Bonaventure

I. Estius (hic § 3. 4.)¹⁶, cui multi alii theologi consentiunt, contendit, S. Bonaventuram, Alexandrum Hal., Gabrielem et nonnullos alios quoad hanc I. quaestionem sequi errorem Magistri et Richardi a S. Vict. docentium, sacerdotem utentem potestate absolvendi sibi a Christo data non vere a peccatis absolvere poenitentem nec ei quoad culpam seu poenae aeternae obligationem peccata remittere, sed tantum ostendere et declarare sive annuntiare, peccata esse a Deo remissa. Veram autem sententiam, ait, tenere Hugonem, S. Thomam, Scotum, Durandum aliosque communiter. — Concedendum est, Magistrum (hic c. 4. 5.) et Richardum a S. Vict. (in libello de Potestate ligandi et solvendi, qui a B. Alberto aliisque antiquis Hugoni a S. Vict. falso tribuebatur) hic errasse vel insufficienter locutos esse. Sed valde mirandum est, a multis gravibus theologis tribui eundem errorem Alexandro et S. Bonaventurae, qui tot locis manifeste comprobant, se ab illis opinionibus alienos esse nec a communi doctrina recedere nisi in modo loquendi. — Alexander quidem tantum abest, ut dissentiat ab Hugone, ut eum fere integrum transcripserit; immo ipse etiam singularem eiusdem opinionem (hic q. 2. notatam) explicare nititur, quod scilicet Deus, qui culpam per se remittat, poenam aeternam clavibus sacerdotum solvendam reliquerit. Praedictam autem opinionem, quod sacerdotes non habeant potestatem ligandi et solvendi, nisi quatenus ostendant, homines esse solutos sive ligatos, Alexander explicite reprobat verbis Hugonis, « quod haec sententia tam frivola est quam ridenda »; et adductis eiusdem rationibus, concludit: « Tenendum est ergo, hanc sententiam esse nullam » (S. p. IV. q. 20. m. 3. a. 2. in argg.). Ibidem in resp. resolvit: « Potestas autem solvendi et ligandi a peccato est solius Dei, proprie et per se loquendo, et quodam modo cooperative est ipsorum sacerdotum »... « De hac ergo cooperatione intelliguntur verba Domini in Matthaeo et Ioanne, et alio modo, ut infra patebit ». Deinde idem in solutione argumentorum nominat et refellit Richardum a S. Vict. Denique (ibid. m. 6. a. 3.) cum Hugone explicat, quo sensu ista potestas intelligatur esse « solius Dei, scil. auctoritate sive a se, praelatorum Ecclesiae est ministerio dato a Deo, non a se »... « Illi etiam, nisi eo, a quo sunt hoc quod sunt, in eis et per eos operante et eis cooperante peccata dimittere non possunt. Quomodo ergo solus Deus bonus est, nec inde sequitur, bonos non esse etiam eos qui Deo serviunt; et quomodo solus Deus mirabilia facit, et tamen de iusto homine dicitur: Fecit enim mirabilia in vita sua; ita etiam solus Deus peccata dimittit, tunc quoque, quando sacerdos ab eo et per eum dimittit; ipse enim hoc in homine facit, quod per eum homo facit ». Clarissima sunt haec verba et optime concordant verbis Concilii Trident. (Sess. XIV. c. 6.): « Quamvis autem absolutio sacerdotis alieni [scil. Dei] beneficii sit dispensatio, tamen non est solum nudum ministerium vel annuntiandi Evangelium, vel declarandi, remissa esse peccata, sed ad instar actus iudicialis » etc.

S. Bonav. in tota hac doctrina non recedit a suo magistro; praesertim autem in hac I. quaestione eiusdem doctrinam (loc. cit. q. 21. m. 1.), paucis mutatis, exscribit; unde potius Hugonem (excepta praedicta singulari opinione) quam Magistrum sequitur, ut patet locis supra d. 17. p. I. a. 2. q. 3. in scholio citatis et infra citandis. Sufficiat hic notare verba eius (infra dub. 2.), ubi refert « triplicem modum dimittendi peccata, scilicet secundum clavem auctoritatis, et haec est Dei iudicantis; secundum clavem excellentiae, et haec est ipsius Verbi incarnati; secundum clavem ministerii, et haec est ipsius sacerdotis... Peccata dicuntur dimitti a sacerdote non per modum efficientis, sed ministrantis ».

