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Dist. 23, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 23

Textus Latinus
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Articulus I. De permissione primae tentationis.

Quaestio I. Utrum Deus debuerit facere hominem impeccabilem.

Circa primum sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod Deus debuit facere hominem impeccabilem sive inexpugnabilem, et hoc:

1. Primo per divinam bonitatem, quia, ut dicit Dionysius1, « optimi est optima adducere »; sed melior est natura rationalis, quae non potest peccare, quam quae potest: ergo videtur, quod decuerit Deum optimum, facere hominem ad peccandum impossibilem, et ita inexpugnabilem.

2. Item, hoc ipsum videtur per divinam liberalitatem. Ad excellentiam enim liberalitatis non solum facit dare multa et magna, sed etiam dare velociter2; sed donum gratiae confirmantis et beatificantis hoc maius est quam donum cuiuslibet gratiae

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gratum facientis: ergo si hoc Deus dare homini disposuerat, et homo ex prima sui conditione ad hoc idoneus erat; videtur, quod statim cum eum fecit, debuit ei hoc donum dare; sed si hoc haberet, esset inexpugnabilis: ergo etc.

3. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur tertio ex parte sapientiae3. Maioris enim sapientiae est scire mala praecavere, quam, postquam facta sunt, remedium adhibere: ergo si divina sapientia maxime manifestanda erat in hominis conditione, videtur, quod talem debuit eum facere et tantam sibi cautelam adhibere, quod non posset in malum incidere.

4. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur ex parte divinae potentiae. Quanto enim potentia maior est, tanto velocius operatur: magis igitur divina potentia manifestatur in operatione subita quam in operatione successiva. Si igitur hominis gratificatio et confirmatio et glorificatio est immediate a Deo, videtur, quod Deus subito et in eodem instanti, in quo hominem fecit, debuit eum gratificare et in gratia confirmare, ac per hoc inexpugnabilem facere.

Sed contra: 1. Gloria est bonum laudabile; sed nullus est laudandus in eo quod habet, nisi habeat illud per merita: ergo si Deus fecit hominem ad hoc, ut perveniret ad statum gloriae et praemii; videtur, quod debuit etiam facere hominem in statu meriti. Sed status meriti et praemii debent esse distincti, sicut status viae et patriae, secundum legem communem: ergo et dona viae et patriae. Si igitur habere impossibilitatem ad peccandum hoc4 spectat ad securitatem beatitudinis, videtur, quod a principio non debuit homini dari: ergo debuit homo expugnabilis fieri.

2. Item, ad plenam perfectionem universi decuit, fieri omnem creaturam, quae a ratione recta potuit excogitari, sicut dicit Augustinus in tertio de Libero Arbitrio5; sed rationabiliter cogitari potest, ad perfectionem universi spectare creaturam, quae haberet libertatem arbitrii et relicta esset in manu consilii sui: hanc igitur decuit fieri et in statu vertibilitatis constitui. Sed hoc nulli creaturae magis competit quam homini: ergo etc.

3. Item, universum ex oppositione mali ad bonum decoratur « quasi quibusdam antithetis », sicut dicit Augustinus6, et Ecclesiasticus innuit trigesimo tertio: Contra malum bonum etc. Si ergo Deus universum venustare debuit et decorare, videtur, quod hunc decorem universo non debuit auferre; sed si fecisset hominem inexpugnabilem, iam hic decor non esset: ergo etc.

4. Item, hoc videtur quarto, quia Deus universum fecit ad sui ipsius manifestationem7; et sicut Deus est summe potens et sapiens, sic est summe iustus et misericors: ergo tale debuit facere universum, in quo manifestaretur eius summa iustitia et summa misericordia. Sed summa iustitia non manifestatur nisi in severitate punitionis malorum; summa misericordia non manifestatur perfecte nisi in liberatione miserorum et remissione delictorum; haec autem non possent esse, nisi rationalis creatura facta esset in statu, in quo posset peccare et expugnari: ergo divina iustitia et misericordia exigebat, hominem vertibilem et expugnabilem fieri.

