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Dist. 7, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 3

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 7

Textus Latinus
p. 180

Quaestio III. Utrum mala voluntas in daemonibus intendatur.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum in daemonibus sit malae voluntatis intensio. Et quod sic:

1. Isidorus de Summo Bono1: « Diabolus non per hoc contentus est, quod Deo aequalem se existimans cecidit, sed etiam superiorem se Deo dicit »: ergo videtur crevisse superbia. p. 181 2. Item, ratione videtur. Quia mala facimus, mali sumus2: ergo quanto plura mala facimus, tanto peiores sumus: sed diabolus plura mala fecit post lapsum: ergo peior est nunc, quam quando cecidit: ergo crevit in eo voluntatis deordinatio.

3. Item, diabolo debetur maior poena nunc, quam quando cecidit — hoc non est dubium — sed praemium in bonis non augetur, nisi crescat bona voluntas: ergo nec in malis supplicium, nisi crescat mala voluntas: ergo etc.

4. Item, malum est « privatio modi, speciei et ordinis3 »; sed ista non possunt totaliter ab aliquo removeri, alioquin cederet in non-ens, quia dicit Augustinus, quod « ubi haec nulla sunt, nullum bonum est »: ergo si non sunt omnino ablata, possunt adhuc diminui. Sed diminuuntur per peccatum: cum ergo diabolus peccet, tanto magis diminuuntur, quanto magis peccat; sed quanto magis diminuuntur, tanto peior est voluntas: ergo etc.

5. Item, qui procurat homicidium corporale homicida est, et quanto plura procurat homicidia, tanto peior in eo est voluntas: ergo pari ratione, immo fortiori, qui mortem spiritualem procurat homicida est, et qui plurium mortem procurat peior est; sed diabolus post mortem primi hominis dicitur fuisse homicida ab initio4, quia procuravit eius lapsum, sed processu temporis procuravit mortem plurium: ergo in malitia crevit. Si tu dicas, quod crevit mala voluntas in comparatione ad hominem, non in comparatione ad Deum; ostenditur, quod ista responsio nulla est, primo, quia diabolus inordinate movetur in Deum, sicut in hominem. Si ergo multiplicando et iterando peccatum in hominem intenditur, et crescit in eo malitia; pari ratione, cum odit et blasphemat Deum, quod nullo modo potest bene fieri5. Praeterea, non est peccatum, in quo non contemnatur et offendatur Deus, et in quo peccans non avertatur a Deo: ergo in omni peccato crescit mala voluntas in comparatione ad Deum.

Contra: 1. « Opposita nata sunt fieri circa idem6 »; sed daemones non possunt proficere: ergo non possunt magis deficere sive peiores esse.

2. Item, hoc videtur per simile in hominibus damnatis, quia diabolus et homo mortuus sive damnatus sunt in consimili statu, sicut dicit Damascenus7, quod « hoc est hominibus mors, quod Angelis casus »; sed post mortem mala voluntas in homine non crescit: ergo nec in daemone post casum.

3. Item, hoc ostenditur per simile in bonis Angelis. Similis enim est status bonorum in bono, et malorum in malo; sed in bonis non potest crescere bona voluntas: ergo nec in malis mala.

4. Item, Angelus simplex est et nullum habet retardativum8: ergo in prima conversione tantum se convertit, quod non potest amplius converti: ergo similiter tantum se avertit, quod non potest amplius: ergo etc.

5. Item, in nullo crescit mala voluntas, in quo non crescit demeritum; sed demeritum non crescit in eo, quia non potest evitare peccatum: ergo si necesse est, diabolum male velle, impossibile est, malam voluntatem in eo crescere.

6. Item, diabolus et daemones sunt redditi omnino impossibiles ad gratiam in primo lapsu, nec possunt magis impossibiles esse; sed quando9 crescit mala voluntas, fit maior elongatio a gratia: si ergo non possunt magis elongari, sicut caecus non potest plus caecari: ergo etc.

Conclusio

Daemonis voluntas mala semper intenditur quoad vim administrativam.

Respondeo: Triplex est hic modus dicendi.

