Bonaventure

Quaestio II. Ad quid istae claves Ecclesiae datae sint.

Secundo quaeritur, ad quid sint istae claves. Et supposito, quod sint ad aperiendum, quaeritur, utrum sint ad claudendum. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Isaiae vigesimo secundo¹: Dabo clavem domus David, et aperiet, et nemo claudet, et claudet etc.; sed potestas collata est ministris conformis potestati Christi: ergo ad claudendum et ad aperiendum.

2. Item, in datione clavium Dominus dedit non solum potestatem solvendi, sed etiam ligandi, non solum dimittendi peccata, sed etiam retinendi, sicut patet Matthaei decimo sexto² et Ioannis vigesimo; et per hoc, quod solvunt, sunt ad aperiendum; et per hoc, quod remittunt, similiter: ergo ab oppositis per hoc, quod ligant et retinent, erunt ad claudendum: non ergo solum ad aperiendum.

3. Item, si clavis dicitur metaphorice in spiritualibus ad similitudinem clavis in corporalibus³: sed officium clavis non tantum est aperire, sed etiam claudere: ergo etc.

4. Item, si solum est ad aperiendum: ergo pari ratione, cum baptismus sit ad aperiendam ianuam et omnia Sacramenta, et praecipue eucharistia et unctio extrema, quae removent⁴ obstacula ad ingrediendum in gloriam; ergo omne Sacramentum esset clavis, quod non admittit usus nec ratio: ergo etc.

Contra: 1. Claves datae sunt ad nostram utilitatem; sed utilitas nostra non est, quod regnum caeli nobis claudatur: ergo non sunt ad claudendum.

2. Item, nihil claudit regnum caelorum, nisi quod apponit⁵ obstaculum; appositum autem obstaculum ad ingrediendum non est nisi debitum, quod est ex peccato; sed claves non sunt ad faciendum homines peccare: ergo etc.

3. Item, quicumque utitur instrumento ad illud, ad quod est, recte utitur illo; sed sacerdos claudendo aditum regni non recte facit, sed peccat: ergo clavis non est ei ad hoc data. Probatio minoris, Matthaei vigesimo tertio⁶: Vae vobis Scribae et Pharisaei, qui clauditis regnum caelorum ante homines: ergo peccabant in hoc.

4. Item, nihil idem est ad oppositos fines; sed claudere et aperire regnum caelorum sunt opposita: ergo clavis non ordinatur ad haec duo.

Quaeritur etiam iuxta hoc, cum malum exemplum claudat regnum caelorum, et bonum aperiat: quare non dicitur clavis?

Item, cum solvere et ligare non sit clavis usus, sed magis manus, non videtur, quod Dominus deberet clavibus attribuere usum ligandi et solvendi; quod tamen facit Matthaei decimo sexto⁷; quaeritur ergo, unde hoc sit.

Conclusio. Claves Ecclesiae datae sunt simul ad ligandum et solvendum, ad claudendum et aperiendum, sed principalius ad solvendum et aperiendum.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod potestas sacerdotibus communiter concessa super subditos non est ad omnino solvendum debitum, quia non debebat

hoc cuilibet communicari, ne culpa sine poena remaneret^a; ideo data est eis potestas, ut ligando solverent, ligando scilicet ad unum, absolverent ab alio; sed non est data potestas ligandi nisi propter solutionem. — Quoniam igitur solvere aliquem a debito est removere obstaculum; et hoc est aperire caelum, et per consequens ligare est claudere: ideo dico, quod claves istae simul sunt ad ligandum et solvendum, claudendum et aperiendum; sed actus ligandi et solvendi competit eis immediate et in^b subiectum; sed actus claudendi et aperiendi in relatione ad finem ultimum. Et quoniam instrumentum denominatur ab optimo et a fine, ideo magis denominatur illa potestas a nomine respiciente finem.