II. Sed operae pretium est, eandem doctrinam diligentius demonstrare ex ipsa hac I. quaestione, quae fuit lapis offensionis, dum ipsa, attente lecta, genuinam sententiam S. Doctoris nobis aperit, ut manifestatur triplici consideratione.

Primo enim ipse disertis verbis et perspicuis rationibus refutat opinionem Magistri et Richardi a S. Vict., hic primo loco relatam; qua supposita, re vera etiam absolutio ut signum tantum ostendit hominem iustificatum, non hoc facit (licet alias effectus quoad augmentum gratiae et remissionem poenae habere possit). Cum igitur antiquiores illi magistri urgerent haec duo principia, quod contritio ut medium iustificationis actum absolutionis semper praecedat, et quidem tempore, et quod solus Deus per se immediate peccata remittat; inciderunt in difficultates disputationesque inextricabiles et opiniones ineptas, ut ex verbis Magistri et Richardi apparet. Si autem etiam attritus per sacramentalem confessionem et absolutionem fieri potest contritus; tunc confessio et absolutio « valet ad deletionem culpae quantum ad eos qui se non praeparaverunt sufficienter omnino, et etiam poenae quantum ad alios et ad multas utilitates » etc. (supra d. 17. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. ad 2; cfr. p. II. a. 2. q. 3. per totam).