Quidam enim senserunt, quod sicut in Angelis bonis voluntas bona crevit in prima conversione usque ad terminum, ita quod amplius in se non potest crescere, sed solum in effectibus bonis, quos efficiunt circa homines; similiter in angelis malis dicere voluerunt, quod in prima aversione aversa est voluntas eorum in termino, ita quod tantum fuit depravata voluntas malorum, quod amplius nec depravatur nec crescit, sed solum in effectibus, quando plura mala ex aequali voluntate semper facit. Et quia supplicium non tantum respicit intensionem voluntatis, sed etiam actum exteriorem, ideo gravius punitur diabolus ex malis, quae committit. Rationem autem huius positionis assignant simplicitatem et spiritualitatem angelicam, quae nullum habet retardativum; et ideo totaliter et in termino in prima conversione se convertit; homo autem non sic.

Aliorum positio est ista, quod in malis angelis, simpliciter loquendo, crescit malitia et malae voluntatis deordinatio. Sicut enim patet ex problemate praecedenti, diabolus continue peccat et novas malitias quotidie excogitat. Et quoniam, quia mala facimus, mali sumus, et quodlibet malum adimit de habilitate voluntatis, quia aliter non esset malum: ideo semper habilitas minuitur, et voluntas magis et magis deordinatur. Nec est simile de bonis, quia bonum opus non ita apponit ad bonitatem gratiae vel voluntatis, sicut peccatum quodlibet adimit. p. 182 Sed quia durum videtur dicere, quod diaboli malitia non intendatur, cum dicatur in Psalmo10: Superbia eorum, qui te oderunt, ascendit semper, et exponitur de daemonibus; et iterum irrationabile videtur, quod ita crescat in diabolo malitia sicut in pure viatore, cum iam sit in statu damnationis et necessitatem habeat ad aliqua mala; ideo est tertius modus dicendi, quod in diabolo crescat malitia voluntatis quantum ad vim administrativam, qua convertitur ad hominem, sed non quantum ad vim contemplativam, qua est simpliciter et necessario aversus a Deo.

Ratio autem huius positionis est ista. Ad crementum enim voluntatis malae sive demeriti non sufficit inordinata affectio, quia haec est in damnatis et erit in sempiternum, sed requiritur ultra tempus meriti et status merendi vel demerendi. Diabolus autem est in statu demerendi quantum ad vim administrativam, non quantum ad contemplativam; et ideo crescit et demeritum et peccatum quantum ad vim administrativam, non quantum ad contemplativam. — Ratio autem huius patet, si revocentur ad memoriam praedicta in solutione praecedentis primi problematis, ubi tactum est de praefixione temporis ad merendum ipsi Angelo. Dictum est enim, quod11 Angelus spiritualis et incorruptibilis et propinquus ad gloriam est conditus; ideo est ei tempus breve praefixum, homini vero terminus longus. Sed quia Deus sic condidit universum, ut maior et potentior minorem adiuvet; ideo non tantum Angelo dedit vim contemplativam, qua mereretur et ad Deum converteretur, sed etiam administrativam, qua homini suffragaretur. Quia ergo vis contemplativa erat ipsius Angeli in se, quantum ad illam praefixum est spatium merendi usque ad primam conversionem vel aversionem. Sed quia administrativa respectum habet ad hominem, ideo praefixum est Angelis spatium merendi, usquequo12 homines assumerentur totaliter ad gloriam. Mansit ergo quantum ad vim istam status merendi vel demerendi, et manet usque ad diem iudicii. — Sed quoniam meritum et demeritum non est in vi administrativa nisi per vim contemplativam, et in bonis contemplativa ita est conversa ad bonum, quod non potest averti; ideo administrativa non habet nisi locum merendi13. Econtra, quia in malis ita est aversa contemplativa, quod non potest converti, ideo quantum ad administrativam non habet nisi locum et spatium demerendi. Et in hoc patet, quod divinum decretum manet iustum et inviolatum, quia tempus, quod a conditione praefixerat, non debuit auferre nec bonis nec malis. Et illis14 quidem diligentibus Deum spatium illud conversum est in bonum, impiis autem et peccatoribus angelis conversum est in malum. Et ideo patet, quo modo crescit mala voluntas in malis, scilicet quantum ad vim administrativam solum. — Nec est omnino simile in bonis et malis, quia voluntas in bonis propter influentiam perfectam statim pervenit ad terminum; et ideo, quamvis plura bona faciant, tamen voluntas bona propter hoc non intenditur. Sed in malis non est ita, quia corruptio venit ab ipsis; et non potuerunt ita se inficere, quin adhuc magis, quamdiu durat tempus. Unde et crescit in eis macula15 et etiam appetitus nocendi et dominandi hominibus; non sic in Angelis bonis.

