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Dist. 1, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 1

Textus Latinus
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QUAESTIO II. Utrum rerum universitas triplici differentia distinguatur, scilicet substantia spirituali, corporali et ex utraque composita.

Secundo quaeritur circa hoc de differentiis, secundum quas res multiplicatae sunt, quas Magister ponit in littera1, scilicet substantiam spiritualem et corporalem et ex utraque compositam. Quaeritur ergo, utrum haec distinctio debeat esse in universo. Et videtur, quod non:

1. Primo de corporali. Nam, sicut tactum est2, omne quod Deus facit, facit salva ordinatione, ergo propter suam bonitatem, sed non facit propter bonitatem suam augendam, sed participandam: sed sola creatura spiritualis «Dei capax est et eius particeps esse potest3»: ergo solam spiritualem debuit facere, non corporalem. Si tu dicas, quod corporalis est particeps in effectu, quamvis non in se; hoc nihil est, quia aliquid participare bonitatem divinam in effectu, non est aliud quam esse — hoc enim ipso quod est, participat effectum bonitatis — ergo idem est dicere, creaturam esse factam propter participationem divinae bonitatis, quod dicere, creaturam esse factam, ut sit; sed hoc nihil est: ergo etc.

2. Item, de composito videtur. Omne enim compositum, quod Deus facit, facit salva proportione — semper enim formam coniungit materiae summe proportionabili4 — sed creaturae spiritualis ad corporalem nulla aut valde modica et longinqua est proportio: ergo nullo modo deberet Deus haec unire ut perfectionem perfectibili. Quod non sit proportio, patet: spirituale enim est simplex, corporale habet partium infinitatem.

3. Item, corporale est corruptibile, et ita habet durationem finitam, spirituale autem incorruptibile, et ita habet durationem infinitam; si ergo «finiti ad infinitum nulla est proportio5», patet etc. Si tu dicas, quod corpus fuit incorruptibile a conditione prima: tunc ergo saltem, postquam corruptibile fuit, debet cessare unio.

4. Item, de pure spirituali videtur. Omne quod Deus facit, debet facere salva connexione naturarum; sed natura generis essentialiter est connexa differentiae: ergo si animatum et sensibile est connexum rationali, ergo impossibile est, quod aliquid fiat habens rationem, quin habeat vegetationem et sensum, sive quin sit animal. Sed animal est substantia composita ex spirituali et corporali: ergo etc. Et hoc videtur dicere Philosophus6, «quod vegetativum est in sensitivo, sicut trigonum in tetragono», et hoc in rationali, sicut tetragonum in pentagono; sed nunquam Deus facit tetragonum sine trigono, nec pentagonum sine tetragono et trigono: ergo etc.

5. Item, nihil facit Deus nisi ex magna dilectione7, ergo quod melius est naturae unicuique. Aut ergo naturae spirituali melius est esse separatum, aut melius est esse coniunctum: quocumque dato, altera differentia tollitur.

Sed contra:

1. Decuit Deum ita res facere, ut essent in manifestationem suae potentiae; sed potentia manifestatur in productione rerum multum distantium et in earum coniunctione — nam potentia tanto virtuosior ostenditur, quanto potest super magis distantia — sed prima et summa distantia substantiarum est inter corporeum et incorporeum, quia primae differentiae generis8 sunt: ergo ad hoc, quod divina potentia manifestetur plene, necesse fuit substantiam spiritualem et corporalem producere, rursus productas unire.

2. Item, decuit Deum sic res producere, ut manifestaretur eius sapientia; sed sapientia artificis manifestatur in ordinis perfectione, omnis autem ordo habet de necessitate infimum et summum et medium. Si ergo infimum est natura pure corporalis, summum natura spiritualis, medium composita ex utraque; nisi haec omnia fecisset, non ostenderetur perfecte Dei sapientia: oportuit igitur haec omnia fieri. Unde Augustinus duodecimo Confessionum9: «Duo fecisti Domine, unum prope te et aliud prope nihil».

