Dist. 7, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 2
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 7
Quaestio II. Utrum obstinatio tollat a daemonibus libertatis usum.
Secundo quaeritur, utrum obstinatio tollat daemonibus libertatis usum. Et quod sic, videtur.
1. « Liberum arbitrium, ut dicit Anselmus1, est potestas servandi rectitudinem », ergo servatio rectitudinis est usus liberi arbitrii; sed hanc non habent nec possunt habere Angeli obstinati: ergo etc.
2. Item, Anselmus2: « Potestas peccandi nec est libertas nec pars libertatis », ergo peccare nullo modo est uti libertate; sed daemones per liberum arbitrium nunquam faciunt actum, qui non sit peccatum, nec possunt facere propter obstinationem in malo: ergo perdiderunt libertatis usum.
3. Item, libere velle et necessario velle sunt opposita; sed daemones necessario habent malam voluntatem: ergo necessario volunt malum, non ergo libere. Sed libere velle est usus libertatis: ergo amiserunt libertatis usum.
4. Item, phrenetici et insani non habent libertatis usum, quoniam plus in eis regnat appetitus phantasticus quam rationalis; sed « in daemonibus est furor irrationalis, amens concupiscentia, phantasia proterva », sicut dicit Dionysius3: ergo videtur, quod amiserunt usum liberi arbitrii.
5. Item, bestiae non habent usum liberi arbitrii, quia moventur secundum impetum4: sed diabolus maiori impetu movetur ad malefaciendum, quam bestia: ergo non habet libertatis usum. Quod autem maiori impetu moveatur, videtur. In libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum5 dicit Augustinus: « Videmus ferocissimas bestias timore poenarum a maximis voluptatibus abstrahi »; sed diabolus timore poenae non dimittit superbire: ergo maiori impetu fertur in malum.
Contra: 1. In quocumque est usus rationis et appetitus, est usus liberi arbitrii; sed in daemonibus est usus rationis, quia conferunt et disponunt: ergo etc.
2. Item, ei qui non habet usum liberi arbitrii p. 186 non imputatur aliquid quod faciat; sed daemonibus obstinatis mala, quae faciunt, imputantur: ergo habent usum.
3. Item, potentia incorruptibilis non alligata organo semper est in suo actu et usu; sed liberum arbitrium in daemonibus est huiusmodi: ergo nullo modo potest impediri a suo usu.
4. Item, nihil quod causatur ab usu liberi arbitrii et sine illo non potest causari, aufert liberi arbitrii usum; sed obstinatio est huiusmodi: ergo obstinatio non aufert liberi arbitrii usum. Prima patet per se, quia effectus proprius non destruit causam; secunda patet, quia obstinatio est a mala voluntate.
5. Item, per quae quis peccat, debet puniri6; sed daemon libero arbitrio peccavit: ergo in ipso debet puniri; ergo daemon habet liberum arbitrium; et constat, quod ipsum non est otiosum: ergo habet aliquem usum.
Conclusio
Obstinatio daemonibus non omnem usum liberi arbitrii aufert, sed tantum actum ordinatum in finem.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod etsi multis modis dicatur usus, sicut habitum est in primo libro7, tamen quantum ad praesens sufficit, quod usus alicuius potentiae dicitur dupliciter: uno modo actus elicitus a potentia, alio modo actus elicitus a potentia ad eum finem, ad quem est. Primo modo dicendo, usus liberi arbitrii est libere velle sive eligere. Secundo modo, usus liberi arbitrii est rectitudinem servare, quoniam ad illam est. Dicendum est igitur, quod obstinatio daemonibus non aufert usum primo modo, quia libere volunt quod volunt; sed usum secundo modo sic, quia eorum potentia, etsi in actum exeat, non tamen in actum ordinatum in finem. Rationes autem probantes, quod daemones habent usum liberi arbitrii, procedunt de usu secundum primam viam; unde concedendae sunt.