Concedendae igitur sunt rationes probantes, quod mala voluntas in daemonibus intendatur et crescat, tamen quantum ad vim administrativam, sive in comparatione ad hominem.

Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod inordinate movetur in Deum; dicendum, quod sicut in damnatis16 inordinatus motus voluntatis conversus est in poenam et imputatur in supplicium, non in demeritum; sic in angelis malis in poenam est conversus ille inordinatus motus.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in omni peccato contemnitur Deus; dicendum, quod non est peccatum, quin adsit vis contemplativa, et quin sit in Deum aliquo modo17; sed tamen distinguuntur haec ad invicem quantum ad principalitatem actuum. Dicitur enim aliquod peccatum esse in Deum, aliquod in proximum; aliquod quantum ad vim administrativam, aliquod quantum ad vim contemplativam; et secundum quod distinguuntur, sic loquimur.

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod opposita nata sunt fieri circa idem; dicendum, quod illud habet instantiam in accidentibus inseparabilibus, sive sit inseparabile per naturam, sive per acquisitionem. Quia ergo in Angelis bonis est gratia inseparabiliter, ideo impossibile est, quod insit culpa. Econtra intelligendum est in malis angelis. Accidens enim inseparabile aut est naturale, aut quasi in naturam conversum; et in his quae naturaliter insunt, habet illud verbum instantiam etiam secundum Philosophum18. p. 183 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de statu hominis mortui, iam patet, quod non est simile, quia simpliciter exiit statum meriti, Angelus non.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Angelis bonis, quod non augetur in eis bona voluntas; patet, quod non est simile, quia voluntas bona non ita est ab opere19, ut malitia.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de simplicitate Angeli, dicendum, quod illud argumentum deficit dupliciter: primo, quia voluntas deliberativa, cum sit libera, non movetur secundum totum suum posse, quamvis nullum habeat retardativum; et illud manifestum est, quia Angelus magis diligit unum quam alium, et magis odit unum quam alium; sed hoc non esset, si totaliter moveretur in quemlibet. Et ideo ratio non valet. Praeterea, alius defectus est ibi, quia, esto quod quantum posset, se converteret prima vice, adhuc posset magis20, quoniam posse peccare est posse deficere et posse moveri inordinate; et quamvis non possit intensius moveri quantum ad motum, potest tamen magis deordinari, quia semper crescere potest pronitas et inclinatio ad malum. Et ita patet illud.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non potest evitare; dicendum, quod falsum est. Quamvis enim malitiam voluntatis non possit immutare, potest tamen cessare a nocumento, quod homini facit. Et praeterea21, ipse induxit se in hanc necessitatem et non poenitet, et ideo non excusatur; nullus enim excusatur per necessitatem inductam, nisi poeniteat de inductione.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod diabolus est omnino impossibilis ad gratiam; dicendum, quod non crescit mala voluntas quantum ad impossibilitatem suscipiendi gratiam, quia hoc est aequaliter in omnibus damnatis; sed quantum ad indignitatem; et diabolus est indignus et potest esse magis indignus, secundum quod magis offendit et abutitur bonis naturalibus sibi datis22.

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English Translation

Question III. Whether evil will is intensified in demons

Thirdly it is asked whether in demons there is an intensification of evil will. And that there is:

1. Isidore, On the Highest Good1: "The devil is not content with this, that, esteeming himself equal to God, he fell, but he also calls himself superior to God": therefore it seems that his pride has grown. p. 181 2. Likewise, it seems [so] by reason. Because we do evils, we are evil2: therefore the more evils we do, the worse we are: but the devil has done more evils after his fall: therefore he is worse now than when he fell: therefore the disorder of his will has grown in him.

3. Likewise, a greater punishment is owed to the devil now than when he fell — this is not in doubt — but the reward in the good [angels] is not increased unless the good will grows: therefore neither [is] the punishment in the evil [ones] unless the evil will grows: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, evil is "the privation of mode, species, and order3"; but these cannot be totally removed from anything, otherwise it would pass into non-being, because Augustine says that "where these are nothing, there is no good": therefore if they are not wholly taken away, they can still be diminished. But they are diminished by sin: since therefore the devil sins, they are diminished the more, the more he sins; but the more they are diminished, the worse the will is: therefore, etc.

