Dist. 23, Art. 1, Q. 2
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 23
Articulus I. De permissione primae tentationis.
Quaestio II. Utrum Deus debuerit permittere, hominem impugnari.
Secundo quaeritur, utrum debuit Deus permittere, hominem impugnari. Et quod sic, videtur:
1. Per illud, quod dicit Magister in littera1: « Non esset laudabile bene vivere, nisi esset qui male vivere suaderet »: ergo si debuit permittere omne quod faciebat ad humanam laudem ampliandam, debuit ergo permittere, hominem impugnari per suggestionem diabolicam.
2. Item, secundum rectum iudicium rationis et attestationem Apostoli, secundae ad Timotheum secundo2: Non coronabitur, nisi qui legitime certaverit: si ergo homo perducendus erat ad coronam gloriae, videtur ex recto ordine, quod statui debuerit in conflictu tentationis et pugnae.
3. Item, decet Deum sic administrare res et eis providere, ut salva sit lex, quam indidit eis a primaria conditione, iuxta illud Augustini septimo de Civitate Dei3: « Sic res, quas Deus condidit, administrat, ut eas agere proprios motus sinat »; sed Deus fecit et facere debuit hominem in vertibilitate arbitrii et relinquere eum in manu consilii sui, et similiter luciferum: ergo si diabolus voluit hominem vexare, et homo voluit ei consentire, Deus nullum illorum debuit impedire.
4. Item, facilius erat homini vincere adversarium, quam diabolo vincere hominem; homo enim non poterat vinci nisi volens: ergo pugna illa de se magis erat ordinata ad victoriam hominis quam ad victoriam diaboli: ergo magis ad bonum quam ad malum. Si ergo Deus permittere debet quod directe ad bonum hominis ordinatur, videtur, quod a tentatione primi hominis adversarius non erat arcendus.
Contra: 1. Impius esset pater, qui permitteret, filium aggredi bellum, in quo sciret, eum esse ab alio superandum; sed Deus noverat, Adam illa tentatione esse superandum: ergo videtur, quod non tanquam pius pater se habuit, dum permisit, eum a diabolo superari.
2. Item, non est bonus praelatus nec pastor, qui permittit, ovem a lupo morderi et rapi, dum potest ipsum repellere et arcere; sed Deus praelatus et pastor hominis erat: ergo cum videret, lupum atrociter insistere, videtur, quod non debuit permittere, ab adversario hominem impugnari sive impeti a lupo4.
3. Item, non est rectus iudex, qui bellum constituit inter eos qui non sunt aequaliter fortes; sed diabolus multo fortior erat viribus per naturam quam homo, cum non sit potestas super terram, quae possit ei comparari5. Multo etiam erat obstinatior in malitia, quam homo esset confirmatus in gratia. Si igitur Deus iudex aequus est, non debuit permittere, eos invicem confligere.
4. Item, non est fortis possessor, qui permittit, alium invadere atrium suum: cum enim fortis armatus custodit atrium suum, in pace sunt omnia quae possidet6. Cum igitur homo in primo statu atrium et templum esset Dei, et Dominus ipse custodiret7; aut Deus non fuit fortis armatus et custos, aut non debuit permittere, adversarium vexare et invadere hominem per conflictum et pugnam tentationis.
Conclusio.
Propter plures rationes decuit Deum permittere, ut homo impugnaretur.
Respondeo: Ad praedicta dicendum est, quod cum Deus posset adversarium prohibere, ne hominem tentaret, decuit tamen ipsum permittere. — Et ratio condecentiae haberi potest ex rationibus praeassignatis in praecedenti problemate, in quo ostensum est, quod Deus debuit facere hominem in libertate8 liberi arbitrii.
Praeter has tamen rationes assignari potest ratio, primo ex ordine, qui attenditur ex comparatione virtutis ad proprium actum. « Sic enim Deus res omnes administrat, ut eas agere proprios motus sinat »; et ideo tam hominem quam diabolum constituit in libertate arbitrii et in manu consilii sui reliquit, et utrumque permisit agere quod voluit9, sive hunc in tentando, sive illum in consentiendo. Hoc enim competebat regimini in conservatione ordinis, qui attenditur ex comparatione virtutis ad actum proprium.
Secundo vero sumitur ratio ex ordine, qui attenditur per comparationem boni ad suum oppositum, in quo gloriosior et laudabilior ostenditur virtus, sive ex ipsa praedicta comparatione, ob quam relucet et magis apparet, sive ex cuiusdam nobilis triumphi assecutione, ob quam fortificatur et vigoratur. Ideo, ut virtus hominis reluceret et proficeret, decuit Deum permittere, ipsum ab adversario impugnari; quia vel tunc, vel post ex ipsa tentationis impulsione manifestanda erat fortitudo et eminentia caritatis, de qua dicit Apostolus, quod neque mors neque vita neque principatus neque potestates ab ea poterunt separare, ad Romanos octavo10.