Secundo, adversarii non attenderunt statum quaestionis qualis a Ss. Bonav., Thoma et aliis coaevis in hoc problemate ponebatur. Quemadmodum igitur in omnibus Sacramentis ad totalem effectum uniuntur virtus Dei ut causa principalis et efficiens, virtus Christi ut causa meritoria (et secundum S. Thomam etiam ut instrumentum coniunctum physice influens), et tertio minister Sacramenti, qui materiam et formam sensibilem administrat; sic etiam in Sacramenti poenitentiae administratione fit (cfr. hic dub. 2.), cum quadam differentia infra d. 22. a. 2. q. 1. exposita. Antiqui igitur hic non de causalitate totali huius Sacramenti eiusque effectu inquirebant, sed praecise de causalitate clavium, quae tanquam vera potestas spiritualis, a Deo data radicatur in charactere sacerdotali, animae inhaerente. Sic intellecta, quaestio solvenda est secundum principia, quae in quaestione de causali influxu materiae et formae Sacramentorum, sive sit physicalis, sive moralis, ponuntur. De hac duplici via scholarum cfr. supra d. 1. p. I. q. 3; III. Sent. d. 40. dub. 3. a. 1. q. 2. ad 3. Haec principia supra d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 2. applicantur ad quaestionem, utrum aquis baptismi collata sit aliqua vis; item d. 5. a. 3. q. 1. 2. ad potestatem remittendi peccata, quam Christus habuit (ubi in scholio ponitur et antiquior et posterior opinio S. Thomae); denique d. 10. p. II. a. 1. q. 3. applicantur ad verba in transsubstantiatione adhibita. In hac autem quaestione eadem principia adhibentur. Status autem quaestionis ex solut. ad 4, quae sumta est ex Alexandro, satis apparet. Minime igitur negatur, divina institutione absolutioni datam esse infallibilem ordinationem ad effectum reconciliationis rite disposito conferendum; atque simul docetur, potestatem clavium esse qualitatem absolutam (quam negat quoad aquam baptismi). Tamen negatur, eandem potestatem sacerdoti inhaerentem concurrere per modum causae efficientis (nec etiam instrumentaliter) ad infundendam gratiam, qua fit remissio peccatorum. Eundem statum quaestionis et eandem doctrinam in hac quaestione solvenda tenet S. Thom. (hic q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. 1.), excepta illa sententia, qua profitetur doctrinam de causalitate physica Sacramentorum. Iam verba eius: « Eodem modo se habet potestas clavium, quae est in sacerdote, ad effectum Sacramenti poenitentiae, sicut se habet virtus, quae est in aqua baptismi, ad effectum baptismi »; clare praedictum statum quaestionis indicant. Idem apparet ex eiusdem solutione, ubi inter alia dicit: « Virtus clavium operatur ad culpae remissionem (vel in volo existens, vel etiam in actu se exercens), sicut et aqua baptismi. Sed sicut baptismus non agit ut principale agens, sed ut instrumentum, non quidem pertingens ad ipsam gratiae susceptionem causandam etiam instrumentaliter [hoc autem affirmat in Summa]... ita est de potestate clavium. Unde solus Deus remittit per se culpam, et in virtute eius agit instrumentaliter et baptismus ut instrumentum inanimatum, et sacerdos ut instrumentum animatum... Et sic patet, quod potestas clavium ordinatur aliquo modo ad remissionem culpae non sicut causans, sed sicut disponens ad eam ». — Mirum igitur est, ita offendisse verba S. Bonaventurae (in fine corporis), scilicet quod « proprie loquendo », id est, « per modum activi et impertientis », potestas clavium non se extendat ad culpam. Non ita censet S. Thom. (loc. cit. ad 1.), qui verba illa Magistri, absolutionem ostendere remissionem peccatorum a Deo factam, benigne interpretatur, et etiam sententiam S. Bonaventurae fideliter refert nec improbat. Nam illud ostendere tripliciter dicit posse intelligi: vel tantum promittendo in futuro, ut fiebat in Sacramentis veteris legis; vel « ut significent praesentem et nihil operentur ad eam; et sic quidam dicunt, quod Sacramenta novae legis significant collationem gratiae, quam Deus in ipsa Sacramentorum collatione dat sine hoc, quod in Sacramentis sit aliqua virtus [scil. absoluta] operans ad gratiam. Et secundum hanc opinionem, quae in 1. dist. tacta est, etiam potestas clavium esset tantum ostendens [ut signum] divinam operationem in remissione culpae in ipsa Sacramenti collatione factam. Deinde refert tertium modum, quod « significent divinam operationem in remissione culpae praesentem et ad ipsam aliquid dispositive et instrumentaliter operentur ». « Neque Sacramentum poenitentiae neque Sacramentum baptismi operando pertingit directe ad gratiam nec ad culpae remissionem, sed dispositive (ad 2.). — Secundum quidem modum sequitur S. Bonav., quam recepit Scot. (hic d. 19. n. 23.). Docet enim hic, quod in hoc Sacramento, quando poenitens est tantum attritus tanta attritione, quae non sufficeret per modum meriti ad iustificationem suscipiendam in termino attritionis... recipitur gratia prima, quia a Deo confertur, et absolutio sacramentalis est signum efficax illius absolutionis sequentis in ultimo instanti ipsius, sicut prolatio verborum est signum confectionis corporis Christi ». — Hoc statu quaestionis supposito, solutio est optima.

