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Dist. 44, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 44

Textus Latinus
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Articulus I. Unde habeat ortum potestas peccandi.

Quaestio II. Utrum potentia peccandi, secundum quod huiusmodi, sit mala.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum potentia peccandi, secundum quod huiusmodi, sit mala. Et quod sit mala, in quantum huiusmodi, videtur.

1. Potentia peccandi non est aliud quam voluntas; sed voluntas peccandi est mala: ergo potentia peccandi est mala, secundum quod huiusmodi.

2. Item, « cuius usus malus est, ipsum quoque malum est », sicut « cuius usus bonus est, ipsum bonum1 »; sed usus potentiae peccandi est peccare, et peccare est malum: ergo et potentia peccandi est mala.

3. Item, sicut se habet potentia bene faciendi2 respectu boni, ita se habet potentia male faciendi respectu mali; sed omnis potentia bene faciendi, in quantum huiusmodi, est bona: ergo potentia male faciendi, in quantum huiusmodi, est mala.

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4. Item, unaquaeque potentia completior est, quando est suo actui coniuncta3; sed potentia male faciendi, dum est coniuncta actui male faciendi, mala est: ergo si minus completa est, quando est separata ab actu, ergo videtur, quod etiam separata ab actu mala sit.

5. Item, potentia male faciendi aut est bona, aut est mala. Si est bona, et omne bonum est in Deo et a Deo4: ergo videtur, quod potentia male faciendi, in quantum huiusmodi, et a Deo sit et in Deo sit, quorum utrumque falsum est: restat igitur, quod potentia peccandi sit mala.

Sed contra: 1. Si potentia peccandi est mala, ergo potens peccare est malus; sed iustus et sanctus potest peccare5: ergo iustus et sanctus est malus.

2. Item, si potentia peccandi est mala, aut ergo malo poenae, aut malo culpae. Malo poenae non; quia illud sequitur malum culpae6. Malo culpae non; quia culpa consequitur peccandi potentiam tempore et natura; prius enim et homo et Angelus peccare potuit, quam peccavit.

3. Item, si potentia peccandi est mala, aut ergo malitia, quam fecit, aut malitia, quae facta est in ipsa. Malitia, quam fecit, non oportet, quia multi possunt male facere, qui non faciunt nec fecerunt. Si malitia, quae facta est in ipsa; sed contra: Augustinus in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum probat, quod « nullo alio auctore potest homo fieri malus nisi se ipso »: ergo non videtur, quod potentia peccandi, quantum est de se, mala sit.

4. Item, non sequitur: iste potest adulterari, ergo est adulter; ergo non sequitur: iste potest malum facere, ergo est malus; sed si potentia male faciendi esset mala, necessario sequeretur ad ipsam, esse malum: ergo etc.

Iuxta hoc quaeritur: unde hoc est, quod voluntas male faciendi est mala7, et potentia male faciendi non dicitur esse mala8? — Quaeritur etiam: propter quid voluntas peccandi non dicitur involuntas, sicut potentia peccandi dicitur impotentia? Videtur enim, quod magis. Si enim voluntas peccandi maiorem dicit approximationem ad peccati defectum quam potentia peccandi; magis videtur, quod deberet cadere a propria ratione, ut voluntas peccandi diceretur involuntas, quam potentia peccandi dicatur impotentia.

Conclusio.

Potentia peccandi, ut talis, non est mala.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sicut potentia respectu bonorum non dicit actualem ordinationem ad effectum, sed solum habitualem, voluntas vero dicit actualem ordinationem; sic et in malis intelligendum est, quod potentia non dicit actualem ordinationem ad defectum, sed potius habitualem. Unde non dicitur aliquis habere potentiam male faciendi, quia actualiter tendat9 in mala, sed quia potest tendere in malum. Voluntas autem actualem ordinationem dicit; non enim dicitur: iste vult malum, nisi quando actualiter tendit in malum. Sicut enim dictum fuit in primo libro10, voluntas est approximativa ipsius potentiae ad agendum. — Et ideo, quia esse malum dicit aliquem defectum praesentem in eo vel circa id, de quo dicitur; hinc est, quod voluntas peccandi mala est, et velle peccare est malum; potentia autem peccandi sive posse peccare non dicitur esse mala. — Concedendae igitur sunt rationes ostendentes, quod potentia peccandi, in quantum huiusmodi, non est mala.

Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium de voluntate, dicendum, quod illud non valet, quia voluntas male faciendi plus ponit quam potentia male faciendi; dicit enim actualem ordinationem ad malum, vel, ut proprius dicam, actualem deordinationem. Unde sicut argumentum illud non valet: velle male facere est malum, ergo posse male facere est malum; ita nec illud valet, quod obiicit11, quod potentia male faciendi non est aliud quam voluntas. Quamvis enim non sit aliud, alio tamen modo importatur per hoc nomen potentia, et alio modo per hoc nomen voluntas; quia in uno importatur in maiori elongatione, in altero vero in maiori approximatione; et ideo est ibi sophisma secundum accidens12, sicut hic: eadem est voluntas, quae distat a malo, et quae approximatur malo: ergo si

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mala est, prout est approximata, ex comparatione ad malum similiter mala erit, prout est distans; assignatur enim hic, aliquid similiter accidenti et rei subiectae inesse.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod usus potentiae peccandi, in quantum huiusmodi, est malus; dicendum, quod illa maxima intelligitur de usu, ad quem unaquaeque res directe et de proximo ordinatur; sed potentia peccandi non ordinatur, nec directe nec de proximo ad actum peccandi; pro eo quod illa eadem potentia est ad opposita et ad suum oppositum ordinatur per se, ad hoc autem ordinatur per accidens13. Unde oppositum peccati est eius usus, et peccatum est eius abusus; et ideo non sequitur, quod si peccare sit malum, quod propter hoc potentia peccandi, in quantum huiusmodi, sit malum.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in bonis potentia bene faciendi est bona, ergo etc.; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia in bonis bonitas actus est a bonitate potentiae; unde consuevit dici, quod non, quia bona facimus, boni sumus, sed quia boni sumus, bona facimus. Non sic autem est in malis; immo econtra, quia mala facimus, mali sumus14. Et ratio huius est, quia, quamvis potentia non possit se per suum actum perficere, potest tamen se per suum actum deordinare et deficientem facere; et propter hoc non tantum addit bonum opus super bonum opus quantum ad rationem merendi, sicut peccatum super peccatum quantum ad rationem demerendi15.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod completior est potentia, cum est suo actui coniuncta; dicendum, quod hoc verum est de actu, ad quem ordinatur simpliciter; sed non est verum de eo, ad quem ordinatur per accidens, maxime cum actus ille plus tenet rationem defectus quam effectus. Tunc enim magis deordinat, quam perficiat; et sic est in potentia peccandi respectu actus peccandi; et ideo magis recedit potentia a completione in hoc, quod peccat, quam in eo, quod potuit peccare16.

5. Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum potentia peccandi sit bona, an mala; dicendum, quod si dicatur potentia peccandi potentia, qua quis potest peccare, absque dubio bona est et a Deo est. Similiter, si dicatur potentia peccandi ordinata ad actum peccato substratum, similiter est a Deo. Si autem dicatur potentia peccandi ipsa potestas deficiendi, hoc modo non debet dici bona nec mala. Bona non debet dici, quia non dicit aliquod ens, et nihil habet rationem entis, quod non habeat rationem boni17. Mala non debet dici propter hoc, quod non dicit privationem alicuius boni nati inesse, nec dicit actualem defectum, sed habitualem; unde talis potentia non debet dici potentia mala vel deficiens, sed potentia defectiva; nec est proprie potentia, sed impotentia. Unde sicut non posse videre in lapide nec est bonum nec est malum, quia nec dicit positionem nec dicit privationem alicuius boni nati inesse18: sic intelligendum est de potentia peccandi in creatura rationali, secundum quod potentia peccandi dicit defectibilitatem, quae inest ei ex ratione creaturae, secundum quam ex nihilo habet esse.