1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur ad oppositum de Anselmo, dicendum, quod Anselmus definit liberum arbitrium per actum ordinatum in finem, qui est servare rectitudinem, et ita quantum ad usum secundo modo dictum, et hunc amittunt daemones obstinati.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod potestas peccandi non est libertas nec pars libertatis; dicendum, quod verum est; nunquam tamen est sine libertate, sicut nec peccare est sine usu libertatis sive liberae voluntatis. Omnis enim qui peccat, libere vult. Et ideo continuatio peccati usum liberi arbitrii non excludit, sed includit.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod libere velle et necessario velle opponuntur; dicendum, quod duplex est necessitas: quaedam a causa extrinseca, utpote necessitas coactionis, et haec opponitur ei quod est libere velle; quaedam vero est a dispositione intrinseca, et haec non opponitur, immo stat simul cum libertate8; talis est in libero arbitrio daemonum, quod ita conglutinavit sibi malum, ut nullo modo velit ab eo separari.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de phreneticis, dicendum, quod phrenetici sic habent usum phantasiae, quod absorbetur usus rationis, et magis aguntur, quam agant9; daemon autem sic habet phantasiam protervam, quod usus et actus rationis non excluditur. Illa enim protervitas potius est a libero arbitrio, quam sit ab infirmitate naturae, sicut ponimus in phrenetico.
5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de bestiis, quod abstrahuntur, ergo minori impetu moventur; dicendum, quod illud impetu movetur, quod non habet retrahens. Habere autem retrahens est dupliciter, scilicet intra et extra; impetus autem, qui magis repugnat libero arbitrio, est illud quod excludit retinaculum interius, non quod excludit exterius. Quoniam igitur impetus bestiae excludit retinaculum intra, quamvis possit retrahi per illud quod est extra; ideo non habet liberum arbitrium. Daemon autem habet potentiam interiorem, per quam sine aliquo exteriori repellente potest retrahi, et quae a nullo extrinseco potest superari; et ideo impetus daemonum in malum libero arbitrio non repugnat, sed consonat; et sic patet illud. p. 187
I. Alii plurimi commentatores hanc et seq. quaest. tantum breviter tangunt in praecedenti quaest., et Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 72. m. 5; explicite autem de hac nullus et de sequenti pauci tractant, scil. D. Albert., hic a. 2. 3; S. p. II. tr. 4. q. 16. m. 3. 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. (tantum quoad confirmationem in bono).
II. Verba in quaest. 2. ad 3: « Quaedam (necessitas) vero est a dispositione intrinseca, et haec non opponitur, immo stat simul cum libertate », non sunt intelligenda in eo sensu, quod sola violentia, quae procedit ab extrinseco, opponatur libero arbitrio, quatenus ad merendum et demerendum requiritur. Contrarium iam ex solut. ad 5. sequitur; et alibi S. Doctor apertissime docet, ad actum liberum et moralem praeter libertatem a coactione requiri libertatem a necessitate sive libertatem indifferentiae. Ita infra d. 25. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4. ait: « Non quicumque motus ab intrinseco facit potentiam liberam, sed ille motus, quo vis motiva movet se ipsam », quam sententiam clarius in toto illo articulo, praesertim q. 3. explanat (cfr. etiam infra d. 24. p. I. dub. 3. et p. II. a. 1. q. 1, d. 26. q. 6, nec non schol. ad praeced. quaest. n. III.). Ille autem modus loquendi, quo utitur hic S. Bonav., apud antiquos Scholasticos passim occurrit, et apud ipsum S. Thomam, qui S. I. q. 82. a. 1. ad 1. dicit: « Necessitas autem naturalis non aufert libertatem voluntatis »; quae verba apte explicantur a Gotti (Theol. scholast. t. II. tr. 2. q. 2. dub. 2. § 2.) ex ipsius S. Thomae doctrina (de Verit. q. 24. a. 1. ad 2.). Hoc enim loco distinguitur libertas voluntatis, quae significat velle respectu ordinis ad finem et non requirit nisi spontaneitatem et libentiam, a libertate arbitrii, quae convenit voluntati in ordine ad eligenda media et exigit nedum spontaneitatem, sed etiam indifferentiam ad volendum, vel non volendum. — Notae sunt propositiones Baii a S. Pio V. aliisque Sum. Pontificibus damnatae, quarum 39. est: « Quod voluntarie fit, etiamsi necessario fiat, libere tamen fit »; et 66. atque 67: « Sola violentia repugnat libertati hominis naturali ». « Homo peccat etiam damnabiliter in eo quod necessario facit ». Item damnata est ab Innocentio X. propositio 3. Iansenii: « Ad merendum et demerendum in statu naturae lapsae non requiritur in homine libertas a necessitate, sed sufficit libertas a coactione ».
