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Dist. 23, Art. 2, Q. 1

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 23

Textus Latinus
p. 537

ARTICULUS II. De cognitione primorum parentum.

Consequenter quantum ad secundum propositum quaeritur de cognitione primorum parentum, et incidit hic quaestio circa tria.

Primo enim quaerendum est de cognitione primorum parentum quantum ad profectum.

Secundo vero quaerendum est quantum ad defectum.

Tertio quaeritur de ipsa cognitione quantum ad complementum et statum.

QUAESTIO I. Utrum, si homo stetisset, in cognitione profecisset per temporum intervalla.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum, si homo stetisset, in cognitione profecisset per temporum intervalla. Et quod non, videtur:

1. Primo per verbum Hugonis in libro de Sacramentis1: « Rerum omnium, quae cum homine et propter hominem factae sunt, perfectam cognitionem hominem accepisse, nulli dubium esse debet »: si ergo statim perfectam cognitionem habuit, ergo ulterius proficere non potuit.

2. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur ratione, quam facit ipse Hugo2. Nomen debite impositum est naturae rei expressivum; nullus igitur potest res omnes nominare, nisi is qui omnium rerum plenam habet cognitionem. Sed Adam omnibus nomina imposuit, nec illis rebus alia sunt aliquando perfectiora nomina imponenda: videtur igitur, quod Adam perfecte cognoverit omnia creata: ergo in cognitione non profecisset, si in statu suae conditionis permansisset.

3. Item, nullus bene regit et gubernat ea quorum naturam ignorat; sed omnia fuerant commissa regimini et gubernationi Adae, secundum quod dicitur in Genesi3 et in Psalmo: Omnia subiecisti sub pedibus eius etc. A sui igitur conditione primaria habuit primus homo rerum cognitionem: ergo non profecisset ad illam per disciplinam per temporum intervalla.

4. Item, quidquid homo addiscit, addiscit mediante via sensus, memoriae et experientiae, et ita ab inferiori et ab exteriori. Si igitur homo in statu innocentiae didicisset, per inferiora et exteriora ad perfectionem venisset; sed talis ordo non congruit naturae institutae et bene ordinatae, sed solum lapsae, cum omni creaturae praeesset4: videtur ergo, quod nihil sensibilium in statu illo didicisset.

Sed contra: 1. Adam in statu illo per intervalla temporum profecisset ad gratiam; alioquin peior esset conditio sua quam nostra, cum nos multiplicando merita crescamus in gratia: ergo pari ratione per intervalla temporum profecisset in rerum notitia.

2. Item, aut Adam sciebat quae ventura erant, aut non sciebat. Si sic: ergo praescivit lapsum suum, et quid ex illo posteris suis esset eventurum; quod plane apparet esse falsum5. Si futura non cognoscebat; sed rerum naturae variantur in tempore: ergo multa incipiebat cognoscere secundum temporum variationem: ergo profecisset in cognitione.

3. Item, nec Adam omnia viderat nec omnia audierat. Esto igitur, quod videret aliquam rem, quam prius non vidisset; cum videre sit cognoscere, sicut intelligere: videtur, quod sicut necessario sequitur, quod si6 incepit intelligere, incepit cognoscere, similiter, si incepit videre, incepit cognoscere. Si ergo multa sensibilia vidisset, quae prius non viderat, videtur, quod multa didicisset sensibilia per temporum intervalla.

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4. Item, si homo stetisset, aut unus homo sciret voluntatem et cogitationem alterius, aut non. Si sic: ergo frustra egerent sermone. Si non: ergo cum posset ab alio edoceri, videtur, quod in statu innocentiae multa discere potuisset.

