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Dist. 7, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 1

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 7

Textus Latinus
p. 183

Articulus II. De liberi arbitrii immutabilitate tam in confirmatis, quam in obstinatis.

Consequenter secundo quaeritur de liberi arbitrii immutabilitate tam in confirmatis, quam in obstinatis. Supposito autem, quod Angeli in sua conditione habuerint liberum arbitrium, sicut homo, quaeruntur hic tria.

Primum est, utrum confirmatio mutaverit libertatis arbitrium.

Secundum est, utrum obstinatio auferat libertatis usum.

Tertium est, utrum haec, vel illa minuat libertatis dominium.

Quaestio I. Utrum confirmatio mutet libertatis arbitrium.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum confirmatio mutet libertatis arbitrium, ita quod sit aliud ante confirmationem, aliud post. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Vertibilitas inest libero arbitrio creato per naturam1, ergo quod aufert libero arbitrio vertibilitatem mutat eius naturam et variat; sed confirmatio hoc aufert libero arbitrio: ergo mutat et variat.

2. Item, nihil idem, manens idem, potest oppositas differentias participare2; sed mutabile et immutabile sunt oppositae differentiae entis, sicut mortale et immortale viventis: si ergo liberum arbitrium ante confirmationem est mutabile, post confirmationem immutabile: ergo est aliud et aliud.

3. Item, « rationales potestates sunt ad opposita », sicut dicit Philosophus3: ergo cum potentia desinit esse ad opposita, desinit esse rationalis; sed post confirmationem liberum arbitrium desinit esse ad opposita: ergo desinit esse rationalis potestas. Sed nulla potentia rationalis potest fieri non-rationalis, manens eadem: ergo etc.

4. Item, « potentiae distinguuntur per actus, et actus per obiecta4 »; ubi ergo sunt diversa obiecta, necesse est, etiam potentias diversificari; sed liberum arbitrium ante confirmationem potest in malum, p. 184 post confirmationem non potest: ergo est aliud et aliud.

Contra: 1. Anselmus de Libero Arbitrio5 dicit, quod « liberum arbitrium est potestas servandi rectitudinem propter se »; sed haec potestas in confirmatione non tollitur, sed fortificatur: ergo liberum arbitrium non mutatur.

2. Item, gratia naturam perficit et confirmat; sed nihil quod alterum secundum naturam perficit et complet, mutat eius naturam: ergo gratia adveniens libero arbitrio ipsum non mutat6. Sed confirmatio est per gratiam: ergo etc.

3. Item, omne confirmans alterum est conservans; et nihil conservans est corrumpens; et nihil mutat aliquid, nisi corrumpat aliquid, quia non est mutatio sine deperditione: ergo nihil confirmans mutat. Sed confirmatio ideo dicta est, quia liberum arbitrium Angeli confirmat: ergo ipsum non mutat.

4. Item, gratia confirmationis facit esse liberum a miseria in Angelis, sicut gratia gratum faciens facit liberum a culpa; sed libertas a culpa non mutat liberum arbitrium nec eius libertatem: ergo nec libertas a miseria: ergo nec confirmationis gratia7.

Conclusio

Liberum arbitrium per confirmationem non mutatur quoad substantiam, sed tantum quoad statum.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod est mutatio alicuius dupliciter: uno modo quantum ad substantiam sive essentiam, alio modo quantum ad statum; vel per alia verba: est mutari quantum ad primum esse, et est mutari quantum ad bene esse. — Si loquamur de mutatione primo modo, sic sine dubio dicendum, quod confirmatio liberum arbitrium non mutat, cum perficiat et conservet; sicut ostendunt rationes secundo inductae. Si autem loquamur de mutatione secundo modo, scilicet quantum ad statum vel bene esse; sic etiam absque dubio planum est, quod liberum arbitrium alium habet statum8 et aliud complementum, quam haberet prius. — Huic autem mutationi non obviant rationes secundo inductae, sed solum primae, de qua erat quaestio in partem negativam terminata, scilicet quod liberum arbitrium per confirmationem, etsi alteretur, non tamen fit aliud.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur primo, quod vertibilitas est libero arbitrio naturalis; dicendum, quod aliquid est naturale propter naturae complementum, utpote igni, quod tendat sursum; aliquid naturale propter naturae defectum, sicut igni posse extingui. Sic libero arbitrio est aliquid naturale propter naturae complementum, ut posse in bonum; aliquid propter naturae defectum, ut posse verti in malum. — Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aliquid mutatur secundum substantiam, quando perdit illud quod habet per naturam; dicendum, quod etsi hoc possit habere veritatem in eo naturali, quod consequitur complementum, non tamen est verum in eo quod consequitur defectum; et tale quid est vertibilitas. Sicut enim dicit Anselmus9, « posse peccare non est libertas nec pars libertatis ».