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Question II. Whether obstinacy takes from demons the use of freedom
Secondly it is asked whether obstinacy takes from demons the use of freedom. And that it [does], it seems.
1. "Free choice, as Anselm says1, is the power of preserving rectitude," therefore the preserving of rectitude is the use of free choice; but this the obstinate angels do not have nor can have: therefore, etc.
2. Likewise, Anselm2: "The power of sinning is neither freedom nor a part of freedom," therefore to sin is in no way to use freedom; but the demons through free choice never do an act which is not sin, nor can they do [otherwise] on account of obstinacy in evil: therefore they have lost the use of freedom.
3. Likewise, to will freely and to will necessarily are opposites; but the demons necessarily have an evil will: therefore they necessarily will evil, therefore not freely. But to will freely is the use of freedom: therefore they have lost the use of freedom.
4. Likewise, the frenzied and the insane do not have the use of freedom, since in them the phantastic appetite reigns more than the rational; but "in the demons there is irrational fury, mad concupiscence, wanton phantasy," as Dionysius says3: therefore it seems that they have lost the use of free choice.
5. Likewise, beasts do not have the use of free choice, because they are moved according to impulse4: but the devil is moved by a greater impulse to do evil than a beast: therefore he does not have the use of freedom. And that he is moved by a greater impulse, [thus] it seems. In the book of Eighty-three Questions5 Augustine says: "We see most ferocious beasts drawn away from the greatest pleasures by fear of punishments"; but the devil by fear of punishment does not give up being proud: therefore he is borne into evil by a greater impulse.
On the contrary: 1. In whatever there is use of reason and of appetite, there is use of free choice; but in the demons there is use of reason, because they confer and dispose [things]: therefore, etc.
2. Likewise, to him who does not have the use of free choice p. 186 nothing that he does is imputed; but to the obstinate demons the evils which they do are imputed: therefore they have the use [of it].
3. Likewise, an incorruptible power not bound to an organ is always in its act and use; but free choice in the demons is of this kind: therefore it can in no way be impeded from its use.
4. Likewise, nothing that is caused by the use of free choice and cannot be caused without it takes away the use of free choice; but obstinacy is of this kind: therefore obstinacy does not take away the use of free choice. The first [premise] is evident of itself, because a proper effect does not destroy its cause; the second is evident, because obstinacy is from an evil will.
5. Likewise, by the things by which one sins, one ought to be punished6; but the demon sinned by free choice: therefore he ought to be punished in it; therefore the demon has free choice; and it is established that it is not idle: therefore it has some use.
Conclusion
Obstinacy does not take from demons every use of free choice, but only the act ordered to the end.
I respond: It must be said that, although "use" is said in many ways, as was treated in the first book7, nevertheless for the present it suffices that the use of any power is said in two ways: in one way, an act elicited by the power, in another way, an act elicited by the power toward the end for which it is. Speaking in the first way, the use of free choice is to will or choose freely. In the second way, the use of free choice is to preserve rectitude, since it is for that. It must therefore be said that obstinacy does not take from demons the use in the first way, because they freely will what they will; but the use in the second way, thus [it does], because their power, although it goes forth into act, nevertheless [does] not into an act ordered to the end. But the reasons proving that the demons have the use of free choice proceed concerning use according to the first way; whence they are to be granted.