Tertio potest sumi ratio ex ordine, qui attenditur ex comparatione morbi ad suum remedium. Quia enim peccatum hominis non debebat carere remedio, propter hoc quod tota in ipso humana natura erat; sic debuit Deus hominem permittere peccare, quod deceret ipsum eidem Redemptorem praestare. Et ideo magis disposuit Deus permittere11, hominem peccare, alio suggerente et impellente, quam voluntate propria incurvante, qua fortassis incurvatione homo cecidisset, etsi nunquam adversarius pestifera suggessisset.
Quarta ratio sumi potest ex ordine, qui attenditur per comparationem meriti ad praemium. Quia enim nemo dignus est coronari, nisi qui certat legitime; ideo decuit Deum hominem militem suum in campo certaminis prius examinare, quam ipsum in gloria exaltare; et quia examinatio consistit in conflictu et pugna, permittere debuit, hominem a diabolo impugnari. — Sunt et aliae rationes, quae possunt de hoc ipso reddi; ad praesens tamen istae sufficiant.
Ad obiecta:
1. Ad illud autem quod primo obiicitur in contrarium de pietate paterna, dicendum, quod etsi Deus sit pater pius, est tamen iudex aequus; et ideo sic decebat Deum erga hominem pietatem paternam ostendere, ut tamen non omitteret officium potestatis iudiciariae; et ideo, quidquid de homine praenosset, sustinere debuit, ipsum ab adversario impeti tentationis bello.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de bonitate praelationis, dicendum, quod praelatus debet ovem a morsu lupi eripere, sive quia ad hoc tenetur ex lege caritatis, sive quia ex malo nescit12, et ideo non potest elicere bonum maioris utilitatis. Utriusque horum oppositum reperitur in Deo, si quis attendat; et ideo illa ratio non cogit in proposito.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de rectitudine iudicis, dicendum, quod etsi diabolus fortior et astutior esset quam homo, in pugna tamen tentationis non erat fortior, immo multo debilior, sive ex generali lege tentationis, qua nemo vincitur nisi volens, sive ex fidelitate Dei, qui non permittit, aliquem tentari supra id quod possit, immo facit cum tentatione proventum13. Et ideo impulsus tentationis primariae, cum fieret, et servata Dei fidelitate et tentationis lege, non fuit contra ordinem potestatis iudiciariae.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de fortitudine armati custodientis, dicendum, quod etsi Deus hominem fortiter custodiret, non tamen custodiebat invitum sive involuntarium, quia non acceptat Deus servitium coactum, sed liberale et voluntarium. Et ideo, si homo cum Deo stare voluisset, nullus violenter de manu Dei eum auferre potuisset; sed quia ipse ab eius custodia se subtraxit, ideo Deus suam ei custodiam denegavit, et ex hoc adversarius eum invasit, immo non ex defectu Dei custodientis, sed ex ingratitudine hominis custoditi.
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Article I. On the permission of the first temptation.
Question II. Whether God ought to have permitted that man be assailed.
Secondly it is asked whether God ought to have permitted that man be assailed. And that He ought, it seems:
1. By that which the Master says in the text1: "It would not be praiseworthy to live well, unless there were someone who urged living badly": therefore if He ought to have permitted everything that contributed to enlarging human praise, He ought therefore to have permitted that man be assailed through diabolical suggestion.
2. Likewise, according to the right judgment of reason and the testimony of the Apostle, second to Timothy, chapter two2: He shall not be crowned, unless he strive lawfully: if therefore man was to be led to the crown of glory, it seems from right order that he ought to have been set in the conflict of temptation and battle.
3. Likewise, it befits God so to administer things and to provide for them, that the law be preserved which He implanted in them from their first condition, according to that of Augustine in the seventh book of the City of God3: "God so administers the things which He has founded, that He allows them to perform their own motions"; but God made, and ought to have made, man in the changeableness of free choice and to leave him in the hand of his own counsel, and likewise Lucifer: therefore if the devil willed to vex man, and man willed to consent to him, God ought to have hindered neither of them.
4. Likewise, it was easier for man to conquer his adversary than for the devil to conquer man; for man could not be conquered except willingly: therefore that battle was of itself more ordered to the victory of man than to the victory of the devil: therefore more to good than to evil. If therefore God ought to permit what is directly ordered to the good of man, it seems that the adversary was not to be kept away from the temptation of the first man.
