Dist. 1, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 1
ARTICULUS I. De rerum distinctione.
QUAESTIO I. Utrum a primo efficiente debuerit, vel potuerit esse rerum multitudo.
Quaeritur ergo primo, utrum a primo efficiente debuerit, vel potuerit esse rerum multitudo. Et quod non, videtur primo sic:
1. Per Philosophum1: «Idem, uniformiter se habens, natum est efficere idem»; sed efficiens primum unum est omnino uniformiter se habens: ergo videtur, quod nunquam2 multa facere potuerit, ergo unum solum.
2. Item, a summe bono nunquam possunt esse mala, a summe vero non possunt esse falsa: ergo a summe uno non possunt esse multa.
3. Item, mundus sensibilis dicitur assimilari mundo archetypo, qui est in mente divina — ad illius enim expressionem factus est — sed in illo omnia sunt unum: ergo et in hoc mundo: ergo videtur, quod ab illo non potuerit esse multitudo3.
4. Item, a Deo exitus est per generationem, per spirationem et per creationem; sed per generationem non emanat nisi una sola persona, et similiter per spirationem: ergo per creationem non egreditur nisi una sola creatura.
Contra:
1. Quanto substantia producens est melior, tanto magis est sui diffusiva4, et quanto magis est sui diffusiva, tanto pluribus nata est se communicare; sed primum efficiens est optimum inter omnia: ergo etc.
2. Item, quanto substantia spiritualior, tanto plurium est cognitiva5; sed suprema substantia est spiritualissima: ergo multorum est cognitiva. Sed non est cognitiva multorum praecedentium se vel comitantium: ergo multorum ab ipsa exeuntium.
3. Item, quanto substantia simplicior, tanto potentior, quia «virtus quanto magis unita, tanto magis infinita6»; sed quanto potentior, tanto in plura potest: ergo si substantia primi principii est simplicissima, ergo potest et debet ad sui manifestationem producere multa, cum ipsa sit unica.
4. Item, quanto causa prior, tanto universalior, unde prima est universalissima7; et quanto universalior, tanto plurium principium: ergo cum principium productivum universi sit simpliciter primum, debuit ergo et potuit exire ab ipso multitudo rerum.
Conclusio. Multitudo rerum est a principio uno, quia est principium et primum et unice unum.
Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam notandum est, quod si de principio intrinseco quaeratur, unde veniat multitudo rerum, maxime secundum speciem, patet, quod a forma. Sed unde veniat multitudo formarum tanquam a principio effectivo
extrinseco, patet, quod ab efficiente uno. — Sed qualiter potest venire multitudo a principio summe et perfectissime uno, difficile est intelligere. Et aliqui circa hoc erraverunt.
Quidam enim dixerunt, quod quamvis unus esset rerum Conditor, tamen multa et varia facit propter multitudinem formarum idealium. — Sed illud improbatum est in primo libro8, ubi ostenditur, quod omnes illae unum sunt; nec est in Deo secundum rem alius numerus quam personarum.
Aliqui vero dicere voluerunt, quod hoc erat propter multitudinem mediorum. Deus enim, cum sit unus et summe simplex, intellexit se; et se intelligendo et nihil aliud, produxit primam Intelligentiam; et illa Intelligentia intellexit se et Deum, et ideo produxit duo, scilicet aliam Intelligentiam et orbem suum; et sic descendendo et multiplicando9. — Et ista opinio in lectione praecedenti est improbata, ubi ostenditur, quod Deus immediate producit omnia.
Tertii dixerunt, quod multitudo rerum erat a principio unico propter multitudinem et infinitatem reflexionum quibus divinus intellectus supra se reflectitur et intelligit se, et intelligit se intelligere; et sic usque in infinitum. — Sed illud nihil est. Primum, quia falsum est, quod in Deo sit multitudo reflexionum, cum Deus sit suum intelligere10. Item, ex hoc nunquam proveniret nisi diversitas secundum numerum.
Et ideo est positio recta, quod multitudo in rebus est a principio uno, quia est primum principium et unice unum. Quia enim est principium simpliciter primum, ideo fecundum et potens est fecunditate infinita et immensa. Si enim unitas, quae est prima in genere numeri, est principium, a quo possunt infiniti numeri egredi, et punctus, a quo infinitae lineae; quod est simpliciter primum est ita potens, quod omnino immensum11. Propter ergo immensitatem infinita potest, sed propter immensitatis manifestationem multa de suis thesauris profert, non omnia, quia effectus non potest aequari virtuti ipsius primae causae. — Quia vero unice unum, ideo simplicissimum et spiritualissimum et perfectissimum: quia simplicissimum, maximae potentiae; quia spiritualissimum, maximae sapientiae; quia perfectissimum est, bonitatis summae; quia maximae potentiae, multa potest; quia maximae sapientiae, multa novit; quia summae bonitatis, multa vult producere et se communicare. — Et ideo a principio uno, quia primum et unum, exit12 multitudo.