1. To that, then, which is objected on the opposite side concerning Anselm, it must be said that Anselm defines free choice through the act ordered to the end, which is to preserve rectitude, and so as to use in the second way said, and this the obstinate demons lose.
2. To that which is objected, that the power of sinning is neither freedom nor a part of freedom; it must be said that it is true; nevertheless it is never without freedom, just as neither is to sin without the use of freedom or of a free will. For everyone who sins, wills freely. And therefore the continuation of sin does not exclude the use of free choice, but includes [it].
3. To that which is objected, that to will freely and to will necessarily are opposed; it must be said that necessity is twofold: one [kind is] from an extrinsic cause, as the necessity of coercion, and this is opposed to that which is to will freely; but another is from an intrinsic disposition, and this is not opposed, but rather stands together with freedom8; such [a necessity] is in the free choice of the demons, which has so glued evil to itself that it in no way wills to be separated from it.
4. To that which is objected concerning the frenzied, it must be said that the frenzied so have the use of phantasy that the use of reason is absorbed, and they are more acted-upon than they act9; but the demon so has a wanton phantasy that the use and act of reason is not excluded. For that wantonness is rather from free choice than from an infirmity of nature, as we posit in the frenzied [man].
5. To that which is objected concerning beasts, that they are drawn away, therefore they are moved by a lesser impulse; it must be said that that is moved by impulse which has nothing drawing [it] back. But to have something drawing back is twofold, namely within and without; and the impulse which more opposes free choice is that which excludes the interior restraint, not that which excludes the exterior. Since therefore the impulse of a beast excludes the restraint within, although it can be drawn back by that which is without; therefore it does not have free choice. But the demon has an interior power, through which, without anything exterior repelling, it can be drawn back, and which can be overcome by nothing extrinsic; and therefore the impulse of the demons toward evil does not oppose free choice, but is consonant [with it]; and so that [point] is evident. p. 187
I. Very many other commentators touch this and the following question only briefly in the preceding question, and Alex. of Hales, S. p. II, q. 72, m. 5; but no one [treats] of this explicitly, and few of the following, namely D. Albert, here a. 2, 3; S. p. II, tr. 4, q. 16, m. 3, 4. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 1, a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 2 (only as to confirmation in good).
II. The words in question 2, ad 3: "But a certain (necessity) is from an intrinsic disposition, and this is not opposed, but rather stands together with freedom," are not to be understood in the sense that only violence, which proceeds from outside, is opposed to free choice, insofar as it is required for meriting and demeriting. The contrary already follows from the solution to [objection] 5; and elsewhere the Holy Doctor most plainly teaches that for a free and moral act, besides freedom from coercion, there is required freedom from necessity, or freedom of indifference. So below, d. 25, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, ad 4, he says: "Not any motion from within makes a power free, but that motion by which the motive force moves itself," which opinion he explains more clearly in that whole article, especially q. 3 (cf. also below, d. 24, p. I, dub. 3, and p. II, a. 1, q. 1; d. 26, q. 6; as well as the scholion to the preceding question, n. III). But that manner of speaking which the Holy Doctor uses here occurs everywhere among the ancient Scholastics, and in St. Thomas himself, who, S. I, q. 82, a. 1, ad 1, says: "But natural necessity does not take away the freedom of the will"; which words are aptly explained by Gotti (Theologia scholastica t. II, tr. 2, q. 2, dub. 2, § 2) from the doctrine of St. Thomas himself (de Veritate q. 24, a. 1, ad 2). For in this place is distinguished the freedom of the will, which signifies to will with respect to the order to the end and requires only spontaneity and willingness, from the freedom of choice, which belongs to the will in the order to choosing means and demands not only spontaneity but also indifference to willing or not willing. — Well known are the propositions of Baius condemned by St. Pius V and the other Supreme Pontiffs, of which the 39th is: "What is done voluntarily, even if it be done necessarily, is nevertheless done freely"; and the 66th and 67th: "Only violence is repugnant to the natural freedom of man." "Man sins even damnably in that which he does necessarily." Likewise there was condemned by Innocent X the 3rd proposition of Jansenius: "For meriting and demeriting in the state of fallen nature there is not required in man freedom from necessity, but freedom from coercion suffices."
