Dist. 1, Part 1, Art. 3, Q. 2
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 1
Quaestio II. Utrum creatio dicat medium inter Creatorem et creaturam.
Secundo quaeritur, utrum creatio dicat medium inter Creatorem et creaturam. Et quod sic, videtur.
1. Sicut se habet generari ad generatum esse et fieri ad factum esse, ita creari ad creatum esse; sed fieri est medium inter facientem et factum, et generari inter generantem et generatum1: ergo etc.
2. Item, in omnibus creatis entibus «differt quod est et quo est2», etiam formaliter: ergo differt similiter quo creatur et quod creatur. Sed quod creatur est creatura; quo creatur formaliter est creatio: ergo differt creatio a creatura, et similiter a Creatore creatio-passio: ergo est inter utrumque.
3. Item, quod transit non est idem cum eo quod permanet; sed creari rei est in instanti, et non amplius: ergo cum esse creaturae3 duret et maneat post creationem, ergo differt creari et esse, ergo creatio et creatura.
4. Item, omnis mutatio est via4, et omnis via differt a termino, quia nihil terminatur ad se ipsum; si ergo creatio est mutatio et habet creaturam pro termino, ergo differt a creatura ut via a termino. Sed via cadit media inter extrema: ergo etc.
5. Item, per impossibile: si creatio est creatura, et omnis creatura creatur, ergo creatio creatur; sed omne quod creatur, creatur per creationem mediam: ergo creatio per aliam creationem, et sic deinceps usque in infinitum. Si ergo non est abire in infinitum, patet5 etc.
Contra:
1. Philosophus de Causis6: «Prima rerum creatarum est esse»; sed nihil ex parte creaturae
est ante creari: ergo creari non est aliud quam esse, ergo nec creatio quam essentia: ergo nulla est differentia creationis ad creaturam.
2. Item, inter ens ab alio et non ab alio non est medium; sed omne quod non est ab alio, est Creator, omne autem quod est ab alio essentialiter, est creatura: ergo inter ea nihil est medium.
3. Item, per impossibile ostenditur. Creatura refertur ad Creatorem; aut ergo se ipsa, aut per aliud. Si per aliud, quaeritur de illo, utrum referatur se ipso, aut alio, et sic procedendo in infinitum. Si vero refertur se ipsa — sed refertur per creationem — ergo creatio non est aliud quam creatura.
4. Item, si creatio est medium inter Creatorem et creaturam, aut ergo aeternum, aut temporale7. Quod si aeternum, ergo aliquid aeternum est aliud a Deo; si temporale, ergo ante omnem creaturam est aliquod temporale. Horum autem utrumque est haereticum dicere et reprobatum in Concilio Senonensi de ideis, quae ponebantur a quibusdam mediae inter Deum et res.
5. Item, a proportione videtur hoc posse ostendi. Sicut enim se habet Creator ad creaturam, ita creatio-actio ad creationem-passionem: ergo, a permutata proportione, sicut se habet Creator ad creationem activam, ita creatura ad creationem passivam: sed Creator non differt secundum rem a creatione-actione: ergo etc.
Conclusio.
Creatio-actio tantum secundum rationem intelligendi est medium inter Creatorem et creaturam; creatio-passio non est aliud secundum rem a creatura, nec medium inter ipsam et Deum secundum essentiam, sed secundum rationem et habitudinem.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod est loqui de creatione-actione, et de creatione-passione. Si de creatione-actione loquamur, sic dico, quod non est medium secundum rem, sed solum secundum rationem intelligendi, pro eo quod Deus, cum sit summe simplex, est sua actio. Si autem loquamur de creatione-passione, tunc distinguendum8, quia per creaturae nomen potest significari et importari omne quod est ab alio, ita quod habet esse post omnino non-esse. Et hoc modo in nomine creaturae clauditur ipsa creatio, quoniam creatura non tantum nominat ipsa creata, sed etiam concreata; et sic non est medium nec re nec ratione. Alio modo creatura nominat ipsam substantiam rei ab aliquo productae de nihilo; et sic creatio tenet medium non secundum rem et naturam, sed secundum rationem et habitudinem.
Illa tamen ratio non nihil dicit, sed non dicit aliquid per essentiam diversum a creatura, et hoc patet sic. Creatio enim dicitur de nihilo esse, creatio nihilominus dicitur esse a Deo; unde habitudinem dicit ipsius ad non-esse praecedens et ad suum esse producens9, de ratione sui nominis. Creari enim non significat esse principaliter, sed exire de non-esse in esse, et hoc ab aliquo.