3. Item, Deum decuit sic res producere, ut manifestaretur eius bonitas; sed bonitas consistit in diffusione et communicatione sui in alterum: si ergo sua bonitas consistit in communicatione actus nobilissimi, qui est vivere et intelligere, decuit, ut non tantum daret alii potentiam vivendi et intelligendi, sed etiam potentiam alii10 communicandi. Si

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ergo vivens et intelligens est substantia spiritualis, quod autem vivificatur et per intellectum perficitur est corpus: ergo ad perfectam bonitatis manifestationem necesse fuit, fieri substantiam spiritualem et corporalem. Sed hoc non perfecte manifestarent11, nisi una alteri communicaret, et hoc non potest esse nisi per unionem: ergo necesse fuit facere compositam ex utraque.

4. Item, hoc non solum videtur ratione theologica, sed etiam philosophica: quia si est ponere unam differentiam contrarietatis, et alteram12: si ergo corporale, et spirituale; et si ponere est extrema componibilia, ergo et medium: ergo etc.

Conclusio. Triplex illud genus substantiae requiritur propter triplicem perfectionem universi.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod ad perfectionem universi hoc triplex genus substantiae13 requiritur: et hoc propter triplicem perfectionem universi, quae attenditur in amplitudine ambitus, sufficientia ordinis, influentia bonitatis, in quibus tribus exprimit in causa triplicem perfectionem, videlicet potentiae, sapientiae et bonitatis. Unde concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc inductae.

1. Ad oppositas respondendum est. Quod obiicitur, quod in operibus salva debet esse ordinatio, ut omnia fiant propter divinam bonitatem participandam; dicendum, quod fieri propter divinam bonitatem est dupliciter: aut ostendendam, et sic facta sunt cuncta14; omnia enim exprimunt divinam bonitatem; aut participandam, et hoc dupliciter: aut quia sunt nata participare, aut quia serviunt participantibus. Primo modo conditae sunt creaturae spirituales, secundo modo corporales; ipsae tamen aliquo modo participant; sed in earum participatione status non est, sed ordinantur ad ulteriorem.

2. 3. Quod obiicitur, quod in omni coniunctione debet esse salva proportio; dicendum est, quod in coniunctione animae ad corpus salva est proportio, et absolute, et in relatione ad finem: absolute; nam quamvis supremum spiritus15 et infimum corporis multam habeant elongationem, tamen supremum corporis et infimum spiritus summam habent vicinitatem. Spiritus enim animalis sive rationalis habet potentiam vivificandi, potentiam vegetandi et sentiendi; corpus autem humanum habet complexionis aequalitatem, habet organorum multiplicitatem, habet rursus spirituum subtilitatem, et16 secundum triplicem differentiam: habet enim spiritum vitalem, spiritum naturalem et spiritum animalem. Comparando igitur complexionem aequalem ad vim vivificativam per medium et vinculum spiritus vitalis, optimus est nexus. Similiter comparando non solum complexionis aequalitatem, sed et organizationem17 et organizationis perfectionem ad vim vegetandi et sentiendi mediante spiritu naturali et animali, optima est proportio et mirabilis nexus. Unde sicut terra et ignis, quae multum distant, nectuntur duplici medio: uno, quod magis communicat cum terra, et reliquo, quod magis cum igne18; similiter est in proposito.

Attenditur etiam perfecta proportio in relatione ad finem. Cum enim animae humanae data sit libertas arbitrii vertibilis et revertibilis, id est potens stare et cadere et resurgere; datum est ei corpus potens mori, et potens non mori, et deinde potens in sempiternum vivificari. Rursus, cum anima creata sit «veluti tabula rasa19», datum est ei corpus habens organa multiplicia, ut in illo posset perfici scientiis. — Similiter ex parte corporis optima proportio est in relatione ad finem. Cum enim sit ordo in formis corporalibus — quod patet, quia forma elementi20 ad formam mixti, et forma mixtionis ad formam complexionis, et rursus vegetabilis ad sensibilem — et non sit status in re corporali et imperfecta; non est status ibi, sed ultimo disponunt huiusmodi formae ad animam rationalem, per quam etiam corpus et natura corporalis efficitur particeps aeternae beatitudinis. Aut ergo omnis intentio naturae corporalis solvitur, aut necesse est pervenire mediante anima rationali in ultimum finem.