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- Dialog. de lib. arb. c. 3.Dialogue On Free Choice ch. 3.
- Dialog. de lib. arb. c. 1.Dialogue On Free Choice ch. 1.
- De Div. Nom. c. 4. § 23.On the Divine Names ch. 4, § 23.
- Damasc., II. de Fide orthod. c. 22. et 27, ostendens, quod in brutis non sit voluntas nec libertas, utitur his verbis ὁρμή et ὁρμῶσι πρὸς τὴν πρᾶξιν i. e. impulsus sive impetus — impelluntur ad actionem. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 785, nota 2.Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith II, ch. 22 and 27, showing that in brutes there is no will nor freedom, uses these words ὁρμή and ὁρμῶσι πρὸς τὴν πρᾶξιν, i.e. impulse or drive — they are impelled to action. Cf. tom. I, p. 785, note 2.
- Quaest. 36. n. 1; Videmus etiam, immanissimas bestias a maximis voluptatibus absterreri dolorum metu.Question 36, n. 1: "We see also that the most savage beasts are deterred from the greatest pleasures by fear of pains."
- Sap. 11, 17: Per quae peccat quis, per haec et torquetur.Wisdom 11, 17: "By what things a man sinneth, by the same also is he tormented."
- Dist. 1. a. 1. q. 1. seq. — Paulo inferius post «uno modo» codd. L O prosequuntur: est actus naturalis operatio debita cuique rei, et secundum hoc dicitur: cuius usus bonus, ipsum quoque bonum est. Alio modo etc. Ed. 1 cum cod. cc legit: uno modo dicitur usus operatio rei naturalis; alio modo... ad quem est vel in actum ordinatum in finem. Primo modo etc.Dist. 1, a. 1, q. 1 ff. — A little below, after "uno modo" codices L O continue: est actus naturalis operatio debita cuique rei, et secundum hoc dicitur: cuius usus bonus, ipsum quoque bonum est. Alio modo etc. The first edition with codex cc reads: uno modo dicitur usus operatio rei naturalis; alio modo... ad quem est vel in actum ordinatum in finem. Primo modo etc.
- Cfr. Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 1. et I. Magn. Moral. c. 13. seq. (c. 14. seq.).Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics III, ch. 1, and Magna Moralia I, ch. 13 ff. (ch. 14 ff.).
- Damasc., II. de Fide orthod. c. 27. ad insinuandam differentiam hominis, qui libertate praeditus est, et brutorum, utitur hac oppositione: "Ἄλογα ἄγονται μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως, ἤπερ ἄγουσι... ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος, λογικὸς ὤν, ἄγει μᾶλλον τὴν φύσιν, ἤπερ ἄγεται" i. e. Bruta aguntur magis a natura, quam agant... Homo vero, cum sit rationis particeps, ducit potius naturam, quam ab ea ducatur. Cfr. Aristot., I. Metaph. c. 1. et de Motu animal. c. 4. seq. (c. 7.).Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith II, ch. 27, to indicate the difference between man, who is endowed with freedom, and brutes, uses this opposition: "Ἄλογα ἄγονται μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως, ἤπερ ἄγουσι... ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος, λογικὸς ὤν, ἄγει μᾶλλον τὴν φύσιν, ἤπερ ἄγεται," i.e. Brutes are led by nature more than they lead... but man, since he is a participant of reason, leads nature rather than is led by it. Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics I, ch. 1, and On the Motion of Animals ch. 4 ff. (ch. 7). ---