio. Potestas dominandi, quatenus dicit potestatem coercendi subditos, inest homini solum secundum statum naturae lapsae.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod potestas dominandi vel praesidendi dicitur tripliciter, scilicet largissime et communiter et proprie. Largissime dominandi potestas dicitur respectu omnis rei, qua homo potest ad libitum et votum suum uti; et hoc modo dicitur homo esse dominus possessionum suarum, sive mobilium, sive immobilium. Alio modo potestas dominandi sive praesidendi dicit excellentiam potestatis in imperando ei qui est capax rationis et praecepti. Tertio modo potestas dominandi dicitur potestas coercendi subditos12; et haec potestas dicit quandam arctationem libertatis; et talis potestas dominandi proprie dicitur dominium, cui respondet servitus.

Primo modo potestas dominandi communis est omni statui, videlicet statui naturae institutae et naturae lapsae et naturae glorificatae; et excellentiori modo fuit in statu naturae institutae, quam sit in statu naturae lapsae. — Secundo modo competit statui viae, sive pro statu naturae institutae, sive pro statu naturae lapsae. Si enim homo stetisset, et vir posset imperare uxori, et pater potuisset imperare filio. Et hoc reperitur etiam in Angelis, quamdiu sunt administratorii spiritus13, quia ex illa parte aliquo modo sunt in statu viae. Haec tamen praesidentia non manebit in gloria, sicut in praecedentibus14 ostensum fuit. — Tertio vero modo potestas dominandi in homine est solum secundum statum naturae lapsae; inest enim ei secundum culpae punitionem, non secundum naturae institutionem, et hoc, quia servitus sibi correspondens, secundum quod dicunt Sancti, est poena peccati. — Et quia isto modo loquimur hic de potestate dominandi, ideo concedendae sunt rationes ostendentes, quod talis potestas non inest homini secundum primariam suam15 conditionem sive secundum statum naturae institutae.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium ex textu Genesis et ex prima Corinthiorum, iam patet responsio; procedunt enim de potestate praesidendi accepta primo et secundo modo, non tertio. Nam etsi mulier sit viro quodam modo inferior ratione infirmioris sexus, nihilominus, quia non est creata, ut esset ei in adiutorium ut famula, sed ut socia; hinc est, quod quamvis dicatur caput eius, non tamen dicitur dominus, quia ipsa non est ancilla ipsius. Et ideo supra dixit Magister distinctione decima octava16, quod mulier ad aequalitatem fuit condita; ideo fuit formata de latere, non de pedibus, vel de capite, ut viri videretur esse socia, non domina, vel ancilla.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod praelatio est in Angelis: iam patet responsio, quia, quamvis unus praesideat alteri et imperet alteri et auctoritatem habeat super alterum imperandi ei aliquid, quod pertinet ad officium ministerii, tamen unus Angelus non dicitur servus alterius Angeli; et ideo ex hoc non concluditur, quod potestas dominandi, secundum quod ei correspondet servitus, sit in homine secundum conditionem naturae.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod dominium est proprietas dignitatis; dicendum, quod etsi sit pro p. 1009 prietas dignitatis in eo qui praesidet, indignitatem tamen dicit in eo qui subest; et ideo naturaliter potest convenire homini respectu alterius creaturae inferioris, respectu tamen alterius hominis non convenit naturaliter, sed quodam modo praeternaturaliter, videlicet in punitionem peccati; sicut enim dicit Ambrosius17: «Servitus introducta fuit per peccatum ebrietatis».