Ex his patet responsio ad illud quod ultimo quaerebatur, quare videlicet voluntas peccandi dicitur esse mala, et non sic potestas. Hoc enim est ex hoc, quia voluntas est causa immediata et proxima respectu actuum, qui ex deliberatione procedunt. — Magis autem peccandi potentia dicitur impotentia, quam voluntas peccandi dicatur involuntas, pro eo quod nomen potentiae impositum est a positione et complemento; et ideo peccare diminuit de ratione potentiae, cum dicat defectum, sicut mortuus diminuit de ratione hominis. Nomen autem voluntatis impositum est a libertate et complacentia19. Et quia peccatum est placitum et committi habet per liberum arbitrium; hinc est, quod quamvis depravet potentiam voluntatis, tamen non diminuit de ratione voluntatis, quia non habet ad ipsam repugnantiam, secundum quod sic nominatur; et propterea velle peccare velle est, posse autem peccare non est posse; et ideo dictum fuit in primo libro20, quod Deus est omnipotens, et tamen non dicitur omnivolens21.

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English Translation

Article I. On the origin of the power of sinning.

Question II. Whether the power of sinning, as such, is evil.

Secondly it is asked whether the power of sinning, as such, is evil. And it seems that it is evil, insofar as it is such.

1. The power of sinning is nothing other than the will; but the will to sin is evil: therefore the power of sinning is evil, as such.

2. Likewise, "that whose use is evil is itself also evil," just as "that whose use is good is itself good1"; but the use of the power of sinning is to sin, and to sin is evil: therefore the power of sinning too is evil.

3. Likewise, as the power of doing well2 stands toward the good, so the power of doing ill stands toward evil; but every power of doing well, as such, is good: therefore the power of doing ill, as such, is evil.

4. Likewise, every power is more complete when it is joined to its act3; but the power of doing ill, while it is joined to the act of doing ill, is evil: therefore if it is less complete when it is separated from the act, then it seems that even separated from the act it is evil.

5. Likewise, the power of doing ill is either good or evil. If it is good, and every good is in God and from God4: then it seems that the power of doing ill, as such, both is from God and is in God, both of which are false: it remains, therefore, that the power of sinning is evil.

On the contrary: 1. If the power of sinning is evil, then one able to sin is evil; but the just and holy man is able to sin5: therefore the just and holy man is evil.

2. Likewise, if the power of sinning is evil, then either by the evil of penalty or by the evil of fault. Not by the evil of penalty; because that follows upon the evil of fault6. Not by the evil of fault; because fault follows upon the power of sinning in time and by nature; for both man and angel were able to sin before they sinned.

3. Likewise, if the power of sinning is evil, then either by a malice which it produced, or by a malice which has been produced in it. By a malice which it produced is not required, because many are able to do ill who do not and have not done so. If by a malice which has been produced in it; but on the contrary: Augustine in the book of Eighty-three Questions proves that "by no other author can a man be made evil except by himself": therefore it does not seem that the power of sinning, as far as it is of itself, is evil.

4. Likewise, it does not follow: this man is able to commit adultery, therefore he is an adulterer; therefore it does not follow: this man is able to do evil, therefore he is evil; but if the power of doing ill were evil, it would necessarily follow upon it, that there be evil: therefore etc.

Together with this it is asked: whence is it that the will to do ill is evil7, and the power of doing ill is not said to be evil8? — It is also asked: for what reason is the will to sin not called a non-will, just as the power to sin is called a non-power? For it seems that it ought rather to be so. For if the will to sin states a greater approximation to the defect of sin than the power of sinning does; the more it seems that it ought to fall away from its proper character, so that the will to sin should be called a non-will, than that the power to sin should be called a non-power.

Conclusion.

The power of sinning, as such, is not evil.