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de oppositione differentiarum, dicendum, quod sicut mortale et immortale dupliciter possunt comparari ad substantiam viventem, sic mutabile et immutabile ad libertatem. Si enim mortale et immortale utrumque sit per naturam, sic dicunt differentias oppositas, essentialiter diversificantes supposita. Si autem mortale sit per naturam, immortale per gratiam auferentem defectum naturae; sic non sunt differentiae oppositae, sed sunt compossibiles; vel saltem, quod est sub una potest esse sub altera, sola alteritate10 quantum ad bene esse sive complementum gratiae. Per hunc modum mutabile et immutabile per naturam est impossibile esse circa idem, manens idem, nec simul nec successive; sed mutabile per naturam, immutabile per gratiam non sic opponuntur nec essentialiter distinguuntur; et ideo non variant secundum substantiam liberum arbitrium11.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod rationales potestates sunt ad opposita; dicendum, quod verum est; sed non ad omnia opposita, sed ad aliqua, utpote ad facere aliquid et non facere, ad incidere tunicam et non incidere, ut dicit ipse Philosophus12. Et hoc modo liberum arbitrium confirmatum ad p. 185 opposita potest esse, et ideo naturalis potestas est sicut et ante. — Quod ergo obiicitur: non est in malum et bonum, ergo non est ad opposita; manifestum est, quod ista ratio est peccans secundum consequens.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de diversitate obiecti, quod liberum arbitrium confirmatum non est in malum; dicendum, quod hoc veritatem habet de obiecto per se; malum autem non est obiectum per se liberi arbitrii, in quantum liberum, sed solum in quantum deficiens. Et ideo non sequitur, si non potest in malum, quod non sit liberum vel quod sit aliud; sed sequitur, quod non est deficiens, confirmante influentia manus Omnipotentis, quae nullo modo sinit deficere, quamvis liberum habeat posse et velle.

Scholion

I. De libero arbitrio eiusque speciebus cfr. infra d. 25. per totam, praecipue dubia partis I. et II, d. 44. a. 3. q. 1; I. Sent. d. 6. q. 1; III. Sent. d. 12. a. 2. q. 1. 2; IV. Sent. d. 18. p. II. dub. 1; de novem gradibus voluntarii infra d. 41. dub. 3. — Notanda est etiam distinctio de usu liberi arbitrii quoad actum elicitum a potentia, et quoad actum elicitum a potentia et ordinatum ad finem ultimum (hic q. 2.), et altera de duplici immutabilitate (hic q. 2. ad 2.), nec non de dominio, quod opponitur servituti vel coactionis, vel subiectionis (hic q. 3.). De mala voluntate in omnibus damnatis agitur IV. Sent. d. 50. p. I. a. 1. q. 1.

II. Supponit S. Doctor in hac quaestione, quod Angeli confirmati in gratia et adepti gloriam non possint peccare, de quo alii commentatores plerumque explicite tractant et simul hanc nostram et duas seqq. qq. absolvunt. Omnes in hoc conveniunt, quod potentia serviendi peccato (sive indifferentia contrarietatis, qua voluntas possit deficere a fine et ferri ad malum) non est essentialis libertati, sed est potius eius defectus; quo defectu sublato, non minuitur libertas, sed magis perficitur. De ratione autem intrinseca, quare sancti Angeli sint impeccabiles, aliter sentit S. Thomas, aliter Scotus et ex parte etiam Henr. Gand., de quo vide hic a. 1. q. 1.

III. Solut. ad 3. illustratur iis quae docentur III. Sent. d. 18. a. 1. q. 2. ad 1: « Determinatio potentiae ad unum potest esse dupliciter, videlicet per necessitatem naturae et per confirmationem gratiae. Si sit per necessitatem naturae, tunc tollit arbitrii libertatem, ac per hoc tollit dignitatem meriti. Si autem sit determinatio per confirmationem gratiae, cum talis confirmatio gratiae simul stet cum libera voluntate, sic non tollit ab ipso opere bonitatem moris, cum sit voluntarium, ac per hoc nec qualitatem meriti. In Christo autem fuit liberum arbitrium determinatum ad unum non per necessitatem naturae, sed per confirmationem gratiae ».