Conclusio

> Ad manifestandam Dei potentiam, sapientiam, misericordiam et iustitiam congruum fuit, hominem peccabilem creari.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod etsi ipsa divina operatio non indigeat approbatione, pro eo quod quidquid Deus facit, bene facit et recte facit; verumtamen ad excitandam devotionem in mente fidelium, et compescendam rabiem in ore blasphemantium et Deum in suis operibus inculpantium, quadruplex potest ratio assignari, quare Deus talem fecit hominem, ut posset ab adversario expugnari.

Et prima est manifestatio divinae potentiae. Voluit enim Deus ostendere homini, quia, sicut sine eo factus non fuerat, ita nec sine ipso persistere poterat. Ut igitur homo nosset, quod divinum posse non solummodo est omnis potentiae causativum, sed etiam omnis potentiae conservativum, et quod ipsum solum est, quod non potest deficere nec expugnari: ideo placuit sibi, creaturam rationalem facere vertibilem et expugnabilem, nec ipsam confirmare, quousque experimento disceret, quod ipse solus est, in quo non cadit non-posse8.

Secunda ratio est manifestatio divinae sapientiae. Maioris enim sapientiae ostensivum est scire ordinare bona cum malis et elicere bona ex malis, quam ordinare solum bona cum bonis; et ideo, cum non deceret Deum mala facere, debuit talem facere creaturam, quae posset in operando deficere et malum committere, ut Deus mala illa ordinando suam sapientiam declararet9.

Tertia ratio sumitur ex manifestatione divinae misericordiae, quae potissime manifestata est, cum

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unigenitum Filium suum tradidit ad liberationem servi10.

Quarta ratio sumitur ex manifestatione divinae iustitiae, quae potissime manifestatur in hoc, quod Deus retribuit unicuique secundum opera sua, praecipue in aeterna punitione malorum. Haec autem retributio et punitio et etiam praefata misericordiae liberatio non esset, nisi Deus creaturam rationalem, et praecipue hominem, in statu vertibilitatis fecisset, et ita potentem impugnari et expugnari. — Et ideo congruum fuit, Deum hominem in tali statu facere; et concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc inductae.

1. Ad illud quod primo obiicitur, quod Deus debuit facere hominem optimum; dicendum, quod est optimum simpliciter, et est optimum in ordine. Cum autem dicit Dionysius, quod optimi est optima adducere, non intelligit absolute, sed in ordine11; et ideo ex hoc non sequitur, quod homo debuerit fieri in optimo statu simpliciter, sed in statu, in quo optime salvaretur universitatis ordo et pulcritudo. Et sic factus est, cum productus fuit in statu vertibilitatis, ut ordinato processu perveniret a merito ad praemium, ab imperfecto ad perfectum, ab inferiori ad supremum.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de summa liberalitate, dicendum, quod etsi Deus sit liberalissimus, tamen liberalitas non praecludit viam iustitiae et sapientiae. Ideo sic dona sua distribuit largiter, ut tamen non excludatur sapientiae recta ordinatio et iustitiae iusta retributio. Ideo non statim debuit beatificare et confirmare, sed merita hominis exspectare.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod maioris sapientiae est praecavere malum etc.; dicendum, quod falsum est; immo multo maioris sapientiae est morbum bene curare, quam naturam a morbo praeservare. Unde Augustinus in Enchiridio12: « Melius iudicavit Deus de malis bona facere, quam mala nulla permittere ». Et maiori etiam sapientiae attestatur, ut praedictum est, sic res ordinare, ut ex superveniente etiam deordinatione non deturpentur, sed earum ordinatio decoretur.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de potentia, dicendum, quod si in omnibus operibus divinis manifestetur divina potentia, ea tamen quae spectant ad hominis gratificationem et glorificationem, plus sunt ad manifestationem divinae misericordiae et iustitiae quam potentiae. Ideo maior est congruentia in proposito quam in opposito. Nihilominus tamen quantum ad aliquem modum ex ipsa humana infirmitate et indigentia plus innotescit homini divina potentia, quam si homo nunquam conspexisset vertibilitatem in rationali creatura.