1. Quod ergo obiicitur, quod idem similiter se habens etc.; dicendum, quod intelligitur in his agentibus, quorum virtus est arctata et limitata; et hoc non habet locum in Deo13.
2. Quod obiicitur, quod a bono non sunt mala; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia mala et falsa dicunt14 privationes et defectus, et ideo non habent causam efficientem, sed deficientem, qualem non decet esse Deum; sed multitudo est positio, et ideo causam habet effectivam.
3. Quod obiicitur de archetypo et sensibili mundo, dicendum, quod iste imitatur illum in quantum potest, sed deficit. In illo enim est summa pulcritudo per omnimodam unitatem; hic autem, si esset unitas, non esset pulcritudo, quia non esset ordo nec perfectio. Et ideo, ut mundus hic imitaretur15 in perfectione et pulcritudine, oportuit, quod haberet multitudinem, ut multa facerent quod unum facere per se non posset.
4. Quod ultimo obiicitur de generatione et spiratione, iam patet: quia genitus aequalis generanti per omnia implet et imitatur ipsum, similiter et Spiritus sanctus; et ideo superflueret aliam ponere personam16. Sed non sic est in creatura, quae est bonitatis finitae; ideo quod non potuit capere creatura in se, accepit quodam modo in sibi socia, ut sic ex multis una perficeretur mundialis machina.
I. Haec quaestio cohaeret cum iis quae supra (p. I. a. 2. q. 1. 2.) disputata sunt, et militat contra multos philosophos Arabes. Ad rem Scotus (de Rerum princip. q. 2. a. 1. n. 7.): «Avicenna veritati catholicae videtur maxime contrarius esse. Nam IX. Metaphysicae suae c. 4. vult, quod a primo principio non possunt esse plura, nec secundum numerum, nec secundum divisionem». Huc spectant plures articuli condemnati Parisiis a. 1276 (cap. 6. de Deo, ut n. 15. 16; Collect. iudic. p. 189).
II. Contra istos errores diffuse disputant Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 11. m. 1. 2. — Scot., loc. cit., et IV. Sent. d. 1. q. 1. n. 16. — S. Thom., S. 1. q. 47. a. 1. 2; S. c. Gent. II. c. 43, III. c. 97; de Potent. q. 3. a. 16. — B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. I. q. 3. m. 3. a. 1. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic p. I. q. 3. a. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.
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ARTICLE I. On the distinction of things.
QUESTION I. Whether from the first efficient [cause] there ought, or could, have been a multitude of things.
It is asked therefore first, whether from the first efficient [cause] there ought, or could, have been a multitude of things. And that there could not, it seems first thus:
1. Through the Philosopher1: «The same thing, behaving uniformly, is of its nature apt to produce the same effect»; but the first efficient [cause], being one, behaves altogether uniformly: therefore it seems that it could never2 have made many things, therefore one only.
2. Likewise, from the supremely good evils can never come; from the supremely true, falsities cannot come: therefore from the supremely one, a multitude cannot come.
3. Likewise, the sensible world is said to be likened to the archetypal world, which is in the divine mind — for it was made unto the expression of that world — but in that [world] all things are one: therefore also in this world: therefore it seems that from it there could not have been a multitude3.
4. Likewise, from God there is a going-out by generation, by spiration, and by creation; but by generation only a single Person emanates, and likewise by spiration: therefore by creation only a single creature goes forth.
On the contrary:
1. The better a producing substance is, the more it is diffusive of itself4, and the more it is diffusive of itself, the more things it is of its nature apt to communicate itself to; but the first efficient [cause] is the best among all things: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, the more spiritual a substance is, the more things it is cognizant of5; but the supreme substance is the most spiritual: therefore it is cognizant of many things. But it is not cognizant of many things preceding it or accompanying it: therefore of many things going out from it.
3. Likewise, the simpler a substance is, the more powerful, because «a power, the more it is united, the more it is infinite6»; but the more powerful, the more it can do as to many things: therefore if the substance of the first principle is the simplest, then it can and ought, for the manifestation of itself, to produce many things, since it is itself unique.