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod dominium et servitus facit ad conservationem ordinis naturalis; dicendum, quod est ordo, qui respicit naturam secundum omnem statum; et est ordo, qui respicit naturam secundum statum suae conditionis; et est ordo, qui respicit naturam secundum statum suae corruptionis. Et secundum hoc quaedam sunt de dictamine naturae simpliciter; quaedam de dictamine naturae secundum statum naturae institutae; quaedam de dictamine naturae secundum statum naturae lapsae18. Deum esse honorandum, dictat natura secundum omnem statum; omnia esse communia, dictat secundum statum naturae institutae; aliquid esse proprium, dictat secundum statum naturae lapsae ad removendas contentiones et lites19. Sic omnes homines esse servos Dei, dictat natura secundum omnem statum; hominem vero adaequari homini, dictat secundum statum suae primae conditionis; hominem autem homini subiici et hominem homini famulari, dictat secundum statum corruptionis, ut mali compescantur, et boni defendantur. Nisi enim essent huiusmodi dominia coercentia malos, propter corruptionem, quae est in natura, unus alterum opprimeret, et communiter homines vivere non possent. Non sic autem esset, si homo permansisset in statu innocentiae; quilibet enim in gradu et statu suo maneret. Et sic patet, quod illa ratio non concludit, quod servitus vel dominium respiciat naturam institutam, sed solum, quod respicit naturam lapsam, ubi ordo habet perturbari et potest per dominium conservari.

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English Translation

Question II. Whether the power of presiding is in man according to the institution of nature, or according to the punishment of sin.

Secondly it is asked concerning this, whether the power of presiding is in man according to the institution of nature, or according to the punishment of sin. And that it is in the first way, it seems:

1. Genesis 11: Let us make man to our image and likeness, and let him preside etc. If you should say that he had preeminence with respect to the beasts, but not with respect to men; by this the difficulty is not escaped, because in 1 Corinthians 112: The head of the woman is the man: if therefore the head presides over the body and ought to govern the body, then it seems that according to the institution of nature there is a power of ruling in the human race.

2. Likewise, in the Angels, who are perfect in nature and in glory, there is not only order and grade according to the excellence of natural endowments, but also according to the presidency of offices3: therefore it seems that lordship is not repugnant to, but consonant with, the institution of human nature, as also of angelic nature.

3. Likewise, the power of ruling is a property of dignity and nobility4; but if anything of dignity belongs to fallen nature, much more does it belong to instituted nature: therefore it seems that the power of ruling pertained more to the state of instituted nature than to the state of fallen nature.

4. Likewise, everything that is for the conservation of the natural order pertains to the institution of nature; but the power of presiding pertains to the conservation of the natural order: therefore the power of presiding is in man from God according to the institution of nature. The major is manifest. The minor is proved by what Augustine says in the nineteenth book On the City of God5: "Penal servitude is so ordained by that law which commands the natural order to be conserved and forbids it to be disturbed"; but the power of ruling and penal servitude are ordained to the same end: therefore etc.

On the contrary: 1. Gregory6: "He made all men equal by nature, but for their various merits the hidden, yet just, dispensation of God sets some over others": therefore it seems that subjection and preeminence are not in man according to the institution of nature.

2. Likewise, Augustine, in the nineteenth book On the City of God7: "God did not will that rational man, made to the image of God, should have lordship over any but the irrational creatures": therefore if the power of presiding and ruling is in one man with respect to another, it seems etc.

3. Likewise, by reason this same thing seems true. Liberty is in man from nature; but the power of ruling is an impediment to liberty: therefore it does not seem that it is from nature. And that liberty both is from nature and is liable to be impeded by the power of presiding, is manifested, because liberty is to be defined thus8: "Liberty is the natural power by which it is permitted to a man to do what he wills."

4. Likewise, man according to his first condition was made to the image of God9; but inasmuch as he is the image of God, he is born to be borne immediately into God: therefore if God alone is greater than he, then according to nature nothing is above man except God: therefore there is no lordship in man according to the institution of nature except only the divine lordship.

5. Likewise, there is no master without a servant, therefore neither lordship without servitude; but "servitude was introduced on account of sin," as Augustine says in many places10: therefore it seems that the power of ruling in man is according to the condition of sin, not according to the institution of nature.