Quia vero instrumentum ordinatum ad claudendum et aperiendum in corporalibus est clavis; ideo talis potestas recte dicitur clavis; non tamen est omnimoda similitudo, sed aliqua. Clavis enim materialis ad utrumque principaliter est, et principalius ad claudendum propter latrones et fures^c; sed spiritualis principalius est ordinata ad aperiendum, nec est ordinata ad claudendum nisi propter aperitionem, sicut nec ad ligandum nisi propter solutionem. Et ita, quemadmodum medicina est scientia sani et aegri — sani per se, et aegri per accidens^d — ita intelligendum est in proposito.

Concedo ergo, quod sit ad claudendum, licet non omnino eodem modo, quo clavis materialis.

1. 2. 3. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod clausio est nobis damnosa et fit per peccatum; dicendum, quod sicut in corporalibus quaedam est ligatio simpliciter nocens et impediens, sicut ligatur homo propter paralysim; quaedam simpliciter expediens, sicut ligatur homo medicamento emplastri: sic in spiritualibus ligatio peccati impedit, sed ligatio sacerdotalis melius facit ad velociorem et expeditiorem solutionem. Similiter intelligendum de clausione, quod est quaedam bona et expediens, et hac ligat clavis, non alia; ipse autem opponit de alia. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad tria obiecta; ligat enim non debito peccati, sed impositione sive superpositione remedii.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nihil idem est ad oppositos fines; dicendum, quod verum est, intelligendo de fine per se, sed si est ita, quod ad unum sit per se, ad alterum per accidens, nihil impedit; sic autem dicimus in proposito esse.

Ad illud quod quaeritur: quare exemplum non dicitur clavis? dicendum, quod officium clavis est, quod eadem solvit et ligat, et claudit et aperit; et solum est haec potestas sacerdotalis: ideo sola dicitur clavis. Unde baptismus non dicitur clavis, eo quod tantum aperit; similiter nec bonum exemplum; e converso peccatum, vel malum exemplum tantum claudit: et ideo neutrum dicitur clavis. Praeterea, exemplum disponit a remotis; sed clavis aperit de propinquo: ideo clavis non debet dici.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod clavis non est ad solvere; dicendum, quod potestas illa habet actum in relatione ad subiectum et in relatione ad finem actus. In comparatione ad subiectum respicit potestatis usum, sed in comparatione ad finem respicit fructum. Et quia denominatio est ab optimo, ideo Dominus claves^e illam potestatem vocavit. Sed quia exsecutio et usus respicit actum primum, ideo illi clavi actum solvendi et ligandi attribuit^f.

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Question II. To what end these keys of the Church have been given.

Secondly, it is asked to what end these keys are. And granted that they are for opening, it is asked whether they are for closing. And that they are, it seems.

1. Isaiah 22¹: I will give the key of the house of David, and he shall open, and none shall shut, and he shall shut etc.; but the power conferred upon the ministers is conformed to the power of Christ: therefore [it is] for closing and for opening.

2. Likewise, in the giving of the keys the Lord gave not only the power of loosing, but also of binding, not only of remitting sins, but also of retaining, as is plain in Matthew 16² and John 20; and by the fact that they loose, they are for opening; and by the fact that they remit, likewise: therefore, from the opposites, by the fact that they bind and retain, they will be for closing: therefore not only for opening.

3. Likewise, if a key is said metaphorically of spiritual things by likeness to a key in bodily things³: but the office of a key is not only to open, but also to close: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, if it is only for opening: then by parity of reasoning, since baptism is for opening the door, and [so are] all the Sacraments, and especially the Eucharist and extreme unction, which remove⁴ obstacles to entering into glory; therefore every Sacrament would be a key, which neither usage nor reason admits: therefore etc.

On the contrary: 1. The keys have been given for our advantage; but it is not our advantage that the kingdom of heaven be closed to us: therefore they are not for closing.