Respondeo: It must be said that, just as power with respect to goods does not state an actual ordering to the effect, but only a habitual one, whereas will states an actual ordering; so too in the case of evils it must be understood that power does not state an actual ordering to defect, but rather a habitual one. Hence one is not said to have the power of doing ill because he actually tends9 toward evils, but because he is able to tend toward evil. But will states an actual ordering; for one is not said to will evil, except when he actually tends toward evil. For as was said in the first book10, the will is what brings the power near to acting. — And therefore, since to be evil states some present defect in that of which, or about that of which, it is said; hence it is that the will to sin is evil, and to will to sin is evil; but the power of sinning or to be able to sin is not said to be evil. — Therefore the reasons that show that the power of sinning, as such, is not evil must be granted.

Replies to the arguments for the affirmative:

1. To that which is first objected to the contrary concerning the will, it must be said that it does not hold, because the will to do ill posits more than the power of doing ill; for it states an actual ordering to evil, or, to speak more properly, an actual disordering. Hence, just as that argument does not hold: to will to do ill is evil, therefore to be able to do ill is evil; so neither does that hold which it objects11, namely that the power of doing ill is nothing other than the will. For although it is not something other, yet it is signified in one way by the name power, and in another way by the name will; because in the one it is signified in greater remoteness, but in the other in greater nearness; and therefore there is here a fallacy of accident12, as here: it is the same will which is distant from evil and which is brought near to evil: therefore if

it is evil, insofar as it is brought near, by comparison to evil it will likewise be evil, insofar as it is distant; for here it is assigned that something belongs alike to the accident and to the underlying thing.

2. To that which is objected, that the use of the power of sinning, as such, is evil; it must be said that that maxim is to be understood of the use to which each thing is directly and proximately ordered; but the power of sinning is not ordered, neither directly nor proximately, to the act of sinning; for the reason that that same power is toward opposites, and is ordered per se to its opposite, but to this it is ordered per accidens13. Hence the opposite of sin is its use, and sin is its abuse; and therefore it does not follow that, if to sin is evil, on account of this the power of sinning, as such, is evil.

3. To that which is objected, that among goods the power of doing well is good, therefore etc.; it must be said that it is not alike, because among goods the goodness of the act is from the goodness of the power; whence it is wont to be said that it is not because we do good things that we are good, but because we are good that we do good things. But it is not so in the case of evils; rather the contrary, because we do evil things, we are evil14. And the reason for this is that, although the power cannot perfect itself through its act, yet it can disorder itself through its act and make itself deficient; and on account of this a good work does not add to a good work as much, in respect of meriting, as sin adds to sin in respect of demeriting15.

4. To that which is objected, that the power is more complete when it is joined to its act; it must be said that this is true of the act to which it is ordered simply; but it is not true of that to which it is ordered per accidens, especially when that act holds more the character of a defect than of an effect. For then it disorders more than it perfects; and so it is in the power of sinning with respect to the act of sinning; and therefore the power recedes more from completion in this, that it sins, than in this, that it was able to sin16.

5. To that which is asked, whether the power of sinning is good or evil; it must be said that if the power of sinning be called the power by which one is able to sin, without doubt it is good and is from God. Likewise, if the power of sinning be called as ordered to the act underlying the sin, it is likewise from God. But if the power of sinning be called the very capacity for failing, in this way it ought to be called neither good nor evil. It ought not to be called good, because it does not state any being, and nothing has the character of being which does not have the character of good17. It ought not to be called evil for this reason, that it does not state the privation of any good naturally apt to be present, nor does it state an actual defect, but a habitual one; whence such a power ought not to be called an evil power or deficient, but a defective power; nor is it properly a power, but a non-power. Hence just as not being able to see in a stone is neither good nor evil, because it states neither a position nor the privation of any good naturally apt to be present18: so it must be understood concerning the power of sinning in the rational creature, insofar as the power of sinning states a defectibility which belongs to it from the character of a creature, according to which it has being from nothing.

