Dist. 23, Art. 1, Q. 3
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 23
Quaestio III. Utrum a viro iusto debeat desiderari tentationis impulsio.
Tertio quaeritur, utrum tentationis impulsio desiderari debeat a viro iusto. Et quod sic, videtur.
1. Iacobi primo1: Omne gaudium existimate, fratres, cum in varias tentationes incideritis. Si ergo tentatio, cum praesens est, est materia gaudendi; cum absens est, videtur, quod debeat affectuose desiderari.
2. Item, in Psalmo2: Proba me, Domine, et tenta me. Haec sancta anima petebat, et recte; sed nihil debet homo a Deo petere, nisi quod debet desiderare: ergo etc.
3. Item, hoc videtur ratione. Omne enim illud quod facit ad virtutis exercitationem, est appetendum; sed tentatio est huiusmodi; unde Gregorius3: «Sanctus vir se tentari post virtutes desiderat, ne ex confidentia virtutum torpescat». Si igitur tentatio virtutes exercitat, patet etc.
4. Item, omne illud quod facit ad gratiae promotionem, est appetendum; sed tentatio est huiusmodi; unde primae ad Corinthios decimo4: Faciet cum tentatione proventum etc. Si igitur tentatio promovet ad bonum, videtur, quod ad ipsam anhelare debeat desiderium iustorum.
5. Item, omne illud quod est opus et effectus divinae acceptationis, est appetendum; sed tentatio est huiusmodi; unde in Tobia, ultimo5: Quia acceptus eras Deo, necesse erat etc.
6. Item, omne illud, per quod pervenitur ad meritorum consummationem, est appetendum; sed tentatio est huiusmodi — quod patet, quia nulla est maior tentatio, quam illa quae est per flagella; tribulatio autem patientiam operatur, patientia vero opus perfectum habet6 — ergo videtur, quod quicumque vult esse perfectus, appetere debet tentationis impulsum.
Sed contra:
1. Nihil est desiderandum, cuius contrarium continue petendum debet; sed omnes viri iusti illam petitionem debent facere: Et ne nos inducas in tentationem7: ergo nullus debet appetere tentari.
2. Item, nihil est appetendum, quod diligenter est praecavendum; sed tentatio diligenter est praecavenda, sicut Dominus monet, Matthaei vigesimo sexto8: Vigilate et orate, ne intretis in tentationem: ergo etc.
3. Item, nihil est appetendum, cui non debeat homo se offerre sponte; sed tentationi non debet se homo offerre sponte, sicut dicitur super illud Matthaei quarto9: Ductus est Iesus etc., Glossa: «ductum esse Iesum commemorat, ut nos instruat, quod non sponte oportet in tentationem insilire».
4. Item, nihil est appetendum, quod nostrae salutis adversarius optat; sed diabolus desiderat nos tentare: ergo videtur, quod nullus debeat tentationem appetere.
Conclusio.
> Duplici responsione declaratur, quomodo aliquae tentationes a iustis virtute fortibus desiderari possint.
Respondeo: Ad praedictam quaestionem via duplici responderi potest, et utraque satis probabiliter.
Uno modo sic, ut dicamus, quod cum triplex sit tentatio, sive a triplici principio, una scilicet a Deo, alia a carne, alia a diabolo10; prima tentatio simpliciter appetenda est, quia Deus non tentat nos nisi ad bonum. Altera vero tentatio, scilicet quae est a carne, simpliciter fugienda est, quia illa non potest esse absque peccato, sicut supra dixit Magister distinctione vigesima prima11. Tertia vero, quae est a diabolo, aliquibus fugienda est, aliquibus appetenda est. His enim, qui virtute fortes sunt nec de facili in tentationem induci possunt, etiamsi tentantur, appetibile est tentari ad suae virtutis exercitium et cumulum meritorum. Infirmis vero minime, quia timere possunt, ne ex ipso impulsu in tentationem inducantur, quod omnes debent refugere; nam, etsi tentari malum non sit, in tentationem tamen induci semper malum est, quia hoc est a tentatione superari. Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus decimo quarto de Civitate Dei12: «Sicut se habet firmitas et infirmitas electorum, sic metuunt cupiuntque tentari». — Et secundum hanc distinctionem ad rationes ad utramque partem inductas potest de facili responderi, pro eo quod secundum diversas vias procedunt.
