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Dist. 1, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 1

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 1

Textus Latinus
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ARTICULUS II. De rerum ordine ad finem et ad invicem.

Consequenter secundo loco quaeritur de rebus productis quantum ad ordinem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primum est de ordine rerum in comparatione ad finem. Secundum est de ordine earum, quem habent ad invicem.

QUAESTIO I. Quis sit finis principalior rerum conditarum, utrum divina gloria, an utilitas nostra.

Circa primum sic proceditur; cum omnes creaturae conditae sint propter divinam gloriam et utilitatem propriam, sicut dicit Magister1 et accipi potest ex Scriptura, et Augustinus dicit in libro de Doctrina christiana, quod Deus nos fecit et diligit non propter utilitatem suam, sed propter bonitatem suam et utilitatem nostram; quaeritur ergo, quis sit finis principalior conditionis rerum, utrum divina gloria, vel utilitas nostra. Et quod gloria Dei, videtur.

1. Ille est finis principalior, qui est ulterior — finis enim ultimus est potissimus2 — sed ulterior finis est Dei gloria quam utilitas nostra — nam non gloria Dei propter utilitatem, sed utilitas ad gloriam ordinatur — ergo videtur, quod gloria Dei sit principalior.

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2. Item, ille finis est principalior, qui est perfectior; sed gloria Dei est perfectior: ergo etc. Probatio mediae: perfectior finis est, qui perfectiorem reddit operationem ordinatam ad ipsum; sed multo melius est opus, quod quis facit propter gloriam Dei quam propter utilitatem suam. Unde Apostolus primae ad Corinthios decimo3: Omnia in gloriam Dei facite: ergo etc.

3. Item, ille finis est principalior, qui est essentialior; sed gloria Dei est essentialior unicuique rei conditae, maxime rationali, quam utilitas sua. Nam res propter malitiam potest privari sua utilitate, sed non potest unquam privari, quin sit ad Dei gloriam.

4. Item, ille finis est principalior, qui est universalior, propter hoc quod principalis finis totum debet complecti4: sed gloria Dei est finis, quem assequitur omnis natura, sive humana sive angelica, sive bona sive mala: ergo etc.

Contra:

1. Ille est finis principalior rei conditae, quem efficiens magis intendit; sed Deus magis intendit in conditione creaturae eius utilitatem quam gloriam suam: ergo etc. Probatio mediae: sicut dicit Apostolus primae ad Corinthios decimo tertio5: Caritas non quaerit quae sua sunt, sed quod alterius; sed Deus quae agit facit ex perfectissima caritate: ergo nec quaerit nec intendit quod suum est, ergo non suam gloriam, sed utilitatem alienam.

2. Item, ille finis est principalior conditionis rei, quem res condita magis appetit; sed unaquaeque res ita appetit suum commodum vel utilitatem, quod nullo modo potest velle oppositum6; sed oppositum gloriae divinae potest velle, sicut patet in blasphemis: ergo utilitas etc.

3. Item, ille finis est potior conditionis rei, ad quem efficiens non pervenit nisi per effectum; hoc patet, quia, si aeque bene defenderer a pluviis absque domo sicut cum domo, si facerem domum propter talem defensionem, facerem frustra. Si ergo Deus non est magis gloriosus post conditionem rerum quam ante, si faceret res principaliter propter gloriam suam, faceret frustra: quodsi non frustra facit7, non producit ergo principaliter propter gloriam suam, sed propter utilitatem alienam.

4. Item, ille finis principalior est, qui effectum magis perficit, cum ad ipsum pervenit; sed Dei fruitio magis animam perficit quam Dei laudatio: ergo principalius facta est anima propter fruitionem quam propter Dei gloriam et laudem.

Conclusio. Rerum conditarum principalior finis est Dei gloria sive bonitas, non quidem acquirenda vel augenda, sed manifestanda et communicanda.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod finis conditionis rei sive rerum conditarum principalior est Dei gloria sive bonitas, quam creaturae utilitas. — Sicut enim patet Proverbiorum decimo sexto8: Universa propter semetipsum operatus est Dominus; sed non propter suam utilitatem vel indigentiam, quia Psalmus9: Dixi Domino: Deus meus es tu, quoniam bonorum meorum non eges: ergo propter suam gloriam, non, inquam, propter gloriam augendam, sed propter gloriam manifestandam et propter gloriam suam communicandam; in cuius manifestatione et participatione attenditur summa utilitas creaturae, videlicet eius glorificatio sive beatificatio.