From these things appears the answer to what was asked last, namely why the will to sin is said to be evil, and not so the capacity. For this is from the fact that the will is the immediate and proximate cause with respect to the acts which proceed from deliberation. — But the power of sinning is rather called a non-power, than the will to sin should be called a non-will, for the reason that the name power was imposed from positing and completion; and therefore to sin diminishes from the character of power, since it states a defect, just as a dead man diminishes from the character of man. But the name will was imposed from liberty and complacency19. And because sin is something pleasing and is to be committed through free choice; hence it is that, although it depraves the power of the will, yet it does not diminish from the character of the will, because it has no repugnance toward it, according as it is so named; and therefore to will to sin is to will, but to be able to sin is not to be able; and therefore it was said in the first book20 that God is omnipotent, and yet he is not called omnivolent21.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Boëth., II. de Differ. topic., ubi ad verbum sic: Cuius usus bonus, ipsum quoque bonum est, et e converso. Cfr. Aristot., III. Topic. c. 3. Vide etiam supra pag. 803, nota 8.
    Boethius, On Topical Differences bk. II, where verbatim thus: "That whose use is good is itself also good, and conversely." Cf. Aristotle, Topics III, c. 3. See also above, p. 803, note 8.
  2. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. in principio.
    See here the Master's text, c. 1, at the beginning.
  3. Cfr. supra pag. 681, nota 7.
    Cf. above, p. 681, note 7.
  4. Vide I. Sent. d. 36. a. 3. q. 1. et dub. 1. seqq.
    See I Sent., d. 36, a. 3, q. 1, and dub. 1 and following.
  5. Eccli. 31, 10: Qui potuit transgredi etc. Cfr. etiam Aristot., IV. Topic. c. 4.
    Ecclesiasticus 31:10: "Who was able to transgress" etc. Cf. also Aristotle, Topics IV, c. 4.
  6. Cfr. dicta Augusl., supra pag. 432, nota 4. et pag. 711, nota 1. allata. De ultima propos. argumenti cfr. supra d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. 2.
    Cf. the sayings of Augustine cited above, p. 432, note 4, and p. 711, note 1. On the last proposition of the argument cf. above, d. 3, p. II, a. 1, q. 1 and 2.
  7. Quaest. 3. seq. — Paulo superius pro male facere, qui non faciunt Vat. mala facere, quae non faciunt.
    Question 3, following. — A little above, for to do ill, who do not do it the Vatican edition reads to do evils, which they do not do.
  8. Vat. addit et potentia malefaciendi est mala. In seqq. edd. 2, 3 nec non complures codd. bis perperam substituunt voluntas pro involuntas, quod vitium repetunt infra in solut. huius quaest. incid.
    The Vatican edition adds and the power of doing ill is evil. In what follows, editions 2 and 3 as well as several codices twice wrongly substitute will for non-will, a fault they repeat below in the solution of this incidental question.
  9. Codd. F K L O et alii tendit. Paulo inferius pro non enim dicitur codd. F T W cc et ed. 1 exhibent cum enim dicitur, et deinde pro nisi quando actualiter tendit substituunt notatur, quod actualiter tendat.
    Codices F K L O and others read tendit. A little below, for for it is not said codices F T W cc and ed. 1 give for when it is said, and then for except when it actually tends they substitute it is noted that it actually tends.
  10. Dist. 45. a. 2. q. 1.
    Distinction 45, a. 2, q. 1.
  11. In edd. legitur: ita nec valet illud. Nec valet quod obiicit. In multis codd. nec non in edd. 1, 2 aegre desiderantur verba, quae paulo post sequuntur: per hoc nomen potentia... voluntas.
    In the editions it reads: "so neither does that hold. Nor does that hold which it objects." In many codices, and also in editions 1 and 2, the words which follow a little after are awkwardly lacking: "by this name power... will."