Scholion

I. S. Doctor hoc loco tantum inquirit de congruentia dispositionis divinae, qua hominem fecit peccabilem; pro qua congruentia gravissimas affert rationes, eo magis notandas, quia haec divina dispositio et etiam permissio tentationis, de qua in sequente quaest. agitur, defendenda est « contra rabiem in ore blasphemantium et Deum in suis operibus inculpantium » (hic in corp.). — Alia quaestio connexa tractatur infra d. 24. p. I. a. 1. q. 1, scil. utrum possibile sit Deo creaturam, stante libero arbitrio, facere naturaliter impeccabilem. Ceteri autem commentatores hoc loco de ista altera quaestione disputant, omissa ea quae de congruentia facti agit. Haec tamen tractatur ab Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 91. m. 1. a. 2. § 2; ab aliis tangitur in quaestione, quare Deus in genere mala fieri permittat, de quo conferri potest S. Thom., S. I. q. 48. a. 2.

II. De sequente quaestione tractant: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 103. m. 9. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2; S. II. II. q. 165. a. 1. — B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 14. q. 87. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2; — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 3. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 2.

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English Translation

Article I. On the permission of the first temptation.

Question I. Whether God ought to have made man impeccable.

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is shown that God ought to have made man impeccable or unconquerable, and this:

1. First, through the divine goodness, because, as Dionysius says1, "it belongs to the best to bring forth the best things"; but a rational nature that cannot sin is better than one that can: therefore it seems that it befitted God, who is best, to make man incapable of sinning, and thus unconquerable.

2. Likewise, the same thing seems [to follow] through the divine liberality. For it pertains to the excellence of liberality not only to give many and great things, but also to give swiftly2; but the gift of confirming and beatifying grace is greater than the gift of any grace

that makes pleasing [to God]: therefore if God had disposed to give this to man, and man from his first condition was suited for it; it seems that immediately when He made him, He ought to have given him this gift; but if he had this, he would be unconquerable: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the same thing is shown, thirdly, on the part of wisdom3. For it belongs to a greater wisdom to know how to guard against evils beforehand, than, after they have been done, to apply a remedy: therefore if the divine wisdom was especially to be manifested in the making of man, it seems that He ought to have made him such, and to have applied to him such caution, that he could not fall into evil.

4. Likewise, the same thing is shown on the part of the divine power. For the greater the power, the more swiftly it works: therefore the divine power is more manifested in a sudden operation than in a successive one. If, then, man's gratification and confirmation and glorification are immediately from God, it seems that God, suddenly and in the same instant in which He made man, ought to have made him pleasing [to Himself] and confirmed him in grace, and thereby made him unconquerable.

On the contrary: 1. Glory is a praiseworthy good; but no one is to be praised for what he has, unless he has it through merits: therefore if God made man for this, that he should arrive at the state of glory and reward; it seems that He also ought to have made man in a state of merit. But the state of merit and [the state] of reward ought to be distinct, as the state of the way and of the homeland, according to the common law: therefore also the gifts of the way and of the homeland. If, then, to have an incapacity for sinning4 pertains to the security of beatitude, it seems that it ought not to have been given to man from the beginning: therefore man ought to have been made conquerable.

2. Likewise, for the full perfection of the universe it befitted that every creature be made which could be conceived by right reason, as Augustine says in the third book of On Free Choice5; but it can reasonably be thought that there pertains to the perfection of the universe a creature which would have freedom of choice and be left in the hand of its own counsel: this, therefore, it befitted to be made and to be established in a state of changeableness. But this belongs to no creature more than to man: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the universe is adorned from the opposition of evil to good "as it were by certain antitheses," as Augustine says6, and Ecclesiasticus intimates in the thirty-third chapter: Against evil, good etc. If, then, God ought to have beautified and adorned the universe, it seems that He ought not to have taken away this adornment from the universe; but if He had made man unconquerable, this adornment would no longer be: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, this seems [so] in a fourth way, because God made the universe for the manifestation of Himself7; and just as God is supremely powerful and wise, so He is supremely just and merciful: therefore He ought to have made such a universe, in which His supreme justice and supreme mercy would be manifested. But supreme justice is not manifested except in the severity of the punishment of the wicked; supreme mercy is not manifested perfectly except in the liberation of the wretched and the remission of sins; but these could not be, unless the rational creature had been made in a state in which it could sin and be conquered: therefore the divine justice and mercy demanded that man be made changeable and conquerable.