Si ergo quaeratur, quae sit habitudo, quae importatur in comparatione ad non-esse; dicendum, quod illa habitudo dicitur mutatio. — Et si quaeras, quid sit illa mutatio; dico, quod non est aliud quam ipsa res. — Et hoc patet, quia est mutatio ad esse, et mutatio ab esse, et mutatio in esse. Mutatio ad esse nihil ponit nisi a parte termini; mutatio ab esse nihil ponit nisi a parte principii; mutatio in esse ponit ex parte utriusque; et ideo mutari primo modo nihil aliud est, quam nunc primo esse. Mutatio secundo modo nihil aliud est, quam nunc ultimo esse; et ideo non ponit aliquid aliud secundum rem10, sed solum secundum intentionem. Mutatio vero in esse utrumque extremum habet et subiectum, quod est prius natura quam terminus. Ideo et talis mutatio aliquid potest esse natura praecedens terminum, et diversum ab illo secundum rem, quamvis non sit ens actu completum. — Et ideo non sic creatio est medium inter Creatorem et creaturam, sicut generatio inter generantem et generatum. Dicendo igitur comparationem ad non-esse, dicit11 medium non diversum per essentiam, sed secundum rationem.
Similiter dicendo comparationem ad Creatorem. Triplex enim est relatio: quaedam quae fundatur super proprietatem accidentalem, sicut aliqui dicuntur similes, quia albi; quaedam quae fundatur super dependentiam essentialem, sicut comparatio materiae ad formam; quaedam quae super originem naturalem. Prima relatio addit aliud per essentiam12; tertia relatio nihil aliud nisi pure
esse, sicut patet in divinis; media relatio dicit aliquid, quod est quodam modo idem, quodam modo aliud. — Creatio autem dicit relationem secundum medium modum, quoniam ipsa creatura essentialiter et totaliter a Creatore dependet.
Et ideo concedendum, quod creatio non est aliud secundum rem a creatura, nec medium inter ipsam et Deum secundum essentiam, sed secundum rationem et habitudinem; unde est prius natura creari quam esse, non duratione13. Plus tamen est idem creatio-actio cum creante quam creatio-passio cum creatura, quia ibi non est differentia nisi solum secundum modum nostrum accipiendi; hic autem est differentia rationis et etiam habitudinis, quae non facit diversitatem per essentiam, quia habitudo illa est essentialis. Similiter iudicandum est de unitate, bonitate, veritate essentiali.
His visis patent obiecta. Concedendae enim sunt rationes probantes, quod non est verum medium secundum rem.
Ad argumenta.
Ad 1. Quod obiicitur de generari et generatum esse, patet responsio ex dictis, quia generatio non est secundum totum, immo aliquid praeexigitur de generando, cuius est entelechia14 ipsa generatio natura praecedens ipsam formam, ac per hoc diversitatem notat. Non sic creatio, secundum quam fit tota rei substantia a virtute divina immediate, quae rem creat volendo eam primo esse, cum non sit.
Ad 2. Quod obiicitur, quod differt quod et quo; dicendum, quod illa non est differentia per essentiam, sed quodam modo differt, quodam modo convenit. — Vel dicendum, quod non est simile, quia creatio complectitur totam rei substantiam, quae constare dicitur ex quo est et quod est.
Ad 3. Quod obiicitur, quod transit; dicendum, quod non transit ratione eius quod significationi suae substernitur, sed solum ratione connotati; quod patet. Si enim creari est nunc primo esse, desinit creari non ratione eius quod ponit, sed ratione immediatae collationis ad nihilum.
Ad 4. Quod obiicitur, quod mutatio est via; dicendum, quod mutatio quae habet duo extrema15, illa est, quae necessario differt a termino, cuiusmodi est mutatio in esse; mutatio vero, quae habet tantum ultimum extremum ens, non potest dicere medium, sed necessario oportet, quod se teneat cum altero extremorum.
Ad 5. Quod obiicitur, quod omnis creatura creatur; dicendum, quod verum est de creatura proprie dicta; si autem large dicatur, non solum creatura dicitur quod creatur, sed quod concreatur et quod est creaturae annexum; et hoc modo est creatio. — Si ergo quaeritur, quomodo potest esse; dicendum, quod in primis est status, ut prius tactum fuit16. Unde sicut unitas, quae facit subiectum unum, non est una alia unitate, sic nec creatio, qua substantia exit in esse, per aliam creationem producitur sive concreatur.