  12. Cfr. supra pag. 870, nota 8. — Mox pro quae [Vat. cum edd. 2, 3 qua] approximatur codd. D F (T a secunda manu) cc et ed. 1 quae approximat, et dein pro malo cod. T ad malum.
    Cf. above, p. 870, note 8. — Presently for which [the Vatican edition with editions 2 and 3, by which] is brought near, codices D F (T in a second hand) cc and ed. 1 read which brings near, and then for to evil codex T reads unto evil.
  13. Cfr. supra d. 23. p. II. q. 3. Aristot., VI. Topic. c. 3. (c. 5.), ubi recensens vitia definitionum, quae sunt ad aliquid, ait: In quibusdam profecto secundum veritatem se habet, ut dictum est, in quibusdam autem non, ut in quibuscumque non per se dicitur ad utrumque, ut medicinam scientiam sanitatem et aegritudinem efficiendi; nam de illa quidem per se dicitur, de hac autem per accidens; simpliciter enim alienum a medicina aegritudinem efficere. — In fine solut. pro malum codd. M T Z cc et ed. 1 exhibent mala.
    Cf. above, d. 23, p. II, q. 3. Aristotle, Topics VI, c. 3 (c. 5), where reviewing the faults of definitions which are relative to something, he says: "In some cases indeed it holds according to truth, as has been said, but in others not, as in whatever is not said per se of both, as that medicine is the science of producing health and sickness; for of the former it is said per se, but of the latter per accidens; for it is simply foreign to medicine to produce sickness." — At the end of the solution, for malum codices M T Z cc and ed. 1 give mala.
  14. Vide supra pag. 718, nota 9.
    See above, p. 718, note 9.
  15. Cfr. supra d. 40. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4. et a. 2. q. 3. ad 4.
    Cf. above, d. 40, a. 1, q. 1, reply 4, and a. 2, q. 3, reply 4.
  16. Aristot., IX. Metaph. text. 19. (VIII. c. 9.) docet, in bonis actum meliorem esse et praestantiorem potentia, in malis vero potentiam meliorem praestantioremque esse actu.
    Aristotle, Metaphysics IX, text 19 (VIII, c. 9), teaches that in good things the act is better and more excellent than the potency, but in evil things the potency is better and more excellent than the act.
  17. Cfr. supra pag. 805, nota 4. — In Vat., pro entis posito boni et pro boni substituto entis, legitur sic: et nihil habet rationem boni, quod non habeat rationem entis.
    Cf. above, p. 805, note 4. — In the Vatican edition, with good put for being and being substituted for good, it reads thus: "and nothing has the character of good which does not have the character of being."
  18. Sed solum negationem; de quo cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Oppositis; IV. Metaph. text. 4. et V. text. 27. (III. c. 2. et IV. c. 22.). — De propos. seq. vide supra d. 34. a. 1. q. 2.
    But only a negation; on which cf. Aristotle, Categories, the chapter on Opposites; Metaphysics IV, text 4, and V, text 27 (III, c. 2, and IV, c. 22). — On the following proposition see above, d. 34, a. 1, q. 2.
  19. Cfr. supra d. 23. p. I. q. 6. et dub. 1.
    Cf. above, d. 23, p. I, q. 6, and dub. 1.
  20. Dist. 45. a. 1. q. 2. Cfr. ibid. d. 42. q. 2. Referre iuvat etiam illud quod Anselmus dicit, de Casu diaboli, c. 8, ubi ostendit, voluntatem eiusque conversionem non esse ipsum malum. « Denique, ait, bona voluntas non magis est aliquid quam mala voluntas, nec ista magis malum, quam illa bonum. Non enim magis est aliquid voluntas, quae vult dare misericorditer, quam illa quae vult rapere violenter; nec magis haec malum, quam illa bonum est. »
    Distinction 45, a. 1, q. 2. Cf. ibid., d. 42, q. 2. It is worth relating also that which Anselm says, On the Fall of the Devil, c. 8, where he shows that the will and its conversion are not evil itself. "In fine," he says, "a good will is no more something than an evil will, nor is the latter any more an evil than the former is a good. For a will which wills to give mercifully is no more something than one which wills to seize violently; nor is the former any more an evil than the latter is a good."
  21. Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    See the scholion to the preceding question. ---
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