1. Quod ergo obiicitur, quod caritas alienum commodum quaerit; dicendum, quod secus est in nobis et in Deo. Nam in nobis bonum proprium differt a bono communi; sed in Deo bonum suum est bonum commune, nam ipse est «bonum omnis boni10». Si ergo effectum non ordinaret ad se vel non faceret propter se, cum ipse sit bonum, a quo omne bonum, iam effectus non esset bonus. Quoniam ergo utilitas creaturae tota attenditur in ordinatione ad bonum, quod Deus est; ideo caritas Dei omnia rectissime fecit et convertit ad se. Non sic est in nobis.

2. Quod obiicitur, quod ille finis est principalior, quem natura magis appetit; dicendum, quod est loqui de natura dupliciter: aut de natura ut deficiente, vel ut perfecta. Dico ergo, quod natura deficiens in se recurvatur: ideo proprium bonum desiderat, et ideo suum commodum. Natura vero perfecta amore caritatis sursum elevatur, et multo magis improportionaliter Dei gloriam desiderat quam utilitatem propriam: ut patet in habentibus caritatem. — Quod ergo dicitur, quod ille finis est principalior, quem natura magis desiderat; verum est de natura recta et perfecta11.

3. Quod obiicitur, quod ille est principalior finis conditionis rei, ad quem res facta12 pertingit;

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responderi potest dupliciter. Primo, quod hoc habet veritatem, quando operans operatur propter indigentiam alicuius finis, ad quem non potest pervenire nisi per opus, quod producit; sed talis operans non est Deus, sicut patet: et ideo non habet locum hic. — Vel aliter dicendum, quod res factae sunt propter Dei gloriam, non, inquam, acquirendam vel ampliandam, sed ostendendam et communicandam. Et quamvis gloria Dei sit sine rebus factis, non tamen communicatur vel manifestatur nisi per res productas.

4. Quod obiicitur, quod fruitio magis perficit; dicendum, quod laus dupliciter est, scilicet perfecta et imperfecta. Laus imperfecta minus perficit animam quam fruitio; sed non sic laus perfecta, quia anima magis laetatur in gloria et plus gaudebit de Dei gloria et honore quam de sua glorificatione, et plus iucundabitur in laudando13 quam in considerando proprium bonum. Et ideo patet, quod ille finis est ulterior.

Scholion

Finis distinguitur multipliciter; hoc loco notandus est duplex finis: finis operantis, qui est id quod principaliter intendit operans, et hic est semper in ipso operante; et finis operis, qui est ratio operis, ad quam opus natura sua ordinatur, et hic saepe est extra agentem in alio (cfr. infra d. 11. a. 2. q. 3. ad 6.). Tamen finis operis reducitur in finem operantis (S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1.). Hic autem dupliciter concipi potest: aut propter desiderium acquirendae rei non habitae, ut est in nobis; aut propter complacentiam finis iam habiti, quem operans intendit communicare aliis, ut est in Deo (ad 3.). — Facile intelligitur, finem ultimum, ex parte creaturae consideratum, non esse nisi in Deo, qui est eius primum principium. Omnia enim appetunt bonum sibi competens, quod non est nisi bonum a summo bono participatum et ad idem ultimo reducendum. — Maior difficultas est de fine ex parte Dei operantis, cum Deus nec intrinsecus aliquid acquirere, nec eius voluntas a bono aliquo extra ipsum ultimo moveri possit, sicut voluntas creata (cfr. I. Sent. d. 45. dub. 3; Breviloq. p. II. c. 1.). Unde Durandus, finem operantis in Deo esse, perperam negavit, arguens contra rationes S. Thomae (hic q. 2. a. 1.); aliique multi recentiores circa capitale hoc ethicae christianae fundamentum erraverunt. Hinc Conc. Vatican. de Fide non tantum in can. 5. de Deo anathemate percussit eum, qui «mundum ad Dei gloriam conditum esse negaverit», sed etiam in cap. 1. luculenter doctrinam communem explanavit sic: «Hic solus verus Deus bonitate sua et omnipotenti virtute non ad augendam suam beatitudinem, nec ad acquirendam, sed ad manifestandam perfectionem suam per bona, quae creaturis impertitur... de nihilo condidit creaturam». Quod decretum fere ad verbum convenit cum dictis a S. Bonaventura (hic in corp. et ad 3.). Cfr. I. Sent. d. 43. a. 2. q. 1. 2, et infra d. 45. a. 2. q. 1. — De speciebus finis cfr. hic d. 38. a. 1. q. 1. 2. 3, et ibid. dub. 1, d. 11. a. 2. q. 3. ad 6, d. 40. a. 1. q. 1. 2; I. Sent. d. 1. dub. 15; IV. Sent. d. 6. p. II. a. 2. q. 2.

Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 1. m. 1. 2. 3. — Scot., IV. Sent. d. 49. q. 8. n. 7. ad arg. 4; de Rerum princ. q. 1. a. 3. n. 28. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1. 2; S. I. q. 44. a. 4, et q. 103. a. 2; S. c. Gent. III. c. 17. 18. — B. Albert., S. p. I. tr. 13. q. 53. m. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 5. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic p. II. q. 1. a. 2. 3. 4. — Durand., hic q. 6. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 8. — Biel, hic q. 8.

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English Translation

ARTICLE II. On the order of things to their end and to one another.

Consequently, in the second place, inquiry is made concerning produced things as regards order. And concerning this two things are asked. The first is about the order of things in comparison to their end. The second is about the order they have to one another.

QUESTION I. Which is the more principal end of created things, whether the divine glory or our utility.

Concerning the first the procedure is thus: since all creatures have been created for the divine glory and for their own utility, as the Master says1 and as can be gathered from Scripture, and Augustine says in the book On Christian Doctrine that God made us and loves us not for his own utility but for his goodness and our utility; the question therefore is, which is the more principal end of the creating of things, whether the divine glory or our utility. And that it is the glory of God, it seems:

1. That is the more principal end which is more remote — for the last end is the most powerful2 — but the more remote end is the glory of God rather than our utility — for the glory of God is not [ordered] for the sake of utility, but utility is ordered to glory — therefore it seems that the glory of God is the more principal.

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2. Again, that is the more principal end which is more perfect; but the glory of God is more perfect: therefore etc. Proof of the middle [term]: that end is more perfect which renders the operation ordered to it more perfect; but the work which one does for the glory of God is far better than [that which one does] for his own utility. Whence the Apostle, First to the Corinthians, chapter ten3: Do all things to the glory of God: therefore etc.

3. Again, that is the more principal end which is more essential; but the glory of God is more essential to each created thing, especially to the rational [creature], than its own utility. For a thing can, on account of malice, be deprived of its utility, but it can never be deprived of being [ordered] to the glory of God.

4. Again, that is the more principal end which is more universal, because the principal end ought to embrace the whole4: but the glory of God is the end which every nature attains, whether human or angelic, whether good or evil: therefore etc.

To the contrary:

1. That is the more principal end of a created thing which the efficient [cause] more intends; but God intends in the creating of a creature its utility more than his own glory: therefore etc. Proof of the middle [term]: as the Apostle says, First to the Corinthians, chapter thirteen5: Charity seeks not the things that are its own, but those of another; but God does what he does out of most perfect charity: therefore he neither seeks nor intends what is his own, therefore not his own glory, but the utility of another.

2. Again, that is the more principal end of a created thing which the created thing more desires; but every thing so desires its own advantage or utility that it can in no way will the opposite6; but it can will the opposite of the divine glory, as is clear in blasphemers: therefore utility etc.

3. Again, that is the more powerful end of a created thing at which the efficient [cause] does not arrive except through the effect; this is clear, because, if I were equally well protected from the rains without a house as with a house, then, if I made a house for the sake of such protection, I would make it in vain. If therefore God is not more glorious after the creating of things than before, then, if he made things principally for the sake of his own glory, he would make [them] in vain: but if he does not make [them] in vain7, then he does not produce [them] principally for the sake of his own glory, but for the sake of another's utility.

4. Again, that is the more principal end which more perfects the effect when it arrives at it; but the enjoyment of God perfects the soul more than the praising of God: therefore the soul was made more principally for the sake of enjoyment than for the sake of the glory and praise of God.

Conclusion. The more principal end of created things is the glory or goodness of God — not indeed to be acquired or increased, but to be manifested and communicated.

I respond: It must be said that the more principal end of the creating of a thing, or of created things, is the glory or goodness of God, rather than the utility of the creature. — For, as is clear from Proverbs, chapter sixteen8: The Lord has wrought all things for himself; but not for his own utility or need, because the Psalm [says]9: I have said to the Lord: Thou art my God, for thou hast no need of my goods: therefore for the sake of his own glory — not, I say, for glory to be increased, but for glory to be manifested and for his glory to be communicated; in the manifesting and partaking of which is regarded the highest utility of the creature, namely its glorification or beatification.