4. Quod obiicitur, quod in opere Dei debet salvari naturarum colligatio; dicendum, quod verum

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est: sed sensibile et vegetabile non sunt de necessitate rationalis, nisi quod est rationale per unionem. Anima enim, ut prius tactum est21, cum sit spiritus simplex et purus, non potest uniri carni nisi duplici medio ex parte sui; similiter nec corpus complexionatum. Et ideo necesse est, quod interveniat natura vivificandi sive vegetandi, et natura ulterius sentiendi; et ideo in omni homine haec cadunt. Sed quia Angelus est spiritus purus, ideo istis non indiget. — Patet igitur, quod contra veritatem et fidem errant Sadducaei, qui negant, esse spiritum22. Patet nihilominus, quod errant Manichaei, qui negant, animam uniri corpori ut perfectibili, sed ut carceri.

5. Quod obiicitur ultimo, quod Deus dat unicuique quod melius est; dicendum, quod Deus non dat unicuique quod simpliciter melius, quia tunc non faceret res ordinatas, sed aequaliter perfectas; et hoc repugnaret perfectioni, «quia, si essent aequalia, non essent omnia», ut dicit Augustinus23. Cum ergo dicitur, quod Deus dat unicuique quod sibi melius est, hoc intelligitur secundum exigentiam ordinis et naturae. Naturae autem animae competit uniri corpori, naturae autem angelicae, separatam esse a corpore. Et ideo illa ratio non valet, quia dilectio Dei non excludit ordinem.

Scholion

Definitum est a Concilio Later. IV. c. Firmiter, et iisdem verbis a Conc. Vatic. de Fide c. 1.: quod Deus «simul ab initio temporis utramque de nihilo condidit creaturam, spiritualem et corporalem, angelicam videlicet et mundanam, ac deinde humanam quasi communem ex spiritu et corpore constitutam». Rationes praeclaras et profundas, quibus Seraphicus conclusionem confirmat, esse potius magnae congruentiae quam stricte demonstrativas, verbum decuit in fundam. satis indicat. Cfr. Breviloq. p. II. c. 6. — Hanc quaestionem ab aliis non invenimus explicite tractatam. Tangitur tamen a pluribus in quaestione, utrum conveniens sit, animam uniri corpori, ut a Dionysio Carth., hic q. 9, vel in quaest. de existentia Angelorum sive in genere intellectualium creaturarum, ut a S. Thom., S. c. Gent. c. 46. et 91. Cfr. etiam Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 11. m. 2, q. 18. m. 3; et B. Albert., II. Sent. d. 3. a. 1.

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English Translation

QUESTION II. Whether the universe of things is distinguished by a threefold difference, namely by spiritual substance, by corporeal, and by [that] composed of both.

Secondly, it is asked concerning this, about the differences according to which things have been multiplied, which the Master sets down in the littera1 — namely spiritual substance, and corporeal, and [that] composed of both. It is asked therefore whether this distinction ought to be in the universe. And it seems that it ought not:

1. First, concerning the corporeal. For, as has been touched on2, everything that God makes, he makes with order preserved, therefore on account of his goodness; but he does not make [it] in order that his goodness be increased, but [in order that it be] shared: but only the spiritual creature «is capable of God and can be a partaker of him3»: therefore he ought to have made only the spiritual [creature], not the corporeal. If you say that the corporeal is a partaker in effect, although not in itself; this is nothing, because for something to partake of the divine goodness in effect is nothing other than to be — for by this very fact that it is, it partakes of the effect of [his] goodness — therefore it is the same to say that a creature was made for the partaking of the divine goodness as to say that a creature was made in order that it might be; but this is nothing: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, it seems so concerning the composite. For every composite that God makes, he makes with proportion preserved — for he always joins form to a matter supremely proportionable4 [to it] — but of the spiritual creature to the corporeal there is no proportion, or a very slight and remote one: therefore in no way ought God to unite these as a perfection to a perfectible thing. That there is no proportion is plain: for the spiritual is simple, the corporeal has an infinity of parts.

3. Likewise, the corporeal is corruptible, and so has a finite duration, but the spiritual is incorruptible, and so has an infinite duration; if therefore «of the finite to the infinite there is no proportion5», it is plain etc. If you say that the body was incorruptible from its first condition: then at least, after it became corruptible, the union ought to cease.