Alius modus dicendi est, quod dupliciter est loqui de tentatione. Aut sub propria ratione, et sic tentatio est impulsus ad illicitum, secundum quod de ea fit sermo in proposito. Loquimur enim hic de tentatione diaboli, quae fit per mali culpae suggestionem, qua diabolus hominem ad malum nititur incurvare; non de tentatione Dei, quae fit per flagellationem, qua Deus vult illos quos acceptat, approbare et probatos ostendere13. Hanc igitur tentationem secundum se consideratam nullus debet appetere, immo abhorrere et refugere, maxime considerando finem. — Aliter est considerare tentationem, prout est materia exercendae virtutis; et sic a viris iustis desiderari potest, ab eis potissime, qui in caritate fervent adeo, quod ignis devotionis ipsorum potius inflammatur ex praesentia contrarii, quam exstinguatur. Ab eis autem, qui modicae sunt caritatis, non sic desiderari debet. Et est exemplum, quia ventus perflans fornacem magis et magis accendit, sed candelam exstinguit. — Et ideo tentationis impulsus, etsi, quantum in se est, refugiendus sit ab omnibus et ab infirmis potissime, sicut rationes ad secundam partem inductae ostendunt; in quantum tamen est virtutis exercendae materia, a viris ferventibus et perfectis appeti potest, sicut ostendunt rationes, quae ad primam partem inducuntur. Illud tamen genus tentationis potissime appetunt viri iusti, quod est in flagellorum perpessione, sicut passus est Iob14 et Tobias, sicut etiam passi sunt martyres ab impiis zelo diabolico excitatis. Et ad hoc ostendendum procedunt rationes, quae ad primam partem inducuntur; ideo concedendae sunt.
I. «Appetendorum sunt duo genera: quaedam enim propter se appetenda sunt, ut sanari; quaedam propter aliud, ut secari. Tentatio per se non est bona, sed propter aliud, sicut nec sectio; unde nunquam per se appetenda est, sed propter aliud. — Est autem duplex tentatio: quaedam de bono et ad bonum tendens, qua Deus tentat, et haec ab hominibus debet appeti, non tamen propter se, sed propter bonum consequens; quaedam vero a malo et ad malum, et haec non. Haec enim duplex est: quaedam interior, scilicet a carne, quae semper peccatum est, et ideo nunquam debet appeti [cfr. supra d. 21. a. 2. q. 1. schol.], quaedam exterior, id est ab hoste, quae non est peccatum, nisi consentiatur ei, sed materia exercendae virtutis. Haec autem ab imperfectis, qui facile vincuntur a tentatione, non debet appeti, sed a perfectis» etc. (Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 3.). — His verbis clare exponitur secundus modus dicendi, quem ponit S. Doctor in corp.; et similiter intelligi debet etiam modus primus. — Quod autem tentatio Dei, quatenus consistit in participatione passionis sive crucis, a perfectis appeti possit et ab omnibus Sanctis sit appetita, certissimum est.
II. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 101. m. 7. a. 3. § 4. — S. Thom., II. Sent. d. 21. q. I. a. 3. — B. Albert., II. Sent. d. 21. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. I. q. I. — Aegid. R., II. Sent. d. 21. q. I. a. 3. — Durand., II. Sent. d. 21. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., II. Sent. d. 21. q. 3. in fine.
---
Question III. Whether the assault of temptation ought to be desired by a just man.
Thirdly it is asked whether the assault of temptation ought to be desired by a just man. And that it ought, seems [to follow].
1. James 11: Count it all joy, brethren, when you fall into various temptations. If therefore temptation, when it is present, is matter for rejoicing, then when it is absent it seems that it ought to be affectionately desired.