2. Likewise, nothing closes the kingdom of heaven except what sets up⁵ an obstacle; but the obstacle set up against entering is nothing but a debt, which is from sin; but the keys are not for making men sin: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, whoever uses an instrument for that for which it is [made], uses it rightly; but the priest, in closing the entrance of the kingdom, does not act rightly, but sins: therefore the key was not given to him for this. Proof of the minor, Matthew 23⁶: Woe to you Scribes and Pharisees, who shut the kingdom of heaven before men: therefore they were sinning in this.

4. Likewise, nothing one and the same is [ordained] to opposite ends; but to close and to open the kingdom of heaven are opposites: therefore the key is not ordained to these two.

It is also asked, in connection with this, since a bad example closes the kingdom of heaven, and a good one opens it: why is it not called a key?

Likewise, since to loose and to bind is not the use of a key, but rather of the hand, it does not seem that the Lord ought to have attributed to the keys the use of binding and loosing; which nevertheless he does in Matthew 16⁷; it is asked, therefore, whence this is.

Conclusion. The keys of the Church have been given at once for binding and loosing, for closing and opening, but more principally for loosing and opening.

I respond: It must be said that the power commonly granted to priests over their subjects is not for entirely loosing the debt, because this ought not to be communicated to just anyone, lest fault should remain without penalty^a; therefore the power was given to them that by binding they might loose, namely by binding to the one thing, they might absolve from the other; but the power of binding was not given except for the sake of loosing. — Since therefore to loose someone from a debt is to remove the obstacle, and this is to open heaven, and consequently to bind is to close: therefore I say that these keys are at once for binding and loosing, closing and opening; but the act of binding and loosing belongs to them immediately and in^b the subject; whereas the act of closing and opening [belongs to them] in relation to the ultimate end. And since an instrument is named from what is best and from the end, therefore that power is rather named by a name regarding the end.

But because the instrument ordained for closing and opening in bodily things is a key; therefore such a power is rightly called a key; yet there is not a complete likeness, but some [likeness]. For the material key is principally for both, and more principally for closing on account of robbers and thieves^c; but the spiritual [key] is principally ordained for opening, and is not ordained for closing except for the sake of opening, just as neither for binding except for the sake of loosing. And so, just as medicine is the science of the healthy and the sick — of the healthy in itself, and of the sick by accident^d — so it is to be understood in the matter proposed.

I grant therefore that it is for closing, although not entirely in the same way as the material key.

1. 2. 3. To that, then, which is objected, that closing is harmful to us and comes about through sin; it must be said that, just as in bodily things there is a certain binding simply harmful and impeding, as a man is bound on account of paralysis; [and] a certain [binding] simply expedient, as a man is bound by the medicine of a plaster: so in spiritual things the binding of sin impedes, but the priestly binding makes for a swifter and more expeditious loosing. Likewise it is to be understood concerning closing, that it is a certain good and expedient [thing], and with this [closing] the key binds, not another; but he objects concerning another. — And by this the response to the three objections is plain; for it binds not by the debt of sin, but by the imposition or superimposition of a remedy.

4. To that which is objected, that nothing one and the same is [ordained] to opposite ends; it must be said that this is true, understanding it of the end in itself; but if it be so that to the one it is [ordained] in itself, to the other by accident, nothing prevents [it]; and thus we say it is in the matter proposed.

To that which is asked: why is an example not called a key? it must be said that the office of a key is that the same [thing] looses and binds, and closes and opens; and this priestly power alone is such: therefore it alone is called a key. Whence baptism is not called a key, because it only opens; likewise neither [is] a good example; conversely, sin, or a bad example, only closes: and therefore neither is called a key. Moreover, an example disposes from afar; but a key opens from near at hand: therefore it ought not to be called a key.

To that which is objected, that a key is not for loosing; it must be said that that power has its act in relation to the subject and in relation to the end of the act. In comparison to the subject it regards the use of the power, but in comparison to the end it regards the fruit. And because the naming is from what is best, therefore the Lord called that power keys^e. But because execution and use regard the first act, therefore he attributed to that key the act of loosing and binding^f.

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