I. Creatio activa secundum principale significatum manifeste est ipsa essentia Dei creatrix. Quid autem sit formaliter, vel utrum dici possit vera actio sive immanens sive transiens, an potius mera relatio rationis cum denominatione extrinseca, disputatur inter doctores. S. Bonav. (hic in corp. et hic q. 1 fundam. 2 et ad 1), sicut creationem passivam vult esse quandam mutationem et per consequens passionem, sic activam nominat actionem, tamen sine mutatione aliisque imperfectionibus, quae comitantur actiones creaturarum, ipsamque esse virtualiter sive quoad connotata transeuntem (q. 1 ad 1). Unde in Deo non importat nisi relationem secundum rationem. S. Thom. (S. I. q. 45. a. 3 in corp.) paulo aliter secundum sua principia, ad praeced. quaest. notata, resolvit dicens: «Subtracto motu ab actione et passione, nihil remanet nisi relatio quaedam ad Creatorem ut principium sui esse».
II. Creatio passiva secundum S. Bonaventuram duplicem importat relationem, scil. respectum ad non-esse, quae tantum est rationis, et respectum ad Creatorem (cfr. supra a. 1. q. 1. ad 6). Haec relatio omni creaturae est essentialis. Quid autem sit, et utrum idem cum suo fundamento sive cum ipsa creatura, an realiter ab ea distincta et aliquid ei superadditum; subtilibus disputationibus ventilatum est. Qui dicunt, ipsam esse quid realiter distinctum ab ipsa creatura, per consequens statuunt, eam esse aliquid medium, sed concreatum, inter Deum et creaturae essentiam. Ita Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2: «Alii probabilius dicunt, quod differt secundum rem, quia est accidens quoddam in creatura, et significat quandam rem, non quae sit in praedicamento passionis, proprie loquendo, sed quae est in genere relationis». De hoc diffuse disputat Scot. (hic q. 1; Report. hic q. 5, 6) et concludit, relationem creaturae ad Deum esse idem realiter cum suo fundamento, tamen formaliter distinctum. S. Thom. (hic q. 1. a. 2. ad 4; de Potent. q. 3. a. 3. ad 3) consentit Petro a Tar., docens, eam esse aliquid entitati creaturae superadditum ut accidens in praedicamento relationis. S. Bonav., media via incedens, in corp. tres distinguit relationes, quarum media hic locum habet. Haec ex una parte identificatur realiter cum creatura — et sic non est medium aliquod inter Deum et creaturam — ex altera parte formaliter distinguitur et relationem importat — et sic aliquo modo potest dici medium, si concreatum distinguitur a creato. — Notanda est etiam thesis a Gulielmo Episc. Paris. a. 1240 damnata: «Quod primum nunc et creatio-passio non sunt creator, vel creatura» (vide infra d. 23. in fine et Collectio iudic. pag. 186).
III. In fundam. 4 commemoratur quaedam propositio damnata in Concilio Senonensi. In nullo libro recentiore huius damnatae propositionis, quod scimus, mentio fit. Tamen Alex. Hal. (S. p. II. q. 9. m. 3), de eadem thesi dicit: «Pro damnata thesi haberetur, quod dicitur in libro Parisision [sic corrupte in editionibus Alexandri pro Periphyseon sive rectius Peri physeon], quod ideae erant medium inter Creatorem et creaturam». Iste liber est Ioan. Scoti Erigenae opus περὶ φύσεως (sive φυσέων) μερισμοῦ, vel de Divisione naturae (Patrolog. lat. Migne t. 122). Auctor eiusdem, quem editor Dr. Floss nomine Ierugena secundum codices vocandum esse censet, vixit plures annos in aula imperatoris Caroli Calvi. Ipse Neoplatonicos sequitur et in suo libro inter alios errores docet pantheismum, quem vocant immanentismum. Distinguit quadruplicem naturam: natura, quae creat et non creatur — quae creatur et creat — quae creatur et non creat — quae nec creat nec creatur. Secundam speciem naturae nominat causas primordiales sive ideas, quas ponit factas quidem esse, sed Deo coaeternas (III. n. 16, II. n. 20, 24) et se ipsis intelligentes (II. n. 18. 20; III. n. 1. seqq.). De eisdem pronuntiat illam propositionem a S. Bonav. notatam. Nam (III. n. 20, Patrolog. col. 683, cfr. ibid. n. 4 et n. 23) ait: «Deinde ex primordialibus causis, quae medietatem quandam inter Deum et creaturam obtinent, hoc est, inter illam ineffabilem superessentialitatem super omnem intellectum, et manifestam substantialiter naturam». Cum saec. 13 haeretici Almaricus et David de Dinanto ex dicto libro arma pro defendendis suis erroribus depromerent, a quodam Concilio provinciali Senonensi (circa a. 1224) opus Erigenae igni adiudicatum est; quae sententia confirmata est ab Honorio III. De isto Conc. Senonensi legitur in opere: Sacrorum Conciliorum nova et amplissima Collectio, Mansi, Venetiis, t. 22. col. 1211: «Concilii huius memoria unice (?) superest ex bulla Honorii III, qua liber a Ioanne Erigena scriptus, quoque Albigenses