On the contrary: 1. He would be an impious father who permitted his son to engage in a war in which he knew he would be overcome by another; but God knew that Adam would be overcome by that temptation: therefore it seems that He did not bear Himself as a loving father when He permitted him to be overcome by the devil.
2. Likewise, he is not a good prelate nor a shepherd who permits a sheep to be bitten and carried off by a wolf, when he can repel and ward him off; but God was the prelate and shepherd of man: therefore since He saw the wolf fiercely pressing on, it seems that He ought not to have permitted man to be assailed by the adversary or attacked by the wolf4.
3. Likewise, he is not a right judge who establishes a battle between those who are not equally strong; but the devil was by nature much stronger in powers than man, since there is no power upon earth that can be compared to him5. He was also much more obstinate in malice than man was confirmed in grace. If therefore God is an equitable judge, He ought not to have permitted them to clash with one another.
4. Likewise, he is not a strong possessor who permits another to invade his court: for when the strong man armed keeps his court, those things are in peace which he possesses6. Since therefore man in his first state was the court and temple of God, and the Lord Himself kept it7; either God was not the strong man armed and the keeper, or He ought not to have permitted the adversary to vex and invade man through the conflict and battle of temptation.
Conclusion.
For several reasons it was fitting that God permit man to be assailed.
I respond: To the foregoing it must be said that, although God could have forbidden the adversary to tempt man, it was nonetheless fitting that He permit him. — And the ground of fittingness can be had from the reasons already assigned in the preceding problem, in which it was shown that God ought to have made man in the liberty8 of free choice.
But beyond these reasons a reason can be assigned, first, from the order which is regarded in the comparison of virtue to its proper act. "For God so administers all things, that He allows them to perform their own motions"; and therefore He constituted both man and the devil in liberty of choice and left them in the hand of their own counsel, and permitted each to do what he willed9, whether the one in tempting, or the other in consenting. For this belonged to His governance in the preservation of order, which is regarded in the comparison of virtue to its proper act.
Secondly, a reason is taken from the order which is regarded through the comparison of good to its opposite, in which virtue is shown more glorious and more praiseworthy, whether from that aforesaid comparison, on account of which it shines forth and appears the more, or from the attainment of a certain noble triumph, on account of which it is fortified and invigorated. Therefore, that the virtue of man might shine forth and advance, it was fitting that God permit him to be assailed by the adversary; because either then, or afterward, from the very impulse of the temptation the fortitude and eminence of charity was to be made manifest, of which the Apostle says that neither death nor life nor principalities nor powers shall be able to separate from it, to the Romans, chapter eight10.
Thirdly, a reason can be taken from the order which is regarded from the comparison of disease to its remedy. For because the sin of man ought not to lack a remedy, on account of this, that the whole human nature was in him; God thus ought to permit man to sin, in such a way that it would befit Him to furnish to that same man a Redeemer. And therefore God rather disposed to permit11 that man sin with another suggesting and impelling, than by his own will bending him, by which bending man perhaps would have fallen, even if the adversary had never suggested anything pestilential.
A fourth reason can be taken from the order which is regarded through the comparison of merit to reward. For because no one is worthy to be crowned except him who strives lawfully; therefore it was fitting that God should first examine man, His soldier, in the field of combat, before exalting him in glory; and because examination consists in conflict and battle, He ought to have permitted man to be assailed by the devil. — There are also other reasons which can be given concerning this very matter; but for the present let these suffice.
To the objections:
1. To that which is first objected on the contrary side concerning paternal piety, it must be said that, although God is a loving father, He is nonetheless an equitable judge; and therefore it so befitted God to show paternal piety toward man, that He should nonetheless not omit the office of judiciary power; and therefore, whatever He had foreknown concerning man, He ought to sustain that he be attacked by the adversary in the war of temptation.
2. To that which is objected concerning the goodness of prelacy, it must be said that a prelate ought to snatch a sheep from the bite of the wolf, either because he is bound to this by the law of charity, or because out of an evil he does not know how12, and therefore cannot elicit a good of greater usefulness. The opposite of each of these is found in God, if one attends to it; and therefore that reason does not compel in the matter at hand.
3. To that which is objected concerning the rectitude of the judge, it must be said that, although the devil was stronger and more cunning than man, yet in the battle of temptation he was not stronger, but indeed much weaker, whether from the general law of temptation, by which no one is conquered except willingly, or from the fidelity of God, who does not permit anyone to be tempted beyond what he can bear, but indeed makes with the temptation an outcome13. And therefore the impulse of the first temptation, when it occurred, the fidelity of God and the law of temptation being preserved, was not against the order of judiciary power.