Tertio, confirmatur idem sensus per illa verba recte intellecta, quod habens clavem sit mediator Dei ad hominem et hominis ad Deum, et quod habeat duplex os, et quod ut os Dei descendat ut angelus Dei et per modum superioris et iudicantis, scilicet ut « est mediator in absolvendo » (supra d. 17. p. II. a. 1. q. 2. ad 3.). Sic enim eius absolutio non vi clavium, quatenus in eo est potestas creata, sed virtute et voce Dei agit, quia in persona Dei divinam sententiam pronuntiat ligando, vel absolvendo. Nam « non data est virtus Sacramenti ipsi confessioni, sed absolutioni » (supra d. 17. p. II. a. 1. q. 3.). Alia igitur vis tribuitur absolutioni, alia clavibus. — Verba illa sumta sunt ex Alexandro; sed hic sensum eorum (loc. cit. q. 20. m. 8. a. 1.) fusius et clarius sic exprimit: « Sacerdos secundum habitudinem subiectionis, quam habet ad Deum, est promulgator sententiae et ei unitus; sic enim sacerdos loquitur et promulgat sententiam iudicis, quasi in persona eius dicens: excommunico te, vel absolvo te, id est, iudico te absolutum, scilicet a culpa... non quod omnium horum habeat sacerdos potestatem [scil. in se], sed hoc eius est, ut os vel lingua est tantum habentis hanc potestatem, et ministerium est subiectionis, non potestatis, et proinde non dicitur clavis ». En, modus loquendi antiquorum diversus a consuetudine recentiorum, qui solent virtutem clavium non praecise in se considerare, sed ut unitam principali virtuti divinae, in absolutione simul operante. Hinc orta est etiam occasio alterius sinistrae interpretationis, ita ut plures in his verbis invenerint errorem, quasi sacerdos non nisi per modum deprecativum gratiam et absolutionem a culpa in hoc Sacramento conferat, dum S. Doctor loquatur praecise de ea potestate clavium, quae illi inhaeret, non de absolutione, quatenus ut os Dei divinam sententiam promulgat (cfr. supra d. 17. p. II. dub. 5.). — Verba autem « absolutio praesupponit » recte dicuntur, quatenus sacerdos ut os et praeco Dei sententiam ipsius effective operantis promulgat verbis absolutionis; intelliguntur autem vel secundum ordinem temporis, si absolutio dat tantum gratiam secundam iam antea contrito; vel secundum ordinem naturae, si attrito confert primam gratiam. — De forma deprecativa cfr. supra d. 17. p. II. dub. 3.

Haec fusius dicenda erant, ut vera sententia Alexandri et S. Bonav., a plurimis obscurata, ostendatur, et etiam, ut cum S. Thoma mitius de aliis opinionibus illius aetatis, quamvis insufficientibus, iudicetur. Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 2. a. 1.) refert de hac re quinque opiniones, quarum quartam sequitur auctor noster, quintam S. Thomas, sed B. Albert. (hic a. 7. 11) fere loquitur ut Magister.

III. Praeter locos citt.: Scot., loc. cit. et supra d. 14. q. 4. n. 6. seqq. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. — De hac et seq. q. Durand., hic q. 2; Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.

IV. Seq. (2.) quaestio, praedictis suppositis, facile intelligitur. Si enim potestas clavium directe non attingit culpam, saltem poenam¹⁵ attingere debet, ut aliquid per se operetur. — Opinio in principio resp. tacta fuit Hugonis. Communius antiqui cum Magistro et S. Thoma docent, vi clavium remitti aliquid de poena temporali, cuius reatus post absolutionem a poena aeterna remanere potuerit; quae poena etiam in purgatorio solvenda sit. Scot. autem (locc. citt.) hoc restringit ad casum, quando absolutio propter iam dimissam culpam et poenam aeternam non invenit nisi poenam temporalem, sed eam censet non habere hunc effectum in attrito, quando cum culpa remissa poena aeterna permutatur in temporalem. — De eadem quaestione Alex. Hal. loc. cit. q. 21. m. 2. a. 1. 2. 3. — S. Thom. loc. cit. quaestiunc. 2; Suppl. q. 18. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 9. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2.