abutebantur, igni damnatur. — Honorius Episcopus servus serv. Dei Archiepiscopis et Episcopis etc. Inimicus homo zizania bono semini superseminare non cessat... Nuper siquidem, sicut nobis significavit venerabilis frater noster Parisiensis Episcopus, est quidam liber, Periphysis titulatus, inventus, tot scatens vermibus haereticae pravitatis, unde a vener. fratre nostro Archiepiscopo Senonensi et suffraganeis eius, in provinciali Concilio congregatis, iusto est Dei iudicio reprobatus» etc. Eandem bullam editor Dr. Floss in sua praefatione (loc. cit. col. 439 seq.) imprimendam curavit. — Sed iam antea alii Scoti Erigenae errores saepius reprobati erant, scil. errores, quos docet in libro de Praedestinatione, in synodo Valentina, a. 855 (in dicto opere Mansi, t. 15. 1. col. 1) et Lingonensi, a. 859 (ibid. col. 538); etiam errores circa Eucharistiam ipsi imputati et reprobati sunt in synodo Parisiensi, a. 1050 (ibid. t. 19. col. 782) et Vercellensi et Romana (ibid. col. 757).
IV. Praeter locos citatos: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 9. m. 2, 3. — B. Albert., S. p. I. tr. 13. q. 33. m. 2. q. incid. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 3, 4. — Aegid. R., hic q. 3. a. 2. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. 9. q. 3. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. in fine.
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Question II. Whether creation implies a medium between Creator and creature.
Second, the question is asked whether creation implies a medium between Creator and creature. And that it does, it seems:
1. As to be generated stands to to have been generated, and to come-to-be stands to to have been made, so to be created stands to to have been created; but to come-to-be is a medium between the maker and the thing made, and to be generated between the generator and the generated1: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, in all created beings «that which is and that by which it is2» differ, even formally: therefore likewise that by which it is created and that which is created differ. But that which is created is the creature; that by which it is created is formally the creation: therefore the creation differs from the creature, and similarly creation-as-passion differs from the Creator: therefore it is between the two.
3. Likewise, what passes away is not the same as what remains; but to be created for a thing is in an instant, and not beyond it: therefore since the being of the creature3 endures and remains after creation, then to be created and to be differ, and so creation differs from creature.
4. Likewise, every mutation is a way4, and every way differs from its terminus, because nothing is terminated at itself; if therefore creation is a mutation and has the creature for its terminus, then it differs from the creature as way from terminus. But way falls in the middle between its extremes: therefore etc.
5. Likewise, by reduction to impossibility: if creation is a creature, and every creature is created, therefore the creation is created; but everything that is created is created by means of a mediating creation: therefore the creation is created by another creation, and so on to infinity. If therefore one cannot proceed to infinity, the conclusion is plain5 etc.
On the contrary:
1. The Philosopher in the Book of Causes6: «The first of created things is being»; but nothing on the side of the creature is before being created: therefore to be created is nothing other than to be, and so creation is not other than essence: therefore there is no difference between creation and creature.
2. Likewise, between being from another and not from another there is no medium; but everything which is not from another is the Creator, and everything which is essentially from another is the creature: therefore between them there is no medium.
3. Likewise, it is shown by reduction to impossibility. The creature is referred to the Creator; either then by itself, or through another. If through another, the question is asked about that other, whether it is referred by itself or by another, and so proceeding to infinity. But if it is referred by itself — and it is referred through creation — then creation is nothing other than the creature.
4. Likewise, if creation is a medium between Creator and creature, then either eternal, or temporal7. If eternal, then something eternal is other than God; if temporal, then before every creature there is something temporal. Both of which are heretical to say and were reproved in the Council of Sens concerning the ideas, which were posited by some as media between God and things.