6. Likewise, in the glorification of men "the vices will be taken away, and nature will be preserved," according to what Augustine holds in the book On the City of God11; but in the state of glory the lordship of preeminence and the subjection of servitude will not remain: therefore these do not seem to be in human nature according as it is instituted, but only according as it is fallen and vitiated.

Conclusion

Conclusion. The power of ruling, insofar as it means the power of coercing subjects, is in man only according to the state of fallen nature.

I respond: It must be said that the power of ruling or of presiding is spoken of in three ways, namely, most broadly, commonly, and properly. Most broadly, the power of ruling is spoken of with respect to every thing which a man can use according to his pleasure and wish; and in this way a man is said to be the master of his possessions, whether movable or immovable. In another way the power of ruling or of presiding signifies an excellence of power in commanding one who is capable of reason and precept. In a third way the power of ruling is said to be the power of coercing subjects12; and this power signifies a certain constraining of liberty; and such power of ruling is properly called lordship, to which servitude corresponds.

In the first way the power of ruling is common to every state, namely to the state of instituted nature and of fallen nature and of glorified nature; and it was in a more excellent way in the state of instituted nature than it is in the state of fallen nature. — In the second way it belongs to the state of the wayfarer, whether for the state of instituted nature or for the state of fallen nature. For if man had stood firm, the husband could have commanded the wife, and the father could have commanded the son. And this is found also in the Angels, as long as they are ministering spirits13, because on that side they are in some way in the state of the wayfarer. Yet this presidency will not remain in glory, as was shown in the preceding14. — But in the third way the power of ruling in man is only according to the state of fallen nature; for it belongs to him according to the punishment of sin, not according to the institution of nature, and this because the servitude corresponding to it, according to what the Saints say, is a penalty of sin. — And because it is in this way that we here speak of the power of ruling, therefore those reasons are to be conceded which show that such a power is not in man according to his primary15 condition or according to the state of instituted nature.

1. To that, then, which is objected to the contrary from the text of Genesis and from First Corinthians, the response is already clear; for they proceed about the power of presiding taken in the first and second way, not the third. For although the woman is in a certain way inferior to the man by reason of the weaker sex, nevertheless, because she was not created to be to him as a maidservant for assistance, but as a companion; hence it is that, although she is called his head, yet he is not called her master, because she is not his handmaid. And therefore the Master said above, in the eighteenth distinction16, that the woman was created for equality; and so she was formed from the side, not from the feet, nor from the head, that she might seem to be the man's companion, not his mistress, nor his handmaid.

2. To that which is objected, that preeminence is in the Angels: the response is already clear, because, although one presides over another and commands another and has authority over another to command him something which pertains to the office of ministry, nevertheless one Angel is not called the servant of another Angel; and therefore from this it is not concluded that the power of ruling, according as servitude corresponds to it, is in man according to the condition of nature.

3. To that which is objected, that lordship is a property of dignity; it must be said that although it is a property of dignity in him who presides, yet it signifies unworthiness in him who is subject; and therefore it can naturally belong to a man with respect to another, inferior creature, but with respect to another man it does not belong naturally, but in a certain way preternaturally, namely as a punishment of sin; for as Ambrose says17: "Servitude was introduced through the sin of drunkenness."