1. To what is therefore objected, that charity seeks another's advantage; it must be said that it is otherwise in us and in God. For in us the proper good differs from the common good; but in God his own good is the common good, for he himself is «the good of every good10». If therefore he did not order the effect to himself, or did not make it for the sake of himself — since he himself is the good from which is every good — then the effect would not be good. Since therefore the whole utility of the creature is regarded in [its] ordering to the good, which is God; therefore the charity of God most rightly made all things and turned [them] to himself. It is not so in us.

2. To what is objected, that that is the more principal end which nature more desires; it must be said that nature can be spoken of in two ways: either of nature as deficient, or as perfect. I say therefore that a deficient nature is curved back into itself: therefore it desires its proper good, and therefore its own advantage. But a perfect nature is, by the love of charity, lifted upward, and far more disproportionately desires the glory of God than its own utility: as is clear in those who have charity. — To what is therefore said, that that is the more principal end which nature more desires; it is true of a right and perfect nature11.

3. To what is objected, that that is the more principal end of a created thing at which the made thing arrives12;

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it can be answered in two ways. First, that this holds true when the agent operates on account of need for some end, at which it cannot arrive except through the work which it produces; but such an agent is not God, as is clear: and therefore it has no place here. — Or otherwise it must be said that things were made for the glory of God — not, I say, to be acquired or enlarged, but to be shown and communicated. And although the glory of God exists without the things made, nevertheless it is not communicated or manifested except through produced things.

4. To what is objected, that enjoyment more perfects [the soul]; it must be said that praise is twofold, namely perfect and imperfect. Imperfect praise perfects the soul less than enjoyment; but not so perfect praise, because the soul rejoices more in glory and will delight more in the glory and honor of God than in its own glorification, and will take more joy in praising13 than in considering its own good. And therefore it is clear that that end is more remote.

Scholion

The end is distinguished in many ways; in this place a twofold end is to be noted: the end of the agent, which is that which the agent principally intends, and this is always in the agent itself; and the end of the work, which is the ratio of the work, to which the work by its own nature is ordered, and this is often outside the agent in another (cf. below, d. 11, a. 2, q. 3, ad 6). Yet the end of the work is reduced to the end of the agent (St. Thomas, here, q. 2, a. 1). This [latter] can be conceived in two ways: either on account of desire for a thing not possessed, to be acquired, as it is in us; or on account of complacency in an end already possessed, which the agent intends to communicate to others, as it is in God (ad 3). — It is easily understood that the last end, considered on the part of the creature, is nothing but in God, who is its first principle. For all things desire the good befitting them, which is nothing but a good shared from the highest good and ultimately to be led back to the same. — The greater difficulty is about the end on the part of God the agent, since God can neither intrinsically acquire anything, nor can his will be ultimately moved by any good outside himself, as a created will [can] (cf. I Sent. d. 45, dub. 3; Breviloquium p. II, c. 1). Whence Durandus wrongly denied that the end of the agent is in God, arguing against the reasons of St. Thomas (here, q. 2, a. 1); and many other more recent [authors] have erred concerning this capital foundation of Christian ethics. Hence the Vatican Council, On the Faith, not only in canon 5 On God struck with anathema him who «shall have denied that the world was created for the glory of God», but also in chapter 1 lucidly set forth the common doctrine thus: «This one true God, by his goodness and almighty power, not to increase his own beatitude, nor to acquire [it], but to manifest his perfection through the goods which he imparts to creatures... created the creature out of nothing». This decree agrees almost word for word with what was said by St. Bonaventure (here, in the body and ad 3). Cf. I Sent. d. 43, a. 2, q. 1–2, and below, d. 45, a. 2, q. 1. — On the species of the end cf. here, d. 38, a. 1, q. 1–3, and ibid. dub. 1; d. 11, a. 2, q. 3, ad 6; d. 40, a. 1, q. 1–2; I Sent. d. 1, dub. 15; IV Sent. d. 6, p. II, a. 2, q. 2.

Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 1, m. 1–3. — Scotus, IV Sent. d. 49, q. 8, n. 7, ad arg. 4; On the Principle of Things q. 1, a. 3, n. 28. — St. Thomas, here, q. 2, a. 1–2; Summa I, q. 44, a. 4, and q. 103, a. 2; Summa contra Gentiles III, c. 17–18. — Bl. Albert, Summa p. I, tr. 13, q. 53, m. 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here, q. 3, a. 1–2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here, a. 5, q. 2. — Giles of Rome, here, p. II, q. 1, a. 2–4. — Durandus, here, q. 6. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here, q. 8. — Biel, here, q. 8.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Hic c. 4, ubi etiam idem probatur ex s. Scriptura. — Textus Augustini est I. de Doctr. christ. c. 31. seq. n. 34. seq., ubi ostenditur, quod Deus nos diligendo nobis non fruatur, sed utatur: «Quia enim bonus est, sumus, et in quantum sumus, boni sumus... Ille igitur usus, qui dicitur Dei, quo nobis utitur, non ad eius, sed ad nostram utilitatem refertur, ad eius autem tantummodo bonitatem». Cfr. etiam liber de Diligendo Deo, c. 2, qui olim Augustino adscribebatur. — Aliquanto superius verbum proceditur deest in multis mss.
    Here, c. 4 [of the Master's text], where the same is also proved from Sacred Scripture. — The text of Augustine is On Christian Doctrine I, c. 31 seq., n. 34 seq., where it is shown that God, in loving us, does not enjoy us but uses us: «For because he is good, we are; and inasmuch as we are, we are good... That use, therefore, which is called God's, by which he uses us, is referred not to his benefit but to ours, but to his goodness alone». Cf. also the book On the Love of God, c. 2, which was once ascribed to Augustine. — Somewhat above, the word proceditur is absent in many manuscripts.
  2. Aristot., I. Ethic. c. 1. seq. Ibid. c. 7. ait: Id autem, quod per se sectandum est, eo perfectius dicimus, quod propter aliud appetimus... absolute autem perfectum, quod semper per se, nunquam ob aliud expetendum est.
    Aristotle, Ethics I, c. 1 seq. Ibid. c. 7 he says: But that which is to be pursued for its own sake we call more perfect than that which we desire for the sake of something else... but absolutely perfect is that which is always [pursued] for its own sake, never to be sought on account of anything else.
  3. Vers. 31. — De maiori cfr. Aristot., I. Magn. Moral. c. 3. (c. 2.), ubi dicit, quod ipsorum finium praestat semper qui perfectus est imperfecto... Imperfectus autem, cuius adventu alium desideramus.
    Verse 31. — On the major [premise] cf. Aristotle, Magna Moralia I, c. 3 (c. 2), where he says that, of ends themselves, the one that is perfect is always superior to the imperfect... but imperfect is that at whose coming we [still] desire another.
  4. Sub hoc respectu ait Aristot., X. Metaph. text. 13. (IX. c. 4.): Extra finem autem nihil est; ultimum enim in re omni est et continet.
    In this respect Aristotle says, Metaphysics X, text 13 (IX, c. 4): But outside the end there is nothing; for it is the last in every thing and contains [it].
  5. Vers. 5. — Mox cod. T sed quae alterius pro sed quod alterius.
    Verse 5. — Soon, codex T reads sed quae alterius for sed quod alterius.
  6. Cfr. Boeth., III. de Consol. prosa 11.
    Cf. Boethius, On the Consolation [of Philosophy] III, prose 11.
  7. Aristot., I. de Caelo et mundo, text. 32. (c. 4.): Deus autem et natura nihil frustra faciunt.
    Aristotle, On the Heaven and the World I, text 32 (c. 4): But God and nature do nothing in vain.
  8. Vers. 4.
    Verse 4.
  9. Psalm. 15, 2.
    Psalm 15:2.
  10. August., VIII. de Trin. c. 3. n. 4. Cfr. etiam Enarrat. in Ps. 134. n. 3. seqq., ubi haec fusius exponuntur.
    Augustine, On the Trinity VIII, c. 3, n. 4. Cf. also Enarration on Psalm 134, n. 3 seqq., where these things are expounded more fully.
  11. Cod. I prosequitur non autem verum est de natura deficiente et imperfecta.
    Codex I continues non autem verum est de natura deficiente et imperfecta ("but it is not true of a deficient and imperfect nature").
  12. Vat. per effectum.
    The Vatican ms. reads per effectum ("through the effect").
  13. Subaudi cum cod. N Deum.
    Supply, with codex N, Deum ("God") — i.e. "in praising [God]".
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