IV. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 29. m. 1. a. 3; q. 72. m. 3. a. 3. 4. et m. 4. — Scot., IV. Sent. d. 49. q. 6. n. 9. seqq.; Report. ibid. q. 5. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 62. a. 8. — B. Albert., de hac et seq. q. hic a. 1; S. p. II. tr. 4. q. 16. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Henr. Gand. rem tangit Quodl. I. q. 17. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. — Biel, hic q. unica.

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English Translation

Article II. On the immutability of free choice both in the confirmed and in the obstinate.

Consequently it is asked, secondly, concerning the immutability of free choice both in the confirmed and in the obstinate. And granted that the angels in their [original] condition had free choice, just as man [does], three things are asked here.

The first is whether confirmation has changed the freedom of choice.

The second is whether obstinacy takes away the use of freedom.

The third is whether the one or the other lessens the dominion of freedom.

Question I. Whether confirmation changes the freedom of choice

Concerning the first it is thus proceeded and asked, whether confirmation changes the freedom of choice, such that it is one [thing] before confirmation and another after. And that it [does], it seems.

1. Vertibility [changeableness] is present in created free choice by nature1, therefore that which takes away vertibility from free choice changes and alters its nature; but confirmation takes this away from free choice: therefore it changes and alters [it].

2. Likewise, nothing one and the same, remaining the same, can participate in opposite differences2; but mutable and immutable are opposite differences of being, as mortal and immortal [are differences] of the living thing: if therefore free choice before confirmation is mutable, after confirmation immutable: therefore it is one [thing] and another.

3. Likewise, "rational powers are toward opposites," as the Philosopher says3: therefore when a power ceases to be toward opposites, it ceases to be rational; but after confirmation free choice ceases to be toward opposites: therefore it ceases to be a rational power. But no rational power can become non-rational while remaining the same: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, "powers are distinguished through acts, and acts through objects4"; where therefore there are diverse objects, it is necessary that the powers too be diversified; but free choice before confirmation can [tend] toward evil, p. 184 after confirmation it cannot: therefore it is one [thing] and another.

On the contrary: 1. Anselm, On Free Choice5, says that "free choice is the power of preserving rectitude for its own sake"; but this power is not taken away in confirmation, but strengthened: therefore free choice is not changed.

2. Likewise, grace perfects and confirms nature; but nothing which perfects and completes another according to nature changes its nature: therefore grace, coming to free choice, does not change it6. But confirmation is through grace: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, everything that confirms another is preserving [it]; and nothing preserving is corrupting; and nothing changes anything unless it corrupts something, because there is no change without loss: therefore nothing confirming changes [anything]. But confirmation is so called because it confirms the free choice of the angel: therefore it does not change it.

4. Likewise, the grace of confirmation makes [one] to be free from misery in the angels, just as sanctifying grace makes [one] free from fault; but freedom from fault does not change free choice nor its freedom: therefore neither [does] freedom from misery: therefore neither [does] the grace of confirmation7.

Conclusion

Free choice is not changed by confirmation as to substance, but only as to state.

I respond: It must be said that the change of anything is twofold: in one way as to substance or essence, in another way as to state; or in other words: there is being-changed as to first being, and there is being-changed as to well-being. — If we speak of change in the first way, then without doubt it must be said that confirmation does not change free choice, since it perfects and preserves [it]; as the reasons adduced in the second place [the Contra] show. But if we speak of change in the second way, namely as to state or well-being; then likewise without doubt it is plain that free choice has another state8 and another completion than it would have had before. — But this change is not opposed by the reasons adduced in the second place, but only by the first [set], on which the question was determined toward the negative part, namely that free choice through confirmation, although it be altered, nevertheless does not become another [thing].

1. To that, then, which is objected first, that vertibility is natural to free choice; it must be said that something is natural on account of the completion of nature, as for fire, that it tend upward; something natural on account of the defect of nature, as for fire the being able to be extinguished. So in free choice there is something natural on account of the completion of nature, as the being able [to tend] toward good; something on account of the defect of nature, as the being able to be turned toward evil. — To that which is objected, that something is changed according to substance when it loses that which it has by nature; it must be said that, although this can have truth in that natural [feature] which follows upon completion, it is nevertheless not true in that which follows upon defect; and such a thing is vertibility. For as Anselm says9, "to be able to sin is not freedom nor a part of freedom."