4. Likewise, it seems so concerning the purely spiritual. Everything that God makes, he ought to make with the connection of natures preserved; but the nature of a genus is essentially connected to [its] difference: therefore if the animate and the sensible is connected to the rational, then it is impossible that anything be made having reason without its having vegetation and sense, that is, without its being an animal. But an animal is a substance composed of the spiritual and the corporeal: therefore etc. And the Philosopher seems to say this6, «that the vegetative is in the sensitive, as the triangle in the quadrilateral», and this [holds] in the rational, as the quadrilateral in the pentagon; but God never makes a quadrilateral without a triangle, nor a pentagon without a quadrilateral and a triangle: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, God makes nothing except out of great love7, therefore [he makes for] each [nature] what is better for it. Either, then, it is better for the spiritual nature to be separate, or it is better to be conjoined: on whichever supposition, the other difference is taken away.

On the contrary:

1. It was fitting for God so to make things that they should be unto the manifestation of his power; but power is manifested in the production of things greatly distant and in their conjunction — for a power is shown the more powerful, the more it can [reach] over things more distant — but the first and greatest distance of substances is between the corporeal and the incorporeal, because they are the primary differences of the genus8: therefore, in order that the divine power be fully manifested, it was necessary to produce spiritual and corporeal substance, and again to unite the ones produced.

2. Likewise, it was fitting for God so to produce things that his wisdom might be manifested; but the wisdom of a craftsman is manifested in the perfection of order, and every order has of necessity a lowest and a highest and a middle. If, then, the lowest is the purely corporeal nature, the highest the spiritual nature, the middle [that] composed of both; unless he had made all these, the wisdom of God would not be perfectly shown: it was therefore fitting that all these be made. Whence Augustine, in the twelfth book of the Confessions9: «Two things hast thou made, O Lord, one near to thee and the other near to nothing».

3. Likewise, it was fitting for God so to produce things that his goodness might be manifested; but goodness consists in the diffusion and communication of itself to another: if therefore his goodness consists in the communication of the noblest act, which is to live and to understand, it was fitting that he should give to another not only the power of living and understanding, but also the power of communicating to another10. If

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therefore the living and understanding [thing] is spiritual substance, and that which is vivified and perfected through intellect is body: therefore for the perfect manifestation of goodness it was necessary that spiritual and corporeal substance be made. But these would not manifest [it] perfectly11, unless the one communicated to the other, and this cannot be except through union: therefore it was necessary to make [a substance] composed of both.

4. Likewise, this seems [so] not only by a theological reason, but also by a philosophical one: because if one is to posit one difference of contrariety, [one must posit] also the other12: if therefore the corporeal, then also the spiritual; and if the extremes that can be composed are to be posited, then also the middle: therefore etc.

Conclusion. That threefold kind of substance is required on account of the threefold perfection of the universe.

I respond: It must be said that for the perfection of the universe this threefold kind of substance13 is required: and this on account of the threefold perfection of the universe, which is regarded in the amplitude of its compass, the sufficiency of its order, the inflowing of [its] goodness — in which three it expresses in [its] cause a threefold perfection, namely of power, of wisdom, and of goodness. Whence the reasons adduced to this [conclusion] are to be conceded.

1. To the opposing [arguments] it must be replied. As to the objection that in [God's] works order ought to be preserved, so that all things come to be for the divine goodness to be shared; it must be said that to be made for the divine goodness is twofold: either [for it] to be shown, and in this way all things were made14; for all things express the divine goodness; or [for it] to be shared, and this in two ways: either because they are of a nature to partake, or because they serve those that partake. In the first way the spiritual creatures were founded, in the second way the corporeal; yet these too partake in some way; but in their partaking there is no [final] stopping-point, but they are ordered toward a further one.