Conclusio

Adam, si stetisset, in cognitione rerum, quae naturali cursu fiunt, non profecisset quoad novi habitus acquisitionem, sed tantum quoad modum cognitionis et quoad habilitationem maiorem. Tamen proficere potuisset etiam nova cognitione respectu voluntariorum et mirabilium.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod profectus scientiae triplici via potest considerari: vel a parte scibilium, vel a parte modorum cognoscendi, vel a parte maioris habilitationis in cognoscendo. — Secundum primum modum loquendo, intelligendum est, quod quaedam sunt res, quae fiunt cursu naturali; quaedam, quae cursu mirabili; quaedam, quae fiunt cursu voluntario, secundum quod determinat Anselmus7.

In earum igitur rerum cognitione, quae quidem cursu naturali fiunt, non profecisset Adam quantum ad novi habitus acquisitionem. Accepit enim, sicut dicit Hugo, et Magister in littera8, « ab exordio omnium rerum plenam notitiam »; et hoc etiam ostendunt rationes, quae ad primam partem inducuntur. Proficere tamen potuisset quantum ad alium modum cognoscendi, et quantum ad maiorem habitum sciendi. — Quantum ad alium modum9 proficere poterat, quia quod noverat simplici notitia cognoscere poterat experientia; et quod noverat intellectu cognoscere poterat et sensu. — Proficere etiam poterat quantum ad maiorem habilitationem, quia ex frequenti consideratione eorum quae noverat, promptior fuisset et paratior ad iudicandum de his rebus, quarum habebat cognitionem per habitum innatum. Etsi enim primus homo non haberet tarditatem hebetudinis per aggravationem corporis mortalis10; habebat tamen spiritus eius quandam minorem velocitatem per vegetationem corporis animalis. — Et sic in cognitione rerum naturalium Adam quodam modo profecisset, quodam modo minime, si stetisset.

In earum vero rerum cognitione, quae fiunt cursu voluntario et mirabili sive supernaturali, simpliciter proficere potuisset, non solum quantum ad modum cognoscendi, sed etiam in acquirendo novam cognitionem. Nec mirum, quia ad hoc, quod cognosceret divina mysteria, indigebat superna illustratione; ad hoc vero, quod cognosceret secreta alterius, indigebat ipsius detectione11. Nec talis profectus statui innocentiae derogabat, cum etiam beati Angeli in cognitione divinorum mysteriorum et humanorum secretorum proficiant; propter quod dicitur ad Ephesios tertio12: Ut innotescat Principatibus et Potestatibus per Ecclesiam multiformis Dei sapientia.

Et sic patet responsio ad propositam quaestionem. Nam rationes ad primam partem inductae procedunt de cognitione rerum naturalium, et sic intelligit Hugo. Illis enim rebus Adam nomina imposuit, et illarum rerum sibi cura commissa fuit. Ultima tamen ratio de perfectione ab inferiori et exteriori non cogit, quia, sicut dicit Augustinus in sexto Musicae13, « obiectum exterius non agit in animam nec ipsam perficit; sed ipsa anima se ipsam movet, occasione ab exteriori accepta, et informando se ipsam magis agit in obiectum, quam agatur ab ipso »; et hoc fuisset in Adam multo fortius et nobilius, quam sit post lapsum. Unde illa ratio non cogit, quod Adam non potuisset respectu eorum quae cognoscebat, novum modum cognitionis acquirere; nec praecedentes rationes hoc astruunt, quod Adam non posset14 magis habilitari in cognoscendo per frequentiam in considerando.

Rationes autem, quae ad partem oppositam inducuntur, ostendunt, quod Adam, si stetisset, proficere potuisset in cognitione respectu eorum quae sunt voluntaria et mirabilia. De aliis autem, scilicet de his quae naturaliter fiunt, non concludunt, quod Adam acquisivisset cognitionem novam. — Unde illa prima ratio de comparatione gratiae ad scientiam non valet, quia perfectio gratiae non tantum est ex dono, sed etiam ex merito. Perfectio autem cognitionis in Adam erat ex dono; et si stetisset, non solum in ipso, sed etiam in posteris non indocte a pluribus creditur similiter fuisse, saltem quantum ad habitum; et hoc dico propter aetatem infantiae15. — Ad alia satis plana est responsio per iam dicta.