4. To that which is objected, that lordship and servitude conduce to the conservation of the natural order; it must be said that there is an order which regards nature according to every state; and there is an order which regards nature according to the state of its own condition; and there is an order which regards nature according to the state of its own corruption. And accordingly some things are of the dictate of nature simply; some of the dictate of nature according to the state of instituted nature; some of the dictate of nature according to the state of fallen nature18. That God is to be honored, nature dictates according to every state; that all things be in common, it dictates according to the state of instituted nature; that something be private property, it dictates according to the state of fallen nature, to remove contentions and disputes19. Thus that all men are servants of God, nature dictates according to every state; but that man be made equal to man, it dictates according to the state of his first condition; but that man be subjected to man and that man serve man, it dictates according to the state of corruption, so that the wicked may be checked and the good defended. For unless there were such lordships coercing the wicked, on account of the corruption which is in nature, one would oppress another, and men could not commonly live together. But it would not be so, if man had remained in the state of innocence; for each one would remain in his own grade and state. And thus it is clear that that reason does not conclude that servitude or lordship regards instituted nature, but only that it regards fallen nature, where the order is liable to be disturbed and can be conserved through lordship.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 26.
    Verse 26.
  2. Vers. 3. — Pro evadetur cod. F substituit evades.
    Verse 3. — For evadetur codex F substitutes evades.
  3. Ut supra d. 9. per totam ostensum est. — Mox pro non cod. T habet nec.
    As was shown throughout above in distinction 9. — Presently, for non codex T has nec.
  4. Cfr. Aristot., III. Polit. c. 4. et 12. (c. 11. seq.). — Subinde pro aliquid codd. L O aliquis status.
    Cf. Aristotle, Politics III, c. 4 and 12 (c. 11 ff.). — Thereupon, for aliquid codices L O read aliquis status.
  5. Cap. 15.
    Chapter 15.
  6. Libr. XXI. Moral. c. 15. n. 22: Omnes homines natura aequales genuit, sed variante meritorum ordine, alios aliis dispensatio occulta postponit. Ipsa autem diversitas, quae accessit ex vitio, recte est divinis iudiciis ordinata, ut, quia omnis homo iter vitae aeque non graditur, alter ab altero regatur. Cfr. ibid. XXVI. c. 26. n. 46. — In fine arg. pro institutionem naturae codd. C F K R S T ee constitutionem naturae.
    Morals book XXI, c. 15, n. 22: "He begot all men equal by nature, but, the order of merits varying, the hidden dispensation sets some after others. But that very diversity, which came in from vice, is rightly ordained by the divine judgments, so that, because not every man treads the path of life equally, one may be governed by another." Cf. ibid. XXVI, c. 26, n. 46. — At the end of the argument, for institutionem naturae codices C F K R S T ee read constitutionem naturae.
  7. Cap. 15. — Paulo inferius in cod. T desunt verba et dominandi.
    Chapter 15. — A little below, in codex T the words et dominandi are wanting.
  8. Iustiniani, I. Institut. iur. civ. c. 3. § Et libertas: Et libertas quidem (ex qua etiam liberi vocantur) est naturalis facultas eius quod cuique facere libet, nisi si quid vi aut iure prohibetur. — In definitione allata post quod vult supplendum esse videtur quod loc. cit. sequitur. — Loc. cit. § seq. de servitute dicitur: «Servitus autem est constitutio iuris gentium, qua quis dominio alieno contra naturam subiicitur». Sententiam Aristot. de hac re vide in eius I. Polit. c. 3. seq. (c. 2.).
    Justinian, Institutes of Civil Law I, c. 3, § "And liberty": "And liberty indeed (from which men are also called free) is the natural faculty of doing what each one pleases, unless something is prohibited by force or by law." — In the definition cited, after quod vult there seems to be supplied quod, which follows in the place cited. — In the place cited, in the following §, concerning servitude it is said: "But servitude is an institution of the law of nations, by which one is, against nature, subjected to another's lordship." For Aristotle's opinion on this matter see his Politics I, c. 3 ff. (c. 2).