5. Likewise, he who procures a bodily homicide is a homicide, and the more homicides he procures, the worse the will is in him: therefore by parity of reasoning, indeed by a stronger one, he who procures spiritual death is a homicide, and he who procures the death of more [people] is worse; but the devil after the death of the first man is said to have been a homicide from the beginning4, because he procured his fall, but in the process of time he procured the death of many: therefore he has grown in malice. If you say that the evil will grew in comparison to man, not in comparison to God; it is shown that this response is null, first, because the devil is moved inordinately against God, as against man. If therefore by multiplying and repeating sin against man it is intensified, and malice grows in him; by parity of reasoning, when he hates and blasphemes God, which can in no way be done well5. Furthermore, there is no sin in which God is not despised and offended, and in which the one sinning is not turned away from God: therefore in every sin the evil will grows in comparison to God.

On the contrary: 1. "Opposites are by nature produced about the same thing6"; but demons cannot make progress: therefore they cannot fail more, or be worse.

2. Likewise, this seems [so] by a likeness in damned men, because the devil and a dead or damned man are in a like state, as Damascene says7, that "this is to men as death, what to angels [is] the fall"; but after death the evil will does not grow in a man: therefore neither [does it grow] in a demon after the fall.

3. Likewise, this is shown by a likeness in the good angels. For the state of the good [angels] in good is like [that] of the evil [ones] in evil; but in the good [ones] the good will cannot grow: therefore neither [can] the evil [will grow] in the evil [ones].

4. Likewise, an angel is simple and has nothing retarding8: therefore in the first conversion he converts himself so [completely] that he cannot be converted further: therefore likewise he turns himself away so [completely] that he cannot [do so] further: therefore, etc.

5. Likewise, evil will does not grow in anyone in whom demerit does not grow; but demerit does not grow in him, because he cannot avoid sin: therefore if it is necessary that the devil will evilly, it is impossible that evil will should grow in him.

6. Likewise, the devil and the demons have been rendered wholly incapable of grace in the first fall, nor can they be more incapable; but when9 the evil will grows, a greater removal from grace comes about: if therefore they cannot be removed further, as a blind man cannot be made more blind: therefore, etc.

Conclusion

The demon's evil will is always intensified as to the administrative power.

I respond: There is here a threefold manner of speaking.

For some held that, just as in the good angels the good will grew in the first conversion up to its term, such that it can no longer grow in itself, but only in the good effects which they bring about regarding men; so likewise concerning the evil angels they wished to say that in the first aversion their will was turned away at its term, such that the will of the evil [ones] was so depraved that it is no longer depraved nor grows, but only in effects, when from an equal will it always does more evils. And because punishment regards not only the intensity of the will but also the exterior act, therefore the devil is more grievously punished from the evils which he commits. As the ground of this position they assign the simplicity and spirituality of the angel, which has nothing retarding; and therefore wholly and at its term he converts himself in the first conversion; man, however, [does] not so.

The position of others is this: that in the evil angels, speaking simply, malice and the disorder of evil will grows. For as is evident from the preceding problem, the devil sins continually and daily devises new malices. And since, because we do evils, we are evil, and every evil takes away from the aptitude of the will, because otherwise it would not be evil: therefore the aptitude is always lessened, and the will is more and more disordered. Nor is it the same with the good [angels], because a good work does not so add to the goodness of grace or of will as every sin takes away. p. 182 But since it seems harsh to say that the devil's malice is not intensified, since it is said in the Psalm10: The pride of them that hate thee ascendeth continually, and it is expounded of demons; and again it seems unreasonable that malice should grow in the devil just as in a pure wayfarer, since he is already in the state of damnation and has a necessity to certain evils; therefore there is a third manner of speaking, that in the devil malice of will grows as to the administrative power, by which he is turned toward man, but not as to the contemplative power, by which he is simply and necessarily turned away from God.