Scholion

I. Maior pars trium qq. huius articuli ad verbum conveniunt cum iis quae Alex. Hal. habet, S. p. II. q. 92. In hac autem 1. quaest. argumenta ad oppos. et responsio conveniunt cum Summa Alexandri, loc. cit. m. 2. a. 3. Nihilominus non omnino certum est, S. Bonaventuram ista sumsisse ex dicta Summa. Constat enim, Alexandrum reliquisse suum opus imperfectum, et quidem in quatuor eius partibus lacunas restasse; constat etiam, Fr. Gulielmo de Melitona a. 1256 (i. e. postquam S. Bonav. hos Commentarios iam scripsit) a Summo Pontifice Alexandro IV. mandatum esse, ut imperfectam Summam perficeret, eundemque, ut vult Waddingus, usque ad a. 1260 vixisse. Hinc possibile est, quod praedictus Gulielmus aliquas lacunas huius Summae expleverit vel aliquid addiderit, adhibitis etiam S. Bonaventurae scriptis. Nec quoad factum assertio solius Sbaraleae, nihil a Gulielmo isto Summae additum fuisse, ullo firmo argumento nititur. Plura de his vide tom. I. Prolegomena p. LVIII. seqq.

II. Alex. Hal. praeter hanc quaestionem alibi (loc. cit. m. 1.) specialiter inquirit, utrum Adam statim habuerit perfectam scientiam, quam solvit affirmative, atque hoc congruum fuisse ostendit tribus rationibus, approbatis etiam a posterioribus Scholasticis. — Notandum, quod alii commentatores, excepto Biel, non praecise de profectu in cognitione, sed de perfectione primitiva huius cognitionis disputant; tamen in principiis satis conveniunt.

III. S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 2; S. I. q. 94. a. 3; de Verit. q. 18. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 1; S. p. II. tr. II. q. 89. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 3. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 3. — Durand., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 3. — Biel, hic q. unica in fine.

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English Translation

Article II. On the knowledge of the first parents.

Next, with respect to the second proposal, the question is asked concerning the knowledge of the first parents, and here a question falls under three heads.

For first it must be asked concerning the knowledge of the first parents as regards advancement.

Second, however, it must be asked as regards defect.

Third, the question is asked concerning that knowledge itself as regards its completion and state.

Question I. Whether, if man had stood, he would have advanced in knowledge through intervals of time.

Concerning the first the procedure is thus, and it is asked whether, if man had stood, he would have advanced in knowledge through intervals of time. And that he would not, seems [to follow]:

1. First, from the word of Hugh in his book On the Sacraments1: « That man received perfect knowledge of all the things which were made together with man and on account of man, ought to be doubted by no one »: if therefore he had perfect knowledge at once, then he could not advance further.

2. Likewise, this same thing is shown by a reason which Hugh himself makes2. A name duly imposed is expressive of the nature of the thing; no one therefore can name all things, except him who has full knowledge of all things. But Adam imposed names on all things, nor are other more perfect names ever to be imposed on those things: it seems therefore that Adam knew perfectly all created things: therefore he would not have advanced in knowledge, if he had remained in the state of his condition.

3. Likewise, no one rightly rules and governs those things whose nature he is ignorant of; but all things had been committed to the rule and governance of Adam, according to what is said in Genesis3 and in the Psalm: Thou hast subjected all things under his feet, etc. From his primary condition, therefore, the first man had knowledge of things: therefore he would not have advanced to it through instruction through intervals of time.

4. Likewise, whatever a man learns, he learns by means of the way of sense, memory, and experience, and thus from the lower and from the exterior. If therefore man had learned in the state of innocence, he would have come to perfection through lower and exterior things; but such an order does not befit a nature instituted and well-ordered, but only a fallen one, since he was set over every creature4: it seems therefore that he would have learned nothing of sensible things in that state.