2. To that which is objected concerning the opposition of differences, it must be said that, just as mortal and immortal can be compared to a living substance in two ways, so [can] mutable and immutable to freedom. For if mortal and immortal are each by nature, then they state opposite differences, essentially diversifying their supposits. But if mortal be by nature, [and] immortal by a grace taking away the defect of nature; then they are not opposite differences, but are compossible; or at least, that which is under the one can be under the other, by mere otherness10 as to well-being or the completion of grace. In this manner mutable and immutable by nature are impossible to be about the same [thing], remaining the same, neither simultaneously nor successively; but mutable by nature, [and] immutable by grace, are not so opposed nor essentially distinguished; and therefore they do not alter free choice according to substance11.

3. To that which is objected, that rational powers are toward opposites; it must be said that it is true; but not toward all opposites, but toward some, as toward to do something and not to do, toward to cut a tunic and not to cut, as the Philosopher himself says12. And in this manner confirmed free choice can be toward p. 185 opposites, and therefore [it] is a natural power as also before. — As for what is objected, then: it is not toward evil and good, therefore it is not toward opposites; it is manifest that this argument is fallacious by [the fallacy of the] consequent.

4. To that which is objected concerning the diversity of object, that confirmed free choice is not toward evil; it must be said that this has truth concerning the object per se; but evil is not the object per se of free choice, insofar as it is free, but only insofar as it is deficient. And therefore it does not follow, if it cannot [tend] toward evil, that it is not free or that it is another [thing]; but it follows that it is not deficient, the influence of the hand of the Omnipotent confirming [it], which in no way allows [it] to fail, although the free [will] has the being-able and the willing.

Scholion

I. Concerning free choice and its species cf. below, d. 25, throughout, especially the dubia of parts I and II; d. 44, a. 3, q. 1; I Sent. d. 6, q. 1; III Sent. d. 12, a. 2, q. 1, 2; IV Sent. d. 18, p. II, dub. 1; on the nine grades of the voluntary, below, d. 41, dub. 3. — There is also to be noted the distinction concerning the use of free choice as to an act elicited by the power, and as to an act elicited by the power and ordered to the ultimate end (here q. 2), and another concerning the twofold immutability (here q. 2, ad 2), as well as [the one] concerning dominion, which is opposed to servitude either of coercion or of subjection (here q. 3). Of evil will in all the damned it is treated [in] IV Sent. d. 50, p. I, a. 1, q. 1.

II. The Holy Doctor supposes in this question that the angels confirmed in grace and having attained glory cannot sin, concerning which the other commentators for the most part treat explicitly and at the same time resolve both this our [question] and the two following questions. All agree in this, that the power of serving sin (or the indifference of contrariety, by which the will can fail from the end and be borne toward evil) is not essential to freedom, but is rather its defect; with which defect taken away, freedom is not lessened, but rather perfected. But concerning the intrinsic ground why the holy angels are impeccable, S. Thomas thinks one way, Scotus another, and in part also Henry of Ghent, concerning which see here a. 1, q. 1.

III. The solution to [objection] 3 is illustrated by the things taught [in] III Sent. d. 18, a. 1, q. 2, ad 1: "The determination of a power to one [thing] can be twofold, namely by the necessity of nature and by the confirmation of grace. If it be by the necessity of nature, then it takes away the freedom of choice, and by this takes away the dignity of merit. But if the determination be by the confirmation of grace, since such confirmation of grace stands together with a free will, then it does not take away from the work itself the goodness of morals, since it is voluntary, and by this neither the quality of merit. But in Christ there was free choice determined to one [thing] not by the necessity of nature, but by the confirmation of grace."