4. To that which is objected concerning the fortitude of the armed keeper, it must be said that, although God kept man strongly, He did not, however, keep him unwilling or involuntary, because God does not accept coerced service, but free and voluntary service. And therefore, if man had willed to stand with God, no one could violently have carried him off from the hand of God; but because he himself withdrew from His keeping, therefore God denied him His keeping, and from this the adversary invaded him — indeed, not from a defect of God the keeper, but from the ingratitude of man the kept.
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- Haec nec non seq. ratio insinuantur et ab August., XXI. de Civ. Dei, c. 12; Enchirid. c. 106. seqq. et XI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 8. n. 10. Cfr. etiam I. Sent. d. 47. q. 3. — Hic c. 1. — Paulo inferius post ergo si aliqui codd., ut H Q aa, subiiciunt Deus.This and the following reason are intimated also by Augustine, On the City of God XXI, c. 12; Enchiridion c. 106 ff. and On Genesis according to the Letter XI, c. 8, n. 10. Compare also I Sent. d. 47, q. 3. — Here, c. 1. — A little below, after ergo si some codices, such as H, Q, aa, add Deus.
- Cfr. I. Sent. d. 44. a. 1. q. 2. ad 1. — Vers. 5: Nam et qui certat in agone, non coronatur, nisi legitime certaverit. — Cod. W conclusionem seq. sic exhibet: si ergo non perducendus erat ad coronam gloriae nisi ex recto ordine, statui debuit in conflictu etc.; plures alii codd., inter quos F I K V Y cc, et ed. 1 legunt, verbis transpositis, sic: videtur, quod ex recto ordine statui debuit (aliqui debuerit) in conflictu etc.Compare I Sent. d. 44, a. 1, q. 2, ad 1. — Verse 5: For also he that striveth in the games is not crowned unless he strive lawfully. — Codex W gives the following clause thus: if therefore he was not to be led to the crown of glory except from right order, he ought to have been set in the conflict, etc.; several other codices, among them F, I, K, V, Y, cc, and ed. 1 read, with the words transposed, thus: it seems that from right order he ought to have been set (some, ought) in the conflict, etc.
- Cap. 27. n. 8, quo loco in textu originali legitur bene pro bona et post mala nulla adiicitur esse. — Cap. 30. — Seq. textus est Eccli. 13, 14: Deus ab initio constituit hominem et reliquit illum in manu consilii sui.Chapter 27, n. 8, in which place in the original text bene is read for bona, and after mala no esse is added. — Chapter 30. — The following text is Ecclus. 13:14: God from the beginning constituted man and left him in the hand of his own counsel.
- Alluditur ad Ioan. 10, 11, ubi Christus se vocat pastorem bonum. — Paulo supra edd. pluresque codd. capi pro rapi.An allusion to John 10:11, where Christ calls Himself the good shepherd. — A little above, the editions and several codices have capi (to be taken) for rapi (to be carried off).
- Iob 41, 21.Job 41:21.
- Luc. 11, 21, ubi Vulgata, omisso enim, substituit ea pro omnia. — Paulo inferius pro et Dominus ipse custodiret Vat. et Dominus ipsum custodiret, fere omnibus codd. et primis edd. contradicentibus.Luke 11:21, where the Vulgate, omitting enim, substitutes ea for omnia. — A little below, for et Dominus ipse custodiret (and the Lord Himself kept it) the Vatican edition reads et Dominus ipsum custodiret, against nearly all the codices and the first editions.
- Edd. 3, 4 et Vat. vertibilitate.Editions 3, 4 and the Vatican edition read vertibilitate (turnability).
- Cod. T addit secundum hunc modum.Codex T adds according to this mode.
- Vers. 38. — De hac ratione cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. I; de seq. cfr. supra, d. 21. a. 3. q. 2.Verse 38. — On this reason compare the Master's text here, c. 1; on the following compare above, d. 21, a. 3, q. 2.
- Rom. 8, 38–39.Romans 8:38–39.
- Ed. 3 et Vat. non bene omittunt permittere.Edition 3 and the Vatican edition, not rightly, omit permittere (to permit).
- Nonnulli codd. hic supervacue subiiciunt elicere bonum, Vat. eligere (!) bonum. Mox plures codd., ut X Y aa cc, cum ed. 1 omittunt ideo.Some codices here superfluously add elicere bonum (to elicit a good); the Vatican edition, eligere (!) bonum (to choose a good). Then several codices, such as X, Y, aa, cc, with ed. 1 omit ideo (therefore).
- Epist. I. Cor. 10, 13. — Cfr. etiam supra scholion ad praecedentem quaest.First Letter, 1 Cor. 10:13. — Compare also above, the scholion to the preceding question. ---