  9. Gen. 1, 26. — De minori cfr. supra d. 16. a. 1. q. 1. in corp., et de prima conclusione vide supra pag. 45, nota 5.
    Genesis 1:26. — On the minor cf. above d. 16, a. 1, q. 1, in the body, and on the first conclusion see above page 45, note 5.
  10. Libr. XIX. de Civ. Dei, c. 15; XI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 37. n. 50; I. Quaest. in Pentateuch. q. 153. — Sententia propos. maioris ab August., V. de Trin. c. 16. n. 17. sic exprimitur: Sicut autem non potest esse servus qui non habet dominum, sic nec dominus qui non habet servum.
    On the City of God book XIX, c. 15; On Genesis to the Letter XI, c. 37, n. 50; Questions on the Pentateuch I, q. 153. — The proposition of the major is thus expressed by Augustine, On the Trinity V, c. 16, n. 17: "But just as there cannot be a servant who has no master, so neither a master who has no servant."
  11. Libr. XXII. c. 17. Cfr. ibid. c. 19. n. 2. — Paulo ante pro hominum Vat. et ed. 1 hominis, edd. 2, 3 homini.
    Book XXII, c. 17. Cf. ibid. c. 19, n. 2. — A little before, for hominum the Vatican edition and ed. 1 read hominis, edd. 2, 3 homini.
  12. Secundum Boeth., cuius verba videsis supra pag. 69, nota 10. Cfr. Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 12, ubi ad dominationem tria requiri docetur: superioritas sive excellentia gradus, possessio bonorum et immutabilis firmitas i. e. potestas continendi et coercendi. — Paulo superius post potestas dominandi Vat. adiicit sive praesidendi.
    According to Boethius, whose words you may see above on page 69, note 10. Cf. Dionysius, On the Divine Names c. 12, where it is taught that three things are required for lordship: superiority or excellence of grade, possession of goods, and unchangeable firmness, i.e. the power of restraining and coercing. — A little above, after potestas dominandi the Vatican edition adds sive praesidendi.
  13. Hebr. 1, 14. — Cfr. August., XI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 37. n. 50, et I. Quaest. in Pentateuch. q. 153: Est etiam ordo naturalis in hominibus, ut serviant feminae viris... quia et illic haec iustitia est, ut infirmior ratio serviat fortiori.
    Hebrews 1:14. — Cf. Augustine, On Genesis to the Letter XI, c. 37, n. 50, and Questions on the Pentateuch I, q. 153: "There is also a natural order in men, that women should serve their husbands... because there too this is justice, that the weaker reason should serve the stronger."
  14. Dist. 9. q. 6. — Cfr. August., XIX. de Civ. Dei, c. 16.
    Distinction 9, q. 6. — Cf. Augustine, On the City of God XIX, c. 16.
  15. Cod. T sui.
    Codex T reads sui.
  16. Cap. 2. Cfr. ibid. Comment. a. 1. q. 1.
    Chapter 2. Cf. ibid. the Commentary, a. 1, q. 1.
  17. Libr. de Elia et ieiunio, c. 5. n. 11: Non esset hodie servitus, si ebrietas non fuisset.
    Book On Elijah and Fasting, c. 5, n. 11: "There would be no servitude today, if drunkenness had not existed."
  18. In hac ultima propositione codd. et primae edd. non modice discrepant a nostra lectione, quae est etiam Vaticanae. Plerique enim codd. cum primis edd. omittunt verba naturae institutae; quaedam de dictamine naturae secundum statum naturae lapsae, terminantes propositionem verbis secundum statum; cod. W loco verborum istorum omissorum posuit istum vel illum et dein prosequitur Nam Deum esse etc.; denique cod. H textum sic formavit (post simpliciter): quaedam de dictamine naturae secundum omnem statum, ut Deum esse etc.
    In this last proposition the codices and the first editions differ not a little from our reading, which is also that of the Vatican edition. For most of the codices, together with the first editions, omit the words naturae institutae; some of the dictate of nature according to the state of fallen nature, ending the proposition with the words according to the state; codex W in place of these omitted words put this or that and then continues For that God is etc.; finally codex H formed the text thus (after simply): some of the dictate of nature according to every state, that God is etc.
  19. Cfr. Iac. 4, 1. seq. Cfr. etiam Aristot., II. Polit. c. 3. (c. 2.), ubi Platonis doctrina de communitate bonorum impugnatur.
    Cf. James 4:1 ff. Cf. also Aristotle, Politics II, c. 3 (c. 2), where Plato's doctrine on the community of goods is attacked.
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