4. Likewise, the prior a cause is, the more universal, whence the first is the most universal7; and the more universal, the principle of more things: therefore since the principle productive of the universe is simply first, it ought therefore and was able to bring forth from itself a multitude of things.
Conclusion. The multitude of things is from one principle, because it is a principle both first and uniquely one.
I respond: For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that, if it be asked concerning the intrinsic principle, whence comes the multitude of things — especially according to species — it is plain that [it comes] from form. But whence comes the multitude of forms, as from an effective principle
extrinsic [to the things], it is plain that [it comes] from the one efficient [cause]. — But how a multitude can come from a principle supremely and most perfectly one is difficult to understand. And some have erred concerning this.
For certain men said that, although the Founder of things was one, nevertheless he makes many and varied things on account of the multitude of ideal forms. — But that was disproved in the first book8, where it is shown that all those [forms] are one; nor is there in God, according to reality, any number other than [that] of the Persons.
But some wished to say that this was on account of the multitude of intermediaries. For God, since he is one and supremely simple, understood himself; and understanding himself and nothing else, he produced the first Intelligence; and that Intelligence understood itself and God, and therefore produced two, namely another Intelligence and its own sphere; and so descending and multiplying9. — And this opinion was disproved in the preceding lecture, where it is shown that God produces all things immediately.
A third group said that the multitude of things was from a single principle on account of the multitude and infinity of reflections by which the divine intellect reflects upon itself and understands itself, and understands itself to understand; and so on to infinity. — But that is nothing. First, because it is false that in God there is a multitude of reflections, since God is his own act of understanding10. Likewise, from this there would never come anything but a diversity according to number.
And therefore the correct position is that the multitude in things is from one principle, because it is the first principle and uniquely one. For since it is the principle simply first, therefore it is fecund and powerful with an infinite and immense fecundity. For if unity, which is first in the genus of number, is a principle from which infinite numbers can go forth, and the point, from which infinite lines [go forth]; that which is simply first is so powerful that it is altogether immense11. On account, therefore, of its immensity it can [do] infinite things, but on account of the manifestation of its immensity it brings forth many things from its treasures, not all, because the effect cannot be equalled to the power of the first cause itself. — But because it is uniquely one, therefore it is the simplest and most spiritual and most perfect: because the simplest, of the greatest power; because the most spiritual, of the greatest wisdom; because it is the most perfect, of the highest goodness; because of the greatest power, it can [do] many things; because of the greatest wisdom, it knows many things; because of the highest goodness, it wills to produce many things and to communicate itself. — And therefore from one principle, because first and one, a multitude goes out12.
1. As to the objection that the same thing behaving in like manner etc.; it must be said that this is understood of those agents whose power is constrained and limited; and this has no place in God13.
2. As to the objection that from the good there are no evils; it must be said that there is no parallel, because evils and falsities denote14 privations and defects, and therefore have no efficient cause, but a deficient one, such as it does not befit God to be; but a multitude is a position [a positive thing], and therefore has an effective cause.
3. As to the objection concerning the archetypal and the sensible world, it must be said that this [world] imitates that one insofar as it can, but falls short. For in that [world] there is the highest beauty through unity in every mode; here, however, if there were unity, there would not be beauty, because there would be neither order nor perfection. And therefore, that this world might imitate15 [it] in perfection and beauty, it was necessary that it should have a multitude, so that many things might do what one could not do by itself.
4. As to the last objection concerning generation and spiration, it is now plain: because the begotten, equal to the begetter, fulfils and imitates him in all things, and likewise the Holy Spirit; and therefore it would be superfluous to posit another Person16. But it is not so in the creature, which is of finite goodness; therefore what the creature could not contain in itself, it received in a way in a fellow given to it, so that thus from many things one world-machine might be perfected.
I. This question coheres with the things which were disputed above (p. I, a. 2, q. 1, 2), and it militates against many Arab philosophers. To the point Scotus (On the Principle of Things q. 2, a. 1, n. 7): «Avicenna seems most contrary to Catholic truth. For in book IX of his Metaphysics, c. 4, he holds that from the first principle there cannot be many things, neither according to number nor according to division». Hither belong several articles condemned at Paris in 1276 (cap. 6, on God, as nn. 15, 16; Collectio iudiciorum p. 189).