IV. Alex. of Hales, S. p. II, q. 29, m. 1, a. 3; q. 72, m. 3, a. 3, 4, and m. 4. — Scotus, IV Sent. d. 49, q. 6, n. 9 ff.; Reportata ibid. q. 5. — S. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1; S. I, q. 62, a. 8. — B. Albert, on this and the following q. here a. 1; S. p. II, tr. 4, q. 16, m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 1, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 1, a. 1. — Henry of Ghent touches the matter [in] Quodl. I, q. 17. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2. — Biel, here q. unica.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Cfr. Damasc., II. de Fide orthod. c. 27, ex quo etiam conceptus vertibilitas (τροπή) sumtus esse videtur. — Paulo inferius cod. bb sed confirmatio aufert libero arbitrio vertibilitatem pro sed confirmatio hoc aufert libero arbitrio.
    Cf. Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith II, ch. 27, from which also the concept vertibilitas (τροπή, "turning") seems to have been taken. — A little below codex bb [reads] sed confirmatio aufert libero arbitrio vertibilitatem for sed confirmatio hoc aufert libero arbitrio.
  2. Nam ut ait Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Differentia: Universaliter omnis differentia addita alicui alteratum facit... quae vero propriissime, aliud. Vide etiam Aristot., II. de Gener. et corrupt. text. 56. (c. 10.), ubi dicit, quod « idem et similiter se habens semper idem natum est facere », et quod « contrariorum contrariae causae »; I. de Caelo et mundo, text. 130. (c. 12.), ubi ait: Dicere nihil prohibere, generatum quippiam esse incorruptibile... perimere est datorum aliquid.
    For as Porphyry says, Isagoge (On the Predicables), the chapter on Difference: "Universally every difference added to anything makes [it] altered... but those [differences which are] most properly [so called make it] another [thing]." See also Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption II, text 56 (ch. 10), where he says that "what is the same and behaves in the same way is by nature apt to do the same," and that "the causes of contraries are contrary"; On the Heavens I, text 130 (ch. 12), where he says: "To say that nothing prevents some generated thing from being incorruptible... is to do away with one of the things granted."
  3. Libr. IX. Metaph. text. 3. et 10. (VIII. c. 2. et 5.).
    Metaphysics IX, text 3 and 10 (VIII, ch. 2 and 5).
  4. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 33. (c. 4.).
    Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 33 (ch. 4).
  5. Cap. 3. — Paulo inferius nonnulli codd. ut H aa bb non totaliter tollitur pro non tollitur.
    Ch. 3. — A little below several manuscripts, such as H aa bb, [read] non totaliter tollitur for non tollitur.
  6. Cod. aa ergo gratia adveniens liberi arbitrii rationem non mutat.
    Codex aa [reads] ergo gratia adveniens liberi arbitrii rationem non mutat.
  7. In hoc arg. supponitur ista a S. Bernardo, de Gratia et lib. arb. c. 3, allata distinctio libertatis a peccato, a miseria et a necessitate. — Cod. aa nec libertatem tollit pro nec eius libertatem.
    In this argument is presupposed that distinction of freedom from sin, from misery, and from necessity, adduced by St. Bernard, On Grace and Free Choice ch. 3. — Codex aa [reads] nec libertatem tollit for nec eius libertatem.
  8. In Vat. additur nunc.
    In the Vatican edition nunc is added.
  9. De Lib. Arb. c. 1, ubi textus originalis potestas peccandi pro posse peccare. — Non pauci codd. cum ed. 1 Sic enim pro Sicut enim.
    On Free Choice ch. 1, where the original text [reads] potestas peccandi for posse peccare. — Not a few manuscripts with the first edition [read] Sic enim for Sicut enim.
  10. Cfr. Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Differentia, ubi docet differentiam tripliciter accipi, scil. communiter, proprie et propriissime. Communiter, qua unum ab altero vel etiam a se ipso (ut Socrates a Platone et a se ipso, puero et sene facto) differt quocumque modo; proprie, quando unum ab altero differt inseparabili accidente, v. g. caecitate oculorum differt Socrates a Platone; propriissime, quando unum ab altero differt differentia specifica. Duae priores differentiae constituunt alteritatem, tertia vero alietatem.
    Cf. Porphyry, Isagoge (On the Predicables), the chapter on Difference, where he teaches that difference is taken in three ways, namely commonly, properly, and most properly. Commonly, by which one [thing] differs from another or even from itself (as Socrates from Plato and from himself, made a boy and an old man) in any way whatever; properly, when one differs from another by an inseparable accident, e.g. by blindness of the eyes Socrates differs from Plato; most properly, when one differs from another by a specific difference. The two former differences constitute otherness (alteritas), but the third [constitutes] otherhood (alietas).
  11. Aliqui codd. cum ed. 1 variant substantiam liberi arbitrii.
    Some manuscripts with the first edition [read] variant substantiam liberi arbitrii.
  12. Libr. I. Peri Herm. c. 7. (c. 9.), ubi tamen haec exempla in forma passiva fieri, non fieri etc. exprimuntur. — Cod. F post non facere addit ad opposita, quae sunt in genere naturae, non in genere moris. Paulo inferius Vat. rationalis potestas pro naturalis potestas.
    On Interpretation (Peri Hermeneias) I, ch. 7 (ch. 9), where however these examples are expressed in the passive form fieri, non fieri (to be done, not to be done) etc. — Codex F after non facere adds ad opposita, quae sunt in genere naturae, non in genere moris. A little below the Vatican edition [reads] rationalis potestas for naturalis potestas. ---
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