5. Likewise, this seems provable from proportion. For as the Creator stands to the creature, so creation-as-action stands to creation-as-passion: therefore, by alternation of proportion, as the Creator stands to active creation, so the creature stands to passive creation: but the Creator does not differ in reality from creation-as-action: therefore etc.
Conclusion.
Creation-as-action is a medium between Creator and creature only according to the reason understanding [it]; creation-as-passion is not other in reality from the creature, nor a medium between the creature and God according to essence, but [only] according to reason and relation.
I respond: It must be said that one may speak of creation-as-action and of creation-as-passion. If we speak of creation-as-action, then I say it is not a medium in reality but only according to the reason understanding [it], because God, being supremely simple, is his own action. But if we speak of creation-as-passion, then a distinction must be made8, because by the name creature one can signify and import everything which is from another, such that it has being after sheer non-being. And in this way the creation itself is included in the name of creature, because creature names not only the things created but also what is co-created [with them]; and so it is no medium, neither in reality nor in reason. In another way, creature names the very substance of the thing produced by someone from nothing; and in this way creation holds a middle place not in reality and nature, but in reason and relation.
That account [of "medium"] nevertheless does not say nothing; but it does not say anything which is essentially diverse from the creature, and this is plain as follows. For creation is said to be from nothing, and creation is likewise said to be from God; whence by the very account of its name it implies a relation of the thing to its preceding non-being and to its producing being9. For to be created does not principally signify to be, but to go out from non-being into being, and this from some [agent].
If then it be asked, what is the relation imported by the comparison to non-being, it must be said that this relation is called mutation. — And if you ask what that mutation is, I say it is nothing other than the thing itself. — And this is plain, because there is mutation toward being, and mutation from being, and mutation within being. Mutation toward being posits nothing except on the side of the terminus; mutation from being posits nothing except on the side of the principle; mutation within being posits something on the side of both; and therefore to be changed in the first mode is nothing other than to be now for the first time. Mutation in the second mode is nothing other than to be now for the last time; and therefore it does not posit anything other in reality10, but only according to intention. Mutation within being, however, has both extremes and a subject, which is prior in nature to its terminus. Therefore such a mutation can be something prior in nature to its terminus and diverse from it in reality, even though it is not yet a being complete in act. — And therefore creation is not a medium between Creator and creature in the way generation is between generator and generated. So, speaking of the comparison toward non-being, it implies11 a medium not diverse in essence, but only according to reason.
Likewise speaking of the comparison toward the Creator. For relation is threefold: one kind founded upon an accidental property — as some are called similar because both are white; another founded upon essential dependence — as the comparison of matter to form; another upon natural origin. The first relation adds something other in essence12; the third relation adds nothing other than purely
to be, as is plain in the divine [Persons]; the middle relation says something which is in one way the same and in another way other. — Creation says a relation in the middle mode, since the creature itself essentially and totally depends upon the Creator.
And so it must be granted that creation is not other in reality from the creature, nor a medium between the creature and God according to essence, but [only] according to reason and relation; whence to be created is prior in nature to to be, but not in duration13. Yet creation-as-action is more the same with the Creator than creation-as-passion is the same with the creature, because there [in the divine] there is no difference except according to our mode of understanding; here however there is a difference of reason and even of relation — which does not make a diversity in essence, because that relation is essential. The same is to be judged concerning essential unity, goodness, and truth.
Once these things are seen, the objections are plain. For the reasons proving that there is no true medium in reality are to be granted.
To the arguments.
To 1. What is objected from to be generated and to have been generated, the answer is plain from what was said: because generation is not according to the whole, but rather something is presupposed of what is generated, the entelechy14 of which is the generation itself, prior in nature to the form itself, and through this it marks diversity. It is not so with creation, according to which the whole substance of the thing comes about from the divine power immediately, which creates the thing by willing it first to be, when it was not.
To 2. What is objected, that quod ("that which") and quo ("that by which") differ; it must be said that this is not a difference in essence, but in one way they differ and in another way they agree. — Or it must be said that the cases are not alike, because creation embraces the whole substance of the thing, which is said to consist of that by which it is and that which is.
To 3. What is objected, that [creation] passes away; it must be said that it does not pass away by reason of what underlies its signification, but only by reason of what it connotes; which is plain. For if to be created is to be now for the first time, then to be created ceases not by reason of what it posits, but by reason of its immediate ordering toward nothing.