2, 3. As to the objection that in every conjunction proportion ought to be preserved; it must be said that in the conjunction of the soul to the body proportion is preserved, both absolutely and in relation to the end: absolutely; for although the highest of the spirit15 and the lowest of the body have a great separation, nevertheless the highest of the body and the lowest of the spirit have the greatest nearness. For the animal or rational spirit has the power of vivifying, the power of vegetating and of sensing; and the human body has equality of complexion, has multiplicity of organs, has further subtlety of [its] spirits, and16 [this] according to a threefold difference: for it has a vital spirit, a natural spirit, and an animal spirit. Comparing, then, the equal complexion to the vivifying power through the medium and bond of the vital spirit, the bond is best. Likewise, comparing not only the equality of complexion, but also the organization17 and the perfection of organization, to the power of vegetating and sensing by means of the natural and animal spirit, the proportion is excellent and the bond marvellous. Whence, just as earth and fire, which are greatly distant, are bound by a double medium — one which communicates more with earth, and the other which [communicates] more with fire18 — so it is in the matter at hand.

A perfect proportion is also regarded in relation to the end. For since to the human soul has been given freedom of choice, turnable and re-turnable — that is, able to stand and to fall and to rise again — there has been given to it a body able to die, and able not to die, and thereafter able to be vivified everlastingly. Again, since the created soul is «as it were a blank tablet19», there has been given to it a body having manifold organs, so that in it [the soul] might be perfected by the sciences. — Likewise, on the part of the body there is an excellent proportion in relation to the end. For since there is order in corporeal forms — which is plain, because the form of the element20 [is ordered] to the form of the mixed, and the form of mixture to the form of complexion, and again the vegetable to the sensible — and since there is no [stopping-point] in the corporeal and imperfect thing; there is no stopping-point there, but ultimately forms of this kind dispose [matter] toward the rational soul, through which also the body and corporeal nature is made a partaker of eternal beatitude. Either, then, every intention of corporeal nature is dissolved, or it is necessary to arrive, by means of the rational soul, at the ultimate end.

4. As to the objection that in the work of God the binding-together of natures ought to be preserved; it must be said that it is true

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[that it ought]: but the sensible and the vegetable are not of the necessity of the rational, except [in] that which is rational through union. For the soul, as was touched on before21, since it is a simple and pure spirit, cannot be united to the flesh except by a double medium on its own side; likewise neither [can] the complexioned body. And therefore it is necessary that there intervene a nature of vivifying or vegetating, and a nature further of sensing; and therefore in every man these occur. But because the Angel is a pure spirit, therefore it does not need these. — It is plain therefore that against truth and faith the Sadducees err, who deny that there is a spirit22. It is plain nonetheless that the Manichaeans err, who deny that the soul is united to the body as to a perfectible thing, [holding rather that it is united] as to a prison.

5. As to the objection lastly made, that God gives to each what is better; it must be said that God does not give to each what is absolutely better, because then he would not make things ordered, but equally perfect; and this would be repugnant to perfection, «because, if they were equal, they would not be all [things]», as Augustine says23. When therefore it is said that God gives to each what is better for it, this is understood according to the requirement of order and of nature. Now it befits the nature of the soul to be united to a body, but the nature of the angelic [creature] to be separate from a body. And therefore that reasoning is not valid, because the love of God does not exclude order.