Conclusion

> For manifesting God's power, wisdom, mercy, and justice, it was fitting that man be created capable of sinning.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that, although the divine operation itself needs no approval, for the reason that whatever God does, He does well and does rightly; nevertheless, to stir up devotion in the mind of the faithful, and to restrain the rage in the mouth of those who blaspheme and blame God in His works, a fourfold reason can be assigned why God made man such that he could be conquered by the adversary.

And the first is the manifestation of the divine power. For God willed to show man that, just as he had not been made without Him, so neither could he persist without Him. Therefore, that man might know that the divine power is not only the cause of all power, but also the conserver of all power, and that it alone is that which cannot fail nor be conquered: therefore it pleased Him to make the rational creature changeable and conquerable, and not to confirm it, until by experience it should learn that He alone is the one in whom not-being-able does not occur8.

The second reason is the manifestation of the divine wisdom. For it is more indicative of a greater wisdom to know how to order good things together with evil ones and to draw forth good things from evil ones, than to order good things alone together with good ones; and therefore, since it did not befit God to make evils, He ought to make such a creature as could fail in acting and commit evil, that God, by ordering those evils, might declare His wisdom9.

The third reason is taken from the manifestation of the divine mercy, which was most powerfully manifested when

He handed over His only-begotten Son for the liberation of the servant10.

The fourth reason is taken from the manifestation of the divine justice, which is most powerfully manifested in this, that God repays each one according to his works, especially in the eternal punishment of the wicked. But this retribution and punishment, and also the aforesaid liberation of mercy, would not be, unless God had made the rational creature, and especially man, in a state of changeableness, and thus capable of being assailed and conquered. — And therefore it was fitting that God make man in such a state; and the reasons adduced for this are to be granted.

1. To that which is objected first, that God ought to have made man best; it must be said that there is what is best simply, and there is what is best in [a given] order. But when Dionysius says that it belongs to the best to bring forth the best things, he does not understand it absolutely, but in [a given] order11; and therefore from this it does not follow that man ought to have been made in the best state simply, but in a state in which the order and beauty of the whole [of things] would best be preserved. And so he was made, when he was produced in a state of changeableness, so that by an ordered progression he might arrive from merit to reward, from the imperfect to the perfect, from the lower to the supreme.

2. To that which is objected concerning supreme liberality, it must be said that, although God is most liberal, nevertheless liberality does not bar the way of justice and wisdom. Therefore He distributes His gifts so liberally that nevertheless the right ordering of wisdom and the just retribution of justice are not excluded. Therefore He ought not immediately to beatify and confirm, but to await the merits of man.

3. To that which is objected, that it belongs to a greater wisdom to guard against evil beforehand, etc.; it must be said that this is false; rather, it belongs to a much greater wisdom to cure a disease well than to preserve nature from disease. Hence Augustine in the Enchiridion12: "God judged it better to make good things out of evils than to permit no evils." And it bears witness to a greater wisdom also, as has been said, so to order things that, from a supervening disorder also, they are not deformed, but their ordering is adorned.

4. To that which is objected concerning power, it must be said that, although in all the divine works the divine power is manifested, nevertheless those things which pertain to man's gratification and glorification are more for the manifestation of the divine mercy and justice than of power. Therefore there is greater fittingness in the proposed [course] than in the opposite. Nevertheless, as to a certain mode, from human infirmity and indigence itself the divine power becomes more known to man than if man had never beheld changeableness in a rational creature.

Scholion

I. The holy Doctor here inquires only into the fittingness of the divine disposition by which He made man capable of sinning; for which fittingness he brings forward most weighty reasons, the more to be noted because this divine disposition, and also the permission of the temptation treated in the following question, must be defended "against the rage in the mouth of those who blaspheme and blame God in His works" (here in the body). — Another connected question is treated below in d. 24, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, namely whether it is possible for God to make a creature, its free choice standing, naturally impeccable. But the other commentators here dispute about that other question, omitting what concerns the fittingness of the deed. This, however, is treated by Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 91, m. 1, a. 2, § 2; and is touched on by others in the question why God permits evils to be done in general, on which one may consult St. Thomas, Summa I, q. 48, a. 2.