II. Against these errors there dispute at length: Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 11, m. 1, 2. — Scotus, loc. cit., and IV Sent. d. 1, q. 1, n. 16. — St Thomas, Summa I, q. 47, a. 1, 2; Summa contra Gentiles II, c. 43, III, c. 97; De Potentia q. 3, a. 16. — Bl. Albert, Summa p. II, tr. I, q. 3, m. 3, a. 1, 2. — Peter of Tarantasia, here q. 2, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 4, q. 2. — Giles of Rome, here p. I, q. 3, a. 3. — Denis the Carthusian, here q. 3.
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- Libr. II. de Gener. et Corrupt. text. 56. (c. 10.).Book II On Generation and Corruption, text 56 (c. 10).
- Aliqui codd. ut aa bb nunquam.Some codices, as aa and bb, read nunquam ("never").
- Plato, in Timaeo ait: Unus (mundus) profecto est: siquidem factus sit ad exemplum... Ut autem hic mundus esset animanti absoluto simillimus, hoc ipso quod solus atque unus esset, idcirco non duos vel infinitos mundos, sed singularem et unigenum mundum Deus procreavit, qui quidem et est et erit (ed. Serrani, tom. III. pag. 31).Plato, in the Timaeus, says: There is assuredly one world: seeing that it was made unto an exemplar... But in order that this world might be most like to the absolute living being, for this very reason — that it should be alone and one — God did not make two or infinite worlds, but a singular and only-begotten world, which indeed both is and will be (ed. Serranus, tom. III, p. 31).
- Hoc argumentum fundatur in illa Dionysii propositione: Bonum est diffusivum sui; de qua cfr. tom. I. pag. 804, nota 6.This argument is founded on that proposition of Dionysius: The good is diffusive of itself; on which cf. tom. I, p. 804, note 6.
- Cfr. Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 3. seqq. (c. 4.) et Liber de Causis, prop. 10.Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul III, text 3ff. (c. 4), and the Book of Causes, prop. 10.
- Liber de Causis, prop. 17.The Book of Causes, prop. 17.
- Vide Libr. de Causis, prop. 1, de qua cfr. tom. I. pag. 171, nota 3.See the Book of Causes, prop. 1, on which cf. tom. I, p. 171, note 3.
- Dist. 35. q. 2, ubi etiam haec positio fusius explicatur.[I Sent.] d. 35, q. 2, where this position is also more fully explained.
- Hic p. I. a. 2. q. 2. — Paulo superius codd. U bb est multitudo, cod. N et intelligendo est multitudo, cod. 1 processit multiplicando pro et multiplicando, cui cod. cc et ed. 1 addunt ista. Paulo inferius cod. bb produxit omnia pro producit omnia.Here, p. I, a. 2, q. 2. — A little above, codices U, bb read est multitudo; codex N et intelligendo est multitudo; codex 1 processit multiplicando for et multiplicando, to which codex cc and ed. 1 add ista. A little below, codex bb reads produxit omnia for producit omnia.
- Ed. 3 prosequitur: cum ratio vel causa ex parte Dei redditur ex parte creaturae, et haec est manifestatio divinae bonitatis in suo opere, quod Deus sit suum intelligere.Ed. 3 continues: since the ground or cause on the side of God is rendered on the side of the creature, and this is the manifestation of the divine goodness in his work — that God is his own act of understanding.
- Cfr. I. Sent. d. 27. p. I. q. 2. ad 3. Pro sequentibus vide ibid. d. 42. q. 1, et d. 43. q. 1. seqq.Cf. I Sent. d. 27, p. I, q. 2, ad 3. For what follows see ibid. d. 42, q. 1, and d. 43, q. 1ff.
- Plures codd. cum Vat. exiit.Several codices, with the Vatican ms., read exiit ("went out", perfect).
- Cod. F in primo agente.Codex F reads in primo agente ("in the first agent") [for in Deo].
- Multi codd. cum ed. 1 dicuntur. — Plura de hac solutione habentur infra d. 34. a. 1. q. 1. seqq.Many codices, with ed. 1, read dicuntur ("are said [to be]"). — More on this solution is had below, d. 34, a. 1, q. 1ff.
- Cfr. August., 83 Qq. q. 41. et XII. de Civ. Dei, c. 12. — Paulo superius post imitaretur codd. A Y aa interserunt illum.Cf. Augustine, 83 Questions q. 41, and On the City of God XII, c. 12. — A little above, after imitaretur codices A, Y, aa insert illum.
- Vide I. Sent. d. 2. q. 3. seq., et d. 7. q. 2.See I Sent. d. 2, q. 3f., and d. 7, q. 2. ---