On the contrary: 1. Adam in that state would have advanced to grace through intervals of time; otherwise his condition would be worse than ours, since we grow in grace by multiplying merits: therefore by parity of reasoning he would have advanced in the knowledge of things through intervals of time.

2. Likewise, either Adam knew the things that were to come, or he did not know. If so: then he foreknew his own fall, and what would come of it to his posterity; which plainly appears to be false5. If he did not know future things; but the natures of things vary in time: therefore he began to know many things according to the variation of times: therefore he would have advanced in knowledge.

3. Likewise, Adam had neither seen all things nor heard all things. Grant therefore that he saw some thing which he had not seen before; since to see is to know, just as to understand [is]: it seems that, just as it necessarily follows that if6 he began to understand, he began to know, similarly, if he began to see, he began to know. If therefore he had seen many sensible things which he had not seen before, it seems that he would have learned many sensible things through intervals of time.

4. Likewise, if man had stood, either one man would know the will and thought of another, or [he would] not. If so: then they would engage in speech in vain. If not: then since he could be taught by another, it seems that in the state of innocence he could have learned many things.

Conclusion

Adam, if he had stood, in the knowledge of the things which come about by the natural course, would not have advanced as regards the acquisition of a new habit, but only as regards the mode of knowledge and as regards greater aptitude. Yet he could have advanced even by new knowledge with respect to voluntary and miraculous things.

I respond: For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that the advancement of knowledge can be considered in a threefold way: either on the part of the knowable things, or on the part of the modes of knowing, or on the part of greater aptitude in knowing. — Speaking according to the first mode, it must be understood that there are certain things which come about by the natural course; certain ones which [come about] by the miraculous [course]; certain ones which come about by the voluntary course, according as Anselm determines7.

In the knowledge therefore of those things which indeed come about by the natural course, Adam would not have advanced as regards the acquisition of a new habit. For he received, as Hugh says, and the Master in the text8, « from the beginning the full knowledge of all things »; and this also the reasons which are adduced for the first part show. Yet he could have advanced as regards another mode of knowing, and as regards a greater habit of knowing. — As regards another mode9 he could advance, because what he knew by simple cognition he could know by experience; and what he knew by understanding he could know also by sense. — He could also advance as regards greater aptitude, because from the frequent consideration of those things which he knew, he would have been readier and more prepared to judge concerning those things, of which he had knowledge through an innate habit. For although the first man did not have the slowness of dullness through the burdening of the mortal body10; yet his spirit had a certain lesser swiftness through the vegetation of the animal body. — And thus in the knowledge of natural things Adam would in a certain way have advanced, in a certain way not at all, if he had stood.

But in the knowledge of those things which come about by the voluntary and miraculous or supernatural course, he could have advanced absolutely, not only as regards the mode of knowing, but also in acquiring new knowledge. Nor is this surprising, because for the purpose of knowing the divine mysteries, he needed supernal illumination; but for the purpose of knowing the secrets of another, he needed the disclosure of that person11. Nor did such advancement detract from the state of innocence, since even the blessed Angels advance in the knowledge of divine mysteries and of human secrets; on account of which it is said to the Ephesians, chapter three12: That the manifold wisdom of God may be made known to the Principalities and Powers through the Church.

And thus the response to the question proposed is clear. For the reasons adduced for the first part proceed concerning the knowledge of natural things, and thus Hugh understands [it]. For on those things Adam imposed names, and of those things the care was committed to him. Yet the last reason concerning perfection from the lower and the exterior does not compel, because, as Augustine says in the sixth book of the Music13, « the exterior object does not act upon the soul nor perfect it; but the soul moves itself, on the occasion received from the exterior, and by informing itself it acts more upon the object than it is acted upon by it »; and this would have been in Adam much more strongly and nobly than it is after the fall. Hence that reason does not compel [the conclusion] that Adam could not, with respect to those things which he knew, acquire a new mode of knowledge; nor do the preceding reasons establish that Adam could not14 be more aptly disposed in knowing through frequency in considering.