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I. Estius (here § 3, 4)¹⁶, with whom many other theologians agree, contends that St. Bonaventure, Alexander of Hales, Gabriel [Biel], and several others, as regards this first question, follow the error of the Master and of Richard of St. Victor, who teach that a priest using the power of absolving given him by Christ does not truly absolve the penitent from sins, nor remit sins to him as to the fault or the obligation of eternal punishment, but only shows and declares, that is, announces, that the sins have been remitted by God. But the true opinion, he says, is held by Hugh, St. Thomas, Scotus, Durandus, and others commonly. — It must be conceded that the Master (here c. 4, 5) and Richard of St. Victor (in the little book On the Power of Binding and Loosing, which by Blessed Albert and other ancients was falsely attributed to Hugh of St. Victor) here erred or spoke insufficiently. But it is much to be wondered at that the same error is attributed by many weighty theologians to Alexander and St. Bonaventure, who in so many places manifestly prove that they are strangers to those opinions and do not depart from the common doctrine except in the manner of speaking. — Alexander indeed is so far from dissenting from Hugh that he has transcribed him almost entire; nay, he himself even attempts to explain the singular opinion of the same [Hugh] (noted here in q. 2), namely that God, who remits the fault of himself, has left the eternal punishment to be loosed by the keys of the priests. But the aforesaid opinion, that priests do not have the power of binding and loosing except insofar as they show that men are loosed or bound, Alexander explicitly reproves in the words of Hugh, « that this opinion is as frivolous as it is laughable »; and having adduced the same [Hugh's] reasons, he concludes: « It must therefore be held that this opinion is null » (Summa, p. IV, q. 20, m. 3, a. 2, in the arguments). In the same place, in the response, he resolves: « But the power of loosing and binding from sin belongs to God alone, properly and per se speaking, and in a certain way cooperatively it is of the priests themselves »... « Of this cooperation, then, are the words of the Lord in Matthew and John to be understood, and in another way, as will appear below. » Then the same [Alexander], in the solution of the arguments, names and refutes Richard of St. Victor. Finally (ibid. m. 6, a. 3) with Hugh he explains in what sense this power is to be understood as being « of God alone, namely by authority or of himself; [yet] of the prelates of the Church it is by the ministry given by God, not of themselves »... « They too, except by Him from whom they are what they are, working in them and through them and cooperating with them, cannot forgive sins. As therefore God alone is good, nor does it follow from this that those who serve God are not also good; and as God alone works wonders, and yet of a just man it is said, He did wonders in his life; so also God alone forgives sins, even then, when the priest forgives from Him and through Him; for He himself does in the man that which the man does through Him. » Most clear are these words and they agree perfectly with the words of the Council of Trent (Session XIV, c. 6): « Although the absolution of the priest is a dispensation of another's [namely God's] benefit, yet it is not merely a bare ministry either of announcing the Gospel or of declaring that sins have been remitted, but is after the manner of a judicial act » etc.

St. Bonaventure in this whole doctrine does not depart from his master; but especially in this first question he transcribes his [the master's] doctrine (loc. cit. q. 21, m. 1), with few changes; whence he rather follows Hugh (except for the aforesaid singular opinion) than the Master, as is plain from the places cited above at d. 17, p. I, a. 2, q. 3 in the scholion and to be cited below. Let it suffice here to note his words (below, dub. 2), where he reports « a threefold manner of forgiving sins, namely according to the key of authority, and this is of God who judges; according to the key of excellence, and this is of the incarnate Word himself; according to the key of ministry, and this is of the priest himself... Sins are said to be forgiven by the priest not by way of one who effects, but of one who ministers. »

II. But it is worth the effort to demonstrate the same doctrine more diligently from this very first question, which was a stone of stumbling, since the question itself, attentively read, lays open to us the genuine opinion of the holy Doctor, as is made manifest by a threefold consideration.

For, first, he himself in plain words and with clear reasons refutes the opinion of the Master and of Richard of St. Victor, here related in the first place; on which supposition, in fact, even absolution as a sign only shows the man to be justified, it does not do this (although it may otherwise have an effect as to the increase of grace and the remission of punishment). Since therefore those older masters pressed these two principles, that contrition as the means of justification always precedes the act of absolution, and indeed in time, and that God alone of himself immediately remits sins; they fell into inextricable difficulties and disputes and inept opinions, as appears from the words of the Master and of Richard. But if even one who is attrite can be made contrite through sacramental confession and absolution; then confession and absolution « avails for the destruction of the fault as regards those who have not prepared themselves altogether sufficiently, and also of the punishment as regards others and for many uses » etc. (above, d. 17, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, ad 2; cf. p. II, a. 2, q. 3, throughout).