II. On the following question there treat: Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 103, m. 9. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 2; Summa II-II, q. 165, a. 1. — Bl. Albert, Summa p. II, tr. 14, q. 87, m. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 2; — Richard of Middleton, here a. 1, q. 3. — Giles of Rome, here q. 1, a. 2.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. De Div. Nom. c. 4, § 19. Vide supra pag. 113, nota 7.
    [Dionysius,] On the Divine Names c. 4, § 19. See above, p. 113, note 7.
  2. Prov. 3, 28: Ne dicas amico tuo: Vade et revertere, cras dabo tibi, cum statim possis dare. — Paulo inferius post conditione in codd. I K W ee cum ed. 2 additur et, in ed. 1 etiam.
    Prov. 3:28: Say not to thy friend: Go, and come again, and tomorrow I will give to thee, when thou canst give at once. — A little below, after conditione, in codices I K W ee with ed. 2 et is added, in ed. 1 likewise.
  3. Cod. cc et ed. 1 divinae sapientiae.
    Codex cc and ed. 1 [read] divinae sapientiae [of the divine wisdom].
  4. Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 omittit hoc.
    The Vatican edition, with editions 3 and 4, omits hoc [this].
  5. Cap. 5, n. 13; c. 9, n. 24. seqq.; c. 12. n. 33. — Sequens textus est Eccli. 15, 14. — In maiori plures codd., inter quos C R S T ce, substituunt ratione iusta pro ratione recta.
    Chapter 5, n. 13; c. 9, n. 24 ff.; c. 12, n. 33. — The following text is Ecclesiasticus 15:14. — In the major [premise] several codices, among them C R S T ce, substitute ratione iusta [by just reason] for ratione recta [by right reason].
  6. Libr. XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 18. — Textus Eccli. habetur c. 33, 15.
    Book XI of The City of God, c. 18. — The text of Ecclesiasticus is found at c. 33:15.
  7. Sicut ostensum est supra d. 1. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. — Alii [codd.] ... quanto inferius post primum non manifestatur in cod. cc et ed. 1 subiungitur perfecte, et in fine argumenti verbis expugnabilem fieri cod. Q praemittit ita, ubi nonnulli codd., ut F K P, perperam legunt inexpugnabilem fieri.
    As was shown above in d. 1, p. II, a. 2, q. 1. — Other [codices] ... a little below, after primum, [after] non manifestatur in codex cc and ed. 1 is added perfecte, and at the end of the argument, before the words expugnabilem fieri, codex Q prefixes ita, where some codices, such as F K P, wrongly read inexpugnabilem fieri [to be made unconquerable].
  8. Cod. cc et ed. 1 nisi posse. — Cfr. August., XI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 5. n. 7; Enchirid. c. 106. n. 28.
    Codex cc and ed. 1 [read] nisi posse. — Cf. Augustine, On Genesis according to the Letter XI, c. 5, n. 7; Enchiridion c. 106, n. 28.
  9. Vide August., XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 18; Enchirid. c. 11. n. 3. et c. 27. n. 8.
    See Augustine, The City of God XI, c. 18; Enchiridion c. 11, n. 3 and c. 27, n. 8.
  10. Haec nec non seq. ratio insinuantur et ab August., XXI. de Civ. Dei, c. 12; Enchirid. c. 106. seqq. et XI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 8. n. 10. Cfr. etiam I. Sent. d. 47. q. 3.
    This reason, as well as the following one, is intimated also by Augustine, The City of God XXI, c. 12; Enchiridion c. 106 ff.; and On Genesis according to the Letter XI, c. 8, n. 10. Cf. also I Sentences d. 47, q. 3.
  11. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 44. a. 1. q. 2. ad 1.
    Cf. I Sentences d. 44, a. 1, q. 2, ad 1.
  12. Cap. 27. n. 8, quo loco in textu originali legitur bene pro bona et post mala nulla adiicitur esse.
    Chapter 27, n. 8, in which place in the original text bene is read for bona, and after mala nulla the word esse is added. ---
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