To 4. What is objected, that mutation is a way; it must be said that the mutation which has two extremes15 is the one which necessarily differs from its terminus — of which kind is mutation within being; but the mutation which has only its final extreme as being cannot imply a medium, but it must necessarily belong with one of the extremes.
To 5. What is objected, that every creature is created; it must be said that this is true of creature properly so called; but if it is said broadly, then creature names not only what is created but also what is co-created and what is annexed to the creature — and in this way creation [is creature]. — If therefore it is asked how this can be, it must be said that in the first things there is a stop, as has been touched earlier16. Hence as the unity which makes the subject one is not one by another unity, so neither is the creation by which the substance goes out into being produced or co-created by another creation.
I. Active creation, according to its principal signification, is plainly the very creative essence of God. What it is formally, however — or whether it can be called a true action, whether immanent or transient, or rather a mere relation of reason with an extrinsic denomination — is disputed among the doctors. St Bonaventure (here in the body and at q. 1, fundamentum 2 and ad 1), just as he holds passive creation to be a certain mutation and consequently a passion, so he names the active [creation] an action, yet without the mutation and other imperfections which accompany the actions of creatures; and [holds] it to be virtually or quoad connotata transient (q. 1 ad 1). Whence in God it imports only a relation of reason. St Thomas (Summa I, q. 45, a. 3, in corp.) resolves it a little differently according to his principles noted at the preceding question, saying: «With motion removed from action and passion, nothing remains but a certain relation to the Creator as the principle of one's being».
II. Passive creation, according to St Bonaventure, imports a twofold relation: namely the regard toward non-being, which is only a relation of reason, and the regard toward the Creator (cf. above a. 1, q. 1, ad 6). This relation is essential to every creature. What it is, however, and whether it is the same as its foundation — that is, as the creature itself — or really distinct from it and something superadded to it, has been thrashed out in subtle disputations. Those who say that it is something really distinct from the creature itself consequently hold that it is something medium, but co-created, between God and the essence of the creature. Thus Peter of Tarantasia, here q. 1, a. 2, quaestiuncula 2: «Others more probably say that it differs in reality, because it is a certain accident in the creature, and signifies a certain thing — not which is in the category of passion, properly speaking, but which is in the genus of relation». On this Scotus disputes at length (here q. 1; Reportata here q. 5, 6) and concludes that the relation of the creature to God is really identical with its foundation, yet formally distinct. St Thomas (here q. 1, a. 2, ad 4; de Potentia q. 3, a. 3, ad 3) agrees with Peter of Tarantasia, teaching that it is something superadded to the entity of the creature, as an accident in the category of relation. St Bonaventure, going down a middle road, distinguishes in the body three relations, of which the middle one has its place here. This on the one hand is really identified with the creature — and so is not a medium between God and creature — and on the other hand is formally distinguished and imports a relation — and so can in some way be called a medium, if what is co-created is distinguished from what is created. — Worth noting also is the thesis condemned by William, Bishop of Paris, in 1240: «That the first now and creation-as-passion are neither Creator nor creature» (see below at d. 23 in fine and Collectio iudic. p. 186).
III. In fundamentum 4 a certain proposition condemned at the Council of Sens is mentioned. In no more recent book that we know is this condemned proposition mentioned. Yet Alexander of Hales (Summa p. II, q. 9, m. 3) says of the same thesis: «It would be held a condemned thesis that which is said in the book Parisision [thus corruptly in the Alexander editions for Periphyseon, or more correctly Peri physeon], that the ideas were a medium between Creator and creature». This book is John Scotus Erigena's work On the Division of Nature (peri physeos merismou; Migne, Patrologia Latina t. 122). Its author, whom the editor Dr Floss thinks should be called Ierugena on the authority of the codices, lived many years at the court of the emperor Charles the Bald. He follows the Neoplatonists and in his book among other errors teaches pantheism, which they call immanentism. He distinguishes a fourfold nature: nature which creates and is not created — which is created and creates — which is created and does not create — which neither creates nor is created. The second species he names primordial causes or