But the reasons which are adduced for the opposite part show that Adam, if he had stood, could have advanced in knowledge with respect to those things which are voluntary and miraculous. But concerning the others, namely concerning those which come about naturally, they do not conclude that Adam would have acquired new knowledge. — Hence that first reason concerning the comparison of grace to knowledge is not valid, because the perfection of grace is not only from a gift, but also from merit. But the perfection of knowledge in Adam was from a gift; and if he had stood, not only in himself, but also in his posterity it is believed by many, not unlearnedly, to have been similar, at least as regards habit; and this I say on account of the age of infancy15. — To the others the response is sufficiently plain through what has already been said.

Scholion

I. The greater part of the three questions of this article agree word for word with what Alexander of Hales has, Summa p. II, q. 92. In this first question, however, the arguments to the opposite and the response agree with the Summa of Alexander, in the place cited, m. 2, a. 3. Nevertheless it is not altogether certain that St. Bonaventure took these from the said Summa. For it is established that Alexander left his work unfinished, and indeed that lacunae remained in four of its parts; it is established also that it was enjoined upon Friar William of Melitona in the year 1256 (that is, after St. Bonaventure had already written these Commentaries) by the Supreme Pontiff Alexander IV that he should complete the unfinished Summa, and that the same man, as Wadding holds, lived until the year 1260. Hence it is possible that the said William filled in some lacunae of this Summa or added something, employing also the writings of St. Bonaventure. Nor does the assertion of Sbaralea alone, as to the fact that nothing was added to that Summa by that William, rest on any firm argument. See more on these matters in tome I, Prolegomena, p. LVIII ff.

II. Alexander of Hales, besides this question, elsewhere (in the place cited, m. 1) specially inquires whether Adam had at once perfect knowledge, which he resolves affirmatively, and shows that this was fitting by three reasons, approved also by later Scholastics. — It must be noted that the other commentators, except Biel, dispute not precisely concerning advancement in knowledge, but concerning the primitive perfection of this knowledge; yet in their principles they agree sufficiently.