2. Likewise, in the Psalm2: Prove me, O Lord, and try me. This holy soul was asking this, and rightly so; but a man ought to ask nothing of God except what he ought to desire: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, this seems [to follow] by reason. For everything that contributes to the exercise of virtue is to be sought; but temptation is of this kind; whence Gregory3: «A holy man desires to be tempted after [acquiring] virtues, lest from confidence in his virtues he grow sluggish». If therefore temptation exercises the virtues, it is plain, etc.
4. Likewise, everything that contributes to the advancement of grace is to be sought; but temptation is of this kind; whence 1 Corinthians 104: He will make with the temptation also an outcome etc. If therefore temptation promotes the good, it seems that the desire of the just ought to pant after it.
5. Likewise, everything that is a work and effect of divine acceptance is to be sought; but temptation is of this kind; whence in Tobit, in the last [chapter]5: Because thou wast acceptable to God, it was necessary etc.
6. Likewise, everything by which one arrives at the consummation of merits is to be sought; but temptation is of this kind — which is plain, since there is no greater temptation than that which comes through scourges; and tribulation works patience, and patience a perfect work6 — therefore it seems that whoever wishes to be perfect ought to seek the assault of temptation.
On the contrary:
1. Nothing is to be desired whose contrary one must continually pray for; but all just men ought to make that petition: And lead us not into temptation7: therefore no one ought to seek to be tempted.
2. Likewise, nothing is to be sought which must be diligently guarded against; but temptation must be diligently guarded against, as the Lord warns, Matthew 268: Watch and pray, that you enter not into temptation: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, nothing is to be sought to which a man ought not to offer himself willingly; but a man ought not to offer himself willingly to temptation, as is said upon that text of Matthew 49: Jesus was led etc., the Gloss: «it records that Jesus was led, in order to instruct us that one ought not to leap willingly into temptation».
4. Likewise, nothing is to be sought which the adversary of our salvation wishes; but the devil desires to tempt us: therefore it seems that no one ought to seek temptation.
Conclusion.
> By a twofold response it is declared how some temptations can be desired by the just who are strong in virtue.
I respond: It must be said that to the aforesaid question there can be a twofold response, and each one quite probable.
In one way, thus: that we say that, since temptation is threefold, or [arises] from a threefold source — one namely from God, another from the flesh, another from the devil10 — the first temptation is to be sought simply, since God does not tempt us except unto good. But the second temptation, namely that which is from the flesh, is to be fled simply, since it cannot be without sin, as the Master said above in distinction twenty-one11. But the third, which is from the devil, is to be fled by some and to be sought by others. For by those who are strong in virtue and cannot easily be led into temptation, even if they are tempted, it is desirable to be tempted for the exercise of their virtue and the heaping-up of merits. But by the weak, by no means, since they can fear lest from the assault itself they be led into temptation, which all ought to flee; for although to be tempted is not an evil, yet to be led into temptation is always an evil, since this is to be overcome by temptation. And this is what Augustine says in book fourteen of The City of God12: «As stands the strength and the weakness of the elect, so do they fear and desire to be tempted». — And according to this distinction, one can readily respond to the arguments adduced for either side, since they proceed according to diverse ways.
Another way of speaking is that there is a twofold way of speaking about temptation. Either under its proper account, and thus temptation is an impulse toward what is illicit, according to which it is spoken of in the present matter. For here we are speaking of the temptation of the devil, which comes through the suggestion of the evil of fault, by which the devil strives to bend man toward evil; not of the temptation of God, which comes through scourging, by which God wishes to approve those whom He accepts and to show them as proved13. This temptation, therefore, considered in itself, no one ought to seek, but rather to abhor and to flee, especially considering its end. — In another way temptation is to be considered insofar as it is matter for the exercise of virtue; and thus it can be desired by just men, by those especially who burn so greatly in charity that the fire of their devotion is rather inflamed by the presence of what is contrary [to it] than extinguished. But by those who are of slight charity, it ought not so to be desired. And there is an example: that the wind blowing upon a furnace kindles it more and more, but extinguishes a candle. — And therefore the assault of temptation, although, as far as it is in itself, it must be fled by all and by the weak especially, as the arguments adduced for the second side show; yet insofar as it is matter for the exercise of virtue, it can be sought by the fervent and the perfect, as the arguments which are adduced for the first side show. Yet that kind of temptation just men especially seek, which lies in the endurance of scourges, as Job14 and Tobit suffered, as also the martyrs suffered from the wicked stirred up by diabolical zeal. And to show this the arguments proceed which are adduced for the first side; therefore they are to be granted.