Secondly, the adversaries did not attend to the state of the question as it was posed by Sts. Bonaventure, Thomas, and others of the same age in this problem. As therefore in all the Sacraments, for the total effect, there are united the power of God as principal and efficient cause, the power of Christ as meritorious cause (and according to St. Thomas also as a conjoined instrument physically influencing), and thirdly the minister of the Sacrament, who administers the sensible matter and form; so also it happens in the administration of the Sacrament of penance (cf. here dub. 2), with a certain difference set forth below at d. 22, a. 2, q. 1. The ancients therefore here were not inquiring about the total causality of this Sacrament and its effect, but precisely about the causality of the keys, which, as a true spiritual power, given by God, is rooted in the priestly character inhering in the soul. So understood, the question is to be solved according to the principles which are laid down in the question on the causal influx of the matter and form of the Sacraments, whether it be physical or moral. On this twofold way of the schools cf. above, d. 1, p. I, q. 3; III Sent., d. 40, dub. 3, a. 1, q. 2, ad 3. These principles are applied above at d. 3, p. II, a. 1, q. 2 to the question whether any power is conferred upon the waters of baptism; likewise at d. 5, a. 3, q. 1, 2 to the power of remitting sins which Christ had (where in the scholion both the earlier and the later opinion of St. Thomas is set down); finally at d. 10, p. II, a. 1, q. 3 they are applied to the words used in transubstantiation. But in this question the same principles are employed. And the state of the question appears sufficiently from the solution to [argument] 4, which is taken from Alexander. By no means therefore is it denied that, by divine institution, there has been given to absolution an infallible ordination to the effect of reconciliation, to be conferred upon one duly disposed; and at the same time it is taught that the power of the keys is an absolute quality (which he denies as to the water of baptism). Yet it is denied that the same power inhering in the priest concurs by way of efficient cause (nor even instrumentally) to infusing the grace by which the remission of sins comes about. The same state of the question and the same doctrine in solving this question is held by St. Thomas (here q. 1, a. 3, quaestiuncula 1), except for that opinion by which he professes the doctrine of the physical causality of the Sacraments. Now his words: « In the same way is the power of the keys, which is in the priest, related to the effect of the Sacrament of penance as the power which is in the water of baptism is related to the effect of baptism »; clearly indicate the aforesaid state of the question. The same appears from his solution, where among other things he says: « The power of the keys operates toward the remission of the fault (whether existing in the will, or even exercising itself in act), just as the water of baptism does. But just as baptism does not act as the principal agent, but as an instrument, not indeed reaching to the very reception of grace to be caused even instrumentally [but this he affirms in the Summa]... so it is with the power of the keys. Hence God alone of himself remits the fault, and in his power there acts instrumentally both baptism as an inanimate instrument and the priest as an animate instrument... And so it is plain that the power of the keys is ordained in some way to the remission of the fault not as causing, but as disposing toward it. » — It is therefore a wonder that the words of St. Bonaventure (at the end of the body) gave such offense, namely that « properly speaking », that is, « by way of acting and imparting », the power of the keys does not extend to the fault. St. Thomas does not so judge (loc. cit. ad 1), who interprets benignly those words of the Master, that absolution shows the remission of sins made by God, and also faithfully reports the opinion of St. Bonaventure and does not disapprove it. For he says that that showing can be understood in three ways: either only by promising in the future, as was done in the Sacraments of the old law; or « so that they signify the present and effect nothing toward it; and thus some say that the Sacraments of the new law signify the conferring of grace, which God in the very conferring of the Sacraments gives, without there being in the Sacraments any [absolute] power operating toward grace. And according to this opinion, which was touched on in the first distinction, even the power of the keys would be only showing [as a sign] the divine operation in the remission of the fault made in the very conferring of the Sacrament. » Then he reports a third manner, that « they signify the divine operation in the remission of the fault as present and operate something toward it dispositively and instrumentally. » « Neither the Sacrament of penance nor the Sacrament of baptism by operating reaches directly to grace nor to the remission of the fault, but dispositively (ad 2). » — The second manner indeed is followed by St. Bonaventure, which Scotus received (here d. 19, n. 23). For he teaches here that in this Sacrament, when the penitent is only attrite with so great an attrition as would not suffice by way of merit for receiving justification at the term of attrition... the first grace is received, because it is conferred by God, and the sacramental absolution is the efficacious sign of that absolution following in the last instant of it [the attrition], just as the utterance of the words is the sign of the confecting of the body of Christ. » — This state of the question being supposed, the solution is excellent.