ideas, which he posits as made indeed, but co-eternal with God (III, n. 16; II, n. 20, 24) and as understanding by themselves (II, n. 18, 20; III, n. 1ff.). Of these he pronounces the proposition noted by St Bonaventure. For (III, n. 20, Patrologia col. 683, cf. ibid. n. 4 and n. 23) he says: «Then from the primordial causes, which obtain a certain middle position between God and creature — that is, between that ineffable super-essentiality above all understanding, and manifestly substantial nature». When in the 13th century the heretics Amaury and David of Dinant drew weapons from the said book for defending their errors, the work of Erigena was condemned to the fire by a provincial Council at Sens (around the year 1224); which sentence was confirmed by Honorius III. Of this Council of Sens it is read in the work Sacrorum Conciliorum nova et amplissima Collectio, Mansi, Venice, t. 22, col. 1211: «The memory of this Council survives uniquely (?) in the bull of Honorius III, by which the book written by John Erigena, which the Albigensians too were misusing, is condemned to the fire. — Honorius, Bishop, servant of the servants of God, to the Archbishops and Bishops etc. The enemy man does not cease to sow tares upon the good seed... Recently indeed, as our venerable brother the Bishop of Paris has signified to us, there has been found a certain book, entitled Periphysis, swarming with so many worms of heretical depravity, that by our venerable brother the Archbishop of Sens and his suffragans, gathered in a provincial Council, it has been condemned by the just judgment of God» etc. The same bull was caused to be printed by the editor Dr Floss in his preface (loc. cit. col. 439f.). — But already earlier other errors of Scotus Erigena had been often reproved — namely the errors which he teaches in the book On Predestination, at the synod of Valence in 855 (in the said work of Mansi, t. 15, 1, col. 1) and of Langres in 859 (ibid. col. 538); also errors concerning the Eucharist were imputed to him and reproved in the synod of Paris in 1050 (ibid. t. 19, col. 782) and at Vercelli and Rome (ibid. col. 757).
IV. Besides the places cited: Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 9, m. 2, 3. — Bl. Albert, Summa p. I, tr. 13, q. 33, m. 2, q. incid. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 3, 4. — Giles of Rome, here q. 3, a. 2. — Henry of Ghent, Quodl. 9, q. 3. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2 in fine.
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- Cod. cc et ed. 1 supplent hic sicut et paulo superius post factum verbum esse.Codex cc and ed. 1 supply sicut ("as") here and a little above, after factum, the verb esse ("to be").
- Secundum Boeth. et eius commentatorem Gilbert. Porret., cfr. tom. I. pag. 85, nota 7. — Aliquanto inferius pro ergo differt creatio Vat., contradicentibus mss. et ed. 1, habet ergo differt creatio-actio, qua lectione punctum comparationis aufertur.According to Boethius and his commentator Gilbert of Poitiers, cf. tom. I, p. 85, note 7. — A little below, for ergo differt creatio the Vatican ms., against the mss. and ed. 1, has ergo differt creatio-actio, by which reading the point of the comparison is taken away.
- Cod. F creatum.Codex F reads creatum ("created [thing]").
- Sub quo respectu Aristot., VI. Phys. text. 40 (c. 5.) ait: Quoniam autem omne quod mutatur, ex quodam in quoddam mutatur... Quod enim mutatur ab eo, ex quo mutatur, discedit aut relinquit ipsum. Cfr. II. Phys. text. 14 (c. 1.). — Cod. cc cum ed. 1 addit ad terminum.With which regard Aristotle, Physics VI, text 40 (c. 5), says: Since everything which is changed is changed from one thing into another... For what is changed departs or leaves that from which it is changed. Cf. Physics II, text 14 (c. 1). — Codex cc with ed. 1 adds ad terminum ("toward the terminus").
- Simile argumentum occurrit in Aristot., V. Phys. text. 13 (c. 2.), quo probatur, quod non possit esse generatio generationis neque mutatio mutationis.A similar argument occurs in Aristotle, Physics V, text 13 (c. 2), by which it is proved that there cannot be a generation of generation or a mutation of mutation.
- Liber de Causis, prop. 4. — Paulo inferius post ergo nec creatio supple cum Vat. et cod. aa aliud.Book of Causes, prop. 4. — A little below, after ergo nec creatio, supply with the Vatican ms. and codex aa the word aliud ("other").
- Plurimi codd. habent aut temporale quid. Si aeternum; nostra lectio invenitur in codd. I cc et edd. 1, 3, 4. Quoad Concilium Senonense, de quo paulo inferius loquitur S. Doctor, cfr. hic Scholion n. III.Most codices read aut temporale quid. Si aeternum ("or something temporal. If eternal"); our reading is found in codices I, cc and eds. 1, 3, 4. As to the Council of Sens, of which the Holy Doctor speaks a little below, cf. Scholion n. III here.
- In cod. A additur quando quaeritur, utrum creatio dicat medium inter Creatorem et creaturam.In codex A is added when the question is asked whether creation implies a medium between Creator and creature.