I. «There are two kinds of things to be sought: for some are to be sought for their own sake, as to be healed; some for the sake of something else, as to be cut. Temptation is not good in itself, but for the sake of something else, just as neither is the cutting; hence it is never to be sought for its own sake, but for the sake of something else. — Now there is a twofold temptation: one tending from good and toward good, by which God tempts, and this ought to be sought by men, yet not for its own sake, but for the sake of the good that follows; another [tending] from evil and toward evil, and this [ought] not [to be sought]. For this latter is twofold: one interior, namely from the flesh, which is always sin, and therefore ought never to be sought [cf. above d. 21, a. 2, q. 1, scholion]; another exterior, that is, from the enemy, which is not sin unless one consents to it, but is matter for the exercise of virtue. This [latter], however, ought not to be sought by the imperfect, who are easily overcome by temptation, but by the perfect» etc. (Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 3). — By these words the second way of speaking, which the Holy Doctor sets down in the body [of the article], is clearly explained; and the first way also ought to be understood similarly. — That the temptation of God, however, insofar as it consists in the participation of the passion or the cross, can be sought by the perfect and has been sought by all the Saints, is most certain.
II. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 101, m. 7, a. 3, § 4. — St. Thomas, II Sent. d. 21, q. 1, a. 3. — Bl. Albert, II Sent. d. 21, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 1. — Giles of Rome, II Sent. d. 21, q. 1, a. 3. — Durandus, II Sent. d. 21, q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, II Sent. d. 21, q. 3, at the end.
---
- Vers. 1. (Iac. 1, 2.)Verse 1. (James 1:2.)
- Psalm 25, 2. — In cod. K post petebat adiungitur a Deo.Psalm 25:2. — In codex K, after petebat there is added a Deo.
- Libr. VIII. Moral. c. 10. n. 20.Book VIII of the Morals, c. 10, n. 20.
- Vers. 13.Verse 13. (1 Cor. 10:13.)
- In Vulgata vero c. 12, 13.But in the Vulgate, c. 12, 13. (Tobit 12:13.)
- Iac. 1, 3. seq. (Cfr. Rom. 5, 3. seq.)James 1:3 ff. (Cf. Rom. 5:3 ff.)
- Matth. 6, 13.Matthew 6:13.
- Vers. 41. (Matth. 26, 41.)Verse 41. (Matthew 26:41.)
- Vers. 1. — Glossa est ex Chrysost. hom. 13. in Matthaeum. — In cod. aa omittitur dicitur.Verse 1. (Matthew 4:1.) — The Gloss is from Chrysostom, homily 13 on Matthew. — In codex aa the word dicitur is omitted.
- Cfr. supra d. 21. a. 2. q. 1. in corp. et dub. 3.Cf. above, d. 21, a. 2, q. 1, in the body and dubium 3.
- Cap. 6.Chapter 6.
- Cap. 9. n. 1: Sicut se infirmitas eorum firmitasque habuerit, metuunt tentari, cupiunt tentari.Chapter 9, n. 1: «As the weakness and strength of them shall stand, [so] they fear to be tempted, they desire to be tempted».
- Cfr. supra d. 21. a. 2. q. 1. in corp. — Codd. Z cc et ed. 1 approbatos pro probatos.Cf. above, d. 21, a. 2, q. 1, in the body. — Codices Z, cc and edition 1 read approbatos for probatos.
- Iob 1, 12: seqq. — Tob. 2, 10. seqq. — Paulo inferius cod. cc et ed. 1 verbo martyres praefigunt sancti.Job 1:12 ff. — Tobit 2:10 ff. — A little below, codex cc and edition 1 prefix sancti (holy) to the word martyres (martyrs).