III. St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 2; Summa I, q. 94, a. 3; de Veritate q. 18, a. 1. — Bl. Albert, here a. 1; Summa p. II, tr. II, q. 89, m. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 2, q. 3. — Giles of Rome, here q. 2, a. 3. — Durandus, on this and the following question, here q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following question, here q. 3. — Biel, here the single question at the end.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Libr. I. p. VI. c. 13: Rerum enim omnium visibilium, quae cum homine et propter hominem factae erant, perfectam etc.
    Hugh of St. Victor, On the Sacraments, Book I, part VI, c. 13: « Of all visible things, which had been made together with man and on account of man, the perfect [knowledge] » etc.
  2. Loc. cit. — Hanc et seq. rationem ponit Magister hic in litt. c. 3. — Quod Adam animantibus terrae, volatilibus caeli etc. nomina imposuit, refertur Gen. 2, 19. seq. — De relatione, quam verba ad res habent, cfr. August., de Magistro, et Boeth., I. in libr. Aristotelis de interpretatione, c. de Signis. — In fine arg. pro suae conditionis edd. perperam et contra antiquiores codd. suae cognitionis.
    Loc. cit. — This reason and the following one the Master sets down here in the text, c. 3. — That Adam imposed names on the animals of the earth, the birds of heaven, etc., is reported in Genesis 2:19 ff. — On the relation which words have to things, cf. Augustine, On the Teacher, and Boethius, Book I on Aristotle's On Interpretation, the chapter On Signs. — At the end of the argument, for of his condition the editions, wrongly and against the older codices, [read] of his knowledge.
  3. Cap. I, 28: Crescite et multiplicamini et replete terram et subiicite eam et dominamini piscibus maris etc. — Psalm. 8, 8. — In maiori Vat., discrepans a principalioribus codd. et edd. 1, 2, habet quorum naturas pro quorum naturam, aliqui codd., ut T ee, quorum nomina.
    Chapter I, 28: Increase and multiply and fill the earth and subdue it, and have dominion over the fishes of the sea, etc. — Psalm 8:8. — In the major [premise] the Vatican [edition], differing from the more important codices and editions 1, 2, has whose natures for whose nature; some codices, as T ee, whose names.
  4. Gen. 1, 26: Faciamus hominem... et praesit piscibus maris et volatilibus caeli etc. — Prima huius arg. propositio est secundum Aristot., I. Poster. c. 14. (c. 18.); II. c. ult. et I. Metaph. c. 1. — Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 falso et obnitentibus codd. substituit interiori et interiora pro inferiori et inferiora.
    Genesis 1:26: Let us make man... and let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea and the birds of heaven, etc. — The first proposition of this argument is according to Aristotle, Posterior [Analytics] I, c. 14 (c. 18); II, last chapter, and Metaphysics I, c. 1. — The Vatican [edition], with editions 3, 4, falsely and against the resisting codices, substituted interior and interior things for lower and lower things.
  5. Cfr. supra d. 4. a. 2. q. 2, ubi exponitur, quod angelus malus certam sui casus praescientiam habere non potuit.
    Cf. above, d. 4, a. 2, q. 2, where it is explained that the wicked angel could not have certain foreknowledge of his own fall.
  6. Vat. quod, cod. Y si; auctoritate nonnullorum codd., ut F I, substituimus quod si, quia contextus saltem particulam si exigit. Mox pro similiter plures codd., ut Iv T cc ee, et ed. I sed mulier.
    The Vatican [edition reads] quod, codex Y si; on the authority of several codices, as F I, we have substituted quod si (« if »), because the context at least requires the particle si. Presently, for similiter (« similarly ») several codices, as Iv T cc ee, and edition I [read] sed mulier.
  7. De Conceptu virg. et orig. pecc. c. 11. Cfr. supra pag. 346, nota 1.
    [Anselm,] On the Conception of the Virgin and Original Sin, c. 11. Cf. above, p. 346, note 1.
  8. Hic c. 3. — Paulo inferius pro habitum sciendi ed. 1 habilitatem sciendi.
    Here, c. 3. — A little below, for habit of knowing edition 1 [reads] aptitude of knowing.
  9. In cod. M additur sciendi, pro quo fere omnes alii codd. cum primis edd. perperam substituunt etiam, qui error ceterum iam in pluribus codd. ab altera manu correctus est.
    In codex M sciendi (« of knowing ») is added, for which nearly all the other codices, together with the first editions, wrongly substitute etiam (« also »), which error, moreover, has already in several codices been corrected by a second hand.
  10. Sap. 9, 15: Corpus enim, quod corrumpitur, aggravat animam.
    Wisdom 9:15: For the body, which is corrupted, weighs down the soul.
  11. Cod. Z revelatione.
    Codex Z [reads] revelatione (« by revelation »).
  12. Vers. 10. — Cfr. supra d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. ad 1. et d. 11. dub. 2.
    Verse 10. — Cf. above, d. 3, p. II, a. 2, q. 1, to the first, and d. 11, dub. 2.
  13. Cap. 5. n. 9. seq., sententialiter. Cfr. Boeth., V. de Consol. prosa 5.
    Chapter 5, n. 9 ff., in substance. Cf. Boethius, On the Consolation [of Philosophy] V, prose 5.
  14. Codd. X aa potuisset.
    Codices X aa [read] potuisset (« could have »).
  15. Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 90. m. 2. — Vat., dissentientibus codd. et ed. 1, propter causam infantiae.
    Cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 90, m. 2. — The Vatican [edition], with the codices and edition 1 dissenting, [reads] on account of the cause of infancy. ---
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