- Cod. cc et ed. 1 subiungunt: «quia creatio-passio dat esse creaturae cum negatione praeexistente; dicit enim, creaturam primo esse, ita quod creatura modo est et prius non fuit; unde pro illo instanti, pro quo dicitur creatura est modo et prius non fuit, potest dici, quod creatura creatur». Immediate post cod. F illa tamen non omnino nihil pro illa tamen ratio non nihil.Codex cc and ed. 1 add: «because creation-as-passion gives being to the creature with a preceding negation; for it says that the creature first is, so that the creature now is and earlier was not; whence for that instant in which it is said the creature now is and earlier was not, it can be said that the creature is created». Immediately after, codex F reads illa tamen non omnino nihil for illa tamen ratio non nihil.
- Intellige: et ad causam, quae suum esse producit. Vat. sola et ad suum producens. Mox codd. M U W de non-esse ad esse pro de non-esse in esse, quae lectio cum subnexis magis convenit.Understand: also to the cause which produces its being. The Vatican ms. alone reads et ad suum producens. Then codices M, U, W read de non-esse ad esse for de non-esse in esse, which latter reading agrees better with what follows.
- Codd. inter se dissentiunt; maior eorum pars habet aliquid aliud quam secundum rem esse, sed secundum etc.; cod. Q (cod. T a sec. manu) quam nunc ultimo secundum rem esse, ergo solum etc.; codd. F K brevius aliquid aliud secundum rem, quos sequimur. Forte legendum aliquid aliud quantum ad esse secundum rem.The codices disagree among themselves; the greater part has aliquid aliud quam secundum rem esse, sed secundum etc.; codex Q (codex T by a second hand) quam nunc ultimo secundum rem esse, ergo solum etc.; codices F, K more briefly aliquid aliud secundum rem, which we follow. Perhaps it should be read aliquid aliud quantum ad esse secundum rem.
- Cod. V creatio dicit.Codex V reads creatio dicit.
- Cod. F aliud ad esse, quia aliud est albedo, et aliud cui inhaeret per essentiam; Vat. aliud super essentiam. Paulo post aliqui codd. ut K aa quod pure est pro pure esse. — De triplici hac relatione cfr. I. Sent. d. 30. q. 3, ubi de tertia relatione dicitur: Tertia est in Deo, sed non respectu creaturae, sed respectu personae; haec enim non dicit compositionem nec dependentiae inclinationem, sicut prima et secunda, sed ponit distinctionem et ordinem. Et quoniam vere una persona ordinatur ad aliam etc.Codex F reads aliud ad esse, quia aliud est albedo, et aliud cui inhaeret per essentiam ("other in regard to being, because whiteness is one thing and that which it inheres in is another by essence"); the Vatican ms. aliud super essentiam. A little later some codices (K, aa) read quod pure est for pure esse. — On this threefold relation cf. I Sent. d. 30, q. 3, where of the third relation it is said: The third is in God, but not with respect to a creature, but with respect to a person; for this implies neither composition nor an inclination of dependence, like the first and second, but posits distinction and order. And since one person is truly ordered to another etc.
- Non pauci codd. cum ed. 1 unde non est prius natura creari quam esse, nec duratione; perperam. — Cfr. I. Sent. d. 30. q. 3 et dub. 4. — Dein plures codd. Similiter dicendum est.Not a few codices with ed. 1 read whence "to be created" is not prior in nature to "to be," nor in duration; wrongly. — Cf. I Sent. d. 30, q. 3 and dub. 4. — Then several codices [read] Similiter dicendum est ("Likewise it must be said").
- ἐντελέχεια in operibus Aristotelis significat perfectionem sive actum vel formam. Cod. F addendo explicat perfectio rei secundum actum et habitudinem.ἐντελέχεια (entelecheia) in the works of Aristotle means perfection or act or form. Codex F by addition explains it as the perfection of the thing according to act and relation.
- Vat. subiungit entia positiva, et paulo inferius unum extremum substituit pro ultimum extremum. — Hic, a. 1, q. 2, ad 2 et 3; I. Sent. d. 3, p. I, dub. 3. — Paulo inferius non pauci codd. non est unum pro non est una.The Vatican ms. adds entia positiva ("positive beings"), and a little below substitutes unum extremum for ultimum extremum. — Here at a. 1, q. 2, ad 2 and 3; I Sent. d. 3, p. I, dub. 3. — A little below not a few codices read non est unum for non est una. ---