Scholion

It was defined by the Fourth Lateran Council, c. Firmiter, and in the same words by the Vatican Council, On the Faith, c. 1: that God «from the beginning of time at once founded both creatures out of nothing, the spiritual and the corporeal, namely the angelic and the mundane, and thereafter the human, as it were common, constituted of spirit and body». That the splendid and profound reasons by which the Seraphic [Doctor] confirms the conclusion are rather of great congruity than strictly demonstrative, the word it was fitting in the foundation [argument] sufficiently indicates. Cf. Breviloquium p. II, c. 6. — We have not found this question explicitly treated by others. It is nevertheless touched on by several in the question whether it is fitting that the soul be united to a body — as by Denis the Carthusian, here q. 9 — or in the question on the existence of Angels or in general of intellectual creatures — as by St Thomas, Summa contra Gentiles c. 46 and 91. Cf. also Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 11, m. 2, q. 18, m. 3; and Bl. Albert, II Sent. d. 3, a. 1.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Hic c. 1.
    Here, c. 1 [of the Master's littera].
  2. Quaest. praec. et supra p. I. a. 1. q. 1. fundam. 5; a. 2. q. 2. fundam. 2. — Mox post ordinatione ed. 1 cum cod. cc adiicit ad finem.
    The preceding question, and above p. I, a. 1, q. 1, foundation 5; a. 2, q. 2, foundation 2. — Soon after ordinatione ed. 1 with codex cc adds ad finem.
  3. August., XIV. de Trin. c. 8. n. 11. Cfr. et Aristot., I. Eudem. c. 4. (c. 7.), ubi dicit, reliqua animantia homine inferiora participare non posse felicitatem. — Paulo inferius Vat. cum pluribus mss. participare pro aliquid participare.
    Augustine, On the Trinity XIV, c. 8, n. 11. Cf. also Aristotle, Eudemian [Ethics] I, c. 4 (c. 7), where he says that the other living things, inferior to man, cannot partake of felicity. — A little below, the Vatican ms. with several mss. reads participare for aliquid participare.
  4. Codd. W aa bb et ed. 3 proportionali.
    Codices W, aa, bb and ed. 3 read proportionali.
  5. Aristot., I. de Caelo et mundo, text. 52. (c. 6.). — Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. paulo inferius post conditione prima adiungit sed peccato factum est corruptibile. Dein codd. H aa debuit pro debet.
    Aristotle, On the Heaven and the World I, text 52 (c. 6). — The Vatican ms. with one or two codices, a little below, after conditione prima adds sed peccato factum est corruptibile ("but by sin it was made corruptible"). Then codices H, aa read debuit for debet.
  6. Libr. II. de Anima, text. 31. (c. 3.). — Paulo superius cod. cc et ed. 1 et si habet pro sive.
    Book II On the Soul, text 31 (c. 3). — A little above, codex cc and ed. 1 read et si habet for sive.
  7. Vat. hic addit aut summa deliberatione, dein prosequitur ergo quod semper facit melius est etc. Plures codd. cum ed. 1 ex mera dilectione. Cod. N post melius est subiungit dat.
    The Vatican ms. here adds aut summa deliberatione, then continues ergo quod semper facit melius est etc. Several codices with ed. 1 read ex mera dilectione. Codex N after melius est adds dat.
  8. Supple: supremi, i. e. substantiae.
    Supply: supremi ("of the highest"), that is, of substance.
  9. Cap. 7. n. 7.
    [Confessions XII,] c. 7, n. 7.
  10. Cod. cc cum ed. 1 hic et paulo superius aliis, qui etiam hic addit se.
    Codex cc with ed. 1, here and a little above, reads aliis; the same [codex] here also adds se.
  11. Codd. V W bb cc et ed. 1 manifestaretur.
    Codices V, W, bb, cc and ed. 1 read manifestaretur.
  12. Aristot., II. de Caelo et mundo, text. 18. (c. 3.): At vero si tertium [necesse est esse], necesse est, et ignem esse; contrariorum enim, si alterum natura est, necesse, et alterum esse natura, si sit contrarium, et esse quandam ipsius naturam.
    Aristotle, On the Heaven and the World II, text 18 (c. 3): But indeed if there must be a third, there must also be fire; for of contraries, if one is by nature, it is necessary that the other also be by nature, if it is contrary, and that there be a certain nature of it.
  13. In multis mss. deest substantiae, pro quo a cod. V rerum, a cod. aa scilicet spirituale, corporale et ex utroque nexum ponitur. Cod. bb legit haec triplex differentia.
    In many mss. substantiae is missing, for which codex V puts rerum, codex aa scilicet spirituale, corporale et ex utroque nexum. Codex bb reads haec triplex differentia.