The ground of this position is this. For the increase of evil will or of demerit an inordinate affection does not suffice, because this is in the damned and will be forever, but there is further required the time of merit and the state of meriting or demeriting. But the devil is in the state of demeriting as to the administrative power, not as to the contemplative; and therefore both demerit and sin grow as to the administrative power, not as to the contemplative. — The ground of this is evident if there be recalled to memory the things said before in the solution of the preceding first problem, where mention was made of the prefixing of a time for meriting to the angel himself. For it was said that11 an angel was constituted spiritual and incorruptible and near to glory; therefore a short time was prefixed for him, but for man a long term. But since God so founded the universe that the greater and more powerful should help the lesser; therefore He gave to the angel not only the contemplative power, by which he might merit and be turned to God, but also the administrative, by which he might assist man. Since therefore the contemplative power was the angel's own in himself, as to it a span of meriting was prefixed up to the first conversion or aversion. But since the administrative has a regard to man, there was prefixed to the angels a span of meriting, until12 men should be wholly assumed into glory. There remained therefore, as to that power, the state of meriting or demeriting, and it remains until the day of judgment. — But since merit and demerit are not in the administrative power except through the contemplative power, and in the good [angels] the contemplative is so turned to good that it cannot be turned away; therefore the administrative has only a place of meriting13. On the contrary, since in the evil [ones] the contemplative is so turned away that it cannot be converted, therefore as to the administrative it has only a place and span of demeriting. And in this it is evident that the divine decree remains just and inviolate, because the time which it had prefixed from [their] founding ought not to be taken away either from the good or from the evil. And for those14 indeed who love God that span was turned into good, but for the impious and sinful angels it was turned into evil. And therefore it is evident in what manner the evil will grows in the evil [ones], namely as to the administrative power alone. — Nor is it altogether the same in the good and the evil, because the will in the good [angels], on account of the perfect influence, immediately arrives at its term; and therefore, although they do more goods, yet the good will is not on this account intensified. But in the evil [ones] it is not so, because the corruption comes from themselves; and they could not so infect themselves but that [they do so] still more, as long as the time lasts. Whence both the stain15 grows in them and also the appetite of harming and of dominating men; not so in the good angels.

The reasons proving that the evil will in demons is intensified and grows are therefore to be granted, yet as to the administrative power, or in comparison to man.

To that, then, which is objected, that he is moved inordinately against God; it must be said that, just as in the damned16 the inordinate motion of the will is turned into punishment and is imputed to chastisement, not to demerit; so in the evil angels that inordinate motion is turned into punishment.

To that which is objected, that in every sin God is despised; it must be said that there is no sin but that the contemplative power is present, and but that it is against God in some way17; but yet these are distinguished from one another as to the principality of the acts. For some sin is said to be against God, some against the neighbor; some as to the administrative power, some as to the contemplative power; and according as they are distinguished, so we speak.

1. To that which is objected on the contrary, that opposites are by nature produced about the same thing; it must be said that this has an instance [i.e. a counterexample] in inseparable accidents, whether it be inseparable by nature or by acquisition. Since therefore in the good angels grace is [present] inseparably, therefore it is impossible that fault be present. The contrary is to be understood in the evil angels. For an inseparable accident is either natural or quasi-converted into nature; and in those things which are present naturally, that maxim has an instance even according to the Philosopher18. p. 183 2. To that which is objected concerning the state of a dead man, it is now evident that it is not the same, because he simply went out of the state of merit, an angel [does] not.

3. To that which is objected concerning the good angels, that the good will is not increased in them; it is evident that it is not the same, because the good will is not so from the work19 as malice [is].

4. To that which is objected concerning the simplicity of the angel, it must be said that that argument fails in two ways: first, because the deliberative will, since it is free, is not moved according to its whole power, although it has nothing retarding; and this is manifest, because an angel loves one more than another, and hates one more than another; but this would not be so if it were moved wholly into [each and] every one. And therefore the argument is not valid. Furthermore, there is another defect there, because, granted that he turned himself in the first time as much as he could, he could still [do so] more20, since to be able to sin is to be able to fail and to be able to be moved inordinately; and although he cannot be moved more intensely as to the motion, he can nevertheless be more disordered, because proneness and inclination to evil can always grow. And so that [point] is evident.

5. To that which is objected, that he cannot avoid [sin]; it must be said that it is false. For although he cannot change the malice of the will, he can nevertheless cease from the harm which he does to man. And furthermore21, he led himself into this necessity and does not repent, and therefore he is not excused; for no one is excused by an induced necessity, unless he repent of the inducing [of it].