Thirdly, the same sense is confirmed by those words rightly understood, that one who holds the key is mediator of God to man and of man to God, and that he has a twofold mouth, and that as the mouth of God he descends as the angel of God and by way of a superior and a judge, namely as he « is mediator in absolving » (above, d. 17, p. II, a. 1, q. 2, ad 3). For thus his absolution acts not by force of the keys, insofar as in him there is a created power, but by the power and voice of God, because in the person of God he pronounces the divine sentence in binding or absolving. For « the power of the Sacrament has not been given to the confession itself, but to the absolution » (above, d. 17, p. II, a. 1, q. 3). A different power therefore is attributed to absolution, another to the keys. — Those words are taken from Alexander; but here he expresses their sense (loc. cit. q. 20, m. 8, a. 1) more fully and clearly thus: « The priest, according to the relation of subjection which he has to God, is the promulgator of the sentence and united to Him; for thus the priest speaks and promulgates the sentence of the judge, as if saying in His person: I excommunicate you, or I absolve you, that is, I judge you absolved, namely from the fault... not that the priest has power over all these things [namely in himself], but this belongs to him, that he is as the mouth or tongue of one who alone has this power, and the ministry is one of subjection, not of power, and therefore it is not called a key. » Behold, the manner of speaking of the ancients different from the custom of more recent [theologians], who are wont to consider the power of the keys not precisely in itself, but as united to the principal divine power, operating together in absolution. Hence too arose the occasion of another wrong interpretation, so that many have found in these words an error, as though the priest confers grace and absolution from the fault in this Sacrament only by way of beseeching, whereas the holy Doctor speaks precisely of that power of the keys which inheres in him, not of absolution insofar as, as the mouth of God, it promulgates the divine sentence (cf. above, d. 17, p. II, dub. 5). — But the words « absolution presupposes [it] » are rightly said, insofar as the priest, as the mouth and herald of God, promulgates by the words of absolution the sentence of Him who effectively operates; and they are understood either according to the order of time, if absolution gives only the second grace to one already contrite beforehand; or according to the order of nature, if it confers the first grace on one attrite. — On the deprecatory form, cf. above, d. 17, p. II, dub. 3.

These things had to be said more fully, that the true opinion of Alexander and St. Bonaventure, obscured by very many, might be shown, and also that, with St. Thomas, a milder judgment might be made of the other opinions of that age, however insufficient. Peter of Tarentaise (here q. 2, a. 1) reports on this matter five opinions, the fourth of which our author follows, the fifth St. Thomas, but Blessed Albert (here a. 7, 11) speaks more or less like the Master.

III. Besides the places cited: Scotus, loc. cit. and above, d. 14, q. 4, n. 6 ff. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 2, q. 1. — On this and the following question, Durandus, here q. 2; Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 3.

IV. The following (2nd) question, the foregoing being supposed, is easily understood. For if the power of the keys does not directly attain the fault, it ought at least to attain the punishment¹⁵, so that it may operate something of itself. — The opinion touched on at the beginning of the response was that of Hugh. More commonly the ancients with the Master and St. Thomas teach that by the force of the keys something of the temporal punishment is remitted, the guilt of which could remain after absolution from the eternal punishment; which punishment is also to be discharged in purgatory. But Scotus (locc. citt.) restricts this to the case when absolution, on account of the fault and the eternal punishment already remitted, finds nothing but temporal punishment, yet he judges that it does not have this effect in one attrite, when, with the fault remitted, the eternal punishment is commuted into temporal. — On the same question, Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. q. 21, m. 2, a. 1, 2, 3. — St. Thomas, loc. cit. quaestiuncula 2; Suppl. q. 18, a. 2. — Blessed Albert, here a. 9. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 2, q. 2.

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