  14. Fere omnes codd. cum primis edd. cetera, cod. W omnia.
    Almost all codices, with the first editions, read cetera; codex W omnia.
  15. Ed. 1 et cod. cc addunt ut mens, secundum quam homo est imago Dei. — In sequentibus ostenditur, valere hic illam legem cosmicam, quae dicitur lex continuitatis, et quae a Dionysio sic enuntiatur: «Supremum inferioris naturae attingit infimum superioris», a Leibnitio autem: «Natura nunquam saltus facit». — Paulo inferius et in solutione ad 3. Vat. sensificandi pro sentiendi.
    Ed. 1 and codex cc add ut mens, secundum quam homo est imago Dei ("as the mind, according to which man is the image of God"). — In what follows it is shown that here that cosmic law holds which is called the law of continuity, and which is enunciated by Dionysius thus: «The highest of a lower nature attains the lowest of a higher», and by Leibniz: «Nature never makes a leap». — A little below, and in the solution to [argument] 3, the Vatican ms. reads sensificandi for sentiendi.
  16. Cod. N et hoc; cod. aa et secundum hanc triplicem etc.
    Codex N reads et hoc; codex aa et secundum hanc triplicem etc.
  17. Cod. N organum sentiendi, cod. cc et ed. 1 organa.
    Codex N reads organum sentiendi; codex cc and ed. 1 organa.
  18. Aristot., II. de Caelo et mundo, text. 18. (c. 3.), duplici ratione probat, quod, si terra est, necesse sit, etiam ignem esse, qui terrae contrarius est: Eadem enim est materia contrariorum. Et privatione prior affirmatio; dico autem veluti calidum frigido; quies autem et gravitas [quae conveniunt terrae] dicuntur per privationem levitatis et motus [quae attribuuntur igni]. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 44. a. 1. q. 3. et Schol.
    Aristotle, On the Heaven and the World II, text 18 (c. 3), proves by a double reason that, if earth is, fire too must necessarily be, which is contrary to earth: For the matter of contraries is the same. And affirmation is prior to privation; I mean, e.g., the hot to the cold; but rest and heaviness [which belong to earth] are said by the privation of lightness and motion [which are attributed to fire]. Cf. I Sent. d. 44, a. 1, q. 3, and the Scholion.
  19. Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 14. (c. 4.): Oportet autem sic [se habere], ut in tabula, in qua nihil est scriptum actu; quod quidem accidit in ipso intellectu. — Paulo inferius plurimi codd. ut illo pro ut in illo.
    Aristotle, On the Soul III, text 14 (c. 4): It must be so [disposed], as in a tablet on which nothing is actually written; which indeed happens in the intellect itself. — A little below, very many codices read ut illo for ut in illo.
  20. Codd. U Y supplent ordinatur, Vat. est, quae etiam paulo inferius ulterius substituit pro ultimo. Deinde cod. N post per quam adiicit est.
    Codices U, Y supply ordinatur; the Vatican ms. est, which also a little below substitutes ulterius for ultimo. Then codex N after per quam adds est.
  21. Hic ad 2. — Paulo superius pro nisi quod codd. F aa nisi quantum, cod. cc cum ed. 1 nisi illius quod, Vat. nisi secundum quod. Mox post duplici plures codd. ut A K N Y aa cc et ed. 1 addunt vel triplici.
    Here, [in the reply] to [argument] 2. — A little above, for nisi quod codices F, aa read nisi quantum, codex cc with ed. 1 nisi illius quod, the Vatican ms. nisi secundum quod. Soon after duplici several codices, as A, K, N, Y, aa, cc and ed. 1, add vel triplici.
  22. Matth. 22, 23: Sadducaei, qui dicunt, non esse resurrectionem. — Ultimam partem propositionis seq. aliqui codd. ut V Z sic exhibent: qui dicunt, animam uniri corpori non ut perfectibili etc. Vat. falso post corpori addit id est non. Cod. cc et ed. 1 post seu subiungunt tantum dicunt uniri.
    Matthew 22:23: the Sadducees, who say there is no resurrection. — The last part of the following proposition some codices, as V, Z, exhibit thus: qui dicunt, animam uniri corpori non ut perfectibili etc. The Vatican ms. falsely after corpori adds id est non. Codex cc and ed. 1 after seu add tantum dicunt uniri.
  23. Libr. 83 Qq. q. 41. et 1. contra Adversar. Leg. et Proph. c. 4. n. 6: Quia non essent omnia, si essent aequalia. — Circa finem solut. plures codd. cum ed. 1 separatum esse pro separatam esse.
    The book 83 Questions q. 41, and [book] 1 Against the Adversary of the Law and the Prophets c. 4, n. 6: Because they would not be all [things], if they were equal. — Toward the end of the solution several codices with ed. 1 read separatum esse for separatam esse. ---
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