6. To that which is objected, that the devil is wholly incapable of grace; it must be said that the evil will does not grow as to the incapacity of receiving grace, because this is equally [so] in all the damned; but [it grows] as to unworthiness; and the devil is unworthy and can be more unworthy, according as he more offends and abuses the natural goods given to him22.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Libr. I. c. 10. n. 8, ubi textus originalis Diabolus non solum hoc contentus, quod etc.
    Book I, ch. 10, n. 8, where the original text [reads] Diabolus non solum hoc contentus, quod (The devil not only content with this, that) etc.
  2. Econtra respectu bonorum; nam quia boni sumus, bona facimus. Cfr. infra d. 40. a. 2. q. 3. ad 4; d. 44. a. 1. q. 2. ad 3. et tom. I. pag. 469, nota 3.
    The contrary as regards the good; for because we are good, we do good. Cf. below, d. 40, a. 2, q. 3, ad 4; d. 44, a. 1, q. 2, ad 3, and tom. I, p. 469, note 3.
  3. August., de Natura boni, c. 4. Ibid. c. 6. 9. et 13. habetur etiam sequens textus.
    Augustine, On the Nature of the Good, ch. 4. The following text is also found ibid., ch. 6, 9, and 13.
  4. Ioan. 8, 44.
    John 8, 44.
  5. In Vat. perperam omittitur bene.
    In the Vatican edition bene is wrongly omitted.
  6. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Oppositis, et II. Topic. c. 3. (c. 7.). Cfr. tom. I. pag. 30, nota 6.
    Aristotle, Categories, the chapter on Opposites, and Topics II, ch. 3 (ch. 7). Cf. tom. I, p. 30, note 6.
  7. Libr. II. de Fide orthod. c. 4.
    Book II of On the Orthodox Faith, ch. 4.
  8. Nonnulli codd. ut F bb retardamentum; idem recurrit et in corp. quaest. et in solutione obiectorum.
    Several manuscripts, such as F bb, [read] retardamentum; the same recurs both in the body of the question and in the solution of the objections.
  9. Ed. 1 cum Vat. et cod. cc quanto.
    The first edition with the Vatican edition and codex cc [read] quanto.
  10. Psalm. 73, 23.
    Psalm 73, 23.
  11. Non pauci codd. cum ed. 1 quia; cod. W (Q a secunda manu) quod quia.
    Not a few manuscripts with the first edition [read] quia; codex W (Q by a second hand) [reads] quod quia.
  12. Codd. T cc et ed. 1 quousque. Vat. hic et paulo superius post merendi addit et demerendi.
    Codices T cc and the first edition [read] quousque. The Vatican edition here and a little above adds et demerendi after merendi.
  13. Codd. V cc et ed. 1 locum et spatium merendi.
    Codices V cc and the first edition [read] locum et spatium merendi.
  14. Codd. bb cc et ed. 1 iustis.
    Codices bb cc and the first edition [read] iustis.
  15. Ed. 1 cum cod. cc et Vat. malitia.
    The first edition with codex cc and the Vatican edition [read] malitia.
  16. Intellige cum codd. U aa in hominibus damnatis.
    Understand, with codices U aa, in hominibus damnatis (in damned men).
  17. Ergo secundum S. Doctorem non est peccatum philosophicum, quod scil. sit contra rationem et non contra Deum.
    Therefore according to the Holy Doctor there is no philosophical sin, that is, [one] which would be against reason and not against God.
  18. Libr. de Praedicam. c. de Oppositis. Libr. II. Topic. c. 3. (c. 7.): « Rursum, si positum est accidens, cui est aliquid contrarium, considerandum, si et contrarii susceptivum, quod accidentis est; nam idem contrariorum susceptivum ». Quae verba B. Albert., in hunc locum, ita exponit: « Considerandum... si illud contrarium potentia insit eidem subiecto, vel non; si enim inest accidens contrarium accidenti eidem, potest inesse, quia idem est susceptibile contrariorum, nisi alterum insit natura » etc. Colligi etiam potest ex I. Phys. text. 28. (c. 3.), ubi Aristot. accidens distinguit in separabile et in inseparabile.
    The book of the Categories, the chapter on Opposites. Topics II, ch. 3 (ch. 7): "Again, if an accident is posited to which there is something contrary, it must be considered whether the receptacle of the contrary is also that which is of the accident; for the same [thing] is the receptacle of contraries." Which words B. Albert, on this passage, expounds thus: "It must be considered... whether that contrary be potentially present in the same subject, or not; for if an accident contrary to an accident is present in the same [subject], it can be present, because the same [thing] is receptive of contraries, unless the other be present by nature," etc. It can also be gathered from Physics I, text 28 (ch. 3), where Aristotle distinguishes an accident into separable and inseparable.
  19. Cod. B opere nostro; Vat. operatione.
    Codex B [reads] opere nostro; the Vatican edition [reads] operatione.
  20. Vat. posset se convertere prima vice, adhuc posset magis peccare.
    The Vatican edition [reads] posset se convertere prima vice, adhuc posset magis peccare.
  21. Cod. cc et ed. 1 cum Vat. propterea.
    Codex cc and the first edition with the Vatican edition [read] propterea.
  22. Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    See the scholion to the preceding question. ---
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